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In Our Time
The Battle of Valmy
00:47:43
Melvyn Bragg and guests discuss the day in 1792 when the French Revolution risked defeat.
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Melvin Bragg
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Podcast Announcer
BBC Sounds Music Radio Podcasts this is.
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Melvin Bragg
In our time from BBC Radio 4 and this is one of more than a thousand episodes you can find on BBC Sounds and on our website. If you scroll down the page for this edition, you find a reading list to go with it. I hope you enjoy the program. Hello on the 20th of September 1792 at Valmy, 120 miles to the east of Paris, the French won one of the most significant battles of recent centuries, so saving their revolution. Ranged against them were the Prussians, Austrians and French royalists heading for Paris to free Louis XVI and restore his power. Thanks to the morale of recruits, including memorably from Marseille and the professional soldiers they joined, the French forced their opponents to retreat and the very next day, back in Paris, the National Convention abolished the monarchy and declared the new Republic. With me to discuss the Battle of Valmy are Michael Rowe, Reader in European History at King's College London Heidi Merkens, a lecturer in Modern European History at the University of Aberdeen, and Colin Jones, professor emeritus of History at Queen Mary University of London. Colin why had France gone to war in April 1792?
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Michael Rowe
If we go back to July 14th and the storming of the Bastille and what followed on from that, we see a new type of phenomenon coming into international affairs, and that was clearly in conflict with the way that all the other powers of Europe thought about it. So in a way a move towards war became not inevitable, but certainly likely the longer the revolution went on. And in fact, from late 1791 to early 1792 there was a standoff effectively between France, still a monarchy, and the rest of Europe, but particularly the Holy Roman Emperor, the ruler of Germany, particularly over the collection of troops, German troops on the French frontiers, along with armed forces led by in fact the brother and the cousins of the King, Louis xvi, who seemed a very threatening force there, and there was fear that they would intervene. Their refusal, the Emperor's refusal to withdraw those troops, led Louis XVI to declare War on the Holy Roman Emperors. He would become, on 20 April 1792.
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Colin Jones
Did that seem to be a rather foolish move on his part?
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Michael Rowe
Many people thought it was very foolish, and in retrospect, most historians think it was pretty foolish too. But at the time, there are very few people who seemed against it. In fact, funnily enough, one of those people was Maximilien Robespierre, famously the architect of terror, but who at this stage said honestly, quite accurately, I think no one loves an armed missionary. To go abroad and to try and sell the revolutionary message to the rest of Europe seemed ridiculous and fraught with all sorts of dangers. But most of the revolutionaries wanted war because they felt a short conflict would put an end to this intransigence of the Allied powers and also force the King and his supporters within France to support the revolution. It must be said that the King and particularly his supporters at court, wanted warfare for the same reason, a short war, but in which the victor would be the Allied forces, and this would end the revolution. They'd be able to put Louis XVI back on his throne and possibly themselves partitioned parts of France as well.
- [04:01]
Colin Jones
And they called up recruits from all over France, including from Marseilles, who brought a tremendous. What became a great propaganda song and seriously important in the affairs of the battle.
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Michael Rowe
Yes, the Marseillaise. This is really the moment when the Marseillaise makes its entry into history. It was a war song written by Roger Lelidle, as we all know, and it was written in Strasbourg, in fact, in April 1792, just as the war was being declared. But it became very famous straight away. It spread through France, and we know that a recruit, a national volunteer for the army from Montpellier, went to Marseille in the summer of 1792 and started singing this song, and the Marseillaise picked it up. Many of the national volunteers from Marseille then were marching up to Paris to support the Revolution, to defend Paris, and maybe as many did actually go on to fight the enemy, and they took that song with them when they arrived in Paris. Paris, everyone realized the Marseillais, the men from Marseille, were singing this song. It's interesting also because in some ways, the first revolution, genuinely revolutionary song that everyone was singing in, in Paris and elsewhere from 1790 onwards was the famous, you know. But that's a sort of dancing song. When you hear the Marseillaise, you know, that's. You can hear the boot tramp, you know, it's a marching song. It's that sort of song. So, yeah, this is the moment when the Marseillaise really makes it.
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Colin Jones
But it did have an effect, did it, on the battle, on the morale of both sides in different ways?
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Michael Rowe
Definitely. Well, we're going to talk about this, I'm sure, but my sense is that it was a very important psychological weapon actually in the conflict of September 1792. Everyone knew this, Everyone, you know, they were singing it, they were singing that. The. So these revolutionary songs were sweeping over the battlefield almost as much as the cannonballs were later on and giving a bit of sort of psychological edge to the French. And it was really a bit unsettling for the Prussians because the Prussians had gone into the battle, onto the battlefield, thinking it's going to be a walkover. These guys are undisciplined. Earlier on in the summer, there'd been a famous conflict in which the French literally not only ran away, but murdered their commander. There have been all the September massacres, which we're going to talk about, I'm sure, in Paris as well. So there's this feeling that they were up against this very highly trained professional army of the Ancien regime, was up against a rabble of undisciplined, you know, very enthusiastic people, but they would be wiped off the field of battle altogether.
