Napoleon's Hundred Days (Archive Episode)

Summary

Summary of "Napoleon's Hundred Days" Episode on In Our Time

Released on August 7, 2025, by BBC Radio 4's In Our Time, hosted by Melvyn Bragg, this episode delves into the dramatic and pivotal period known as Napoleon's Hundred Days. Featuring experts Catherine Asterbury, Zach White, and Michael Rowe, the discussion explores Napoleon's return from exile, the political and military maneuvers that followed, and the eventual downfall at Waterloo.

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1. The Prelude to the Hundred Days

Escape from Elba

The episode begins with a historical overview of Napoleon Bonaparte's escape from exile on the island of Elba on February 26, 1815. Catherine Asterbury explains, "In 1815, Elba was in the Mediterranean, just quite near Corsica, where he was born and brought up. The British fleet then wasn't there to keep him in Elba. How did he escape and why did he escape?" [03:18].

Melvin Bragg provides context on Napoleon's earlier abdication and exile: “As part of the Treaty of Fontainebleau in early April 1814, Napoleon was exiled to Elba, but he was given sovereignty over the island, making his settlement there problematic and ripe for future conflicts.” [03:03].

Factors Enabling Escape

Zach White elaborates on the logistical aspects that facilitated Napoleon's escape: “There isn't much of a naval cordon to get through. As sovereign of Elba, Napoleon has his own little army and navy, including a brig which he used to facilitate his departure.” [04:10]. He also mentions rumors of French support during his voyage back to France, suggesting internal factions were sympathetic to his return.

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2. The March to Paris: Building Momentum

Gathering Support

Upon landing in France with a small contingent, Napoleon swiftly began amassing an army, eventually raising approximately 200,000 men. Zach White recounts a pivotal moment: “On the 7th of March at La Rothière, he faces a royalist army and declares, 'Go on, then, shoot me. Long live the Emperor,' prompting his former soldiers to rally behind him.” [06:27].

Strategic Recruitment and Propaganda

Napoleon's charisma and strategic proclamations played a crucial role in attracting support. Zach White notes, “He taps into the fear that the gains of the Revolution are being lost under Louis XVIII, issuing proclamations like, 'I'm the Savior, grab your tricolor flags,' to position himself as the defender of revolutionary ideals.” [08:21].

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3. The Allies React: The Congress of Vienna and Military Mobilization

Formation of the Coalition

Michael Rowe discusses the immediate and unified response from the Allies at the Congress of Vienna, stating, “Within five days of Napoleon's return, the coalition partners—Britain, Prussia, Russia, Austria, Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands—commit to fielding 150,000 men each to defeat Napoleon once more.” [10:56].

Strategic Considerations

Rowe emphasizes the Allies' strategic approach: “They have learned to defeat Napoleon by either avoiding direct confrontation with him and targeting his subordinates or by overwhelming him with superior numbers, as seen in their coordinated efforts resembling a 19th-century NATO.” [20:04].

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4. The Waterloo Campaign: Strategies and Battles

Napoleon's Strategy

Melvin Bragg outlines Napoleon's initial strategy to divide and conquer the Allied forces: “His Plan A was political, hoping the coalition wouldn't unite, but failing that, Plan B was to defeat the British and Prussian armies separately.” [21:19]. He aimed to target the British in Belgium first, leveraging the relative weakness and fragility of Wellington's multinational force.

Initiating the Battle

The campaign commenced with the twin battles of Quatre Bras and Ligny. Michael Rowe describes, “Napoleon defeats Blucher at Ligny but fails to decisively destroy his corps, allowing the Prussians to regroup and support Wellington.” [27:00].

Critical Mistakes

Rowe and Zach White highlight key missteps by Napoleon, such as the delayed orders to Marshal Grouchy, which cost him valuable time: “Grouchy did not engage the Prussians promptly, delaying until 4 PM on June 18 at Wavre, by which point a significant portion of the Prussian army had arrived at Waterloo.” [30:02].

The Battle of Waterloo

The decisive confrontation is characterized by intense and fragmented fighting. Zach White reflects on the chaos: “Stendahl's depiction of Waterloo captures the confusion and the elusive presence of Napoleon, symbolizing the disorder of the battle.” [33:49]. Melvin Bragg adds, “Napoleon makes critical errors, such as underutilizing Marshal Grouchy and mismanaging his commanders, which contribute to his downfall.” [29:59].

Michael Rowe elaborates on the final moments: “Despite leading from the front with his Imperial Guard, Napoleon's forces were ultimately repelled, especially after the Prussians reinforced Wellington, leading to his retreat and eventual surrender.” [42:23].

Notable Quotes

• Michael Rowe: “...the most important decision made in the 19th century is the decision made by the Prussians to retreat from Ligny northwards so they remain in touch with the British army...” [29:47].
• Zach White: “...it's a most ridiculous, astonishing achievement. Chateaubriand, the writer, said, how is it possible for one man to invade a country?” [07:51].
• Melvin Bragg: “He is not as sharp and not as, you know, you would have loved to have seen the Napoleon of a 1790s campaign...” [32:13].

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5. The Aftermath: Napoleon's Final Decline and Legacy

Political Maneuvering and Abdication

Upon retreating to Paris, Napoleon's political situation deteriorates rapidly. Zach White explains, “In Paris, the Chamber of Representatives refuses to acknowledge his authority, forcing him to abdicate for the second time and attempting to name his son as heir.” [43:51].

Exile to St. Helena

Melvin Bragg discusses his final exile: “Sailing to St. Helena, a remote island in the South Atlantic, Napoleon is confined under strict British guard, ensuring he cannot escape and continue his influence.” [45:51].

Legacy and Impact on France

Zach White assesses the long-term effects: “Napoleon's administrative legacy, including the education and legal systems, remains intact. However, his defeat leads to harsher treatment of France, including territorial losses and significant reparations, exacerbating national humiliation.” [47:35].

Aftermath for Europe

Michael Rowe reflects on the broader implications: “The Congress of Vienna's successful coordination during the Hundred Days laid the groundwork for a century of relative peace in Europe, avoiding the large-scale wars seen between 1814 and 1914.” [56:36].

Notable Quotes

• Melvin Bragg: “Losers do sometimes, you know, write their own history. And it's not just the winners.” [47:15].
• Michael Rowe: “Waterloo becomes embedded in popular culture. Figures of Napoleon and dolls of Napoleon and Wellington is nowhere to be seen...” [57:19].
• Zach White: “It enables him to reinforce that sense of the charismatic, legendary, remarkable by emphasizing precisely the arrival in Paris in 1815 as part of a broader legend of him as the savior figure.” [47:32].

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6. Bonus Material: Symbolism and Cultural Impact

In the post-main discussion, the guests delve into the symbolic representations and cultural legacies of the Hundred Days and Waterloo.

Theatrical and Propaganda Efforts

Zach White highlights Napoleon's use of theatre and cultural productions as propaganda: “Theatres in Paris reverted to empire-era operas like 'The Triumph of Trajan' to portray Napoleon as a benevolent ruler, reinforcing his revolutionary hero image.” [52:53].

British Portrayal of Napoleon

Michael Rowe discusses British propaganda: “British caricatures, such as those by James Gillray, perpetuated the myth of Napoleon's short stature and depicted him as a bumbling adversary, undermining his legendary status.” [55:12].

