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- [00:01]
A
Hi, Identity Crisis listeners. This is Yehuda. I'd love to study with you in Jerusalem this summer. Every summer, our campus hosts the Community Leadership Program, transforming Jerusalem into a gathering place for learners and leaders committed to wrestling with the big questions facing Jewish life today. This summer, you can be part of this experience, learning with me and my wonderful colleagues, joining a community rooted in hope, curiosity and possibility. Join us in Jerusalem from July 1 through 7 for the community Leadership Program. Space is very limited. Visit shalomhartman.org CLP to reserve your spot. Hope to see you there. Hi everyone. Welcome to Identity Crisis, a show from the Shalom Hartman Institute, creating better conversations about the essential issues facing Jewish life. I'm Yehuda Kertzer. We're recording on January 29, 2026. I have a cousin who lives here in Jerusalem. I love him, though we haven't been in touch in a little while, and I doubt he listens to this podcast. He is the head of an ultra Orthodox yeshiva. I follow some of his work, and I'm really proud of him that he's reached this place in his career. I believe deeply in Torah study and in Jewish education, and I think of us both as in, roughly speaking, the same line of work. But beyond that, beyond the fact that we share uncles and aunts and especially our beloved grandparents, there's not a lot we hold in common. I remember spending Shabbat with him a few times when I was a yeshiva student here in Israel, in a very different yeshiva than his, and even our conversations about Torah felt like they were taking place on different planets, almost in an entirely different language, even though we were both speaking English. I recognize that for some listeners outside the observant Jewish world, it may seem crazy that the two of us hierarchically observant Jews would feel ourselves so far apart from one another. But I don't think it's just the narcissism of small differences. The differences between us, which seem today virtually unbridgeable, lie in how we see our relationships to the world around us and what political, social and moral obligations befall us based on those relationships. There are too many such differences to count, and those differences are both ideological and material. Perhaps the most visible and controversial of those, the one that is the stuff of escalating tensions here in Israel, is that neither he nor his sons, nor his sons in law have or will serve in the Israeli army. They are beneficiaries of the state's infrastructure. But on this issue, they will not be contributors. Now, I can't really claim that that difference between us afflicts me. I too have not served in the idf. I live in New York. I too am, as a Zionist outside of Israel, benefit from a state of Israel whose security depends on the sacrifice of others. Therefore, this difference for me between us feels more like an ideological issue than an emotional one. But I know that that's not how some of my other cousins in Israel feel about our shared cousin. I have a different first cousin here in Israel who I also love, who spent hundreds of sleepless nights these past two plus years as her son and her son in law fought in Gaza. And I struggle to imagine how she must feel about her fellow Israelis, especially those that are her own relatives, whose refusal to make that sacrifice amplifies the very sacrifice that she and her family have to make. We, me and my cousins, and by metaphorical extension, all of us, we're held together by this bond of kinship, which is sometimes the strongest bond we have and sometimes, like a tenuous accident of history, and it's gradually worn down by our competing commitments. You have to wonder whether it will hold. This week in Israel, some colleagues and I participated in a seminar together, struggling over the idea of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. My colleague Sraga Baron invited us to read a text by David Megurian, written in 1954, in which he was trying to formulate one of his signature ideas. Forging a sense of mamlachtiyut for for Israeli society. Our colleague Masuha Sagiv defines mamlachtiyut, a very hard word to explain in English, as the political notion of an inclusive sense of statehood. This would be a sense of statehood in Israel's case, in which all of the state's citizens can participate regardless of their other identities. That sense of statehood is thick, complex and multi layered, rooted in a story encompassing members of all faiths and nationalities. And in being thick, it would be able to withstand the calls for this or that alternate identity to prevail. So, trying to make the case for this, Ben Gurion writes the following he says no state can exist without governance, coercion and majority decision, unless it's a totalitarian state ruled by a single authority. But no state can exist solely by governance, coercion, and majority rule. The vitality, strength and integrity of a state are drawn from the general will of the people, from their shared historical needs, from mutual responsibility, from an inner unity that bridges contradictions and tensions. And then he gets to the specific challenge of the state of Israel, and he says, the divisions of hearts and opinions in matters of Faith and religion places both sides, the religious and the secular, who desire the continued existence of the state, under an obligation to understand one another, to respect each other's feelings and convictions, and and to relate to one another not merely with tolerance, but with respect and trust. Both sides, Ben Gurion says, are convinced that they are faithful to the sources and roots of Judaism. Yet both must live together and build together the people and the state, without either compelling the other to accept its view. It was, like many things Ben Gurion said and wrote and did, characteristically ambitious for that early state of Israel that needed everyone on deck. And it's fair to say that maybe it worked for a while. The current ultra Orthodox draft controversy, however, which has intensified since October 7 as the needs for more soldiers and the fears about Israel's security have increased, and as the ultra Orthodox community has remained broadly recalcitrant about brooking any change to the status quo in which they are exempted from army service for the purpose of state supported Torah study, absent a successful negotiation that is divorced from pure political needs of keeping ultra Orthodox parties in the government, which aggravates tensions on this issue. And it's not surprising to see a rise in efforts to do exactly what Ben Gurion hoped wouldn't happen, a move towards coercion. And you have to wonder, is it only a matter of time? I'm grateful today to have a guest with me, Rabbi Yeshua Pfeffer, to help unpack the complexity of this issue in Israeli society, to learn about it and to understand what is happening and what will happen. Yoshua Pfeffer is the head of the IUN Institute focused on promoting Haredi integration and responsibility. He's a community rabbi in Ramo Jerusalem Dayan and a founding editor of Tzarik Iun, a journal of Haredi thought and ideas. Many more affiliations, a very profound career. I'm grateful that you're here to help talk about this and work it through. I wonder if we can start by you helping to understand the moment that we're in. This story of this controversy I remember with been talking about this for decades, actually the future inevitability of a real clash about whether this would be able to hold, especially as the Hared community has grown in numbers. There's a myth that the early days Ben Gurion and other secularists figured a small amount of exemptions wouldn't bother the State of Israel in the long term. So this has been an issue for a long time. But it has felt in the last several years a deep intensification I wonder if you could help us understand how we've gotten to this point and what the state of play you feel is in Israel right now about this issue.