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Colin Jones
Heidi, who were the forces of the. Let's call them the coalition, they call themselves the coalition invading France and why did they do it?
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Podcast Announcer
Yeah, the Holy Roman Emperor, he joined forces with the King of Prussia and the Prussian armies and the Austrian armies would go into battle here or go into this campaign together. So we've got about, in July, August 1792, we've got about 80,000 troops gathering in the Rhineland. So we've got a core here of 42,000 Prussian soldiers, well trained, well disciplined, and we've got two armies protecting their flanks and both are Austrian troops led by very experienced commanders. And I can only say, you know, I completely agree with Colin. The expectation was that this would be basically a walk in the park before they even went into, you know, across the frontier. The expectation was that the French soldiers are not disciplined, they would just run away. So this army, the Allied army, was commanded by the Duke of Brunswick and the battle plan was basically to, you know, sweep away the French troops and then march directly for Paris with the aim at this stage to rescue the French royal family, because there was a sense that the royal family's lives, they were in imminent danger, especially after the storming of the Tuileries in June. The army was then joined by emigres forces as well. Later In August, about 4,000 4,500 strong, including the brothers of Louis XVI, Comte d'Artois, Comte d'a Provence. And they came with their own agenda re establishing monarchical authority in France, maybe even before the army would reach Paris.
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Colin Jones
And at the head of, let's call it, the coalition, was the Duke of Brunswick. Who was he and how experienced was he as a general?
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Podcast Announcer
Charles William Ferdinand, Duke of Brunswick. He was a very experienced general. He was born in 1735, so had been in the business for a long time. He was a field marshal with the Prussian army. He had started his military career in the Seven Years war in the 1750s, shown his leadership qualities. 1759, 1760, in various battles. The Duke of Brunswick was actually quite popular in Britain because he had fought with allied British troops. But he was also married to an English princess, Augusta, sister of King George iii, because of the personal union, because the Hanoverian branch of his family and Great Britain. So he was a seasoned military commander. His last battle would actually be the battle of Jena and Auerstedt in 1806, and he was 71 and he was wounded in battle and died of these wounds afterwards. So nobody clearly to stand just in the back and, you know, shout commands, but he was in the thick of the action. Command was given to a very seasoned and rational commander.
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Colin Jones
Thank you, Michael Rowe. Can you tell us about his plan? He delivered a manifesto, didn't he?
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Melvin Bragg
Yes, the famous or infamous Brunswick manifesto. Probably not penned by him, but it bears his signature in which he threatens, you know, destruction upon Paris should anything happen to the French royal family, who are, you know, at this stage of a revolution, essentially being imprisoned. You know, they're, they're in a place called the Temple in Paris.
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Colin Jones
Who would imprison them?
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Melvin Bragg
Well, the revolutionary government, who I think quite correctly suspect them of treason. They've been in, in communication with the brother of the Queen of France. Marie Antoinette is the sister of the Emperor and he's. His troops are amongst those who are marching into, into France. So you've got a head of state who's in effect committed treason, as indeed has his spouse. So they've been imprisoned and there's genuine fear on the coalition side that they will come to harm, you know, it'll be murdered, something which of course will happen eventually. And Brunswick issues this manifesto, you know, threatening destruction upon Paris and Parisians if any harm should come. It has, of course, as one would possibly expect, the exact opposite effect.
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Colin Jones
Paris was an undefended city, wasn't it? So when he said he would walk in and they could Run amok. He could have done that.
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Melvin Bragg
Yes. I mean, Paris's fortifications of the medieval fortifications had been demolished under Louis XIV, so about 100 years earlier, and faith had been placed not in the walls of Paris, which didn't exist anymore, but in border fortifications built by a very famous military engineer, somebody called Vauban. So France and the northeastern frontiers ringed by these very powerful fortresses. And it was felt that that was suff to keep out an invading army once you punched through them. Yes, theoretically, you could march into Paris, mind you, to have half a million, possibly enraged revolutionaries to deal with.
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Colin Jones
At that point, the coalition under Brunswick moved into France. What success did they have at first?
- [11:57]
Melvin Bragg
They do have successes, and it's partly, as Colin mentioned, because the French army, its performance is dismal, it runs away. They murder their own commanders because they're suspected of treason, of being. Being royalists. Some of them indeed are. The most famous Frenchman in this period is probably Lafayette, hero of the American Revolutionary War. He defects. So it does seem that the French army will fall apart. Longueville, which is an important sort of fortified point that surrenders to Brunswick even More seriously on the 2nd of September, you get the surrender of Verdun, which is a key fortress. Of course, it's famous for being a fortress in the First World War when it doesn't surrender. So, yeah, I mean, it does seem the route, the path, the road to Paris is open and that then sparks this complete panic in the French capital.
