Intelligence Squared Debate: "Sanctions Don’t Work as a Tool of Foreign Policy"

Date: November 19, 2025
Chair: Anne McElvoy
Proposing the Motion: Ian Proud (former diplomat), Rebecca Harding (trade economist)
Opposing the Motion: Tom Keating (Centre for Finance and Security, RUSI), Edward Lucas (The Times columnist)

Episode Overview

This Intelligence Squared episode features a lively, in-depth debate around the effectiveness of sanctions as a tool of foreign policy. With recent events like Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and long-standing sanctions against Iran, North Korea, and others, the panel examines whether sanctions achieve their stated goals, or if they’re merely political theater with significant unintended consequences. The debate features evidence-driven arguments from both sides, framed by real-world experience and academic research.

Key Arguments & Discussion Points

1. Opening Remarks and Context ([02:15]-[07:46])

Chair (Anne McElvoy):

• Sanctions are popular because they seem actionable when other solutions feel unattainable or politically difficult.
• Sanctions can take the form of trade embargoes, asset freezes, travel bans, and targeted action against individuals or corporations.

2. Proposition: Sanctions Don’t Work

Ian Proud ([07:46]-[15:02])

• Experience: Served in Moscow, directly authorized approx. half the UK’s sanctions against Russia.
• Key Points:
  • Russia is now the most-sanctioned country in the world with over 20,000 sanctions imposed by Western countries, yet its actions in Ukraine have not been deterred.
  • Sanctions have failed to achieve their stated aims as per the UK’s own 2019 legislation: “Sanctions are intended to make Russia cease its destabilizing actions in Ukraine and to avoid interfering with the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.” ([09:07])
  • Sanctions haven’t prevented humanitarian catastrophes, continued war, or economic collapse in Ukraine.
  • Quoting Domestic Response: "Vladimir Putin considers sanctions to be unjust. And unfortunately, he has 1.5 million soldiers and 6,000 nuclear missiles to back up his grievance." ([11:13])
  • Sanctions reinforce Putin’s domestic narrative that the West is hostile, strengthening his position, not weakening it.
  • The hope that sanctioning oligarchs like Roman Abramovich would spur a palace coup is "a fantasy." ([12:31])
  • Collective Western action on sanctions is slow and indecisive compared to the decisiveness of autocrats like Putin.
  • Conclusion: "Sanctions are economic warfare by committee...Sanctions are not affecting his decision making in any way other than to increase his resolve to continue on his course." ([14:21])

Rebecca Harding ([25:00]-[34:01]; [79:37]-[80:56] Summary)

• Economic Viewpoint: Defines effectiveness as whether sanctions help achieve their specific foreign policy goals.
  • “If we assume our goal was to prevent Russia’s actions in Ukraine… or prevent Iran or North Korea from developing their nuclear programs… it’s quite clear that we are failing.” ([25:34])
• Research Cited: Tufts University finds sanctions effective in only 34% of cases, and only when goals are limited and clear.
• Case Study – Russia:
  • Despite sanctions, Russia continues its war, revenues down only 19% and it has built resilience, especially in grain exports.
  • The West overestimates its leverage via the dollar-based order, but "trade itself was being weaponized long, long before Russia invaded Ukraine… Russia's invasion...has just accelerated the process." ([30:54])
  • Unintended consequences: Rising food and energy prices adversely affect populations in sanctioning countries, fueling domestic discontent.
• Strategic Blind Spots: The West underestimates adversaries’ preparedness and resilience, leading to strategic backfire.
• Conclusion: "Sanctions are a tool of foreign policy, but they are not being used effectively... Only our assumptions about economic power remain." ([33:10])
• Final Summary: Sanctions now constitute economic warfare and risk escalation; calls for “careful, coherent” foreign policy: "We are at economic war… We need to be very careful and very coherent." ([80:56])

3. Opposition: Sanctions Work

Tom Keating ([16:04]-[23:59]; [81:00]-[81:53] Summary)

• Opening Rebuke: Calls the opposing argument "very defeatist". ([16:04])
• Evidence of Effect:
  • Personal anecdote — sanctioned by Russia, travel restricted. "That's behavior change right there." ([16:53])
  • Western banks “hire vast personnel and block transactions and freeze assets... The impact is global.” ([17:41])
  • Russia’s central bank lost access to $300 billion, Libyan central bank lost $70 billion — direct impact.
  • Sanctions compelled Iran to the negotiating table for the 2015 nuclear deal; they "achieved their objective and worked." ([19:45])
  • Drug kingpin sanctions in Latin America "are held in fear" and suffocate organized crime. ([20:27])
• Russia Example:
  • While sanctions haven’t ended the war or restored Ukrainian sovereignty, they have burdened the Russian economy.
    • “...The production of tanks and trucks, is [that] the sort of economic growth a country wants?” ([21:57])
    • Cites strain on the Russian economy, as reported in Kremlin-aligned media.
  • "Sanctions are a slow puncture, not a magic bullet." ([22:40])
• On Definition of “Work”:
  • "What do we mean by work? …sanctions are just one tool among many, and policymakers sometimes over-promise."
• Conclusion: "Sanctions, when properly designed and applied as part of a considered strategy, do work as a tool of foreign policy." ([23:53])
• Final Summary: "They are a tool in a toolbox...We need stick and we need carrot...They do work as a tool of foreign policy." ([81:53])

