D (7:46)

Thank you, Ann, for the generous introduction. I'm glad to join you all here this evening. I'm obviously speaking very much in favor of this motion that sanctions are not effective as a tool of foreign policy. I don't plan to get into why sanctions have never worked in Cuba or why sanctions have never worked in North Korea or why sanctions have never worked in Iran. I plan just to talk about why sanctions have not worked on Russia. The country has been more sanctioned than any other country on the planet, more than 20,000 sanctions so far by the U.S. the EU, the U.K. new Zealand, Australia, Japan and some others. I say this having authorized around half of the British sanctions against Russia after the war in Ukraine broke out. So I'm keen to make the point that I'm not a Putin stooge. I'm not going to advance today Kremlin talking points, whatever they are, but I'm here to really talk about my impressions of what I did to keep the sanctions juggernaut clumsily moving forward. And, you know, I faced up to the Russian intelligence services on the streets of Moscow over four and a half years as a British diplomat, I've been harassed and intruded upon in ways which most of you would find very weird, except possibly Edward, who knows an awful lot about these things. So I'm not proposing this motion because I think we should go soft on Russia, but out of a clear eyed sense that actually what we're doing in terms of our foreign policy on the Ukraine war is failing Ukraine with our good intentions. We should all be worried that there is so little debate about whether some sanctions are an effective policy. If we look at UK sanctions legislation, the Russia sanctions regulations of 2019 say as their purpose that sanctions are intended to make Russia cease its destabilizing actions in Ukraine and to avoid interfering with the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. And it would be hard to say today that over 11 years of sanctions that they have actually achieved either of those goals. Since 2022, 5.9 million people have fled Ukraine. 3.7 million people have been internally displaced in Ukraine. 1.3 million people, including children, have been killed or injured in Ukraine. Have sanctions prevented that? No, I'm sorry, but they have not. Ukraine is bankrupt, completely reliant on $50 billion of aid every year from Western donors, which no longer now include the US Under Donald Trump. So that's all down to us. Its energy infrastructure has once again been bombarded on a nightly basis as winter approaches and people worry about whether they'll be able to heat their homes. Have sanctions prevented that? No, they have not. Lots of people will still nevertheless try and persuade you that sanctions are an effective tool. We should stay the course. We should hold Putin to account. We shouldn't give him any blank checks and lots of other vacuous statements like that and reasons why we should continue with this misguided policy. But I want to point out two reasons that I think that sanctions have not worked and will not work against Russia. The first is that even if you consider them to be just, I was appalled by the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. I authorized half of the sanctions in the months after that time. I was appalled, as everybody else in this room. But Vladimir Putin considers sanctions to be unjust. And unfortunately, he has 1.5 million soldiers and 6,000 nuclear missiles to back up his grievance. And he has shown, at least in terms of conventional means, he's willing to use those ever since the Minsk 2 agreement was subordinated to sanctions policy in March of 2015, Putin has convinced himself, and he convinces himself of the West's hatred of Russia very easily. It seems to me that the west will sanction Russia come what may. And unfortunately all of our actions to seem since that time have actually proved him, in his mind at least, to be correct. Vladimir Putin has spent 25 years telling the Russian population that the west dislikes Russia, wants to encircle Russia, wants to declaw the bear, and every time we impose a new round of sanctions against Russia, we simply prove in the minds of ordinary Russian people that Vladimir Vladimirovich will was right all along, even if he wants to. And I frankly don't think that he does want to pull out of Ukraine. I doubt that he'd have the political space domestically to do so. And he's built a massive security apparatus around himself in Moscow to completely dethrone and declaw the so called oligarch class in Russia. The wealthy billionaires who made their money to during the 90s era of bandit capitalism. You know, this idea that somehow if we expropriate the assets of a London based billionaire who moved their assets to London to avoid those assets being stolen in Russia, that they will rise up against Putin, I'm afraid is misguided. The idea that if we sanction Roman Abramovich, he's going to join forces with other oligarchs in Russia and unsurprisingly, seat Putin is, I fear, a fantasy. The Russian Oleg Tinkov, who famously took to Instagram a couple of weeks after the invasion and declaimed the Russian army as shit within a couple of days, sold his bank under duress to another oligarch. So we've carried on, we've sanctioned 2,000 individuals and entities hoping for the best, and nothing has really changed since that time. Sanctions haven't stopped the war and seem unlikely to stop the war. The other reason, of course, is that actually sanctions are economic warfare by committee, despite NATO having 27 times economically greater weight than Russia. You know, collectively we can't decide anything quick enough to affect decisive action. Putin sits across a chessboard looking at 32 people squabbling loudly for months on end, only to decide not to take the most optimal move on the chessboard. We can't outsmart Putin. Sanctions are not affecting his decision making in any way other than to increase his resolve to continue on his course, his deadly course in Ukraine. So I'm afraid, ladies and gentlemen, that I'm very much in favor of a peaceful settlement to the war in Ukraine, to get back to diplomacy and to step off this primrose path that we've followed over the past 11 years, which has been sanctions. Thank you.

