Is J.D. Vance Right about Europe?

Summary

Imprimis Podcast Summary: "Is J.D. Vance Right about Europe?"

Podcast Information

• Title: Imprimis
• Host/Author: Hillsdale College
• Episode: Is J.D. Vance Right about Europe?
• Release Date: July 23, 2025
• Description: Imprimis is a free monthly speech digest from Hillsdale College, dedicated to educating citizens and promoting civil and religious liberty by addressing cultural, economic, political, and educational issues. Featuring speeches from Hillsdale College events, it has been a widely circulated opinion publication since 1972.

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Introduction

In the July 2025 episode of Imprimis, Hillsdale College delves into the contentious perspectives of J.D. Vance regarding Europe's political and cultural trajectory. Adapted from a speech by Christopher Caldwell at a Hillsdale Leadership seminar, this episode critically examines Vance's assertions about Europe's retreat from democratic values and the implications for transatlantic relations.

J.D. Vance's Perspective on Europe

J.D. Vance, presented as a critical voice on European affairs, argues that Europe's most pressing threat is not external powers like Russia or China but an internal decline in military and democratic values.

J.D. Vance (00:33): "...the threat that I worry the most about vis a vis Europe is not Russia, it's not China. It's the retreat of Europe from some of its military most fundamental values."

Vance contends that Europe has become increasingly hostile to free speech and democracy, evidenced by persistent voter demand for reduced immigration, which paradoxically has been met with increased immigration policies. He draws parallels between Europe's political climate and that of the United States, highlighting a global struggle between populist movements and entrenched elites.

Populists vs. Elites: A Transatlantic Phenomenon

Vance identifies a clear division within Europe, mirroring the split in American politics between populists and elites. However, while populist movements in the U.S. have gained significant power, European populists have struggled to achieve similar dominance, with notable exceptions in Italy, Slovakia, and Hungary. Vance attributes this to Europe's robust mechanisms designed to thwart populist victories, contrasting with the U.S. political landscape where populists have recently secured power.

Emily (01:02): "Europe is split between two camps, so-called populists and elites... For the second time in three elections, populists have now taken power in the US... In Europe, they have a harder time ruling only in Italy, Slovakia, and Hungary."

The AfD and German Politics

A focal point of Vance's critique is Germany's Alternative for Germany (AfD) party. Despite its significant electoral success—becoming the second-largest party with 26% approval according to an April poll—the AfD has been systematically excluded from major forums like the Munich Security Conference. Vance's meeting with AfD leader Alice Weidel sparked controversy, as critics argue that ostracizing the party is necessary to prevent a resurgence of extremist ideologies reminiscent of Nazism.

J.D. Vance (02:32): "The AfD has now left them in the dust. And yet the AfD was kept out of the Munich Security Conference."

Vance suggests that the suppression of the AfD is less about preventing extremism and more about maintaining elite control, drawing parallels to how populist Republicans are criticized in the U.S. under the guise of combating issues like DEI, ESG, and "wokeness."

EU's Influence and National Sovereignty

Vance passionately critiques the European Union (EU), portraying it as a technocratic body that undermines national sovereignty. He argues that the EU has systematically weakened member states' military capabilities while promoting transnational economic dependencies and social policies that erode traditional national identities.

J.D. Vance (08:11): "The EU is a system run by and for technocratic elites... It shifts power from legislatures to courtrooms and regulatory bodies."

According to Vance, the EU's consolidation of power has rendered European militaries less effective and increased reliance on American defense commitments, particularly through NATO. This dependency, he argues, diminishes Europe's ability to act independently on the global stage.

Partisan Dimensions of US-EU Relations

Vance highlights the growing partisan divide between the United States and the European Union. He posits that since the Maastricht Treaty and the rise of the Democratic Party in the U.S., the EU has aligned closely with American Democrats, leading to harmonious relations when Democrats are in power. Conversely, when anti-EU or populist parties gain traction within EU member states, the relationship becomes strained.

Emily (09:09): "Since 1992, the year the Maastricht Treaty was signed and Bill Clinton elected, the EU has been in harmony with the Democratic Party in the US."

This alignment means that the EU often collaborates with progressive American policies, while populist leaders like Trump and Vance view the EU's actions as undermining U.S. sovereignty and interests.