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Michael Rowe
Yeah, I think that's a really important point to pick up, that the Brunswick declaration, which in many ways is a sort of routine declaration, which one makes as the commanding officer going into, just to try and keep people quiet, has completely the opposite effect in Paris, because Paris.
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Colin Jones
So he threatened them and they reacted against.
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Michael Rowe
Exactly, yes. And I think he didn't realize the extent to which Parisians had been completely enraged by the processes of the Somme, in particular the overthrow of the King, and then this threat reigning in on them, that they're going to be pursued and punished with exemplary forms of punishment and avenge basically, if any harm falls on the King. And then as a result, you get this extraordinary event of the September massacres, where gangs of Parisians go round the prisons of Paris and kill probably about half the prison population, 1200, although most people at the time think it's a much bigger figure. And the rationale behind that, which people were saying at the time, is that basically we are going to fight. We volunteered for the front, but before we go, we want to make sure that there's no plotting within Paris. And these fifth column aristocrats or clerics or whatever in the prisons can be neutralized, in fact, before they leave the city. But that also adds to this feeling on the German side that basically this is a rabble, they're undisciplined, they can't be controlled, they're just completely out of control and they will therefore militarily pose no problem.
- [14:18]
Colin Jones
What happened in Paris? Was there any sense of it reorganizing in a more formal, militaristic way?
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Michael Rowe
I think what happens is that basically the national assembly accepts that the King has been removed. They have to decide then what to do with him. But without a proper executive arm, they immediately appoint a set of six ministers and provisional executive council. The most significant figure is actually Danton in that, and he's a major, major figure, Danton, in mobilizing and giving a sense of commitment and engagement to the French. But at the same time, the Legislative assembly, the national assembly, is being competed for power by the Commune, the Paris sur Commun. So you have a very strange and very unsettling and unusual situation where you've got a sort of dual power situation right at the heart of the revolution.
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Colin Jones
Heidi, let's start to talk about Valmy. The Battle of Valmy. There's a famous quotation ascribed to Goethe which says, from this day forth begins a new era in the history of the world. We have your comment on that.
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Podcast Announcer
Yeah. So Goethe was actually an eyewitness. That's so interesting. He joined the campaign. He was traveling with his prince, the Duke of Weimar, who was commanding a regiment. And Goethe, he wasn't really a political person. He was the poet, philosopher. He looked at the whole affair with different interests, but he was certainly not sharing the hardships of soldiers. He was traveling quite comfortably in his carriage and on horseback. And he had a manservant who made sure he had enough to eat. But he was interested in the Battle of Valmy. He observed it, he described the sound of cannon, and he wrote about all of this in his memoirs and in his recollections of his French campaign. He wrote about this around 1820, and it was published in 1822. And this is where he says, I sat with soldiers after the Battle of Valmy. And they were all terribly demoralized. And he gave them this bon mot about, you know, the. The New World era starting. It's a fantastic quote. We don't know if he said this in 1792, but from the perspective 1820, when Goethe looked back on the campaign with 30 years of hindsight, it certainly made complete sense to say that Valmy was there, a turning point, a moral turning point in French history and world history.
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Colin Jones
Michael, let's come to Valmy, the battle and what happened on the 20th of September in 1792.
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Melvin Bragg
Well, one thing happens is it's bad weather, and so many sort of key battles in this period seem to be affected by rain. And you have rain on the day of Valmy and you also have mist, which obscures the French position so that the Prussians and the French don't see each other. In many ways, it's an odd battle. If you look at the actual map, you think you've got the map the wrong way round, because the Prussians are actually closer to Paris than the French are. So the French have actually got behind the Prussian lines of communication through clever manoeuvring. And arguably that actually already dooms the Prussian effort because it means that their lines of communication back to their territories in Germany have been cut off. The French occupy something which is maybe calling it a hill is a bit flattering. It's a slight rise of the ground, famously a windmill, which they then demolish, and they position themselves there.
- [17:53]
Colin Jones
A windmill, because they didn't want it to be a marker for.
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Melvin Bragg
Yes, it'd been spectacularly stupid to have kept that windmill in position. And they occupy high ground. The mist burns away, if you like, in the sun, and the French position is revealed. And, you know, we've talked a little bit about morale on the French side being high. And in the context of Marseillaise, I think something which also impresses the Prussians is that the French are drawn up in disciplined formations. You know, they clearly know what they are about. And the Prussians advance. There's an exchange of artillery fire. The sodden growl means that actually the cannonballs don't ricochet and create the sort of casualties that they might have done. So it's a battle which has, by the standards of the day, surprisingly few casualties, you know, low hundreds on each side. The big achievement is that the French don't run away. They hold their ground, they hold their position. Brunswick, quite wisely, you know, decides not to press the point.