B (15:02)

Thank you, Ian, for setting a great example. As I sit here in the role of one of those rather fierce chairs that used to have in the Supreme Soviet, armed only with a Biro and a glass of water and panel, when you hear, you get a minute warning when I take the glass. I don't like to interrupt the flow, but just so that we keep flowing through, that is what is going to happen. So it's time for our first speaker now, against the motion that sanctions don't work as a tool of foreign policy. Tom Keating, founder director of the Centre for Finance and Security at risi, the leading UK defence and security think tank, focusing in his work on the intersection of finance and security, including sanctions and the financial the dimension of a range of security threats, and hosts a podcast, the Suspicious Transaction Report. But just to be clear, as I went the wrong way around, is that Tom is making a case against the motion. So against the motion that sanctions don't work right.

C (16:04)

Well, I found that very defeatist, but I will explain perhaps why I found that defeatist. But before we start, how many people are there in the audience from Ukraine? The lights aren't helping me, but I know there's at least one here in the front row. And I we want to say thank you for your defense of Europe, thank you for resisting the Russians, something the policymakers, sanctions policymakers are also doing in their own way with sanctions. Now, sanctions don't work as a tool of foreign policy, say the other side. It's categorically and evidently erroneous statement. And I am certain of this for a range of reasons, many of which I've witnessed in person, that I'll explore in the next few minutes. I'm tempted to start and finish my argument right here with one piece of incontrovertible evidence that that sanctions work and work with certainty. Earlier this year, I was personally sanctioned by the Russian Federation, and as a result, I will not be traveling to Russia again. That's behavior change right there. That's one of the things that foreign policy and sanctions are trying to do. But you want some more detail, you want some more nuanced argument as to why sanctions work specifically as a tool of foreign policy policy. So I'll lay out some of that evidence first. I spent 20 years working in an investment bank and boy, have I seen sanctions work. Now, banks are not perfect by any Stretch of the imagination, but constant reminders to staff of their obligations to implement sanctions. Vast hiring of personnel and investment of resources and the regular blocking of transactions and freezing of assets suggests that the announcement of sanctions by the UN or governments certainly has an impact. They work. And it's not just banks in London or Frankfurt or New York that feel this pressure. So too do those in South Africa, Singapore, Seoul and even, dare I say it, Shanghai. The control of the financial system by Western capitals means that whether sanctions decisions are taken at the un, in Washington or in Brussels, the impact is global. And if that's not enough evidence, just ask the Russian central bank that saw $300 billion immobilized in 2022 taken off the playing field, taken out of service for funding the war in Ukraine. Or ask the Libyan central bank that had $70 billion frozen by the global banking community in 2011. That sounds like something sanctions working to meet. Second, for a more foreign policy focused example, consider how sanctions played a very central role in bringing Iran to the negotiating table to agree the nuclear deal in 2015. Restrictions on its exports of oil, the main source of national wealth, along with restrictions on the country's financial system to operate internationally, were crippling. Sanctions played their part by forcing Iran to negotiate. Now what happened thereafter resulting in the recent reapplication of UN level sanctions on Iran is the fault of cack handed statesmanship and diplomacy. Sanctions played their role, achieved their objective and worked. Third, consider the fear in which U.S. transnational organized crime sanctions, or so called kingpin sanctions used to target the narco barons, are held in Latin America. The way in which sanctions are used to strangle businesses in Colombia and Mexico even have their own term amongst those on the receiving end, muerta civil, reflecting the way in which those that are subject to sanctions and their businesses are suffocated and rendered toxic and untouchable. Again, this sounds like sanctions working to me. Fourth, we of course have to talk, as Ian has done, about the application of sanctions against Russia since its