- [07:54]
B
Well, first of all, thank you, Huda, thank you for the monologue and thank you for having me on the show. It definitely is a very unique and special moment in the annals of the State of Israel. And of course it's deeply related to what we've experienced over the last couple of years. The condition of being at war for two years is something which is unheard of in the history of the State of Israel. I dare say the Jewish people on some level. The wars of the Hasmoneans lasted for many years, but it was a kind of guerrilla warfare. We didn't have the kind of state that we have now. And this has certainly brought the kind of tensions that were always there on some level between Haredim and the rest to a head. Of course, the primary issue today is army service, and with great justification, before October 7th, it has to be said, this wasn't the primary issue. Before October 7, the main focus of Haredi participation in Israel was actually on the economy, meaning the doomsayers were saying that without Haredi participation in the economy, and not just participation, but as part of the locomotive of Israel's economy, we're not going to be able to sustain the kind of growth which is essential for our survival. That was a focus prior to October 7th to the degree that Israel's Finance Ministry was suggesting that we should give exemption across the board from military service to allow Haredim to join the workforce. Because part of the equation, this weird and funny status quo equation, is that those who are in full time Torah study get exemptions, but those who aren't don't get exemptions from IDF service. And therefore that is a disincentive for Haredim not to go to work. So the Finance Ministry was saying, let's just allow these Haredim to go to work and we don't need them in the army. We want a small and technologically advanced army. That was the preconception at the time. The army itself was not very enthusiastic about admitting Haredim. They were a headache for the army. The army was much more involved and enthusiastic about recruiting women into every unit, which is in tension with recruiting Haredim. And therefore the army wasn't the main issue. Post October 7, the army has become the main issue with great justification. And, and it's not just because of the need, it's also because of the moral issue, which perhaps we'll get Back to later. And the army happens to be the most thorny and delicate from the Haredi perspective. Because you mentioned Ben Gurion. Ben Gurion was very clear at the founding that the army has two purposes. One of them is to defend the Jewish people. Of course, to defend the Jewish state, the nation state of the Jewish people. Absolutely. But the second purpose, and he was very explicit about this, is to provide the melting pot, the place where your Sephardi guy from Beer Sheva will meet your Yapi from Lechavia, more or less where we are here, and develop something shared, a shared concept of belonging, of identity, a shared culture. And that would happen in the army, meaning the army was also the cauldron to create this new Israeli identity, which is divorced from the previous Jewish identity of yesteryear of Europe. It represents. It embodies the transition from powerlessness to power. It represents the transition from the Jew that's bent over his lectern and studying at night and during the day and being dependent on the mercy of his host nation to being strong and independent and upright and engaged in agriculture and productivity. And army, of course. And the Haredim were always most afraid of the army because of its deeply formative nature for young people, 18, 19 year olds. And that's why the Haredim that want to maintain their identity of continuity from everything that there was before the Haredi Yeshivat you mentioned before Torah study. But it's characterized in a different way. The Haredi Yishuat are all named after places in Europe, whether it's Mir or Slobodka or Grodna or Panovitch or anything. While by the way, all the Tzioni Shivat, none of them carry those names. They're all modern Israeli names named mainly after places, towns, settlements in the land of Israel. So, of course, that difference is not just a difference of nomenclature. That's a difference in essence. And the Haredim say, yes, we want continuity. We don't want to cross lines from the Haredi line of continuity to the parallel line of being Israeli and being in this different mental state of what it means to be Jewish. It really is a very fundamental issue. And that's why we've come to this special moment here. Because the demand for army service is today like never before. And again, with a lot of justification, we can definitely understand this after two years of war. That's a tremendous demand from the Haredim. The Haredi leadership understands that if there will be significant entry of Haredim into the idf, then Haredi society will not be the same. It will Change dramatically. Even if you're going into Haredi units where you get Mahadrian food. That's part of the story. Yes, we want to be able to maintain a high level of religious observance and so on, but that's only part of the story. The deeper part of the story is your sense of identification, your sense of belonging, your sense of duty, your sense of responsibility. Everything stands to shift hinging on this issue of entry into the idf. And that's really why things are coming to such a head today.
- [13:45]
A
Yeah, you have two different pieces that I think are really important, I want to pull apart. We're going to come to what you're describing as a kind of fear of the flattening or the transformation of Haredi identity. But I wonder if we could start outside of the Haredi community with the Israeli public, which has become more and more angry at the Haredi community. There was always resentment in this society about Haredim not being in the workforce, being dependent on the largesse of the state and the support of the state. But. But as you are noting, it shifted from being frustrated about non contribution to the economy to non participation in the army pretty dramatically. I wonder if you can help articulate how much of this is about a kind of righteous anger. When Moses says to the two and a half tribes who want to stay over the line outside of the land of Israel, and he says, your siblings are going to come in to fight this war and you're going to stay there, that doesn't start from a place of we need them. It starts from how is it that you're making us wield this burden. So how much of it is that and how much of it is a genuine need for actually just bodies to fight in the army? And I don't know if you can exactly identify where one of these criticisms begins and the other one ends, but I'm wondering if you have a sense of that as part of the public discourse about this issue from the non Haredi community, of course.