Case Studies: Poland, Hungary, and Romania

Vance examines specific instances where the EU's interventions have altered national political landscapes:

• Poland and Hungary: Initially, populist parties like Poland's Law and Justice (PiS) gained power by advocating strict immigration policies and justice reforms. However, the EU's withholding of substantial funds in response to these policies effectively coerced these countries into compliance, as seen in Poland's 2023 elections where pro-EU parties swiftly regained control after fund releases.

• Romania: The sudden annulment of Colleen Georgescu's election victory, attributed to alleged Russian disinformation without substantial evidence, illustrates the EU's readiness to intervene in national elections. Vance interprets these actions as attempts to suppress leaders sympathetic to nationalist and sovereigntist ideologies, aligning them against U.S. interests.

J.D. Vance (05:10): "Just as troubling is what happened last November in Romania... authorities arrested him and banned him from the May vote."

The Concept of Wokeness as a Power Network

Vance connects the EU's regulatory overreach to the broader theme of "wokeness" as a pervasive power network. He argues that wokeness transcends mere cultural shifts, representing a network of governmental and corporate entities exerting control over societal norms and political outcomes.

Emily (16:XX): "Wokeness doesn't rest on convictions. It rests on the power of governments and employers to punish and threaten."

This perspective suggests that both the U.S. and EU elites utilize wokeness to entrench their power, manipulating political and social landscapes to maintain their influence.

Public Perception and Future Implications

A poll cited by Vance reveals significant distrust between Europeans and the American administration influenced by Trump and Vance's nationalist rhetoric:

Emily (Single timestamp): "In March, a poll of EU citizens found that 51% consider Trump an enemy of Europe versus just 9% who consider him a friend."

This growing animosity underscores the fraying transatlantic alliance, with Vance and Trump advocating for a reinvigorated European sovereignty that may operate independently—or even antagonistically—toward U.S. interests.

Conclusion

J.D. Vance's critique of Europe, as explored in this Imprimis episode, presents a stark warning about the erosion of national sovereignty and democratic values within the EU. By drawing parallels between European and American political dynamics, Vance emphasizes the risks of transnational overreach and the diminishing role of national identities in global politics. This analysis invites listeners to consider the balance between collective security and individual sovereignty, and the future of US-Europe relations in an increasingly fragmented political landscape.

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Notable Quotes:

• J.D. Vance (00:33): "...the threat that I worry the most about vis a vis Europe is not Russia, it's not China. It's the retreat of Europe from some of its military most fundamental values."

• Emily (01:02): "Europe is split between two camps, so-called populists and elites... For the second time in three elections, populists have now taken power in the US... In Europe, they have a harder time ruling only in Italy, Slovakia, and Hungary."

• J.D. Vance (02:32): "The AfD has now left them in the dust. And yet the AfD was kept out of the Munich Security Conference."

• J.D. Vance (08:11): "The EU is a system run by and for technocratic elites... It shifts power from legislatures to courtrooms and regulatory bodies."

• Emily (09:09): "Since 1992, the year the Maastricht Treaty was signed and Bill Clinton elected, the EU has been in harmony with the Democratic Party in the US."

• Emily (16:XX): "Wokeness doesn't rest on convictions. It rests on the power of governments and employers to punish and threaten."

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Final Note: For those interested in deepening their understanding of these complex geopolitical dynamics, subscribing to Imprimis offers a wealth of insights drawn from esteemed thinkers and leaders.

Transcript

[Emily]

Hi, I'm Emily, a junior studying rhetoric and media at Hillsdale College, and this is Imprimis. Here is the June 2025 issue is JD Vance right about Europe? By Christopher Caldwell, a contributing editor at the Claremont Review of Books. The following is adapted from a speech delivered on April 25, 2025, at a Hillsdale College national Leadership seminar in in Kansas City, Missouri.

[J.D. Vance]

Vice President J.D. vance's first major assignment from Donald Trump was to join a bunch of European leaders who thought of themselves as our close allies and to read them the riot act. This happened at the Munich security conference on February 14th. Instead of discussing armaments and armies, Vance said, the threat that I worry the most about vis a vis Europe is not Russia, it's not China. It's the retreat of Europe from some of its military most fundamental values.