full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Have sanctions reversed the barbaric action of the Kremlin and restored Ukraine's territorial integrity? No, they have not. Have the sanctions dramatically restricted Russia's economy and forced Putin and his central bank into economic choices they'd rather not make? For sure they have now. It's fashionable, of course, to drink the Kremlin's economic Kool Aid and point to the continued growth of the Russian economy as an indication that sanctions don't work. This is a superficial analysis of course the economy is growing. The Kremlin is throwing everything and everyone it can at meeting the needs of the military. But is the production of tanks and trucks the sort of economic growth a country wants if those outputs get destroyed within a month in eastern Ukraine? I encourage you also on this point to read the excellent morning Russian media summaries produced by the BBC, Steve Rosenberg that reveal in the Kremlin supporting press the strain the Russian economy is under, from the cost of potatoes to the struggle of CEOs to run their companies. Furthermore, the use of sanctions against those companies, particularly in China, that support Russia's war in Ukraine. Ukraine do not go unnoticed in Beijing, which dispatches its diplomats to engage with the west in a manner that would not be otherwise happening. Sanctions are clearly working, even if the nightly raids on Kyiv and other cities continue. They are, as the EU sanctions envoy likes to note, a slow puncture, not a magic bullet. Now, there are many other examples of sanctions working, from the times of the Greeks to the cyber world today. But in the interest of time, I will turn to my second important point. What do we mean by work? Now? This may be the moment you dread. It may be the moment you think, here goes the academic about to drown you in an argument about definitions. But fear not, I will spare you that, as I always keep my mother in mind when tempted to veer into any sort of argument. And I know she's watching tonight. So I do think, though, forgive me, Mother, it is important to at least consider what we mean by work. Or put differently, what is our theory of change in using sanctions? What are we trying to achieve in early 2022? As Russia's military forces built up across the border from Ukraine, Western leaders, notably in this city, deployed hysterical rhetoric of hope that sanctions would deter Putin from acting and once he had acted, reverse his decision. This was never going to happen for one important reason. Following the initial invasion of Ukraine by the Kremlin in 2014, the Western world's use of sanctions was weak and timid and quickly evaporated. As Russia's support in the fight against Islamic State in Syria and Iraq was deemed more important than supporting Ukraine, the foreign policy opportunity of sanctions was wasted. In 2014, sanctions were never given a chance, and thus when the west threatened Putin with sanctions once again in 2022, he would have been forgiven, as he did for assuming that we were not serious. This is a failure of foreign policy, not a failure of sanctions, and an example of sanctions not working. The other side might also suggest rapidly.

B (23:21)

Up as soon as you Can.

C (23:22)

Sorry. The other side might also suggest that sanctions push countries together in a way that is counterproductive. I'll answer that question later. So to conclude, do political leaders misunderstand how to get the most from sanctions regimes and over promise the extent and speed with which they will work? Yes. But that does not mean that sanctions, when properly designed and applied as part of a considered strategy, do not work as a tool of foreign policy. For that reason, I urge you please tonight to oppose the motion. Thank you.

B (23:59)

Thank you, Tom. And I should say to our speakers that point that was just beyond the horizon. Of course, I'm sure you will somehow manage to make in the Q and A session if I frustrated you. I'm going to give just a chair point to Tom for getting his mother in there as an extra plea for listening to his case. We are flipping over now to our third speaker in favour of the motion that sanctions don't work. And joining us via video link from Abu Dhabi is Rebecca Harding. Hello, Rebecca. Rebecca, welcome from Abu Dhabi. Tonight, she is CEO of the center for Economic Security and a trade economist who's an expert in digital and sustainable trade and supply chain finance, as well as geopolitics and geo economics, running an advisory business called, Fetchingly Enough, Rubeconomics. Rebecca, give us your argument in favor of the motion.