- [15:03]
B
Well, I would say the following. The demand for. For Haredi army service comes, I think, from, I would say, three main arguments or three main points. One point is of course, a point of need. And that really did switch. The main need before October 7th was defined or constituted in terms of economic participation. And that's still there, by the way. We still need economic participation. However, post October 7, the army began to really suffer under the burden of requiring more soldiers. The numbers, and I say this with a really heavy heart, but the numbers of wounded, many, of course, tragically also lost their lives during this war. And many, many were wounded. And there was also a realization that we need troops, we need boots on the ground. We actually need many more soldiers than we have. The army is talking about two new armies or two new divisions, meaning thousands, many thousands of soldiers. And of course, the principal burden, or the way Israeli society is really feeling, the principal burden is not with a regular army, but rather with the reserves. And the reserves have been doing hundreds of days of miluim. And that's a crazy burden to carry. In terms of family, in terms of workplaces, in terms of businesses, in terms of psychological demands and psychological harm. It's really not simple. And these are people who are 30, 40, 50, who have been doing this tremendous. And for every reserve, meaning every regular soldier that you have in the army will be able to allow several reserve soldiers to spend much more time at home. That equation is a simple equation. An army needs a big regular army. You can't rely just on reserves. It's been very tough. And that's why this has become such an emotional issue, because it's been so felt, it's so tangible. We all feel it. Every single family in Israel has direct experience of this. And that's why the issue has become such an emotive one, such a demanding one. But added to that point, though, there's two ways in which the demand for Haredim to serve in the IDF is expressed. One is in terms of the idea of equality. In Hebrew, Shiv yon Panetel, equality in carrying the burden. And that's mainly from the, let's say, the left wings of Israeli society that equality is a thing thing. Equality is a value which they strongly espouse and strongly articulate. The courts have spoken for the last three decades about this value in terms of Haredi army service. This was the reason why the original law, which was called the Tal Law, was struck. It was struck because it doesn't fulfill the equality burden of legitimacy in the Israeli constitutional kind of constitution that we have. And that's one argument. We need equality from the more religious parts of Israel, from the more right wing parts of Israel. They didn't speak about equality. They don't need equality. What they need is to see that we're a part of it, to see that the Haredim are participating, see that we care, to see that we're involved. They don't need every single Haredi to be in the idf. We don't need total equality. In any case, there's no absolute equality. That's a Utopian myth. Tel Aviv is not the same as Modellin. Modellin has north of 90% enlistment rates and Tel Aviv has far lower, still high, but Nowhere near your 90 some percent. And hrisda is not the same as your regular army service. And nevertheless nobody makes a fuss about that because it's not about absolute equality, it's about being a part of it. And I think that's the main, Main point post October 7th. What Israel needs to see is that we're all in this together. And that's what's so painful for much of Israel, to not see the Haredim being a part of it, that they're not there en masse at the funerals and we should not know of anymore, that they're not there visiting the sick, that they're not there participating. There was a moment right after October 7th where we saw this kind of Haredi enlistment. Not into the army necessarily, but to participate, to be a part of it. But it didn't last. And over time the Haredim kind of drew back. They withdrew from that participation partially because of this kind of aggressive demand that you have to serve. It's difficult to map out the exact dynamic, but that's mainly what Israel needs to, that we are a part of it. And that's what I try to tell my Haredi friends. You know, we can have tremendous Batay Medrash, we can have tremendous strongholds of Torah study that are exponentially larger than anything we had pre state of Israel. And yet we can be a real deep part of Israel, including the idf, including other institutions, including the state mechanisms, without compromising our values. And that's what Israel needs.
- [20:21]
A
Yeah, it's interesting because it is imaginable that it's not that these tensions would have been eliminated entirely if the Haredi community, for instance, had responded to October 7 by saying, well, listen, we're not coming into the army, but we're going to share the burden on the home front, we're going to take over on the home front, we're going to let the students out of Yeshiva, we're going to organize food, we're going to make sure that families are taken care of in this time of need. But it was basically silent, you know, obviously a piece of this. I don't know how it fits to still active on a day to day basis. But it is part of the story that Haredim do feel that they are sharing the burden, so to speak, by holding up Torah study and lives of piety on behalf of the Jewish people. As a major Post Holocaust kind of commitment of, as you said, retaining continuity of the past and doing spiritual service for the Jewish people. I think that that wears down not only on secular Jews, but even on other Orthodox Jews who are participants in the state. And it really wears down when you're in a state of crisis like the state of Israel has been in, where there has been obviously massive need on the war front and also tremendous disruption on the home front. It feels like a tragic mistake from the Haredi community to basically have shown up for like a hot second after October 7th and then to just go back to kind of business as usual within the Haredi community. How do you explain that? I'm not holding you accountable. I'm really just trying to understand it.
- [21:43]
B
No, sure, I understand that. And I would just make the following point on what you said, and it's interesting. Sometimes the greater frustration or resentment, sometimes even animosity, is actually felt from the Kipotzukot, meaning from the religious Zionist sector and the right and the more religious than from secular Israel totally.
- [22:05]
A
And because they don't see themselves as anyway part of the same spiritual community, like they're so other to one another that you're obviously going to be more resentful to the people who you have different expectations from.
- [22:18]
B
Right. So I think one could potentially mention two points about that, and I'll mention it very briefly because I want to get to your specific question or query. One of them is, yes, the question of language, meaning the Cheloni Israel, secular Israel. We'll say, well, the Haredimaz is speaking a different language. We don't really understand the language, and therefore it's hard for us to feel any kind of sense of connection, which will also empower this sense of resentment, frustration and anger. Because we don't get it. You know, they're living in this wholly different world and it's a different planet. But those who are religious, okay, so they say, listen, we get it, we also appreciate Torah's study, We also appreciate religious devotion, but we're trying to do that while at the same time sharing this burden, which is existential and which we all benefit from, because we all have this shared vision of going forwards here upon the Holy Land, the state of Israel. And therefore there's this greater sense of resentment and so on. I would say, furthermore, the religious parts of Israel, they expect the Haredim to be partners, meaning they're not afraid of Haredim joining. A lot of secular Israel is afraid what will happen when the Haredim come in. And therefore there's a sense of ambivalence, meaning on the one hand, we need the Haredim to share the burden, but on the other, what's going to happen when the Heredim come in and share the burden? What will that do to the idf? What will it do to these instincts, institutions that we've worked, we quote, unquote, historically have been the ones to establish these institutions in the kind of mold that we saw fit. And all of a sudden, this entry of Haredim into the public sphere, into these institutions, what will that do? We're afraid of that. And therefore the letter from the secular Israel, the Haredim, they look at it as being a little bit insincere. The letter reads, dear Haredim, please join us in Israel. Signed Israeli Society. But the Haredim read another, please join us in Israel, but provided it's on our terms. And therefore there's more tension there. But with the religious Zionists, they say, no, we want the religion part. We'd like to invite you to be partners with us in promoting that, in being a part of this. And therefore there is a division to be made between the language and the reaction and, and the emotions from those different parts of Israeli society vis a vis the Haredim.