Cultural Embedding of Waterloo

Melvin Bragg notes the enduring legacy of Waterloo in places and popular culture: “Despite being called by different names in various countries, Waterloo is universally recognized and symbolized in numerous landmarks and cultural references worldwide.” [58:21].

Notable Quotes

• Zach White: “Theatres will carry on showing things that we might understand as royalists or the audiences would see as royalists. But in Paris, there's very much an attempt to reframe Napoleon as the revolutionary hero...” [54:31].
• Michael Rowe: “...Napoleon was not short. He was just a fraction above average height for the time. But the British very much play that game again after Waterloo...” [55:12].

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7. Conclusion: Assessing the Gains from the Hundred Days

Perspectives on Victory and Legacy

The guests conclude by evaluating who benefited most from the events of the Hundred Days. Zach White asserts, “Napoleon gains by being able to portray himself as a victim persecuted by reactionary forces, influencing French politics long after his defeat.” [49:41].

Michael Rowe provides a broader view: “Wellington emerges as a key victor, enhancing Britain's reputation and contributing to a more stable European diplomatic landscape through the Congress of Vienna's systemic approaches to conflict resolution.” [50:05].

Final Reflections

Melvin Bragg wraps up with insights on historical narratives: “The Battle of Waterloo is remembered differently across cultures, underscoring the multifaceted legacy of Napoleon and Wellington.” [52:28].

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Notable Quotes Overview

• Melvin Bragg: “He is not as sharp and not as, you know, you would have loved to have seen the Napoleon of a 1790s campaign...” [32:13].
• Zach White: “It is a messy. There's bits happening all over the place... And that's the end of the decision.” [35:40].
• Michael Rowe: “The British very much play that game equally well, both before Napoleon's return and after. James Gillray is the most obvious proponent of this through the form of caricatures.” [55:12].

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Closing Remarks

The episode concludes with acknowledgments and previews of upcoming topics, reinforcing the enduring fascination with Napoleon's legacy and the Battle of Waterloo's place in history.

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This comprehensive exploration of Napoleon's Hundred Days offers listeners a nuanced understanding of the political intrigue, military strategies, and personal dynamics that culminated in one of history's most famous downfalls. Through expert analysis and vivid recounting, the episode encapsulates the complexity and enduring impact of Napoleon's final bid for power.

Transcript

[Melvin Bragg]

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[Catherine Asterbury]

Times on its annual break. And we'll be back on BBC Radio 4 and BBC Sounds on the 18th of September. Until then, each week we're offering an episode chosen from our archive of over a thousand programs, which I hope you'll enjoy. Have a good summer. Hello. On the 26th of February, 1815, Napoleon Bonaparte escaped from exile on Elba, arriving in France with fewer than a thousand men. Three weeks later, he was in Paris and he raised an army of about 200,000 men, as large as any that the Allied powers could muster individually. And his best chance was to pick them off one by one. Somehow, victory escaped him at Waterloo and his escape to America was thwarted, too. He surrendered on 15 July, and so was exiled again. But on St Helena, where he wrote his memoirs to help shape his legacy. With me to discuss Napoleon's Hundred Days are Catherine Asterbury, professor of French Studies at the University of Warwick, Zach White Leverhulme Early Career Research Fellow at the University of Portsmouth, and Michael Rowe, Reader in European History at King's College London. Michael Rowe, why was Napoleon on Elba?

[Melvin Bragg]

Well, the Hundred Days. The subject of today's program, of course, is in the spring of 1815. We need to go back a year. We need to go back to March and April 1840. The once great Napoleonic Empire is crumbling. It's being invaded from all sides. It is in deep trouble. Napoleon's put up a good fight in France in early 1814, but, you know, the end is now drawing to a close and the Allies need to get him to abdicate and indeed his marshals around him who see that the empire is essentially finished, they need to get him to abdicate. He's still in a position to negotiate the terms of his abdication. He strikes a deal with the Russian tsar and he signs a treaty called the Treaty of Fontainebleau in early April 1814. And as part of that treaty, by the packages, that he will be exiled to Elba. But remember, he's not a Prisoner. He's not going to be a prisoner on Elba. He is given sovereignty over that small island. In many ways, it's a problematic settlement. It'll throw up issues which will obviously explode.

[Catherine Asterbury]

In 1815, Elba was in the Mediterranean, just quite near Corsica, where he was born and brought up. The British fleet then wasn't there to keep him in Elba. How did he escape and why did he escape?

[Melvin Bragg]

The Royal Navy. The British Navy is by far the largest in the world. According to some estimates, it's bigger than all the other fleets added together, but it's also engaged on the other side of the Atlantic. You've got the War of 1812, which is a misnomer. It stretches into late 1814, early 1815, and the British are sort of then demobilizing. So the Royal Navy is maybe less impressive in the Mediterranean than it might have been. And there's also an issue that the British are not quite sure whether they are Napoleon's jailers or not. You know, they hadn't really been part of this settlement about sending Napoleon to Elba. It had been very much Russian Tsar Alexander I, who had come up with that idea. So the British are a little bit unsure how to police this.

[Catherine Asterbury]

So how did he get through that? How did he get away?

[Melvin Bragg]

There isn't much of a naval cordon to get through. As sovereign of Elba, of course, Napoleon has his own little army and his own little navy, so he has actually a warship at hand, a brig, and he chooses his moment when the British agent is not present in Elba, so he's not really held in protective custody. So the escaping bit is not that difficult. There are rumours that on his voyage to France, that he's spotted by at least a French frigate, which somehow mysteriously turns a blind eye. So there is a suspicion that already on the French side, there are those who are willing to see Napoleon succeed in willing him on.

[Catherine Asterbury]

So he gets across and gets to France, then he marches up to Paris, and as we heard, he's got five or six hundred men. And he arrives in Paris with an army, we're told, around the 200,000 mark. Can you tell us how I manage that?

[Zach White]

When Napoleon lands on the south coast of France, he has just a very small number of men to hand to support him. He's faced immediately with a choice of which way to go to Paris. On his way down into exile. The previous spring, he'd almost been lynched outside Avignon. So he decides to avoid Provence entirely and takes the mountainous route through Gap Grenoble and onto Lyon on the basis that that's a safer route for him. As he goes, he gathers support, men come over to him. The most famous example of that is on the 7th of March at Laughrey, he's faced with a royalist army, which obviously 12 months earlier had been his army, and he says, go on, then, shoot me. So the legend goes, and all the soldiers then instantly say, long live the Emperor. Vive l'. Empereur. One of the things that Louis XVI had done when he took over in 1814 was to put a lot of the officers on half pay, reduce the size of the army. So you have a really very substantial number of people with nothing to do at the start of the Restoration. So they're actually quite enthusiastic at Napoleon coming back, because he's going to give them purpose. So he makes his way in every town he goes through. The enthusiasm for his arrival grows, and a bit like the Pied Piper of Hamelin, he sort of gains supporters on the way.

[Catherine Asterbury]

He's going through royalist territory, though, there must be some people who say, we don't want him here.

[Zach White]

The whole of France remains a little bit divided. It's not that instantly everybody is enthusiastically Bonapartist. When he arrives, there are still opponents to him. And when he lands, I think he doesn't know for certain whether the army or the people of France are actually going to back the final throw of the dice that he's made. But he starts to gain confidence, and by the time he reaches Grenoble and then Lyon, there's a real sense that he's got enough support and enough soldiers are prepared to back him that he can legitimately claim to be the people's choice as sovereign and march to Paris with confidence.