E (25:00)

So thank you to Tom for quite usefully using my argument in order to prove the case that I want to prove, because my approach is an economic one. And the key word, you're quite right, Tom, here is effective. Because how we define effective is critical to the outcome of this debate. For the purposes of my intervention and my seconding the motion, I'm defining effective as achieving the foreign policy goals that the tools were set out to achieve. So if we assume that our goals were to prevent Russia's actions in Ukraine, or if we assume that our goals were to prevent Iran or North Korea from developing their nuclear programs, or more recently, if we assume our goal is to prevent China from developing military gate technologies, then it's quite clear that we are failing. If we look at some of the economic arguments against limited and highly targeted foreign policy goals, one might say objectives. Tufts University argued recently that sanctions are effective in just 34% of cases. Perhaps those are the cases, as Tom cited, where individuals are sanctioned and they cease to act, their behavior is changed. And yet, even where our policy goals have been more limited, we have visibly not succeeded. In the case of Russia, for example, our goal was initially simply to starve the Russian government of cash, to restrict finance to its military operations. Yet although Russia's energy revenue revenues declined by 19% year on year over the last 12 months, it is still fighting its war. Indeed, in the words of President Putin in the Russian press Recently, World War 3 is well on its way and it's starting in the economic sphere. The west has failed to understand Russian strategic culture and the role of economics within that culture that carries on regardless. It is our own strategic failings, our own lack of clear foreign policy goals for which sanctions are the best tool, that has undermined their effectiveness. Unless we know what our goals are, we cannot measure and therefore we cannot define effectiveness. So although it pains me to say it, those opposing the motion are quite right. Sanctions regimes work and are a function of foreign policy, and our foreign policy is failing, and therefore so too are the sanctions. So first, let's have a think about what we are trying to achieve. Were we trying to constrain Russia from military action by limiting its access to technology, financial markets and revenues? If so, we needed to have the whole world aligned with the sanctions that were being imposed. It certainly cannot be assumed that sanctions and export controls would be universally imposed. History tells us that this is not the case, not least because global business will find a way round sanctions and export controls, even if governments are aligned, as Toshiba in 1987 clearly illustrated by providing quiet submarine propeller blades to Russia against a US NATO led ban. It is businesses that trade, not governments, allow. When these US is voting in the United nations with Russia, North Korea and Iran, we can no longer assume that there is a we or indeed an international rules based order that we are trying to protect through sanctions. So second, perhaps the reason for all of this is because we did not understand the extent to which those against whom we impose our sanctions see trade as a strategic game. This requires planning, and here strategic culture matters. Here, Russia and China are way ahead of us in terms of playing a long game. For example, Russia started to focus on grain production back in 2000, diversifying its economy away from its clear focus on oil and gas. It switched its export support measures to grain in 2017 after the west had imposed sanctions on oil and gas. It is now the largest exporter of grain, at nearly 25% of world wheat exports. African and European markets are highly dependent on Russian supplies, and so when Russia did invade Ukraine, it could predict the impact on Western, particularly European, prices. In contrast, the west has played its hand predictably and with cavalier assumptions about its own power and hegemony. In short, we have assumed that the dollar based international rules, based Order was something every country in the world aspired to. This we thought gave us an unrivalled capability to coerce and constrain the actions of other states. When a military option was not, indeed could not be on the table. Our economic and trade power would be enough to win the day, lock Russia or Iran out of the global economy and watch their actions fall into line with what we thought was right. There is a risk through all of this that we actually make things worse because of the reaction of the adversary and its capacity to predict or circumvent what we are doing. A weak economy hands a propaganda victory to the adversary. As my right honorable friend Ian said, this is not guns or butter in Russia. The argument is if it were up to us, you'd have guns and butter. But they have guns pointed at us and you can't get butter because the west is stopping you through sanctions. So finally, and perhaps most importantly of all, there are unforeseen consequences of sanctions that we have failed to anticipate. Take food and energy prices as an example. We thought we could isolate Russia from a global economic system. We didn't not calculate the effect that sanctions would have on us in terms of higher costs of living. This has caused domestic issues, exacerbated the rise of a populist narrative and made louder the general dissatisfaction with the inequalities and lack of fairness that had become associated in the public and voters eye with globalization. Trade itself was being weaponized long, long before Russia invaded Ukraine. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has just accelerated the process. Exclusions from SWIFT have prophesied Russia's adoption of the Chinese interbank payment system which is renminbi based. It has accelerated its use of bitcoin and digital assets as a means of circumventing sanctions. And most of all, trade has diverted other non sanctions sanctioned countries to other non sanctioned countries around the world. For example, the UK up until March.