- [24:47]
A
I'm going to interrupt your tangent with a tangent, and then we can go back to the original question, which is when I was in yeshiva, in Yeshiva Hartzion, in Alon Sh Food, my teacher, Ravaran Lichtenstein, of blessed memory, I remember a talk he gave which agitated me at the time for totally different reasons. This will make sense to you where he said, our closest kindred spirits as religious Zionist Jews in Israel are the Haredi community much more than Reform Conservative Jews and secular Israelis. Now, that agitated me because of my pluralistic inclinations, but it was coherent 30 years ago to make that statement. And it underlies exactly what you're talking about. And I don't know whether that same statement would be made today, or at least if it was made, it would be made as the intro to a sense of frustration, like, these are our fellow travelers in the world, but we can't believe that they're not actually serving as our fellow travelers.
- [25:39]
B
Yeah, this is the bus test. You get on a bus, there's two open seats, one next to a Haredi Jew and one next to a secular Jew. And you, as a religious Zionist person, who do you sit next to? Who do you have a conversation with? Who do you feel deeper partnership with? This is painful. I find this deeply painful. I have to say, it's something which I feel very Frustrated about. Because, yes, you know, you mentioned in your monologue, in fact, the sense of kinship and the question of how long will this residual kinship, if you want, how long will it last to keep that bond together. But it's not just about kinship. It's about a shared vision, a shared purpose, a shared mission, a shared journey. And that shared journey surely should be felt the strongest, like Rabaron said, between people who share very similar, at the very least, convictions in religious terms, and so on. But to get to your question, where are the Haredim on this? The Haredim, or at least the Haredi leadership, is simply afraid. It's anxious. The word haredi in Hebrew, haradim, means harada, anxiety. Of course, it's taken from the Posse Charadim Lidvar Hashem, those who are anxious to fulfill the word of God. But there's anxiety there. Haredi society was predicated on this sense of withdrawal from your modern Western liberal society because of the dangers of involvement with it. Modern orthodoxy has its own approach or strategy toward that danger. And we could call it education. We'll educate our youth to take the good and to reject the bad. The Haredim say, good luck with you on that project. But that's a scary proposition, because who says that they'll take the good and reject the bad? Maybe they'll do the opposite. They'll take the bad, reject the good. It's a dangerous arena to be in. So Haredi's society is predicated on that concept of withdrawal or isolationism from that world. And October 7th, what was a moment, and seeing all of this reaction on the part of Haredim, to be a part of it, whether it's in the Zakah or in the Hatzala people. And by the way, these people became heroes of Israeli society in those days. After October 7th, there was this tremendous outburst, a pouring of unity, a sense of, we're all in this together. And it didn't last very long, but we go back to it with nostalgia. But for the Haredi leadership, that itself comes with a sense of threat. It comes with a sense of alarm. Where is this leading? Because if we're all in this together, then where does that place us? Meaning, where does that place that Haredi identity? I remember an article in the Ted Neman that came out against the slogan Biyachad nenatzeh, We'll win together, we shall prevail together, we'll win together. United, kind of united. We stand, if you want. And there were two newspapers that I saw, maybe others, but there were two newspapers That I saw that rallied against that slogan. Ted Neman, what was the other one? Guess.
- [28:45]
A
Haaretz.
- [28:46]
B
Haaretz. Haaretz rallied against. And Aretz said, we're not together with them. We're not together with the settlers. We're not together with the Haredim, we're not together with these people. And therefore this logo is apostle. We'd like to cancel this slogan. We don't believe in this slogan. And the Haredim Yaten, at the very least, which is kind of the ideological trumpet of Haredi. Litvish Haredi leadership said the same, said no. This Biyacha Nenetzer slogan is dangerous because don't forget, part of that isolationism withdrawal is a matter of identity. You ask a chassid on the street, who are you? And he'll say, well, I'm a Vishnitz, a Chassid. And you'll ask a Gera Hasid. And he'll say, well, I'm a Gera Hasid. And the litvish Jew, he'll say, well, I'm a Haredi guy, or something like that. He's likely to say that. He's unlikely to say, I'm a Jew. And secondary identity, I'm Viznet. That's part of the isolationism and this. And certainly being a home front, a great idea, by the way, and it's come up. You're not the first to raise it. Let the Haredim do the home front. And that will mean they're deeply participant, they're a part of it, they'll be admired by the rest of Israel, and it won't compromise as much of their values or their way of life because they won't have to be out there in the field and so on. But that will still mean a radical transformation within Haredi society. And that's something which the Haredi leadership is afraid of. I'll just end by saying that my argument on this is that we're experiencing that transformation anyway.
- [30:19]
A
Yeah, that's what I want to get.
- [30:20]
B
To, meaning it's not going to help. We're anyway becoming Israeli. I'm happy to expound on that if we'll have time. But we're anyway becoming Israeli. We're anyway becoming a part of Israel in the deepest possible sense. And therefore we need to adjust our strategy in order to allow us to, on the one hand, maintain, preserve those core values while at the same time rising up to this challenge. If we're going to be there anyway, then we should take the high road and try to translate some of those values into Hebrew. To be able to share them with others, to be able to participate in the dialogue, in the conversations about the future of Israel.