Edward Lucas ([34:43]-[43:21]; [78:15]-[79:26] Summary)

• The Magic Bullet Trap: Denounces the claim that sanctions must work like a “magic wand” to be considered functional. "They don't work like magic. They're not a pain-free fix." ([34:53])
• Cites Drawbacks: Overbroad, too narrow, badly enforced, etc., but all policy tools have limits.
• Realistic Standard: Sanctions are just one part of the policy toolkit, alongside aid, diplomacy, military force, intelligence.
• Magnitsky Sanctions: Cites international implementation as a breakthrough for targeted accountability, disrupting impunity for torturers — “puncture[d] the climate of impunity around torture and other abuse of power.” ([36:05])
• Impact Examples:
  • Since 2022, sanctions halved Russia’s fossil fuel export revenues.
  • "Every dollar we keep out of [Putin's war machine] is our contribution to its defeat." ([39:08])
• On Principle: Total opposition to all sanctions means "We should have traded with the Third Reich throughout...and allowed Islamic State to operate its terror mafia structure...without the slightest hindrance." ([39:55])
• Signal and Norms: Sanctions send clear signals and impose costs for egregious actions. "Sanctions are not foolproof. They're not magic, but they're not nothing." ([42:43])
• Final Word: "Use them better, use them smarter. Of course, don't abuse them, but don't ignore them." ([79:20])

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “Sanctions…haven’t stopped the war and seem unlikely to stop the war.”
  — Ian Proud ([13:25])

• “Economic pressure on South Africa made South Africa poorer and isolated...undermined the apartheid regime. But against that there are other examples like Cuba...where [broad] pressure hasn’t worked.”
  — Edward Lucas ([61:56])

• "What we have seen is an increased likelihood…that we are at economic war…all tools of economic war, including sanctions…are being used."
  — Rebecca Harding ([79:37])

• “Before 2022, we had the UN…we were observers. But since 2022 in Europe, we've had to work to make sanctions work. Political leaders were lazy back then…But they do contribute to foreign policy. They do work as a tool of foreign policy.”
  — Tom Keating ([81:00])

• “Sanctions are economic warfare by committee…we can’t outsmart Putin. Sanctions are not affecting his decision making in any way other than to increase his resolve.”
  — Ian Proud ([14:21])

• “Sanctions send a signal not just to [individuals], but to all the British bankers, lawyers, accountants…who help the Putin regime: your choices have costs, and sanctions impose those costs.”
  — Edward Lucas ([38:14])

Audience Q&A Highlights

• How do you measure collateral damage of sanctions?

  • Rebecca Harding: “We cannot use sanctions for a broader set of undefined and unmeasurable foreign policy goals.” ([48:10])
  • Tom Keating: “Two-thirds don’t have the intended impact, but countries are quick to say when sanctions hurt them.” ([56:50])

• Are individualized (e.g., Magnitsky) sanctions different from broad economic ones?

  • Lucas: “Sanctions to bring about regime change via population hardship rarely work…but targeted sanctions can and do, e.g., Belarus, Soviet refuseniks, Sinn Fein.” ([61:56])

• On “signaling”:

  • Proud: “Putin knows we’re not happy with him. It’s made absolutely no difference at all.” ([72:45])

• Are tariffs just sanctions in disguise?

  • Panel generally agreed: yes, in today’s context, tariffs can be seen as a form of economic warfare or sanctions. ([76:44])

Final Results and Takeaways

Pre-Debate Vote:

• For the Motion: 36%
• Against: 41%
• Undecided: 23%

Post-Debate Vote:

• For: 27%
• Against: 63%
• Undecided: 10%

Swing:

• Major swing toward opposing the motion — the panel’s arguments convinced many that sanctions, while imperfect, do indeed “work” as a tool of foreign policy.

Chair’s Closing:

• The debate exposed nuance, unintended consequences, and the need for targeted, strategic use rather than over-reliance. Policy must balance effectiveness, collateral impact, and clarity of objectives.

Structure and Tone

The debate was rigorous but occasionally witty, with references to Harry Potter, Dr. Who, and Casablanca to illustrate points on magical thinking and realpolitik. Speakers drew on data, historical examples, and personal experience, while also scrutinizing definitions (“What does it mean for sanctions to work?”). Both sides acknowledged complexity: sanctions are neither a silver bullet nor useless, but their efficacy depends on context, clarity of goals, and integration with other foreign policy tools.

Timestamps for Key Segments

• [07:46] Ian Proud opening for the motion (sanctions don’t work – Russia case).
• [16:04] Tom Keating opening against the motion (sanctions do work – banking, Iran, Russia).
• [25:00] Rebecca Harding further for the motion (economic perspective, only limited success).
• [34:43] Edward Lucas closing against the motion (sanctions are a necessary tool, not magic).
• [47:11] Audience Q&A (effectiveness and collateral effects).
• [76:44] Tariffs as sanctions – lightning round.
• [78:15] Final summaries.

Conclusion

This episode provides a comprehensive, balanced examination of the effectiveness and ethical implications of sanctions. The spirited debate reflects both the necessity and the dangers of sanctions, concluding that while they are not a panacea, their removal from the policy toolkit would be an abdication of international responsibility — provided they’re intelligently designed, strategically applied, and constantly reassessed for efficacy and harm.