B (32:59)

My glass down the line.

E (33:01)

Okay, let's round out.

B (33:03)

Thank you. Sorry for interrupting, but it occurred to me that this technology doesn't work terribly well if you have to.

E (33:10)

Just to round out your point, I have nearly finished. For example, the UK up until March 20th, 2022 imported most of its gold from Russia. In April 2022 it imported dollar for dollar most of its gold from Kazakhstan. I second the motion. The critical word is effective. Sanctions are a tool of foreign policy, but they are not being used effectively. Our opposition, our adversaries have not created the clearly crafted or we have not created the clearly crafted statecraft and economic statecraft that our adversaries have. Only our assumptions about economic power remain. Thank you.

B (34:01)

Thank you very much Rebecca for joining us across the miles and sounding as if you were in the room. Much, much appreciated. And finally, as billed earlier, the excitement is mounted. Edward Lucas will be our final speaker against the motion arguing that sanctions do work as a tool of foreign policy. Edward is still columnist at the Times and expert on information warfare, espionage, former correspondent in region and knowledgeable about foreign and security policy in the round. He has written books including the New Cold War, the Prescient Account of Vladimir Putin's Russia.

A (34:43)

Edward, thanks very much indeed. Phoenix feathers and unicorn hairs. These are the components of magic wands in the world of Harry Potter. Use the right command and you guarantee success. Just find a regime you don't like, point the wand and sang Chamus. If it fails, well, it's just a children's story and nobody actually believes in magic anyway. And that's kind of the argument that our opponents are making. Sanctions don't work like magic. They don't work as we'd wish, so therefore they don't work at all. But this isn't a children's story. It's the worst real world with all its imperfections and frustrations. So I'm not here to argue that sanctions work like magic. They are not some kind of pain free foreign policy, quick fix, cheaper and safer than a cross press release or diplomatic demarche Avada Kedavra and your enemies vanish in a puff of smoke. Not at all. Of course sanctions have drawbacks. They can be too broad with too much collateral damage. They can be too narrow, easily sidestepped. They can be enforced too briefly or imposed too hastily. They can drag on too long, becoming irrelevant or even harmful. They can be too rigid with all the hard luck stories that that implies. Or they can be too flexible, meaning that everyone's a special case. They can be too bureaucratic and just become a box ticking exercise. They can create opportunities for corruption, enriching the insiders and impoverishing the outsiders. They can benefit the sanction busters, the fixers and grifters who see such splendid opportunities to cut the cake and keep the crumbs. More about them later. They can be overused. If you apply pressure, you stoke the search for alternatives. The City of London is not the world's only financial centre. There's Abu Dhabi. The dollar is not the only currency. There's crypto. SW1 is not the only postcode. Nicely, it is here. And perhaps the strongest argument of all is that Sanctions are too often a distraction, a feel good gesture, politics option that lets you off dealing with the real issues. So we rely too much perhaps on sanctions or put too much faith in them. So if the motion before us here tonight were that sanctions work like magic, or that they should be the only or even the central tool in foreign policy, I depose it. We certainly need other things. We need aid and trade and soft power and statecraft and diplomacy. We need the intelligence services and covert action. We need the ultimate option of the use of force in self defence. We need the full foreign policy toolbox. But we one of those tools is clearly sanctions. Remember, as Anne pointed out earlier, sanctions aren't just economic, they're administrative. They can be targeted against countries, against businesses, against institutions, against individuals. Now, I've worked with Bill Browder. Some of you may have read his books, Red Notice and Freezing Order on what he called Magnitsky Sanctions, after Sergei Magnits, who was beaten to death in a Russian prison for exposing a huge tax fraud perpetrated by corrupt officials. Browder identified the people involved and he got them sanctioned, first by the United States and then by many other countries. No more visas for them, no more access to our financial system. Now, that didn't bring Magnitsky back to life, but it did puncture the climate of impunity around torture and other abuse of power. So here's my