- [18:55]
Colin Jones
But before he does that, let's go back to the French here. Having had a reputation as people who run away, murdered their leaders and so on, all of a sudden, we see them as a force that's well ordered, that's particularly good. Militarily, we're supposed to be one of the best military outfits in Europe, so.
- [19:13]
Michael Rowe
How can we Square that you're quite right. This is a bit of a puzzle, but yes, actually, I think the reason behind that is that although they think the Germans don't make much of this at the time, a heavy corps, large corps, at the heart of the army still in late 1792, is still men who were soldiers under the Ancien Regime in the early part of the revolution. So the volunteers have come in late, they've added enthusiasm, ardor, not to say that the soldiers themselves aren't part of the revolution as well. And probably the most important, certainly the most important on that particular particular day are the artillery.
- [19:50]
Colin Jones
Yes.
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Michael Rowe
Now, the artillery under the Ancien Regime had been pretty radically reformed in many ways, and the French artillery are generally seen to be the best in Europe, although there's much emigration, particularly from the noble dominated cavalry, and to some extent from the infantry commanders. Emigration and the loss therefore of command is less evident among the artillery. So the artillery in some ways is reformed and re energized version of the artillery of the Ancien Regime.
- [20:21]
Colin Jones
How did they reform and re energize it?
- [20:24]
Michael Rowe
Well, basically, the army doesn't sit in its barracks twiddling its thumbs. It reads the newspapers, it attends revolutionary clubs. And in fact, through 1790 and 91, there's a whole set of disputes. The biggest one is in Nancy in late 1790, where men mutiny against their officers because they say they're aristocrats, they're monarchists, they're royalists, they're not really committed to the revolution. So I think this is, you know, they have been changed as well over time. I think the other thing, in terms of the technical side, I think Michael could probably talk better than me on this, is that the type of artillery which evolves in France, particularly under the military theorist Gribowval, is the sort of lighter artillery that can be moved around on the battlefield. And this is generally something which is very important not only under, you know, at Valmy, but right through the 1790s and into the Napoleonic period.
- [21:18]
Colin Jones
Michael?
- [21:18]
Melvin Bragg
Yes, I mean, sort of. Further to Colin's point, I think the French army of 1792 and indeed the following years achieves this sort of magical mix of good morale of soldiers, citizen soldiers who are well informed, who are committed to dying for the revolution and fighting for the Republic, on top of also technical reforms which actually predate the Revolution by decades. The French army had suffered huge defeats in the Seven Years War, and in the 1760s, 1770s, 1780s, embarks on very important technical reforms, new types of musket new types of artillery, new boring techniques which mean you can have lighter guns but with heavier cannonball. Changes in demand, command structure and doctrine. And you get those two elements, you know, the morale and the technical coming together in 1792.
- [22:17]
Colin Jones
Heidi, why did Brunswick withdraw?
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Podcast Announcer
That's a really good question and historians have had quite a bit of a debate about this topic. I think that it's never just one reason why a military commander decides to withdraw. So what's the situation at Valmy? We've got two armies pretty much equal in strength. So like roughly the same amount of troops. The Prussians had more artillery, but the French had the better artillery. So pretty much a balanced affair. But the French had the higher ground and the allied troops tried to advance across open ground, but then decided not to pursue and just to stop in their tracks and retreat. So why this? I think there are several reasons that we need to take into account. Michael has already pointed out the weather was really bad. So we have plenty of soldiers who are cold hungry because the supply chains didn't work either. We've got the army cut off from their supply chains as well because they were in this weird reversed positioning on the battlefield as well, so they couldn't reach their rear as well. And I think Brunswick as a commander, he was very much an 18th century military commander. I think his concern was very much to conserve energy and conserve manpower. You know, 18th century warfare is a lot about outmaneuvering the enemy rather than destroying the enemy. So I think he made the decision to just, you know, conserve power. Also. I'm not sure he was sure he could rely on his troops because morale was so low.
- [23:58]
Colin Jones
Why was it so low?
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Podcast Announcer
It was low because of the bad weather. It was low because actually the French had made an impression on these troops. You know, they could hear the Marseillaise and could hear the Sayra. So that was. Was an important factor too.
- [24:13]
Colin Jones
Yes. And also wasn't something serious like typhus.
- [24:16]
Podcast Announcer
Was in his dysentery was very much a topic as well. So many of the soldiers were ill, so he made the decision to retreat. It's been discussed. There are also more serious allegations against the Duke of Brunswick that have been discussed. For example, was he bribed to retreat? But I don't think there's evidence for this. Or was he told by the French king not to pursue, for example, But I don't think we have evidence for this. So it was the decision of a military commander in line with their way of thinking.