[Emily]

Europe, according to Vance, had become hostile to free speech. It was hostile to free speech because it was hostile to democracy. And you could measure its hostility to democracy by the fact that for 50 years European voters had kept asking for less immigration and had kept getting more of it. Vance admitted that it reminded him a bit of the United States. Is Vance right about Europe and the west more generally? Vance is certainly right that the Europeans situation resembles ours. Europe is split between two camps, so called populists and elites. Neither of the two camps has a name for itself, so without any ill will, we'll use the names applied to each by their foes. The difference between here and there is that for the second time in three elections, populists have now taken power in the US In Europe, they have a harder time ruling only in Italy, Slovakia, and Hungary. As Vance sees it, that's because Europeans have worked to make populist victories impossible. He has been particularly critical of Germany in February, the main anti immigration party there. The alternative for Germany, AfD became the country's second largest, close behind the Christian Democrats. The Social Democrats, who are one of the most successful political parties of modern times, have been contending for power in Germany since the middle of the 19th century.

[J.D. Vance]

The AfD has now left them in the dust. And yet the AfD was kept out of the Munich Security Conference. So Vance went out and met with.

[Emily]

Their leader, Alice Weidel.

[J.D. Vance]

In so doing, he waded into a live controversy.

[Emily]

German progressives argue that ostracizing the AfD is necessary, even if it means excluding the AfD from legislative functions to which they are constitutionally entitled as the largest opposition party. Otherwise, Germany risks repeating the horrors of Nazism. The AfD's supporters counter that their party was founded in 2013 by a bunch of macroeconomists concerned about German bailouts of deeply indebted European countries. It can have little to do with the Nazis.

[J.D. Vance]

Of the war criminals long tracked by the Simon Wiesenthal center, only three appear to be still alive, all of them about 100 years of age.

[Emily]

Not much to build a revanchist movement around. And yet efforts to police Nazism have suddenly taken on a new life ten decades after Nazism's founding and eight decades after its defeat. While Vance has not said much on the subject, his opinion can be guessed. For him, the criticism leveled at the AfD in the name of anti Nazism is a lot like the criticism leveled at populist Republicans in the US in the name of DEI esg wokeness or civil rights. It is political sabotage masquerading as historical responsibility. Vance was criticized for meeting with Wydell, not without reason. A politician on a state visit is hosted by the government, not the opposition. His meeting with Weidell was a breach of protocol.

[J.D. Vance]

On the other hand, evidence for his way of viewing things continues to mount. In April, a poll by the Forsa Institute showed the AfD to be not the second but the top party in Germany, with 26% approval.

[Emily]

Then the Federal Office of Constitutional protection declared that AfD would be placed under heightened surveillance as a threat to human dignity. It is a troubling sign when a party's rise in the polls doesn't mean it's about to take office, but that it's about to get banned. Attempts to disqualify candidates have gone global, and the candidates who get this treatment tend to have a common anti establishment profile. There's Trump with his 34 felonies. There's Marine Le Pen, the top polling candidate for the next presidential elections in France, who was recently banned from those elections for an irregularity in the procedures for paying office assistance that her party established seven years before she became its leader.

[J.D. Vance]

Just as troubling is what happened last November in Romania. The same political establishment has ruled Romania since the Cold War. A populist candidate named Colleen Georgescu rose quickly in the polls by attacking this establishment and also by opposing the Ukraine war. Not only did the first round show Georgescu the big winner, but it also eliminated the Social Democratic prime minister, who had been thought to have a lock on the presidency. With voting already underway in the second round, authorities canceled the election and claimed that Jorgescu had been backed by Russian disinformation spread on TikTok. Not a scrap of proof was offered in fact, the President said that it was impossible to find hard evidence in cases like these, so voters would just have to believe the intelligence services. The election was postponed until May. By March, it was obvious that Georgescu was going to win the rescheduled election, too. This doesn't prove anything about any criminal charges, but it does prove that Russian disinformation was not responsible for Georgescu's win the first time. At that point, authorities arrested him and banned him from the May vote. Was it based on new evidence that might prove the allegations from the first cancelled election? Apparently not. These allegations were not even mentioned. A basic question emerges. Why does Vance care? Maybe he and Trump are in sympathy with Weidell, Le Pen and Georgescu. But Trump and Vance are nationalists, or sovereigntists, to use the newfangled word for it. They think every country has the right to choose its political system and its leader, even if these countries are being run. Even if these countries are being run corruptly.