question to the opponents and they're welcome to answer it later. Are they really saying that the world would be a better place if Browder and I had never lifted a finger? If those torturers and fraudsters were still able to holiday freely in the west and launder their stolen money through our banks. Let's take another and there may be libel laws listening. So hypothetically, example. Just imagine if by some quirk of fate, a top Putin crony had become a member of the House of Lords. Shocking thought, I know. But just imagine, we might call him Lord Munchalot. Now, how could we sanction Lord Munchalot? Well, a European Union country could say that if Lord Montalot wants to go to view his castle in Italy, he's not eligible to visa free travel to the Schengen Zone. Not a huge inconvenience. He'll have to go and queue up consulate for an hour or two. It's a sanction and it's sending a signal not just to him, but to all the British bankers, lawyers, accountants and image polishers who help the Putin regime. What we're saying is your choices have costs and sanctions are What? Impose those costs. Now, of course, we can do more. We can impose asset freezes. It's a temporary measure with very strong conditionality. Mend your ways and you may get your money back. Continue. Kiss it goodbye. And what we're saying with that is that if you want to take advantage of all the blessings that a civilized country offers, then we expect something from you too. And if you're financing torture or terror or genocide or the invasion of another country or the intimidation of critics, you will pay a price. And that's not controversial, it's common sense. Remember the motion before us. It's not do we like Britain's Russia policy or has it worked as we wished? It's this. Sanctions don't work as a tool of foreign policy. Not sometimes overshoot or don't work as well as we'd like or don't work quickly or don't very well. Don't work very well. They don't work as a tool of foreign policy. And that's a really strong statement. And I think Rebecca's kind of conceded, if I understood it wrong, right, that in at least a third of the cases, by her count, they do actually work. And take the sanctions on Russia, seeing as the opponents have raised Russia, since this full scale invasion of Russia, of Ukraine, sanctions have cut Russia's fossil fuel export revenues by half, from a billion dollars a day to half a billion. Now that's not perfect. I wish it were more. Maybe it will be. But it's a lot better than nothing. Every dollar that that goes into Putin's war machine means death and destruction in Ukraine. Every dollar we keep out of it is our contribution to its defeat. Now, if you support this motion, you're not only saying that sanctions don't work, but they should never be tried. Taken to its logical conclusion. That means we should have traded with the Third Reich throughout the Second World War. We should have allowed high tech exports to the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, and we'd allow Islamic State to operate its terror mafia structure here in the UK without the slightest hindrance. If you're against those, those are all sanctions. Now, just to wind up, this motion's only partly about practicalities. Listening to Ian and Rebecca, I sense a whiff of defeatism, maybe cynicism. Who are we in our post imperial decrepitude to tell the rest of the world what to do? Sanctions are a sign of geopolitical arrogance and anachronism. For a middle ranking country, country like Britain, our job is to get along with other countries, not tell them what to do? Rub along with Russia, tough like Ukraine. And I think that's wrong too. So long as foreigners want to park their money here to trade or invest, educate their children, go on holiday, go shopping, we have leverage. We set the rules, we choose how to enforce them and we can't dodge that choice. Remember Rick in Casablanca? The problems of the world and not in my department. He argued well. He didn't want to apply sanctions to Major Strasser of the Third Reich or to help Ilsa Lund and Viktor Laszlo escape. But he came to realize that neutrality has its costs, not just practical ones, but in self respect. Play the Marseillaise, Sam. Hang the consequences or curse yourself forever for your cowardice. So foreign policy in which we sanction nobody, nowhere and never, which is what the supporters of this motion are saying, is not a foreign policy, it's an abdication of responsibility. We're saying to the rest of the world, sorry, you may be suffering all kinds of horrors, but we just can't get involved. What kind of signal does that send to our friends and perhaps more dangerously to our enemies? Sanctions are not foolproof. They're not magic, but they're not nothing. Please oppose the motion.