[Catherine Asterbury]

He's got this immense number of people called up at almost a moment's notice. How does it feed them?

[Zach White]

With difficulty. There's always the big question with all armies is how do you feed people? The route he's taking, though, he's sending an advanced guard each time through to try and secure the provisions. And actually, initially, that advanced guard is asking for three or four times the amount of food they actually need to give the impression that Napoleon is better supported than he is. So there's a little bit of spin going on right from the beginning about how much support he's got. And he's actually almost creating the myth as he goes.

[Catherine Asterbury]

It doesn't seem almost creating the myth. He's definitely creating the myth.

[Zach White]

Yes. It's a most ridiculous, astonishing achievement. Chateaubriand, the writer, said, how Is it possible for one man to invade a country? And it's part of the legend. One of the big things that makes Napoleon such a powerful figure even to this day, is how someone in a completely hopeless position in March 1814 can come back and reach Paris without a drop of blood being spilt.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Is this his charisma or his tactics?

[Zach White]

I think it's a combination of things. So I think charisma plays an important part. Is there really any tactic? He's trying to get to Paris as quickly as he can to scare the living daylights out of the Royalists. But I think it's also that he's tapping in to a fear that the gains of the Revolution from the previous 25 years are being lost under Louis XVIII. So he's tapping into an inherent anti clerical, anti monarchical, anti ancien regime feeling and is playing the revolutionary card everywhere he goes. So when he lands, he issues proclamations saying, I'm the Saviour, grab your tricolor flags, put your cockades back on. I. I'm going to free France of enemy involvement. The gains of the Revolution are safe with me. So he's trying to rewind the clock back to 1799, when he declared first time around that he was saving the Revolution.

[Catherine Asterbury]

There was the old Napoleon and the new Napoleon was there.

[Zach White]

When he arrives in France in 1815, he's very much trying to present himself as the heir to the French Revolution, that he is the people's choice to be sovereign, that the nation should choose who is on the throne, that he is a more legitimate ruler than Louis xviii, who's been placed there by the Allies simply because of his bloodline. So in part he's playing with this revolutionary tradition that the nation and the people should choose who's in in charge of the country. But he also recognizes that things have moved on a little bit since he was forced into abdication in 1814. So what he's also trying to do is suggest that he's going to be more liberal than he was first time around. So he tries to get more liberal, politically minded people, the press, for instance. The press and other politicians, people like Benjamin Constant, and offers a number of liberal concessions. So he re abolishes the slave trade, for instance. He brings back the Marseillaise, as yet the ultimate revolutionary symbol. He brings back the singing of the Marseillaise. He tries to suggest that he's the best of both worlds. He can give people some of the benefits of the Revolution and the ability for the people to choose, whilst giving them the glory and the stability that they enjoyed under the Empire.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Thank you. Is that Whyte? The Allies, meanwhile, are sitting docks at the Congress of Vienna, deciding that peace will break out when the news comes that Napoleon's at large again. What did they make of that?

[Michael Rowe]

In many respects, Napoleon's return comes at the worst possible moment for him, because the Allies, as you say, are convening as part of the Congress of Vienna. And by this point, the squabbling which is part of the opportunity that he saw, the fractious nature of the relationship between those Allies is starting to be resolved. So these guys are literally sat around a table at the moment that news arrives that Napoleon has returned.

[Catherine Asterbury]

How many countries do we have there at the Congress?

[Michael Rowe]

I would say seven or eight. Britain, most obviously, Prussia, Russia, Austria. But you've also got other nations that have been involved in this wider coalition warfare against Napoleon. So, for example, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands also have representatives. And very quickly, within a mere five days, these nations have come together and they make a very clear, steadfast commitment that each of them will field 150,000 men in the fight to topple Napoleon for a second time. One of the quite peculiar aspects of Napoleon's return is the extent to which he doesn't seem to have anticipated the strength of reaction by the Allied Powers to his return. The Allies have spent huge numbers of lives and also a vast amount of money, and I suspect amongst many quarters, actually the money that had been expended was more of a factor than the number of lives. But let's not Forget that around 4 million people die over the course of the Napoleonic Wars. The Allies have invested a huge amount in trying to topple him for a first time. And for him to return in the manner that he does is not something that they were prepared to take lying down.

[Catherine Asterbury]

And it was Napoleon they were against, not. The idea of a new France or.

[Michael Rowe]

Napoleon is absolutely seen as part of the problem, because as far as the Allies are concerned, there is a legitimate ruler of France. Now, Louis has fled to the Netherlands at this point in time. So to declare war on France is deeply problematic because as far as they're concerned, they have a friendly ruler who has just been ousted by what they would have described as a usurper. So the Allies are very particular to declare war on Napoleon the man, as opposed to France, the nation.

[Catherine Asterbury]

What sort of information is he being fed or is he getting hold of?

[Michael Rowe]

Napoleon actually tries to position himself as a man of peace when he comes back in 1815. And there's a very simple reason for that. He knows that the tactical situation hasn't changed that profoundly from when he was beaten in 1814. So he's acutely aware that if the Allies are prepared to come together, they can overwhelm him by force of numbers.

[Catherine Asterbury]

So he plays three to war. No, more than that.

[Michael Rowe]

More than that, because, as I say, the Allies are looking at fielding in the region of 700,000 men against him. And so he effectively proclaims that he doesn't want war. And this is part of what Kate is referring to about this debate about whether or not he is truly a changed man. Now, personally, I regard Napoleon as a hugely Machiavellian figure, and so my interpretation is that Napoleon doesn't want war in 1815 for a very simple reason. He's not ready for it. He needs the time to build up that force too. Much more than the 200,000 men.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Where's his money coming from?

[Michael Rowe]

From the French people, from taxation. But he's playing a very difficult game here because part of the unpopularity of the Bourbon monarchy came from the need to raise taxes in the aftermath of war. So he has to find a way to balance that whilst also appearing to be different.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Michael. Michael Rowe, can you give listeners some idea of the way in which he addressed the French people to get him where he wants to get to?

[Melvin Bragg]

Well, the fact that the Allies have declared Napoleon to be an outlaw makes it actually very easy for Napoleon to argue that he is not the aggressor that he is defending France.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Being an outlaw means that he can be legally killed at any time.

[Melvin Bragg]

Yes, it's something which outrages him, but they declare him to have put himself out of outside the framework of law, which means he can be murdered on a highway. So in a way, that is a propaganda win for Napoleon. During the earlier part of his regime, before 1814, he'd often use the phrase that he was fighting for peace. That hadn't really been plausible then. It is more so in the Hundred Days Campaign, how does he persuade people to come?

[Catherine Asterbury]

What are they going to get from it?

[Melvin Bragg]

Well, there are a lot of veteran soldiers, so he inherits this Royal army, on paper at least of about 200,000 when he returns to France. He doesn't reintroduce conscription. That would have been, I think, very unpopular. But he appeals to those veterans who had left the army to come back to the colours. So he gets back about another 65, 70,000 troops. And these are people who, many of them are veterans of many campaigns. They haven't been serving the French army for a few years and are yearning to get back to civilian life. They've known only military service for perhaps a better part of a decade. They want to get back to the kind of glory of serving, you know, arguably the best commander of all time. But I think where he does score is that he is not Louis xviii, as Catherine mentioned. He sort of positions himself as this great kind of defender of a revolution. He is now the people's emperor. He is defending the legacy of 1789 against, you know, regimes, Louis XVIII, but also Continental European regimes, which are actually very reactionary.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Seems to have thought himself as being tremendously welcome when he went to France. Was he deluded?