- [24:52]
Michael Rowe
Yeah. My sense is that a basic thing for a general in their commander in the 18th century is to concert an army is so expensive to put together, so difficult to train, to work in the way that those armies did. They. You've got to keep them together. I mean, Marshal de Saxe, who's the greatest military theorist of the enlightenment of the 18th century, famously says the sign of truly great generalship will be to go through one's entire career and never fight a battle, but still be seen as a great general. So it's a sort of warfare of maneuver much more than face on battle. And I think Brunswick is following his line. Interestingly, of course, one of the generals, key generals on the French side, Kellerman, is also an Asian regime general, and he's actually rather not sure about committing that day. And in fact, du Maurier pushes him into battle. And of course, Kellermann has this great moment where he shouts out, vive la nation. And everyone puts their hats on their bayonets and lifts it up and everyone shouts, vive la nation. Part of the psychological warfare, if you like, going on on the field of battle, is very much that. But Kellerman sort of steps in backwards into this acclamation that he'll get from the Republicans later.
- [26:02]
Colin Jones
Michael, what's your view about the withdrawal of Brunswick?
- [26:06]
Melvin Bragg
I think Brunswick does the right thing. I would have been very worried had I been Brunswick. At Valmy, we've had talk of bad weather and dysentery. The French have got the advantage of fighting on home soil. It means that they're more motivated. And I think there is a sense that on the Prussian side in particular, to an extent on the Austrian side, that neither of their rulers are fully committed to this campaign. They've got other things to worry about. They're Central European powers. They have eastern border to worry about. They have the Russians to worry about. And what the Russians are doing at this time is actually very. Is very concerning. You know, they're partitioning Poland, so you can't commit fully to defeating the French Revolution. They're not going to throw in every soldier. They've got to defeating France in 1792. So you've got this situation where Brunswick is there at Valmy. His forces are not larger than French forces and they're diminishing. You know, they're diminishing because of illness. His supply lines are overextended. The French, yes, they're suffering from bad weather as well, but they're on home soil and they can replenish their forces. You really face the risk of being cut off and not being able to extract your army. So it is a dire position. So, you know, moving out of France as quickly as possible is actually the sensible thing to do.
- [27:30]
Colin Jones
The idea was that this was a French citizen army. How true do you think that was?
- [27:37]
Melvin Bragg
It's a mixture of citizens and professionals inherited from the old regime. And I think it's about 50, 50. Obviously the officer corps is made up of professionals. As Colin mentioned, people like Kellermann. The French commanders, du Maurier and Kellermann are of the same generation as Brunswick. They're born in the 1730s. They've got plenty of military experience behind them. So you have this core of professionalism which is then supplemented by volunteers. That volunteer element will increase over the subsequent weeks, months and years.
- [28:16]
Colin Jones
Colin, on the day of the battle, France was still a monarchy. How much jeopardy was the royal family in at that time? Where was it?
- [28:26]
Michael Rowe
A lot of jeopardy. As Michael said earlier there, straight after the overthrow on the 10th of August, they're put in the temple prison. The temple no longer exists, but it's a great Gothic structure which would actually be very difficult to attack in the way that the other prisons are attacked in the September massacres. They're kept under very, very heavy armed guard and they're basically removed from Versailles and the sort of atmosphere in which they've lived. Most of the ancien regiments, on the other hand, I think since they moved to Paris, since the days of October 1789 when they moved to the Tuileries, they have felt that they were imprisoned. They don't have freedom of action, if you like. So in some ways there's a continuity with what went before. And the other strange continuity is that the kings of France live their lives publicly. They eat in public, they are dressed in public, they aren't dressed in public. So they're used to not having a private life in some ways, and they certainly won't have a private life in the temple because obviously you've got these armed guards watching their every move to make sure they're not going to escape. And there are quite a few plots going around and rumors of plots and all the rest of it. You've got this core group of King, Queen, the King's sister, Madame Elizabeth, and then their two children, the 13 year old daughter and then the young Dauphin.
- [29:43]
Colin Jones
Yes. When was there any feeling in Paris that they deserved what had come to them?
- [29:48]
Michael Rowe
I think it's very hard for the Crown to make much of a cause for itself after the overthrow and it becomes increasingly difficult to do so. I think the absolute turning point will Be just a little later when the French revolutionaries discover in the Tuileries palace, where the King has been living since 1789, a wall safe in which there's a credible amount of very incriminating evidence, letters and things to the Allied forces, including about the movements of the armies and things like that. After that, there's absolutely no chance. But I think even on September 20th within Paris, there are royalists still, and probably quite a few, but they're keeping their heads pretty low beneath the parapets, partly because of 10 August, partly because of the September massacres.
- [30:40]
Colin Jones
Thank you, Michael Rowe.