- [31:00]
A
So this is really important to talk about. You know, the way you expressed this in the Wall Street Journal last summer was the underlying fear is broader, that widespread service will change the soul of Haredi society. But as you argue, it's already happening, and it's hard not to see it in just the broad manifestations of Haredi society. I mean, there is no such thing as Haredi society. There are a whole variety of ways that that assimilation or acculturation, whatever you want to call it, accommodation is taking place. In fact, it's always been a myth of assimilation, which is. There's the version that you talk about, which is the boogeyman. And then there's the subtle processes by which people are adapting and modifying their behaviors in relationship to their surrounding. And oftentimes the most interesting thing to ask is like, what are the differences between what you think you're trying to prevent and what's taking place organically? My favorite story to this effect is a story that's cited, I think, by Avi Hovitsky in his Messianism Zionism, a Jewish religious radicalism book about Revelvo Soloveitchik, the famous Briskarev who ended up here in Jerusalem, died in 1959. It's a story that's cited, probably apocryphal, from the 50s, in which he's walking down the street with one of his students and sees two ultra Orthodox men, men, publicly criticizing the state of Israel, something about its government. And Revelvo turns to a student and says, those two men are Zionists. You know, this apocryphal story. And the student says, of course they're not Zionists. What are you talking about? And he says, any Jew who feels so at home in their society that they can publicly criticize the government without fear of retribution shows that they have. Basically, they are Zionists because they are at home. And that, by the way, every time I see huge Haredi protests against the government, I'm like, who? The very act of being able to mobilize your own political power, Use your voice. All of this stuff shows that you are partaking of the discourse of this society in one way, even as you're insisting that you're being repressed by that same society. So there's something very subtle here about the already transforming nature of. Of Haredi Judaism. And I wonder if you could unpack. Is the army just like the boogeyman? Like it's now become enshrined as something that represents a threshold that can't be crossed? Or do you think that there will just be a subtle process by which this in the same way that many Haredim do participate in the economy and do read Israeli newspapers and do speak Hebrew, like it will just gradually happen because it's kind of been happening on every other front already.
- [33:38]
B
Yeah. So let me try to unpack that a bit. I mean, it's a great point and very important, I think, to think about this. By the way, the story that you mentioned, the version that I've heard, is that the Briskorov, Ravel von Soloveitchik said this about Amram Bloy. Ramlan Bloy, of course, was a close partner and associate and he was a very anti Zionist person. So was the Briskarov. But Rav Amlon Bloy engaged in demonstrations and the Briskarov apparently accused him of being Zionist. And he said, you're a Zionist. And he said, how dare you accuse me of being a Zionist? And he says, well, if you have the confidence to demonstrate on the streets, that demonstrates that you're at home over here and you're with them. But I would say this is the price you pay for success. Success in two ways. I think this is a success story in terms of Israel and in terms of the Haredim. These are two success stories. Israel at inception. One of the reasons why the Haredim made this decision, again, how consciously was it made? How deliberately did it happen? I don't know. But the Chazanish, who was one of the great rabbinic leaders in the time of the inception of the State of Israel, so he's on the record saying, you know, they've managed to take control over this strip of land. But who says it's going to last? He said, well, in his words, this is the way it's quoted anyway. He said, it's a group of banditten, in Yiddish, bandits. They've taken over the land. But who says it's going to last? And therefore, who says it's worthy of our investment? We need to invest in our 3,000 year old tradition. We need to go on as we did before, passing on that tradition, passing on that heritage from father to son, from mother to daughter, and do what we've always done. And the State of Israel, let's see what will become of it. Well, let's see what did become of it, right? It became this thriving society with a strong economy and an impressive military, the envy of the region, defeating its many enemies from all around, a miracle in gathering millions of Jews. Biblical, really Biblical stuff. Unbelievable. That's Israel on the one hand. And Israel became so good that the Haredim almost inevitably identify with Israel because we're proud of Israel. Israel is so good that you can't not be a part of it, that you can't not participate. When we see Israeli success on the battlefield or on the sports pitch, there's a sense of pride, even for your Haredim. Okay. How aware are they of what's going on on the sports field? More than you would believe. Okay. Because we're aware we're there. And on the other hand, there's the success of the Haredi story. Haredi line, like these two parallel lines, if you want. The Haredi line started off being a very thin line, 2% or 2 and a half percent of Israel's population at inception. Today, that line, this line of perpetuation of what there was, of this isolating, organizing idea from the rest of society, that line has grown from two and a half percent, let's say, to 15% of Israel's population. And if we look at first graders, it's much bigger than that. That's an incredible success. But. But that success by definition means that you won't be able to isolate the way you can when you're a small community. If you're Amish, you can isolate. If you're just Israel, then you can't. And if Haredi women, as an example, used to be the school teachers of the state, and this really held out till the late 80s or something, you know, my wife studied in a Haredi high school, and she is a qualified teacher. She never intended to spend one day in a classroom, but that was what Haredim did. In fact, till today, Haredi high schools are not called high schools. They're not called Tikhon, they're called seminar. Why all Haredi women become teachers? That's the myth. But that used to be true. But post 1990, let's say that broke down because the profession became saturated. And what do Haredi women do today? Well, they're in every profession, whether it's computer programming and engineering, whether it's architecture and interior design and graphic design and social work and psychology, everything. And where do they work? Well, they work at Google and amdocs and mobileye and Facebook and Intel and so on. So where's the isolation? How do you isolate there? And how do you isolate in a digital age? B' Nai Brak has the number one, highest or number two. I don't remember Volume of Internet shopping in Israel. What are you going to do? You need to buy clothes for your kids, so you're going to buy from next and Shane and other Internet, you know, shop AliExpress, you know, that's what you're going to do. And therefore all of that led to this blending in terms of identity. By the way, From Israel also, 20 years ago, Stisel would not have been possible. Shabab Nikim, these television series look at haredim and say, yeah, they're human and.
- [38:54]
A
They have interesting stories.
- [38:55]
B
Yeah, they have good stories. We can do a soap opera about haredim. Everything's good. Meaning that blending is something that just I think, is an inevitability over time. But of course, I see that, though with a religious dimension. You know, I see that with religious overtones. The Jewish people are not here to isolate. Avraham Avinu Abraham wasn't an isolationist. He called out the name of God throughout his region wherever he could. He fought a war against the superpowers of the region to rescue his nephew Lot. He argued with Hashem about the destruction of Storm. And he cared about it. He was no isolationist. We're not here to isolate. We're here to spread the light. And perhaps there's something providential here. The haredim needed this incubation time, you know, when at 2% and when Israel is militantly secular, I'm talking marches through Ma' Sharim of youth movements with clubs telling the inhabitants to quit being so primitive and to join the modern state of Israel. Well, then you can excuse this instinct of isolationism, which worked. But having succeeded in building up this very impressive and robust quote unquote Torah world, while we have a responsibility to convert this Noah's Ark into a lighthouse, to be a part of it, kind of. If you're familiar with Emma Barnim Smicha Rav Issachar Shlemi Teichtal, who said, that's our mission. And he was ahead of his time, but he said, that's our mission. If we would participate in this movement, we could elevate it. We could bring so much light. I think that's where we stand today. That's that moment for me on a religious level.
