Podcast Summary: Identity/Crisis

Episode: Rabin, Oslo, and the Road Not Taken — with Yossi Beilin
Date: November 4, 2025
Host: Yehuda Kurtzer (President, Shalom Hartman Institute)
Guest: Yossi Beilin

Episode Overview

This episode marks 30 years since the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and reflects on the trajectory of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, alternate histories, and the enduring impact of that night. Host Yehuda Kurtzer is joined by Yossi Beilin, a pivotal figure in the Oslo Accords and a long-time leader in Israel's peace efforts, for a candid conversation about regret, resilience, the internal and external forces that shaped Oslo’s collapse, and prospects for peace.

Main Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Allure and Danger of "Roads Not Taken" (01:06–07:47)

• Regret and Alternate History: Yehuda begins with a meditation on regret, the human urge to reflect on "what could have been," and the proliferation of alternate history as a genre—often fueled by profound historical ruptures (e.g., Rabin’s assassination).
• The 20th Century as Alternate History: “The Rabin assassination is a haunted event in ways that almost feels literary.” (06:31)
• Personal Connection: Yehuda recounts his own formative connection to Rabin and how the assassination shaped his thinking on Israel's future and Zionism's need for hope and imagination, despite tragedy.

2. Yossi Beilin's Memories from the Night of Rabin’s Assassination (07:48–13:46)

• Where He Was: Beilin was in New York with Amos Oz when he received news of the attempt and then the death. “Amos and myself hugged each other and cried like babies. It never happened to me before… I think that both of us... thought that it was kind of the end of the world.” (09:47)
• Immediate Reactions: Beilin and Ehud Barak coordinated their quick return flight. Their conversation was “never recorded… a pity, because it shows something about our hopes, but also about our mistake.”
• The Mistake: They believed Rabin’s ideas would live on—“the man could be assassinated, but the mission and the aim could not be assassinated”—but this proved false.

“The assassination of Rabin was one of the biggest successes of the entire Oslo camp in Israel. And it's hard to admit it. I'm saying it reluctantly, but I'm afraid that this was the case.” (12:41)

3. Interplay Between Extremisms and the Collapse of Oslo (13:46–18:37)

• Twin Extremisms: Yehuda asks about the narrative that Palestinian terrorism—especially suicide bombings post-assassination—helped derail the peace process just as much as Rabin’s death. Beilin elaborates:

“Rabin used to say we should fight against terrorism as if there is no peace process, and continue with the peace process as if there is no terrorism… It is easy to say. Very, very difficult to do.” (17:07)

• Israel’s Exposed Fragility: Beilin explains how the assassination revealed Israel as vulnerable, challenging common narratives (e.g., Israeli strength vs. Palestinian instability).

4. Rabin’s Leadership, Uniqueness, and the Trust Factor (18:37–24:07)

• The Personal & The Political: Yehuda and Beilin reflect on the shift in public trust post-assassination, and how Peres, Rabin’s successor, was unable to fill Rabin’s unique role.

“Rabin was anti-charismatic in the first time and charismatic in the second one… The fact that he was a military person… worked for him when he was ready to go for compromises.” (21:55)

• Beilin’s Relationship to Rabin: Despite their differences (“he was considered a hawk. And he didn’t like… my need for a two-state solution”), the trust behind Oslo’s backchannel negotiations was complex—sometimes dependent on not fully informing Rabin until necessary.

5. Was Peace Within Reach? How Close Was a Final Agreement? (26:57–28:58)

• Popular Support: Beilin says “the will was there” among the public, though fluctuating with each terror attack, but cautions against romanticizing how close Oslo was to success.

“I’m very careful not to say it was almost there because we didn't begin even the talks about the permanent agreement.” (28:00)

6. The Climate of Incitement and Political Aftermath (28:58–32:38)

• Incitement: Yehuda recalls infamous images of Rabin in SS uniform at far-right rallies, and asks if anyone anticipated violence.