- [30:41]
Melvin Bragg
Well, there is a very interesting sort of observer to what's going on at Valny in that campaign. That's somebody called Henry Clinton, who'd been the commander in chief of British forces in North America in 1778-1782. So he had been. Well, I don't think one could blame him for the loss of 13 colonies, because there's probably no way Britain could have won that particular conflict. But he's interesting. You know, he's dealt with a revolution himself, or failed to deal with it. He's fought a Revolutionary war. He knows Brunswick. He's been his aide de camp earlier on in. I think it's in the Seven Years War. And he does think that the Prussians will win Valmy, but he's rather. He does sort of pose interesting questions about what they'll do of that victory. He does fear it'll probably be the end of a French royal family, you know, even a Prussian victory, they'll probably be murdered. And he does sort of say, you know, how is a Prussian army going to advance in a country full of 20 million enemies? And, you know, Clinton's sort of lesson from America is do not believe in exiles. And, you know, who say that there's a large body of kind of support, you know, when you invade a country, that it's going to rise up in your favor.
- [31:53]
Colin Jones
Heidi, what changed in Paris after the victory?
- [31:56]
Podcast Announcer
So we've got the Battle of Amy on 20 September, which also happens the first day of the Convention getting together. It's the opening session of the Convention. And on the next day, 21st September, the monarchy is officially abolished and the Republic is declared. So these are two parallel events. I don't think we can think that the Battle of Valmy decides that there will be a republic in France. But these events happen basically at the same time because, you know, it takes a long time to elect members for the Convention and plans to establish a republic had been around for a while, like get rid of the constitutional system and establish a republic instead. And this had become a lot more likely after the storming of the Tuileries and the invasion. So this happens at the same time. But I think the battle of Valmy, once the news reached Paris, it created some sort of justification for the Republic and acceptance. You know, suddenly it looked like the forces of the Republic would be successful in battle and strong in battle as well. And it created some sort of legitimacy, I think, for. For the Republic. I think that's a major symbolic boost and. And morale boost for the new political scheme.
- [33:17]
Colin Jones
Would you.
- [33:18]
Michael Rowe
Yeah. No.
- [33:19]
Colin Jones
Colin, would you go along with that?
- [33:20]
Michael Rowe
Endorse that? I think it is rather strange and one of the sort of bizarre conjunctions that we have. A massive battle in terms of the future of the French Republic and the future of the republican tradition in France, which actually fought before a republic is actually declared. The news of Valmy. Yeah, probably the news of what happened on the 20th gets back. But actually the forces remained on the battlefield and there was quite some possibility they would have continued to fight. So it's only a week or so later that people really start rejoicing and saying, a great victory has been won. But I think the idea that, you know, this army, this new type of army which has galvanized France, which has got, you know, the Republic has the.
- [34:00]
Colin Jones
New type of army being the patriotic citizen's army.
- [34:03]
Michael Rowe
Yeah, the patriotic citizen who is willing to take up arms for the defense of the Republic, is enormously, enormously important and will become part of the republican myth. I think as long as there's a republic in France, that republic will always have Valmy.
- [34:17]
Colin Jones
Yes. What did Brunswick himself do after the. After he been, as it were, defeated? It's difficult to say defeated because they just left the battlefield, didn't they? There wasn't a straightforward Ivan 1. What happened?
- [34:32]
Melvin Bragg
Well, he retreats back to Orion and he does retreat back maybe a little bit further than even sort of professional military opinion of a period actually expected him to. And this is where one then enters into rather complicated coalition politics between Prussia and Austria and the sense that they both blame each other for the setback at Valmy and the Austrians, who are further to the north, they withdraw the Prussians, well, very shortly thereafter, a few years thereafter, in 1795, actually signed a peace treaty with the French Republic and exit the conflict. Brunswick is still there. He's there in 1806, you know, when Napoleon invades Prussia and that's where he gets killed. So he's, you know, he keeps his hand in as a sort of military commander, but I suppose Brunswick has come to sort of symbolize, and I think perhaps a little bit unfairly, a sort of ancien regime form of warfare which is plodding armies, you know, supply lines, being perhaps overly concerned with supply lines and so on and so forth. That's not fair. I think there's the politics of Europe which come into play and you know, the politics of the relationship between Prussia and Austria in particular and the Polish partition. And I think the Poles actually deserve a little bit of credit in this, in that they, by resisting, if you like, the partition of their country, in a way distract the eastern powers from dealing with France.
- [36:00]
Colin Jones
Colin, how significant was valmy for France?
- [36:05]
Michael Rowe
I think it's enormously significant. As I said, it really gives legitimacy to the newly founded French Republic. It shows that the Republic can't be pushed around as most people thought it was going to be in battle, that people will stand and stand in their ranks and not run away. Even under incredibly heavy cannon fire, which actually many people on the day say is as loud and as heavy a cannon fire as they've ever heard in their lives. They sort of show their patriotic mettle, if you like. And moreover, once the battle is over and obviously the Prussians are moving away, the French move more onto the attack and take the battle further to the north. And by a couple of months time you've got du Maurier, the French commander, moving into the Low Countries and having some success there.
- [36:57]
Podcast Announcer
Yeah, I think this is the moment where we can speak of a crusade.
- [37:02]
Colin Jones
Can you develop that?