[Emily]

So what? The reason Vance is bothered is that since the end of the Cold War and the rise of the global economy, foreign policy has become less national, more transnational and more partis. When Europeans influence a national election, they are also influencing international bodies to which the US is bound by treaty. The most obvious example is NATO. But there are also various block to block trading arrangements and informal groups that work together at summits. The importance of Germany and France is obvious. But Romania is vital too. Alongside Poland, it is the pivotal European country in NATO's attempt to support and arm Ukraine in its war with Russia. The American public has soured on this war and elected a president who was skeptical about it from the beginning. Electing such a president is exactly what the Romanians tried to do and arguably did in November. Had their decisions been honored then, the American understanding of the Ukraine war would have had much more credibility in NATO discussions and in EU conclaves.

[J.D. Vance]

So what does it mean that Romania's elites, possibly working with those in Europe and America, were unwilling to let that happen?

[Emily]

They say they are intervening so as not to help Vladimir Putin, but Vance suspects they are intervening so as not to help Trump.

[J.D. Vance]

By Europe, of course, we mean not the whole continent, but the European Union, based in Brussels. Since 1992, it has taken control of steering the politics of 27 nations. The EU is not a democracy. It usurps the sovereignty of various great nations. Before Americans heap abuse on it, they should remember that it is a project that America launched and abetted throughout the Cold War. Before Americans heap abuse on it, they should remember that it is a project that America launched and abetted throughout the Cold War. It was the pro American party of the European public that backed the dream of building an organization like the euro. They did so in the name of certain values they called Western, not Christianity, in which any European country could claim a great share, in which any European country could claim as great a share as America, but human rights, in which America had a better record, at least as people saw things late in the last century.

[Emily]