B (43:21)

Edward Lucas there bringing the long range weapon of Casablanca to our debate tonight. Thank you. We have heard all of your argument. This episode is brought to you by Progressive Insurance. Do you ever think about switching insurance companies just to see if you could save some cash? Well, Progressive makes it easy. Just drop in some details about yourself and see if you're eligible to save money when you bundle your home and auto policies. The process only takes minutes and it.

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B (46:01)

I can announce the result of the first vote on the motion. Sanctions don't work as a tool foreign policy. And that was 36% for the motion, 41% against and 23 undecided. So what we're going to do obviously is make a comparison as we go through to the end. But 36 for, 41 against, 23 who don't knows undecideds, whatever you want to call them. Let's see if that firms up by the time you've had your chance to ask some questions. If you are watching online you can put the in the Q and A tab on the right hand side of your screen. It's nice if you tell us your name and where you're tuning in from if you are here IRL in real life as the kids say there will be ushers with roving mics. So why don't we start see you know how many questions we've got. I might start to take them in bunches. And if you're at the back, this is glorious and very grand and quite dark and I'm long sighted so don't be afraid to wave. Where should we start? Steve Crawshaw, you've got 2020 vision there from the panel. Steve, hello, you're up there. I do see you now. Apologies.

A (47:11)

Hi thank you. Thank you very much indeed. And for very interesting introduction to the themes I wanted to pick up. Edward Lucas already addressed some of these things but I was already had made a note. I found it curious to hear from Rebecca that one in three being affected was regarded as somehow meaning that they weren't working properly. And one of the joys of modern life is that even on a phone, you can now check. While you're in the hall listening, I read the Tufts University analysis which was saying, wow, we can manage to do one in three, in effect. So I'm wondering what either you or Ian believe to be the ones that can work so much better. I both as a journalistic commentator, later working as a human rights advocate, I can't think of any. Any of the biggest problems in the world which have been solved, perhaps could be solved, but certainly in terms of confronting Putin, the idea that nice diplomacy has worked better during the past 20 years seems a fantasy. So interested to hear how you would do better than one in three, Rebecca.

B (48:07)

That one goes straight to you.

E (48:10)

So I think the important point here is that one in three is based on people who are being targeted directly. And where the sanctions are very clearly defined in terms of outcomes, they have measurable outcomes. And even when those outcomes are measurable, and the Tufts article suggests in a very small proportion of cases the outcomes are measurable, only one third leads to some kind of a positive outcome. My definition is a purely economic one. If we are looking at a single subset of a subset, then actually, if we've got bigger foreign policy goals, which inevitably we do have now because we're using sanctions and export controls as a means of coercion, that Tufts University article is incredibly clear on exactly what it's saying. We cannot use sanctions for a broader set of undefined and unmeasurable foreign policy goals. And I think my point would be, in this context, what's actually happened, rather than being defeatist, is we've seen the world move ever closer to what the Russians would define and have defined. Defined for a long while, and what China and other brics nations and now the United States are also defining as economic war. And that is something that is incredibly serious.

B (49:38)

I might just bring Ian in. Well, I think Ian wants to come in. Please just make your point, Ian. But I wanted to sort of press a bit on this. The idea that if, according to Rebecca, about a third of sanctions had worked in some measurable sense globally, that didn't seem to be the most terrible track record. Did you find that was a challenge?

D (49:59)

I didn't find it a challenge at all. In fact, I can go further than a third. 92% of all the travel restrictions sanctions imposed on Russian citizens, banning them entering the UK were against citizens who'd never been to the UK and never wanted to Travel to the uk so internal Foreign Office advice not long after the war started said that individual and entity sanctions have practically no impact within six months of their imposition. So, you know, one third, Tufts, are being remarkably generous in my assessment. I would say that the number is much lower than that. I lost count of the number of sanctions that I authorized where the person had never been to the UK and they had no assets in the uk.