- [40:41]
A
So that would suggest that it does sound like you're saying that this assimilation is inevitably happening and you want to both sanctify that process of something that's actually very powerful. And it would imply that this could then change the discourse on the army. But for the fact that the opponents of the haredi community want to Push this harder than people want to handle. And it almost feels. I don't want to say it sounds naive, though. We'll just get there. Because the urgency of this question in Israeli society is forcing the litigation of this issue. And it feels as though the more you insist you need to cross this boundary to come to my side, the more that that boundary just gets lifted higher and is used as the kind of indicator of. Of the assimilation we'll never be willing to commit to.
- [41:31]
B
And that's a fantastic observation. And I think that there's some truth in that. I don't think that the kind of absolutist rhetoric that we sometimes hear, let's say, from the Supreme Court. Supreme Court, that's what courts generally do. It's black and white. But when the Court entered the arena, public policy, meaning, entered the arena of the question of the Haredi draft, as one example, then I think it damaged the capacity for sincere conversation, because that has to be predicated on trust. Every relationship requires trust. And if you don't have trust, if you have a sense that the other side is going to admit you, is going to allow you in, but only on condition that you abandon your core values and you become like them, then that hampers, that, damages the capacity for real conversation. At the same time, though, meaning notwithstanding those issues, which are real, and by the way, I think they're understandable also, meaning I understand the sense of urgency, I understand the frustration and the anger. I understand also that from a secular person's perspective, the religious elements of this discourse could be scary. He's worried that if Haredim, if you give them a finger, they'll take two hands, and all of a sudden we'll be walking on separate sidewalks, one for men, one for women. And he's afraid of that. Meaning it's up to us, the Haredim, to talk a different kind of language. Or you know what, just to talk. The Khoridim have never even said, what do we want? You know, when Litzman, I heard this on the radio interview, Yankee Litzman, he used to be the Health Minister under utj. He's a Garach Hasid. He was asked, let's say you get a majority in the Knesset in the next elections. What do you want? What do you want? What do you do? What's your game plan? And his answer? I think he's being sincere. His answer was, will never be a majority.
- [43:26]
A
That's convenient.
- [43:27]
B
And the interviewer, he didn't relent and he pressed him. He said, okay, let's imagine what do you want? And his answer will never be a majority. And you know what? He's right. Because if we'll be a majority, then we'll have to take responsibility. If we'll have to take responsibility, we'll have to speak a different language. It'll be a language of what do we want for the greater Jewish people? Not just how do we want to water our back garden of the Yeshiva world. And that is a different language that the Haredim needs to speak in order to build trust. So, yes, I'll just finish and say, there's a lot happening from the ground. There's a lot happening bottom up in terms of Haredi education, all these new kinds of schools where you have robust general education together with Torah education, in terms of academic institutions for Haredim, in terms of communities and youth movements, and even for army participation, yes, there's a lot happening, but there's a lot more that could happen. We could expedite that process a lot if there would be real cooperation, if there would be real discourse, and if the politics would be a bit less caustic and toxic, and it would actually be able to figure out a good incentive structure to encourage this process to actually happen on a larger scale.
- [44:45]
A
So I want to push back a little bit in terms of your comments about the activist court, because, like, I shared a worldview with you that the better way for society to navigate difference is through democratic culture. You know, we bring our conflict usefully into a public square. And if you can actually conduct a debate and a dialogue that doesn't resort to violence, but in which people can actually bring their full selves in, you will create a society that can navigate difference, produce outcomes, ultimately produce a culture of compromise. That's the ideal. Wouldn't that be great? The problem is, of course, that societies also have very specific urgencies that are tied to timelines, that it's not just we can't have that because our politics are caustic. It's not just that we can't have it because we're hopelessly polarized. It's also sometimes societies actually have to make resource decisions, right? You can't simply say, let's just let a budget discussion between Democrats and Republican Congress go for years while we work out our differences. You, at the end of the year are going to have to balance a budget or you have to pass a budget rather. And if you haven't come to an agreement, it's going to be the majority rule over the rule of the minority, and the courts play a role in that. Because they wind up upholding various legislations to that purpose. So resisting the notion that somebody has to step in and either impose a change or just, you know, pass a majority rule, it feels, I don't know, it feels like optimistic, but it has no political realism to it. And the pressure really is increasingly going to be on the Haredi community to answer the question of what is a piece of legislation that we can live with. And I don't see that coming from the Haredi community of here's not the legislation we would choose, but here's the compromise that we can live with. And until the Haredi community articulates that, they're really putting themselves under a barrel, because then they're just going to be subject to, you know, you could say all you want. I don't like the activist court, but somebody's got to stand up and make a decision.
- [46:44]
B
Yeah. So, I mean, your comments on somebody has to step in sounds a little bit, you'll forgive me, sounds a little bit dictatorial, of course, but who's going to step in? Some dictator or the people? Well, the people would be great. And that I agree. But the people means through the democratic process. We don't have any other process. I don't want somebody else stepping in and telling the people what to do. And sometimes the court seems a little bit too much like that, meaning they're recognizing this flaw in the democratic system. They say, okay, we're going to take matters into our hands. I don't like that. And by the way, also, if we judge based on results, the court started to get involved in the issue of the Haredi draft sometime in the late 90s based on outcomes. It's been three decades.
- [47:31]
A
Yeah. How's it work?