[Melvin Bragg]

He is welcome in many areas of France and Louis xviii, I think he does receive a bad press. I think he done his best. He reintroduces a kind of constitutional regime. But there are a lot of people around him, the so called ultra royalists who make many enemies both amongst ordinary French people and among example, Napoleon's former marshals, people like Marshal Ney, who see themselves or their wives as having been humiliated by these royalists who come back from exile and from having been marginalized. And so a great deal, many French people who are not pro Louis xviii.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Kate, what risks was he taking? Was and were those who followed him.

[Zach White]

Taking both for Napoleon and anyone following him, the risks are quite substantial. It's a win or lose situation. This is a final attempt by Napoleon to get control of the country once more. A number of those following him, though, do hedge their bets because it is not entirely certain that this gamble is going to pay off. So most notably, advisers like Talleyrand and Foucher are remaining in correspondence with the exiled court in Ghent to try and hedge their bets a little bit, because if it doesn't go well for Napoleon, they don't want to suddenly find themselves cast out again once the the monarchy is restored. So to a certain extent, you've got a number of people for whom this is the last chance and Napoleon is their only chance and they're going to fall wholeheartedly in with the enterprise. But others are a little bit more calculating.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Those who wanted him to get power and stay in power. What were they hoping for?

[Zach White]

I think the people who Support Napoleon in 1815 want one of two things. One is a strong, glorious France again. There's a sense that they'd been humiliated by the Allies invading Paris in 1814, imposing a king on them again not so very long after his brother had been guillotined. So there's, on one hand, there's that real desire for a better system, a better way for France to choose its own path. The other hand, I think people are wanting something that Napoleon can give that no one else can, which is a sense of purpose to where the country might be going next.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Zach White the Allies wanted to bring Napoleon to battle. They were vastly superior in numbers and they'd every reason to think it would be a bit of a walkover. What's your view of that?

[Michael Rowe]

I'd agree with that. But part of the reason for this is that they've learned the formula for defeating Napoleon in 1814. They've done this once already, but it's taken them a long time to reach that realization of how to win. The formula is twofold. One is, if at all possible, don't fight Napoleon, fight his subordinates. So it's very much sort of fight where the enemy isn't. Because there is this acute awareness that Napoleon has consistently defeated all of the leading commanders in Europe, bar perhaps Wellington. And as a result of that, there's an appreciation that if they fight Napoleon himself, there is a very good chance that he will work his magic again as a hugely gifted military commander and defeat them. The other solution to this problem is if you do have to fight Napoleon, fight him with overwhelming advantages in numbers, so that that negates the advantage that the man himself can bring. And as a result of that, the grand strategy in 1815 is to wait until all of these armies are in position.

[Catherine Asterbury]

The armies are from the Vienna Congress, precisely.

[Michael Rowe]

And then invade as a unified force. So in many respects the plan is to fight combined. And as one veteran put it to me a couple of years ago, the strategy at Waterloo and across the planned campaign for 1815 is very much a 19th century equivalent of NATO.

[Catherine Asterbury]

What do you actually mean by that?

[Michael Rowe]

The idea that this is a coalition warfare, as opposed to any individual nation holding the bulk of the responsibility for Napoleon's defeat. Quite often you will see this spun as a British victory or a German victory. And in reality, it is that combined national effort that is responsible for Napoleon's defeat.

[Catherine Asterbury]

He'd won 50 battles, hadn't he before? So there were every right to be rather wary.

[Michael Rowe]

They've learned this the hard way. It's not until 1813 at the Battle of Leipzig, which is the largest battle to be fought before the advent of the First World War, that the back of Napoleon's power is truly broken. For sure, he loses a vast number of men, half a million, in his disastrous invasion of Russia. But it's only at 18:13 that the realisation comes that Napoleon's sun is setting.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Michael. Michael Rowe, what was Napoleon's best strategy? What did he say? This is the way I'll do it.

[Melvin Bragg]

Well, if you want to defeat NATO, I suppose the easiest way is to break bits off it and play on divisions. Now, Plan A had been, you know, essentially political. The coalition partners in 1815 would not come together. That's failed, you know, politically. They say that they're committed to defeat Napoleon. So Plan B is to defeat their armies in detail, you know, so one after another. And that means taking on the British and the Prussians first because they are closest. They are there. They are in what is today Belgium.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Geographically close, walking back from Russia, and they're not working.

[Melvin Bragg]

Yes, the Russians are coming back from Russia, you know, so they've got a long way to go. And Russians don't tend to move very fast anyway, and nor do the Austrians, but they. They are the largest armies, the Russians and the Austrians, but they've got the furthest to come. So the plan is to strike north, to strike towards Belgium, to deal with the British and the Prussians first and within that campaign, to actually divide the British and the Prussians from each other. So to drive a wedge, physically position yourself in the sort of theater of operations between them and make sure they don't unite against you.

[Catherine Asterbury]

These are the two smaller armies, but they're well organised.

[Melvin Bragg]

They are well organised to an extent. Wellington does have a challenge. We refer to his army as being the British army, but it contains a mixture of nationalities and they are not the best of troops, not even the British contingents, but the best bit of British armies in North America fighting the United States, and it's on its way back. So these are not the Peninsula veterans, they're not veterans of Wellington's famous Spanish campaign. And the Prussians are their own problem. You know, they've tried to integrate soldiers from new territories which they've acquired at the Congress of Vienna, Saxony, the Rhineland. Now, many of those soldiers have actually fought for Napoleon rather than against it. So well organized, maybe in terms of their command structure, but a lot of troops who are either green or are a little bit demoralised.

[Michael Rowe]

There is a similar problem amongst Wellington's army as well, in that there is a large Dutch, Belgian contingent, and until very recently, Belgium has been part of a larger France. And even during the battles of the Waterloo campaign itself, you have soldiers fighting one another who have served alongside each other in earlier conflicts to the point that we can Pinpoint episodes where soldiers on both sides are urging the other to desert to the other's side. So it's a huge source of concern for the Allies that actually this coalition force might splinter apart and they're shifting.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Around in that part of Europe to line up for what they know will be a battle.

[Melvin Bragg]

Yes, I think.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Or they want to be a battle.

[Melvin Bragg]

I think the Prussians and the British, what they do have going for them is determination. I mean, out of all the coalition partners, I think the Prussians in particular are sort of fiercely, I think, not only anti Napoleon, but actually anti France. You know, they've suffered greatly during the Napoleonic Wars. If there is a weak link, I think, in the coalition, I would say it would be Nostria. They really want a balance of power between France and Russia, whereas the Prussians, I think, are out for revenge. And the British have also been very determined. So Napoleon, in a way, is unfortunate one that he's fortunate. He's dealing with the two smallest armies, the British and the Prussians. But in many ways, they're also the most determined opponents.

[Alex von Tunzelman]

This is history's heroes, people with purpose, brave ideas, and the courage to stand alone, including a pioneering surgeon who rebuilt the shattered faces of soldiers in the First World War.

[Unnamed Historian]

You know, he would look at these men and he would say, don't worry, sonny. You'll have as good a face as any of us when I'm done with you.

[Alex von Tunzelman]

Join me, Alex von Tanzelman for History's Heroes. Subscribe to History's Heroes wherever you get your podcasts.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Kate, with their lining up in Belgium, getting ready for what will be a big battle. Is that in the air? Is that inevitable?