European right wing parties always distrusted the eu. They saw it as a form of Americanization. They were right to do so. The EU helped spread global capitalism after the mid-1980s, annulling all those quirky regulations that had made globalization impossible and made Europe distinctively European. The EU also, for better or worse, made possible the spread of NATO after the 1990s. President Trump's claim that Europe doesn't pay for its own defense is true if you look just at military budgets. But in a broader sense it is questionable. The US may have bought the heavy weaponry, but the EU has spent lavishly to develop its eastern flank Economically. It has decked out these post communist countries with everything from opera houses to traffic circles to feminist NGOs. All these things may be superficial, but they made it seem less absurd that countries like Romania should belong in a U. S led Western alliance in the first place. The EU brings benefits, but it does so by destroying national sovereignty. It seems to turn the countries it dominates into whimpering, simpering, dysfunctional shadows of the proud nations they once were. As Vance notes, 40 years ago, all these European states had really good militaries. Belgium and Austria, for example, would have robust tank brigades and well drilled air forces. EU membership has made such duplication look wasteful. So the national militaries have been allowed to decay and the large amounts of money saved have been poured into social benefits. Meanwhile, the EU has neither the political legitimacy nor the budget to start a military itself. Today, these countries spend just enough on F16s and F35s to convince Americans to take the whole job of defending Europe on themselves. As power shifted to Brussels, all of these European countries became less impressive in Yankee eyes and in their own. That gives a partial explanation of why the UK left the EU with Brexit. The Trump Vance view of Europe comes with certain ironies. Both really believe in national pride and national sovereignty. And yet the loss of those virtues in the nations of the EU has been one of the preconditions of America's claim to world leadership. Trump and Vance are now proposing to strengthen European nations By giving them their sovereignty back, even at the price of strengthening them against us, their imperial masters. The feeling of the new administration seems to be that there is not really any alternative. The European countries have grown too weak to help us defend the West. The EU is a system run by and for technocratic elites. During the financial crisis, which in Europe lasted for a half decade after 2008, Germany's Angela Merkel and France's Nicolas Sarkozy were able to use the EU's institutions to replace the government of Silvio Berlusconi in Italy with a technocratic one. They also blocked a referendum that would have allowed Greece to exit from the euro. The EU is off stage most of the time, but it has mighty strings to pull when it needs to. It shifts power from legislatures to courtrooms and regulatory bodies. It offers a way for alumni of the better universities to veto democratic decisions and private contracts. EU politicians like to call Brussels a regulatory superpower. That's a boast. This means that the underlying problem that is being hashed out between Trump and Brussels has a partisan aspect. Since 1992, the year the Maastricht Treaty was signed and Bill Clinton elected, the EU has been in harmony with the Democratic Party in the us. When Democrats are in power, American relations with the EU tend to run smoothly. More than smoothly, whenever Brexit style, anti EU parties have governed in any of the EU's member states, especially in Poland and Hungary. In recent years, U.S. democrats and their allies in the foundation sector have joined the EU in sanctioning, harassing and investigating these populist parties until they become more EU friendly. In 21st century Europe, the US has pursued not a national but a partisan foreign policy. Consider Poland and Hungary. After the migration crisis of 2016, law and justice, a Catholic populist, anti immigration party in Poland, won a powerful mandate at the ballot box. They pursued tight immigration policies and justice reform. They succeeded until Covid. But at the height of the pandemic, the EU passed a trillion dollar stimulus and rescue plan. Although this was meant to be an emergency fund with no political strings attached, the EU decided to withhold Poland's $60 billion share as long as the populists persisted with their immigration and justice policies. PIs was defeated in the 2023 elections by a pro EU party that was almost immediately able to get those funds released. Proportionately, it was as if someone had been able to withhold 2, 2 trillion dollars from the American economy until Americans agreed to vote a certain way. The Polish elections of 2023 were thus free, but they were not fair. Trump and Vance have taken notice when they see the EU not only not sanctioning but congratulating Romania for emergency actions that are orders of magnitude more undemocratic than anything the Polish and Hungarian populists ever did. Vance and Trump smell a rat again. They believe the EU's actions are not about values or good government or Putin, but about thwarting the us. At least in the Trump era, the EU is turning into a conspiracy to deprive the US of European allies and to sabotage the American position on the world stage. Trump's understanding of the global economy is of a piece with his understanding of the national economy. He sees both not as societies but as networks, networks where the borders between public and private, between domestic and foreign, are not always clear. This view drives Trump's thinking on everything from tariffs to government efficiency. Recently, when Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced he would cut 132 offices, he explained on substack that he was focusing his cuts on agencies that served as a platform for left wing activists to wage vendettas against anti woke leaders in nations such as Poland, Hungary and Brazil. MSNBC in turn accused Rubio of taking a chainsaw to America's soft power. Rubio's description of his adversaries as woke is a useful reminder. In the half year since Trump's election, the US appears to have overthrown wokeness, but other countries, with the possible exception of Britain, have not been convinced to do the same in Ireland, France and Germany, or wokeness is still in the saddle. This tends to vindicate the Trump view that wokeness is not a culture but a power network. Wokeness doesn't rest on convictions. It rests on the power of governments and employers to punish and threaten. A battle is underway. In March, A poll of EU citizens found that 51% consider Trump an enemy of Europe versus just 9% who consider him a friend. Europeans now say of the US what so many Americans said of Islamists during the George W. Bush administration, they hate our values. It's as wrong now as it was then. The problem is not values, but interests. American and European progressive elites have made themselves partisan actors in the other's politics, assuming Republicans and other populists would be too dim to notice. For decades, that assumption proved correct. Now that things are changing, friction is the natural result. To sign up for a free lifetime subscription to Imprimis, delivered to your mailbox or your inbox, go to Hillsdale. Edu Lifetime hello America.

[Mark Levin]

I'm thrilled, thrilled to announce my new 10 part podcast series, Liberty and Learning with Mark Levin and Larry Arne. Join me and my dear friend Dr. Larry Arne, President of Hillsdale College, as we dive deep into the founding principles of our great, great nation. In these challenging times, understanding our history and the ideals of self government is more crucial than ever. We'll explore the core of America's current crises, the changes in our government and what it means for our lives and liberties. From education to borders, citizenship to the separation of powers, we'll cover it all. Tune in to Liberty and Learning with Mark Levin and Larry Arn of Hillsdale College. So subscribe now and join us on this wonderful journey to rediscover the principles that made America the freest, most prosperous nation in history. The don't miss it.

[Emily]

Listen right now to Liberty and Learning with Mark Levin and Larry Arn at podcast hillsdale.edu. that's podcast hillsdale.edu, or wherever you find your audio.