- [47:32]
B
We're not doing so great, but I do think that things today are reaching that place where the Israeli demographic, the population, is going to vote based on that issue. You know, usually there are more pressing issues to vote on, and therefore the question of Haredi participation in Israel, in whichever way, army, economy, society, whatever, got pushed back, and then whichever government came in, did what it could, usually not much. However, if that becomes the number one or number two, whatever, very high up on the ladder of Israeli preferences, then, yes, then the democratic process ought to be able to take care of that. And by the way, there are many right now kind of, I would say, organizing processes that are trying to establish a new Haredi political party. And of course, I have my own involvement with them in order to try to find a way forward that will provide a real alternative to the current Haredi political model, which has been a very conflictual one, which has been one that has been very convenient, let's be honest, for coalitions. Khareedi were very convenient coalition partners because they say, do whatever you want, we'll give you free rein, we'll raise our fingers with whatever you want. Just give us xyz.
- [48:54]
A
Yeah, they're the definition of an interest group. They're so clear about it.
- [48:57]
B
Very, very much so. And therefore they've been very stable and very good coalition partners. However, that hasn't been for the interest or for the benefit of this process of Haredi participation, responsibility for Israel. And today when that's coming to a head, especially over the extremely delicate army issue, I think it's time for a different kind of politics that will take, take this issue and really place it at the top of the pedestal. And so, yeah, we'll see how that plays out. I agree with you that the way Haredi politics is right now, it's difficult to come up with a legislative bill that will really address the issue.
- [49:36]
A
There are three myths that are oftentimes told by non Haredi Jews that are very self serving about how this is ultimately going to resolve itself. One is, I heard it recently, the exodus from the Haredi community is at 20% Kharidan Jews are leaving en masse. The second is meaning, listen, this is going to resolve itself because of exodus from the Khari community. The second myth is that there's a real gap between the leaders and the people. And until it's possible, look, that could change and then the will of the people is far more interested in integration to Israeli society than their leaders. And the third myth is if we push the Haredim hard enough, they'll leave. I don't believe any of these myths, but they are out there. And my guess is that they are self serving myths told by non Haredi Jews to make them feel like we're ultimately going to win this story. Do you feel the same way? Is there any truth to any of those myths?
- [50:31]
B
Well, I would say the first and the third are far from the truth. Meaning yes, there is some percentage within the Haredi space that's leaving. But in all of the different surveys that have been performed, by far the most stable of any sector in Israel is the Haredi sector. Meaning the kind of surveys that ask your question of how did you grow up and what are you today? So by far and away, of all sectors, the one that maintains the greatest level of continuity is the Haredi sector. So they're doing well. And you know what? Even those who, quote, unquote, leave Haredi society today, they don't have to leave. You can carry on wearing your Haredi clothes, and yet you can do what you want. That space exists within the Haredi space. And then in a sociological sense, you remain Haredi. There are some that drop out, especially in specific sectors. Children of Balet Shuva, let's say, have a higher rate of what we call off the Derek or of dropout from the Haredi space and certain others. But overall, that's a myth. Absolutely. And the third point that you said, they'll leave, what does that mean? Where they're going to go? Like, that's a ridiculous thing to say. As if they have an alternative. Ravitz Hak Yosef now and again he says, well, you know, if you'll make us serve in the army, we'll just leave. Yeah, right. What do you mean you'll leave? Which country is waiting with open arms.
- [51:58]
A
Big visa program in America.
- [51:59]
B
Learn Torah with us, you know? Yeah, absolutely. So those two are absolute. Margaret, had you to say cloud cuckoo land, we would say the second point, though, that there's a par. A distance between the leadership and the people. Well, not all the people, but certainly the significant changes that have overcome the Haredi space over the last couple of decades. And those are big changes. Those have come from the field. They have not come with a support of the Haredi leadership, both rabbinic and political. And I'm talking about, for example, academic colleges that were condemned and slammed and shunned by the Haredi leadership, rabbinic, political, both for religious reasons, but also for financial reasons. Don't forget that there's a big financial incentive to keep those students within the Haredi institutions. And it didn't help. These academic colleges have flourished, they've prospered, and they're filled with tens of thousands of Haredim. And the same is true of the Mamakh schools, not necessarily Mamaach as a stream, but schools that also teach broad general studies, girl schools that do full matriculations. That's happened. That's happening, and that's happened. And you see also in society the diversification of the Haredi space. All of a sudden, there's a strong Haredi presence on X on Twitter, you know, and even, like very Haredi media personalities will say their words on Twitter, meaning things are happening, and those things are happening from the field. And the same is true, of course, in terms of army participation. And from my conversations with a lot of the rabbinic, a lot Parts of the rabbinic leadership that I am in conversation with, they get it. Meaning they appreciate that there's going to be some kind of an intermediate leadership that's going to push this forward, forwards. They just don't see that as their role. They see their role as being a defensive role, a role of preservation. And they're afraid also, if I'll say something, then either I'll be condemned because I'll be chased by the extremists, which happens, okay, even to the highest level rabbis, number one. Number two, if I'll say something, then this Haredi infrastructure, this house of cards, can collapse because we don't do that. We don't do radical change. It's not part of our DNA. And therefore they're happier that from there, courts will hear words of nothing's going to change. We're going to carry on as usual. No one's going to the army, but they know full well that it's going to develop from the field, grassroots, bottom up. Therefore you have this dynamic. Is that the way I'd like to see it? Not necessarily. I think we need that rabbinic leadership because too many of those who are crossing the lines, too many of those who are becoming Israeli just by force of nature don't have guidance. And then they become Israeli in a sociological sense, in a cultural sense, and they start engaging in bourgeoisie kind of Israeli life, but they don't have that spiritual engine to keep it going, that needs education, that needs a kind of shift in the strategy, and that's not taking taking place yet. And something that we need.
- [55:07]
A
Let me just give you one last question. You've been very generous with your time. One thing that's been powerful listening to you today is the way in which you have, in various places in the conversation used the word we. Sometimes when you're talking about being in the Haredi community, sometimes when you're talking about being Israeli and you're a straddler in some sense, right? You're advocating for change within the Haredi community, but at the pace by which Haredi community can stay consistent to its values, you're advocating for change within Israeli society. I would just love just a reflection on what that feels like. It's not easy to find yourself in that position where you are both a change maker, but you're not trying to be a radical from your own community, and you're not trying to leave your Israeliness behind. And I'm curious just if you can reflect a little about what that feels like to be trying to articulate a sense of what we across. Wheeze.