[Zach White]

It's inevitable. The minute Napoleon has been declared an outlaw by the Congress of Vienna, war is the only possible outcome from that, because Napoleon has to strike first. He has to try and get his forces ready before the others can line up in coalition against him. He's forced to move faster than perhaps he would have wanted to go to war earlier than he would have wanted to. He doesn't have the money. The French borders have shrunk as a result of the first abdication and the restoration of the Monarchy. He doesn't have as many men to call on. He doesn't have the finances to call on, but still, his only option, really, is to hit hard and fast before the Allies can actually outnumber him and outmaneuver him.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Let's dig into that. Would you agree with that?

[Melvin Bragg]

Yes, I would. I think what he really wants to do is to Push the Prussians eastward. So they'll retreat towards the Rhine and towards their heartland and. And the British will do a sort of a 1940, as it were. It wouldn't be Dunkirk, it would probably be Antwerp and, you know, be forced to the sea and then across the sea back to Britain. And then, of course, you'd immediately have to turn south to confront the Austrians and the Russians. So you can envisage that campaign having gone all the way through 1815. And it's. I think the only way that Napoleon would have won is had the Allies fallen apart, one of them would have broken ranks. And it's not unrealistic that had happened earlier. It had happened in 1805, it had happened in 1806. He could pick them off one at a time. It doesn't happen in 1813. 1814, I suspect it won't happen in 1815.

[Catherine Asterbury]

So, Zack, Zach, White, let's engage. What happened when the battle started and how did the battle start? Whose were.

[Michael Rowe]

So the Waterloo campaign is actually a series of four battles. The first two engagements are the twin battles of Quatre Bra and.

[Catherine Asterbury]

And Ligny on the forearms crossroads.

[Michael Rowe]

Precisely. And then Ligny. Quatrebras is effectively Wellington's story and Ligny is Blucher's story, the commander of the Prussian army. And this is about Napoleon trying to achieve what Mike has just described, this notion that these two Allied armies can be treated like swinging doors, with the French army being the boot, forcing the two of them apart. And he tries to hold Wellington's force at Quatre Bras whilst attempting to destroy Blucher at Ligny. He manages to defeat Blucher, but it's not an overwhelming victory. There is some mismanagement of one of the French corps. That means that that corps marches from Quatre Bras to Ligny and back again without being engaged at either. And that's one of the critical moments at which I would argue Napoleon loses the Waterloo campaign before the guns even open fire at Waterloo. The other point at which he actually loses this campaign for me is the following day, on 17 June, when Wellington hasn't heard the news that Beluca has been defeated. The messenger carrying that dispatch actually gets caught by the French and shot en route. So Wellington is effectively a sitting duck at Quatre Bras, having managed to hold the line but doesn't know it. And it's only much later in the morning the news arrives, but Napoleon doesn't capitalise on that opportunity. That then enables both the Anglo Dutch force and the Prussian force to move north, parallel to one another. And over the course of the 17th, there's a constant communication back and forth between British and Prussian headquarters about whether or not they can stand a fight on the 18th. In the early hours of the 18th, and we're talking about 3am, Wellington receives a cast iron commitment from Blucher that he will march, come what may, with at least a quarter of his army, if not more, that basically marched to support the British. And that leaves Wellington with the opportunity to use his army like bait, stand at, fight at Waterloo and buy the time for the Prussians to literally come marching over the hill, and then they will be able to enact that strategy of fighting combined and crush Napoleon.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Michael?

[Melvin Bragg]

Yes, I think Zak's right. You know, a lot of the most important parts of his campaign happen on the 16th, 16th of June and the 17th of June. So a day or two before Waterloo and Wellington later on says that the most important decision made in the 19th century is the decision made by the Prussians to retreat from Ligny northwards so they remain in touch with the British army as opposed to retreating eastwards, which would have meant that they were moving away from Wellington's force. So the most important decision of the 19th century, according to Wellington, what you've.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Glossed over, not glossed over, but rushed past, is it seems, from my reading, is that Napoleon's making quite a few mistakes here, and he's not supposed to, is he? I mean, we think he's a magical myth man. What do you say to that?

[Melvin Bragg]

He does make important mistakes.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Such as?

[Melvin Bragg]

Well, for example, one of the villains, if you like, of a Waterloo campaign, at least on the French side, is somebody called Marshall Grouchy and he gets all the blame. And one of Napoleon's of less appealing characteristics is that he's very good at blaming everyone else for his mistakes. And Grouchy is sent in pursuit of the Prussians after Ligny. But Napoleon wastes about 10, 12 hours before actually telling Grouchy to get a move on and to follow the Prussians. And those are very valuable hours. Had Grouchy moved earlier and had Napoleon made his instructions clearer, chances are that the Prussians would have been sort of pushed out and away from the British.

[Michael Rowe]

And a classic example of that is to just take a moment to look at the timings of when the Prussians are engaged at Waterloo versus when Grouchy does in fact catch up with them. And it's not until 4pm on the 18th of June at Wavre that Grouchy finally manages to make contact with the Prussian force and begin to engage them. Now by that time, a quarter of Blucher's army is already at Waterloo and is advancing on Napoleon's right flank. So for all that, as you say, Grouchy gets a huge amount of blame. And the only way that he could have resolved this situation is if he developed the ability to fly.

[Zach White]

I think what we see in the course of the spring of 1815 and into the summer is Napoleon increasingly being unclear, delaying, nervous, both politically and in military terms. I think it's not just about the military situation on the battlefield at Waterloo. It's also before that politically he's hesitant, he changes his mind, he's not quite sure who to listen to.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Why is all that going on?

[Zach White]

It's a really good question. Why is Napoleon not the Napoleon we think he is? He's had this astonishing return to Paris and then dithers. He's not got the sense of purpose. He's somehow doubting himself and his advisors.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Michael.

[Melvin Bragg]

I mean he's also an ill man. I think we do have to look at his health and he's got issues, hemorrhoids which make it difficult for him to sort of sit on a horse for a prolonged period of time.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Time.

[Melvin Bragg]

So he's actually part, he's life of.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Balcony as well, doesn't he?

[Melvin Bragg]

Yes, I mean he's partly out of action, you know, during the battle of Waterloo itself, but he's, he's not as sharp and not as, you know, you would have loved to have seen the Napoleon of a 1790s campaign, you know, in, in 1815. And I think there the outcome would have been different. I genuinely do. He's, he's, he's not well. He's not well.

[Michael Rowe]

The other thing to bear in mind from a military standpoint is that he is only able to take into battle with him what is very much his B team. A number of his key supporters and advisors aren't either willing or able to join him for the Waterloo campaign. The foremost example of those is Marshal Berthier, who had served as Napoleon's chief of staff and was very much his right hand man. Napoleon was a man of vision when it came to campaign strategy, but it was Berthier who dealt with the practicalities of making that happen. Now Berthier chooses not to join Napoleon and then depending on your perspective, either conveniently or very tragically falls from a balcony and fairly obviously dies. And it's not clear whether that's a suicide or whether that was an assassination attempt. And as a result of that Napoleon is taking into battle with him commanders who are not always his best. There are exceptions to that, of course. Marshal Ney, who we've talked about already being an obvious example there. But it means that he doesn't have the right people in the right place at the right time to be able to interpret his vision and turn it into reality.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Is there a period where the heart of the battle takes place and he loses? Can you describe that? Or is it too many actions going on in too many different locations? Which is that, Michael, I mean, armies.