“It was inconceivable… We did not think about killing our Prime Minister. He did not even wear a vest… This was the shock.” (29:36)

• Aftermath and the Right’s Victory: Beilin expresses disbelief at how quickly Netanyahu recovered politically after presiding over the rallies that incited violence against Rabin.

“I couldn’t believe it… Same with October 7th… I became very humble.” (32:34)

7. Enduring Threats: Religion, Nationalism, and Missed Reckonings (32:38–36:59)

• Fukuyama’s “End of History” Revisited: Yehuda notes the left’s blind spot in not grappling seriously with the power of religion and nationalism. Beilin counters with pragmatic realism:

“If tomorrow there is an effort to get to a permanent agreement, we should be sure that these people are controlled. Sorry for the answer… but you cannot prepare the people for peace in a few years and hope that it will succeed.” (34:17)

• Extremism Not Addressed: Both express frustration at Israel’s lack of resolve to curb violent Jewish extremism: “There seems to be no resolve in Israel to deal with the extremism. None at all.” (35:42)

8. Is There Cause for Optimism? The Path Forward (36:59–43:03)

• Demographics as Destiny: Beilin’s ultimate optimism is pragmatic—shared sovereignty is inevitable as time and numbers erode the status quo.

“There is the demographic clock which is ticking… So it won’t take long before it is a minority of Jews dominating a majority of Palestinians. And then Israel will not be a democratic state…” (37:52)

• Settlements as the Major Obstacle: Only new creative frameworks, like confederation (shared citizenship, cross-residency), can solve the key challenge.
• Rabin’s Leadership & Legacy: Rabin was willing to “sacrifice himself” for peace—not just in war but in the risk and cost of leadership, reminiscent of leaders required to say “So what?” even when the personal price is ultimate.

  “He didn’t leave books and ideologies and things like that, but he left his own memory… if you take into account the price that you may personally pay.” (41:59)

• Memorable Closing Story: Beilin recounts Clinton’s conversation with Arafat at Camp David: "If I accept it, he will come to my funeral." Clinton replied, “What would you say to him?”
  Beilin’s takeaway: “I would say, so what? And I think that Rabin was the one who said to himself, so what?” (42:42)

Notable Quotes & Moments with Timestamps

• “Amos and myself… cried like babies. It never happened to me before… I think that both of us… thought that it was kind of the end of the world.” – Yossi Beilin (09:47)
• “The assassination of Rabin was one of the biggest successes of the entire Oslo camp in Israel… Reluctantly, but I’m afraid that this was the case.” – Yossi Beilin (12:41)
• “We should fight against terrorism as if there is no peace process, and we will continue with the peace process as if there is no terrorism… Easy to say. Very, very difficult to do.” – Yossi Beilin (17:07)
• “We did not think about killing our Prime Minister. He did not even wear a vest… This was the shock.” – Yossi Beilin (29:36)
• “I became very humble.” – Yossi Beilin, on being repeatedly surprised by political outcomes (32:34)
• “You cannot prepare the people for peace in a few years and hope that it will succeed. It is an ongoing process… But in the meantime… you should be tough on these people. You know them, and you can prevent it if you know them.” – Yossi Beilin (34:17)
• “There is the demographic clock which is ticking… We are 7.5 million Jews and 7.5 million Palestinians between the river and the sea.” – Yossi Beilin (37:52)
• “Rabin was the one who said to himself, so what?” – Yossi Beilin, on the willingness to accept personal risk for the greater good (42:42)

Key Takeaways

• The Oslo process was fragile and ultimately derailed by a combination of extremist actions on all sides, internal weaknesses, and a failure to reckon with the depth of societal fissures and threats posed by religion and nationalism.
• The legacy of Rabin is bound to his personal courage—to do what was necessary for peace, despite the risks.
• Lasting peace may only be possible with bold leadership capable of tough decisions on settlements and new political arrangements (like confederation), as demographic realities make the present unsustainable.
• Education is necessary but insufficient on its own; active measures against known extremists remain critical.
• Optimism for the future is driven by historical necessity, demographic realities, and the hope that courageous leadership—“so what”—will eventually prevail.