- [56:01]
B
Wow. Well, thank you for that question. It's a good one. It strikes a chord. And it's also deeply personal. Not to say that I'm not happy to speak about it, but it crosses. It's a segue, meaning from the big issues to the personal story. First of all, I grew up in a place where I didn't know these divisions meaning. Sure, there were different groups, but they were not as binary. There was no fence or wall to separate between them. They didn't speak different languages. We were in this together. And Israel even growing up in London. And I didn't grow up like a radically Zionist, but I wasn't anti Zionist either. And then Israel was always a miracle. Israel was always like a mis. God's grace, like God has given us a homeland where we can go and build something Jewish on a state level. It was always a dream. Israel was a dream. And when I moved to Israel and I became a part of Haredi society and I spent all these years really, I would say, in an enclave within Israel and tucked away, I never forgot about the home that Israel is. I never forgot about the value of Israel, but without being fully Israeli. And it was only when I took a step out because I felt that I needed to. I felt that I have the responsibility outside of the Haredi space that I have to discharge, that I have to fulfill, that I really felt the depth of the Israeli belonging when I participated in my first ever Yom Hazikaron ceremony. And to be honest, it felt a little bit like being a Pal Sheva. Like suddenly I felt this energy, like, you're part of this incredible story, and I think it's a divinely led story. I don't look at it in secular terms. I look at this as a. In biblical terms. I look at this as an unbelievable story that Hashem has led us through very strange and weird and wonderful paths and routes and means. But I felt such a deep part of it. And the truth is that that's the sense that I'm trying to convey. My work is predominantly in the Haredi space, but not exclusively. And that's the sense that I'm trying to convey in this story. There can't be a them and us. And when we conceive of it as a them and us, we threaten to undermine the whole story. Because, sure, why should we serve in their army? You know, if it's their army, why should we serve there? And why should they support us in terms of a Torah world if it's completely distinct and unrelated. If there's a sense of estrangement, if there's a sense of otherness between Jews and Israel, then that threatens to undermine the entire project. And I know, I know with full certainty that we're going to succeed in this, because I don't think God put us here and brought 8 million Jews back to the ancestral homeland that was given to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. I don't think we're here just to jump in the sea because of infighting. I don't think that's why we're here. So I have full certainty it's going to be good. But it will only be good if people serve as a channel for. For that good. And that's where I try to place myself. And every day I wake up with passion about this. Every day I wake up and sometimes it's tough. I'm not saying it's easy. It's hard work. And it's hard to be this bridge. It's hard to try to be this engine of on the one hand, you could call it change, but like you said, I don't envisage myself as a social activist of change. The change is happening anyway. What I'm trying to do is to enable it to happen in a positive way, in the best possible way. For the change will happen by force of nature, but how will they happen is going to decide the fate of this and for me to be there is. On the one hand, yes, it's challenging and it's not always easy, but it's so rewarding, it's so fulfilling. You feel that you're at the juncture of the next step, of the next chapter that we're writing together of the history of the Jewish people and the Jewish state. So I feel very privileged to be in this space.
- [60:24]
A
Thank you for staying there. Thanks for doing this work and thanks for coming on the show today.
- [60:28]
B
Thank you. Heta really enjoyed the conversation. Thank you.
- [60:38]
C
Here are some other things that are happening at the Shalom Hartman Institute. Applications open this week for Hartman's internship program for college students for the next academic year. Students can gain hands on nonprofit experience, build educational leadership skills, engage in academic research, or strengthen campus communities. For more information, click on the link in the show Notes. Last week, a number of Hartman staff attended the Jews Against Ice protests at ICE headquarters in D.C. as Yehuda Kurtzer explained recently on Identity Crisis, it is about we, the people who must raise our voices in re accepting the covenant of Americans, its promise to the rule of law, its care for its citizenry and its hospitality to the Stranger. Our staff are proud to have shown up for our neighbors alongside numerous other Jewish organizations and faith leaders in this way. To hear Yehuda speak more on this topic, listen to America Betrays the Stranger on Identity Crisis. You can find the link in the show notes.
- [61:29]
D
Thanks for listening to our show and special thanks to our guest, Yehoshua Pfeffer. Identity Crisis is produced by me, Tessa Zitter and our Executive producer is Maital Friedman. This episode was researched by Gabrielle Feinstone and edited by Josh Allen with music provided by so called transcripts of our show are now available on our website. Typically a week after an episode airs, we're always looking for ideas for what we should cover in future episodes. So if you have a topic you'd like to hear about or if you have comments about this episode, please write to us@identitycrisisalomhartman.org for more ideas from the Shalom Hartman Institute about what's unfolding right now. Sign up for our newsletter in the show notes and subscribe to this podcast everywhere. Podcasts are available. See you next time and thanks for listening.
- [62:18]
B
What are we supposed to do and say and be during this time?
- [62:22]
A
Judaism has so much complexity to it and so many layers to it that no one layer stands by itself.
- [62:28]
C
What you have is Jews who for.
- [62:30]
B
The very first time feel like their.
- [62:32]
C
Value system is out of sync with the broader sector.
- [62:34]
B
I'm your host Alana Steinhein. Welcome to Texting irl, where we wrestle with the dilemmas of Jewish life through the lens of classical and modern Torah texts. I am so fortunate that I have a friend and a colleague who I can talk to Jacob Feinspan, Diana Ginsberg, Dalia Lithwick helping us think through these big questions.
- [62:53]
A
Why are you guys part of this? What calls you personally to it? What are some of the other things that you work on? What's at stake for you?
- [62:59]
C
I think one of the challenges is.
- [63:00]
B
To figure out how much failed democracy we as Jews can tolerate. We have to find opportunities to make enemies into friends. The model is so majestic in this text.
- [63:14]
D
Listen now to Texting irl, a podcast from the Shalom Hartman Institute, available wherever you get your podcasts.
- [63:20]
B
Welcome to the Beauty of Jewish Interpretation. Exactly.