[Melvin Bragg]

Are larger in this period than they had been in the 18th century. And you have what is known as this system of corps. So you have armies which are spread out over a theater of operations. It really requires more than a great genius. You do need to have a system, a machine, a command structure, what we today call a general staff system to coordinate, and that isn't really fully developed in this period. It will be the Prussians, that is the Germans, who will come up with that structure later on in the 19th century. So I think we're in an interesting period in the history of history of war in the early 19th century, where in many ways armies have outgrown the structures which make them efficient.

[Michael Rowe]

It's also worth bearing in mind that Waterloo is an incredibly short campaign, even by Napoleonic standards. Napoleon invades on 15 June, and by 19 June his forces are streaming broken back across the French border. So it is very much in a very frenetic campaign over the 16th, 17th and 18th that Napoleon loses.

[Zach White]

This whilst you asking the question made me think about one of the most famous depictions of the Battle of Waterloo, a literary depiction by the author Stendahl, who in the Charterhouse of Parma describes the Battle of Waterloo. And the young hero goes from bit of the battlefield to bit of the battlefield, looking desperately to see Napoleon. He just wants to see Napoleon and he can't find him anywhere. It's just chaos. There's mud, there's smoke, he has no idea what's happening and the whole of the battle passes him by. And I think in some ways that encapsulates some of what Michael and Zach are talking about, that it's not a clear cut space. It's not, here's one line, here's another line opposing it, and somewhere in the middle you're going to work out who's lost the most men. And that's the end of the decision. It is messy. There's bits happening all over the place. The crucial point is that Napoleon ultimately leaves the field of battle.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Why does he do that?

[Zach White]

He sees that the game is up and thinks that if he goes back to Paris and strengthens the political field of power around him, he can regroup and try again.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Can we talk a little bit about the British Army? Not be too shy about it. How are they doing?

[Michael Rowe]

Well, the first thing to say about Wellington's army is that it's only about a third to maybe 40% British. And this is one of the misconceptions, Waterloo, that this is Wellington, a British commander, leading an all British force that is then able to defeat Napoleon. And that's simply not the case. About a third of it is Dutch, about 25% is Hanoverian troops. So this is a multinational force in its own right. It is very fragile. We see this over the course of the Battle of Quatre Bras, but also particularly at Waterloo, the Dutch Belgian troops are quite raw in many respects. They are propped up in many places by militia and Landwehr. These are not sort of your seasoned, ultra professional units that the British tend to field. And even amongst the British troops, as we've talked about already, there is a variation in terms of the quality. He has about a division and a half of Peninsula war veteran units, but those are not entirely hardened soldiers who have seen combat before. There is a spine of Peninsula war veterans that has then been supplemented by fresh recruits. And it is remarkable just how hard it is for Wellington's force to hold the line in the face of the French assault. The first attack that Napoleon launches very nearly breaks through, so he sends 11,500 men straight up his right flank and very nearly breaks the Anglo Dutch line, despite Wellington actually having one of his peninsular divisions in place. So even the best troops that Wellington has to offer aren't quite enough. And it's ultimately a British cavalry charge that is able to shatter that first assault. We've talked a lot about the Prussians here. The fact that the Prussians arrive late, which is something that we haven't touched on, but they do arrive later than intended, but arrive when they do, is really quite key in saving this very fragile force. Because Napoleon is preparing for a second assault in exactly the same place, but is then forced to take those troops and use them to fend off the Prussians. If you really look at the Imperial Guard attack as well, again a multinational affair, it's beaten back by a mixture of, most famously, the British Guards. This is where the Grenadier Guards get their name by defeating Napoleon's Imperial Guard. They don't actually face Napoleon's Grenadiers, they face the chasseurs, but it's a misunderstanding and a misnomer and nobody really wants to tell the British army that they should rename the Grenadier Guards the Chasseurs Guards. That would be quite unpopular. So one wave of the Imperial Guards attack hits the Maitlands Guards Brigade, but another wave ends up striking a mixture of Hanoverian troops and Dutch Belgian troops, including militia forces. So this is a situation where the line is tested severely. The very fabric of this Anglo allied coalition risks falling apart because when some of those Hanoverian troops break and pull back, they run straight into the British Light Cavalry who have drawn their horses up behind them, have drawn their sabres and are using their horses as a physical barrier and are threatening these troops, trying to force them to stand and fight in the face of the French assault. So the coalition very nearly crumbles before Wellington's own eyes. This is not by any means an all conquering British army that is able to sweep Napoleon from the field.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Do you want to develop that?

[Melvin Bragg]

Well, Wellington himself admits, of course, it is a near run thing, you know, that they come very close to being defeated. I suppose what I would add is that the British have an additional ally. They've got the Prussians, but they've also got the weather. In many ways the British need to hold a position. They need to block Napoleon from advancing north of Brussels. And it's Napoleon's task to sort of break through and in a way that the British have to hold a line. And, and the fact that it's kind of rained overnight the night 17th to the 18th means that the battle can only start later than Napoleon would have ideally liked. And that's because artillery can't be manoeuvred across quagmires. And also the cannonballs tend not to ricochet. Casualties through artillery fire in this period are caused chiefly by ricocheting cannonballs. And if the ground is sodden, they just bury themselves into it. So in many ways the weather, again one thinks, what if it had been dry for the previous days, would that have made a difference?

[Catherine Asterbury]

But what did come from it was that the British reputation was enhanced by this, wasn't it?

[Melvin Bragg]

The British role I think is made easier by the fact that the ground is sodden. It's easier to sort of hold a line. And Wellington does have a reputation for being a good defensive general. He's good at reading the lie of the land. He knows actually the terrain of Waterloo very well. You know, he's surveyed it the previous year when he was Working on fortification systems between Belgium and France, that is actually a great advantage. And he picks this sort of reverse slope, which means that he obscures, as far as the French are concerned, they can't actually see the British lines fully, and they're also shielded by the topography from artillery fire. So Wellington makes some very good decisions, it has to be said. On the eve of the battle, Napoleon's.

[Michael Rowe]

Mindset also fluctuates over the course of just the 18th of June. Actually, he starts the day incredibly bullish. He has a breakfast with his commanders, it's known as the breakfast of the marshals. And he sits down and he's adamant that he's going to beat Wellington. Now he is sitting with a whole series of commanders who have been beaten systematically by Wellington in the course of the peninsula War of 1808-14, where Wellington has this incredible string of victories over all of his major opponents, and yet Napoleon sits down and says, Wellington is a bad general and the British are bad soldiers, and this whole affair will be no more difficult than eating breakfast. Now, inevitably, he ends up being served a heavy dose of humble pie over the course of that. But there is also a moment when he rides forward right at the end of the battle, in the last sort of do or die moments, he makes this last ditch attempt to break the Allied line, having tried multiple times over the course of the day. But he rides forward with his Imperial Guard, his sort of glorified bodyguard. These are troops who have never been defeated. And it is questioned whether or not Napoleon actually intended to die at Waterloo by placing himself at the head of his men. Now, his staff ultimately turn around him and say, you need to stop. And he is forced to pull up his horse and then, as Kate says, ultimately cuts and runs for the French border.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Can we just say a bit more about that?