- [37:03]
Podcast Announcer
Oh, no. I was just picking up on this point of the spirit of the French soldiers changing from like how they gained the self confidence to go out and show their strength and basically take on enemies on their own terms. I think we can see this really further developed from 1799 when Napoleon Bonaparte takes over and you know, basically Europe is in flames just shortly after. So you can see that this is the spirit developing here.
- [37:34]
Colin Jones
So you think they laid the basis, Valmy laid the basis for Bonaparte?
- [37:38]
Podcast Announcer
Yes, yes, in many ways the new formations of the army, Valmy as a first step, the victory at Diamapp as a second step.
- [37:48]
Michael Rowe
I think in some ways valmy shows a winning formula which will be the formula which goes in a straight line really into Bonaparte's campaigns, and that is revolutionary ardor and patriotism and commitment to the la patrie, the fatherland. But plus military expertise and plus talent. I mean, one of the interesting things we haven't talked about really is this emigration of the high officer corps. It gives a wonderful opportunity to very talented under officers, people who are not at such high rank, who would never be able before 1789 to reach the highest rank. Obviously later Bonaparte will be one of these, but there are many, many examples. So this, this winning formula, if you like, of patriotism plus expertise is really, really significant, I think. And talent. And talent, yes.
- [38:37]
Colin Jones
Heidi.
- [38:38]
Podcast Announcer
I think we can see the relevance of modernizing the army, the ardor and the expertise that goes into this. You know, we can see this for Prussia as well. When they are being occupied and defeated in 1806, what do they do? They initiate referring reforms, a massive reform program. I think this is so interesting. The King of Prussia initiates reforms from above. And his capable ministers, Stein Hardenberg. They set out to put these reforms into practice. And these are military reforms, for example, bring in compulsory military service, but these are also stately reforms, policy reforms. There's a sense that in order to keep up with new rising forces like France, we have to modernize ourselves and we have to change our ways in order to be in a competitive position as a nation state. So I think that's really relevant. This is maybe how Valmy then radiates further into the European situation in the first decade of the 19th century.
- [39:45]
Colin Jones
Michael. Michael?
- [39:46]
Melvin Bragg
Yes, a great deal flows from Valmy and I agree. I don't think Goethe actually did make that comment. He probably wished he had made that comment looking back. But it should have been said. Perhaps we can leave that part there. I think we can perhaps indulge in a little bit of counterfactual speculation. You know what? If the French had run away at Valmy, I think the French Revolution wouldn't have been snuffed out. I think too much had been achieved in 1789, 1991. I don't think you could have gone back to 1780. But I think what Valmy in the French victory there does mean is that the revolution will be exported. It will be exported to large parts of Europe. That in itself is a bit problematic because I think Rob Speer is right. People don't like armed missionaries. And it means that actually progress to an extent in much of German speaking Europe, for example, becomes associated with foreign domination. And I think going forward into the 19th century, that leads to a Germany which is in many ways more conservative politically than it otherwise might have been. Valmy also ensures that Belgium will be invaded and that brings in Britain. So the French Revolutionary War turns into not only a French affair and a European affair, but it becomes global, of huge implications in the Western hemisphere and the Caribbean, for example.
- [41:10]
Colin Jones
Heidi, what do you think would have happened if the French had lost?
- [41:13]
Podcast Announcer
That's a very interesting question, very difficult to answer. I think we might have seen less violence in Paris. What I find so fascinating about this is that we have a war scenario, but it's actually, you know, war is always terrible, but it's actually in many ways way less violent than what's going on, what it triggers. And Paris, like the violence, the violent storming of the Tuileries, for example, the September massacres, the situation August 1792 is. We have a highly politically unstable situation.
- [41:50]
Michael Rowe
Yes, very difficult to say exactly. And the counterfactuals are going to be met by counter. Counterfactuals, I think. But one thing just to mention is that the invading forces have been told by the emigration princes that it will be a walkover, not just on the battlefield, but actually in the countryside, that the peasants will welcome them, they'll be throwing flowers at the troops. It doesn't happen. And in fact, many of their supply trains are attacked. There's attacks on personnel that wander off the beaten track. So, actually, I agree with what Michael said before. France has got through so much at that time. It's very difficult to imagine going Back to before the 14th of July, 1789. Too much has happened, but. But what, exactly? Who knows?
- [42:31]
Colin Jones
Well, thank you very much. Thanks to Colin Jones, Heidi Merkens and Michael Rowe. Next week, Plato's Crito and Phaedo, which.
- [42:40]
Melvin Bragg
Cover the last days of Socrates and.
- [42:42]
Colin Jones
Why he chose to drink hemlock rather than escape from prison. Thank you very much for listening.
- [42:47]
Podcast Announcer
And the In Our Time podcast gets some extra time now with a few minutes of bonus material from Melvin and his guests.
- [42:54]
Colin Jones
What did you not have time to say you would like to have said? Heidi, what about you?