[Michael Rowe]

Of course, Napoleon is always somebody who knew the power of leading from the front. He was somebody who was a genius of propaganda and a genius of inspiring his soldiers. We've talked already about that personal touch, that ability to reach over to somebody, tug their earlobe, remember somebody by name from a previous campaign and have those interpersonal relations. And he understands the benefit of that. So it is thought that by riding forward with his Imperial Guard, he would have been inspiring his men in the process. But there is also this question that Napoleon knows the danger and by this point in the afternoon, it is very clear that the Prussians are bearing down on his right flank and this is an all or nothing attempt. So if he dies in the moment of defeat, as somebody who was always hugely aware of his own legend, the death in the moment of defeat enables him to do sort of the inverse of a Nelson and ultimately perhaps bolster his own legend.

[Melvin Bragg]

Yes, I mean, the appearance of the Prussians coming back to the Battle of Waterloo is devastating in terms of morale. And it sort of comes at the point also when the Imperial Guard makes that final advance, but is then beaten back by the British army, by Wellington's army. And of course, you have to remember the Imperial Guard has this sort of legendary status within the French army. So that is absolutely catastrophic for morale throughout the French army.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Kate, how did Napoleon's reign end then? What happened to his support in Paris?

[Zach White]

So when Napoleon flees from Waterloo, he heads back to Paris. At this point, he's not thinking that it's all over, it's one battle lost, not necessarily the campaign. What he wants to do is go back to Paris to try and shore up the political support so that he can regroup and start again. What he finds when he gets back to Paris is that the two chambers that he's created as part of an additional constitutional attempt to show he's more liberal than he was before, the two chambers, the Chamber of Representatives and the Chamber of Peers, have turned against him. The Chamber of Representatives have decided they're going to meet in permanence, as if they were a revolutionary assembly, and they are not going to give him his way. In fact, they end up forcing him to abdicate. He says, well, okay, I'll abdicate, but I name my son as my heir. And they go back and say, you've not really quite got this, have you? You're not actually in a position to decide who's going to follow you, but we'll take note of your wishes. So he's maneuvered out, maneuvered politically by the Chamber of Representatives, into abdicating for a second time. He then goes to Malmaison, which was Josephine's property. She died the year before. But he spends some time there with his stepdaughter Hortense, who's also his sister in law because she'd married Louis. Napoleon spends time there remembering his time with Josephine, and then heads to the west coast of France with a view to escaping to America. That's the first plan, is get to America, regroup, perhaps wait for another opportunity to come back in. Once Louis makes a mess of things again, maybe there'll be another chance for him to return to France. He's not able to get on a ship to America and will end up surrendering to The British and taken to Plymouth on board the Bellerophon, the Billy Ruffian.

[Catherine Asterbury]

But then importantly, he's sent to St. Helena.

[Melvin Bragg]

Yes, St. Helena is in the South Atlantic, so it's hundreds of miles from.

[Catherine Asterbury]

It's a rock in the south.

[Melvin Bragg]

It's a bit more than a rock, but yes, it's. It was run by the East India Company as part of their sort of route to India around the Cape. But escape from there is really impossible. You know, it's, it's surrounded by ocean, there's no way you'd get at the polling there. And he's not as sovereign on his own island as he was on Elba. He is a quite clearly a prisoner, you know, guarded by Hudson Low, who's again gone down in history as a bit of a villain. And he's guarded by a British garrison and there's a permanent naval presence in the South Atlantic. So the Allies and Britain chiefly amongst them, isn't going to make the same mistake twice. Now, I suppose at one level it means Napoleon can't escape, but it does mean that he can portray himself as a victim, which I don't think he could have done had he lived out his years in sort of comfy Mediterranean retirement on Elba. He is a Prometheus chained to the rock by vindict active enemies. So I think when it comes to the Napoleonic legend, that exile in St. Lena does Napoleon, in the very long term, I. E. After he's dead, a great deal of good because he writes.

[Catherine Asterbury]

His memoirs, which is all about how famous he was, but he's a great.

[Melvin Bragg]

Liberator, that he's been persecuted by these of reactionary conservative monarchs.

[Catherine Asterbury]

And that looks plausible, the loser getting the last word.

[Melvin Bragg]

Yes, yes. Losers do sometimes, you know, write their own history. And it's not just the winners.

[Zach White]

It enables him to reinforce that sense of the charismatic, legendary, remarkable by emphasizing precisely the arrival in Paris in 1815 as part of a broader legend of him as the savior figure.

[Catherine Asterbury]

How much of a setback was this for France?

[Zach White]

I think that's an interesting question. In many ways, Napoleon's administrative legacy survives. Is it really a setback? He's already created an education system, he's created a legal system, he's created an administrative system for the organisation of the country that survived more or less to this day. So whether he'd survived or not, his legacy is already intact by 1814. What happens as a result of his defeat is that the political situation is left hanging. 100 days is as much about a political discussion around constitutionalism as it is about a military campaign. The supporters of a more liberal vision for France that's in the as a result of the French Revolution are still there. They'll come out in the 1830 revolution, they'll come out in the 1848 revolution, by which point Napoleon's nephew is elected with 74 and a half percent of the vote as President of the Second Republic. There's a latent vein of Bonapartism that goes right the way through the first half of the 19th century.

[Melvin Bragg]

Michael France is dealt with more harshly after the Hundred Days than it had been in 1814. So in that sense, France is damaged by Napoleon's return. You have a second Treaty of Paris, we lose some territory, not very much, but they do have to pay a very large reparations bill. In 1815, they hadn't in 1814. They need to return looted artworks, artworks which are looted as early as the 1790s from places like Italy. They have to be returned in 1815. And France is also occupied in 1815 by a vast allied army of occupation, the Russians, the Austrians, the British and the Prussians, all under the supreme command of Wellington. And that occupation will last until 1818. So in that sense, France is humiliated. It's really very much in the Naughty Corner in 1815.

[Catherine Asterbury]

We're coming to the end now, but who do you think gained most from these Hundred Days, starting with you? Kate?

[Zach White]

I think in many ways the person who gains most from the Hundred Days is actually Napoleon because it allows him to rephrase, ironically, he's lost the battle, but it allows him to reframe himself as victim, as persecuted by the evil allies who won't leave him alone as the people's choice of sovereign in France. So that allows him a platform that will influence the shape of 19th century French politics.

[Michael Rowe]

Jacques I see things slightly differently. So on a personal level, I think Wellington is the great winner out of the Waterloo story for the fact that he has been integral to the defeat of Napoleon up to this point. There has been no question that Wellington is the second most capable commander of the age. And the fact that he has been successful in defeating Napoleon at Waterloo enables him to just leave that question dangling. Wellington was not a particularly modest man and demonstrated some, I would argue, pretty false modesty when people said, you know, are you the greatest captain in the age? And he said, well, no, Napoleon's surely the greatest. I think it's also important to look at this at a national and continental level. Nationally, Britain benefits in terms of an enhanced reputation as a result of being a key player in the Waterloo story, British forces have now had to face Napoleon directly in the field. And having been a key part of that, I think is something that certainly strengthens the British hand when it comes to negotiations for the Congress of Vienna. But there's also a European level to look at. And when we consider the Congress of Vienna, it is very striking that Napoleon's return in 1815 has focused minds, that squabbling that you see in 1814 is much less prominent. And there is a realization that going forwards, there needs to be a congress system where the different nations of Europe settle their differences by just sitting down and talking. Now, it doesn't last by any stretch of the imagination, but I think a case can be made that notwithstanding the upheaval that we see in the 1830s and 1840s in terms of revolution and repression, that inclination to find a better, more sensible diplomatic solution makes Europe just a little bit more stable in the wake of Waterloo.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Finally.

[Melvin Bragg]

MICHAEL well, I'd agree in a sense of both my fellow guests, both Napoleon and Wellington emerge with their reputations enhanced as a consequence of 100 days. But basing my judgment, if I had to make a choice, I'd base my judgment on the Battle of Waterloo. VISITOR CENTER GIFT SHOP Napoleon is everywhere. Figures of Napoleon and dolls of Napoleon and Wellington is nowhere to be seen, and. And Blucher isn't anywhere to be seen either. So I think I would choose Napoleon.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Well, thank you all very much indeed. Michael Rowe, Kate Astorbury, and Zach White. And to our studio engineer Neva Misiran. Next week, it's the German playwright Bertel Brecht, one of the giants of European theatre. Thank you for listening.

[Alex von Tunzelman]

And the In Our Time podcast gets some extra time now with a few minutes of bonus material from Melvin and his guests.

[Catherine Asterbury]

What would you like to have said you didn't have time to say?

[Zach White]

Kate okay, I'd like to talk about theatre of war. It's often you the Hundred Days is often used as a metaphor. War is used as a metaphor. Theatre is used as a metaphor during the Hundred Days. And I think it's an interesting phenomenon to think more broadly about the way in which theatre and Song and Prince are used as part of a propaganda war that Napoleon is trying to reinforce his regime and his supporters are trying to reinforce his regiment by influencing the hearts and minds of the people, particularly in Paris. So we see the theatres of Paris reverting to some of the hits of the empire. They go back to operas like the Triumph of Trajan, which was the idea was that they would show Napoleon as a benevolent ruler. They bring back revolutionary plays where the audiences see the connections between the plays and the present day. They started to write an opera about Alexander the Great, which was obviously a direct reference to the Napoleon that they knew of the return of Napoleon. So the real attempt to try and influence people through what they're watching on the stage doesn't always work. A town like Bordeaux, where Louis XVI's daughter, the Duchess of Angouleme, Marie Therese, is trying to lead royalist opponents to Napoleon, their theatres will carry on showing things that we might understand as royalists or the audiences would see as royalists. But in Paris, there's very much an attempt to reframe Napoleon as the revolutionary hero, to reinforce the propaganda that's going on in the press and song and in print.

[Michael Rowe]

And the British play that game equally well, it has to be said, both before Napoleon's return and after. James Gillray is the most obvious proponent of this through the form of caricatures. In fact, that perception of Napoleon being short is in part influenced by the works of Gillray. It's also a misunderstanding in terms of French measurements versus British measurements. But Napoleon was not short. He was just a fraction above average height for the time. But the British very much play that game again after Waterloo, and they position Napoleon almost like a naughty schoolboy who has his backside thrashed in one print by Wellington and Blucher.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Anything from you?

[Melvin Bragg]

What I find particularly interesting is the fractious nature of French politics. And something we didn't discuss in the program was the White Terror. So this is the second Restoration. This is when Louis XVIII comes back for the second time in the baggage train of the Allied armies. And whereas in 1814 there had been a certain recognition that France had to be governed from a centre, you needed to appeal to an extension extent to left and right. The regime which comes back in 1815, after Waterloo, is much more vindictive. And you get a purge of Bonapartists and you get the execution of Marshal Ney and you get massacres, especially in the south of France, of people who had been deemed to be Republican. You have a massacre of Arabs in Marseille because they had been associated with the Napoleonic regime, the sort of ambulance who had been brought back from Egypt. So in many ways, I think that's really quite devastating for bringing France together after 1815. And of course, France, you know, throughout the 19th century is going to have these violent swings and regime changes, and I think 100 days contributes to that.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Is there anything importantly Symbolic about the fact that there's almost a century where I'm training on glacier, where there are no. Doesn't seem to be any major, major wars between 1814 and 1914.

[Melvin Bragg]

I think the Congress of Vienna does a good job and, you know, Talleyrand is France's representative there and he says that everyone was moderately dissatisfied, but everyone. So no one is an outright winner at the Congress of Vienna. No one is utterly humiliated. So, you know, one can compare that with the Peace Treaty of Versailles, you know, in many ways is sort of catastrophe. So I think it doesn't leave a large set of revisionist powers, I.e. powers that can't live with that settlement. So, yes, you have a hundred years of no world war, you have smaller wars, but nothing on the scale of the First World War till 1914.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Jacques.

[Michael Rowe]

I think what's also quite remarkable is the way in which Waterloo becomes embedded in popular culture. Somehow we got through this entire recording without mentioning Abba, who open that famous song Waterloo with my, my. At Waterloo, Napoleon did surrender, which of course he didn't, as we've discussed. And in fact, the one thing that people think they know about Waterloo is, is exactly that. So there is a strong kind of place for Waterloo that is written across the landscape, not just of popular culture, but physically across the landscape of the world, whether it's buildings, bridges, railway stations or whether it's towns and cities around the world. The name Waterloo means something to people.

[Melvin Bragg]

Of course, it should be called the Battle of Mont St. Jean, which is what Napoleon called it. You know, Waterloo is actually some distance from the battlefield and it's, in a way, it's a British appropriation, Wellington's appropriation of that battle. And of course the Prussians call it Belall Alliance. So.

[Michael Rowe]

Absolutely that was Blucher's preference and it's a very nice metaphor. So La Belle alliance works in two ways, because French Command HQ during the Battle of Waterloo was actually based at La Belleon, so it's a small inn in the southern portion of the battlefield, but it very much speaks to that coalition nature of warfare, which I think is why Blucher liked the poetic nature of it, emphasising the fact that Waterloo was the result of a fight combined coalition mentality coming to fruition. And as you say, the Germans to this day refer to this battle not as Waterloo, but as the Battle of La Belle Alliance.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Well, our producer, Simon Tillerson, is about to enter.

[Michael Rowe]

Who likes your coffee? I'm good.

[Catherine Asterbury]

I'll have tea, please.

[Melvin Bragg]

Yes, coffee, Coffee.

[Zach White]

Black tea?

[Melvin Bragg]

Black tea.

[Michael Rowe]

If I could have some more water? That'd be great.

[Melvin Bragg]

Thank you very much. In Our Time with Melvin Bragg is produced by Simon Tillotson and it's a BBC Studios audio production.

[G]

I'm David Runciman and from BBC Radio 4. This is Post War from the Cradle.

[Catherine Asterbury]

To the grave, they said 80 years.

[G]

On, we're telling the story of the 1945 election and the creation of post war Britain.

[Michael Rowe]

There must be a revolution in our way of living.

[G]

This is the Britain that many of us grew up in and which still shapes an idea of who we think we are.

[Zach White]

Even Winston Churchill thrown out.

[Catherine Asterbury]

All right, you may have won the war, but you're going to win the.

[G]

Peace post war with me. David Rumpcman Listen on BBC sounds.

[Catherine Asterbury]

Can we have the Britain we desire?

[Alex von Tunzelman]

This is history's heroes. People with purpose, brave ideas and the courage to stand alone, including a pioneering surgeon who rebuilt the shattered faces of soldiers in the First World War.

[Unnamed Historian]

You know, he would look at these men and he would say, don't worry, sonny, you'll have as good a face as any of us when I'm done with you.

[Alex von Tunzelman]

Join me, Alex von Tunzelman for History's Heroes. Subscribe to History's Heroes wherever you get your podcast.