- [42:58]
Podcast Announcer
What I find so fascinating about this topic is the whole aspect of the constitutional monarchy and what it actually means. In 1791 and 1792, the concept of the constitutional monarchy is, you know, to find this balance between the monarchical power and the authority of elected political institutions. And in 1792, the French decided that this is not how they want to run their show. They came up with a new project which was the Republic. What I find so fascinating is that then the constitutional monarchical system comes back into the mix in 1814 in France, but also across Europe, and starts a massive victory ride across the 19th century. So it becomes the most important, the most relevant political system. So We've got all three dynasties competing for the French throne. The Orleans, the Bonaparte, the Bourbons, and they all go with a constitutional monarchical system. So it just shows, I think, how they decided at some point that they would endeavor and would try and find this negotiation and the balance between the monarchical side of things and the elected political side of things. It just shows us constitutional monarchies always have this aspect of negotiation, as in there is a document, not in the British case, but in most other cases there's a document, the Constitution. But how it comes to life and, and how it's actually filled with meaning and with practice depends on the people negotiating the terms.
- [44:36]
Michael Rowe
Yeah, I think that's very interesting. But also I'd throw in, I think, that the 19th century discussions about constitutional monarchy and desirability, in many cases of the constitutional monarchy are deeply, deeply influenced by what happens in France between September 20, 1792 and the middle of 1794. So this period of terror, which obviously is about violence, authoritarian government and violence meted out through the guillotine, revolutionary tribunal, etcetera, but also is about social reforms, social welfare reforms, et cetera, et cetera, which often often lost sight of. But for everyone coming out of the terror and beyond it, and that includes many of the revolutionaries as well as the counter revolutionaries, they think that's not the way forward. We've got to work on this system which seemed to be dead and buried in fact, in France in the middle of 1792, 93, and basically look at that in one way or the other and how that might work.
- [45:28]
Melvin Bragg
I mean, if I may, I'll focus a little bit on the geopolitics and the wider sort of European context, which I think can be developed a bit further. You know, the myth is that France in 1792 is fighting alone against monarchical Europe. Well, it is fighting alone, but it's only fighting part of monarchical Europe. Prussia and Austria, Britain and Russia, you know, the other great powers are sort of looking on from the sidelines. They, I don't think, see the French Revolution as that kind of existential threat. The French, I think, do see the invasion of their territory as an existential threat. So you get this sort of mismatch, I think, in commitment on both sides. And I think that partly explains why the Prussians under Brunswick don't engage in that campaign, as perhaps fanatically, as one might have expected them to have done. If you buy into the myth, one has to remember at this time, the French Revolution isn't the only show in town You've got the partition of Poland, you've got the whole disruption of the state system in central and Eastern Europe. And that concerns Austria and Prussia probably even more than what's going on in France in 1792.
- [46:46]
Michael Rowe
I think, though, most rulers are seeing by late 1792, certainly by early 1793, seeing the French Revolution as not just the danger of armies coming in, etcetera, but seeing it as an ideological contagion which they're worried about that spreading within their own states in a way that obliges them to try and root it out at source in some ways. And so to take the war into. Into France. I, I fully take Michael's point about the importance of what's going on in central and Eastern Europe, but I don't think it's France is just a sideshow. I think it's a very important part of policy formation right across Europe.
- [47:23]
Colin Jones
Well, thank you all very much.
- [47:24]
Melvin Bragg
Would anyone want tea or coffee?
- [47:26]
Colin Jones
Tea would be great.
- [47:27]
Melvin Bragg
Tea? Coffee, Melvin?
- [47:30]
Colin Jones
I'll have a cup of tea, please.
- [47:33]
Fred Meyer Advertiser
Thank you very much.
- [47:34]
Michael Rowe
Thank you. In Our Time with Melvin Bragg is.
- [47:37]
Melvin Bragg
Produced by Simon Tillotson and it's a BBC Studios audio production. Hello, I'm Robin Ince.
- [47:43]
Brian Cox
And I'm Brian Cox.
- [47:44]
Melvin Bragg
And this is the Infinite Monkey Hedgerow.
- [47:47]
Colin Jones
He just.
- [47:47]
Brian Cox
He was unable to write a funny joke for the introduction. That's amazing.
- [47:51]
Melvin Bragg
The new series of the Infinite Monkey Cage.
- [47:54]
Brian Cox
Science with funny bits.
- [47:56]
Melvin Bragg
Science with bits.
- [47:58]
Brian Cox
Funny science plus bits. So the reason that the Neanderthals died out, you're claiming, is because they weren't astronomers? Yes, exactly.
- [48:08]
Podcast Announcer
That's why this is how we investigate cybercrime. We look for the yachts.
- [48:13]
Melvin Bragg
The new series of the Infinite Monkey.
- [48:16]
Brian Cox
Cage from BBC Radio 4. Listen now on BBC Sounds.