B (50:44)

Right. Did you hear anything that made you think maybe they work better in some places than others? Because that seems to be a bit of an underlying. We focus quite heavily on the Russia example. Got a lot of expertise around on Russia, but I think we mentioned Iran, gcpoa, the trap to that agreement, or indeed other examples. If I were to squeeze you, would you say, well, I think maybe Russia is a more difficult case than others, or is your position fully not. No way. It doesn't really work anywhere.

D (51:10)

Not necessarily. I mean, I think you can always cite measurable economic impacts of sanctions. Absolutely. But my point is that. That the response to sanctions has been political. So after the tier three financial sector sanctions came in in July of 2014, for example, that led to a massive outflow of capital out of Russia, the tune of $150 billion in 2014. So that was a very measurable economic impact of that particular measure. But Russia simply responded to that and put all this capital into its domestic banks.

B (51:41)

Okay, Tiny one Ed, or should we get. Go back out to the audience? Do you want to come back quickly?

A (51:46)

I'm in a very opposition of not wanting to talk about Russia. As my family would know. This is basically what I start off before breakfast and continue till late at night. But I just want to remind the other side, we're not here to discuss the pluses and minuses of our Russia policy. Although I would be delighted to point out that for about the first 15 years after 1991, there was a kind of feeding frenzy in Moscow where the British diplomats there, not Ian, but there his predecessors were encouraging all sorts of very lively financial practices by the British financial sector, where everybody got extremely rich. And that created a monster, which we're now dealing with.

D (52:25)

Including Bill Browder. Including Bill Browder, by the way, who's now British.

A (52:32)

So I'm very happy to point out about that. We've made terrible mistakes in the past. But the point here is a principled one. Sanctions do not work as a tool of foreign policy. And it seems to me that the other side's already conceded that when they're properly designed and properly implemented and Properly targeted and properly administered, they do work. And I almost think we could go to the pub, but I'm obviously delighted to have more questions.

B (52:55)

Yes, well, that's always a promising thought. I think we've got two questions down here. We might just take. Take the two. One after each other and then the panel, you can decide where you find your best kicker goal is.

D (53:06)

Yeah. To the two of you, motion I'm.

A (53:09)

Interested in, if it's one in three.

D (53:11)

That'S working, how do you measure the collateral damage of the sanctions that don't work? Because surely it's not just benign, they're chaotic. So the minute you're doing something as broad brush for aggressive as applying a sanction, if it doesn't work, there's going to be huge hidden costs to that, including damaging people in these countries with no agency. So it's all very well saying a perfectly calibrated sanction works. What about the two thirds that create the opposite of what they want? How do you measure the effect of those?

B (53:39)

Can I take the other question as well, just because we can get through a bit more? Thank you.

C (53:42)

This is a question to Tom and to Edward. So the architect of US sanctions on Russia under Joe Biden was a man called Dilip Singh, and he gave a valedictory speech on the 16th of January of this year on economic statecraft to the Atlantic Council, setting out five principles that ought to be applied for an effective sanctions regime. Principle number one, the one most important to him was what's called an off ramp. In other words, if you put sanctions on somebody, you should make it clear what they need to do in order to come off the sanctions list. No sanctions regime, whether it's the us, the eu, the uk, Japan, New Zealand or Australia, has an off ramp. So how can sanctions be an effective. How can a sanctions policy be effective if it doesn't allow people to come off the list when they change their behaviour?

B (54:30)

Tom, why don't we start with you?

C (54:32)

Well, thank you for the question because it actually allows me to make the point that I was going to make before I was robbed by Ann of my opportunity to make it. So I think the. The point that I was going to make, which hopefully addresses what you're saying, is that what we have failed to do is a point of foreign policy. So, in other words, we have the opportunity in the work that we do at rusi, to kind of travel around the world and visit countries that are exactly in the position that you are in. And they say very simple things like we understand the importance of sanctions. We understand the egregious nature of Russia's war in Ukraine and we want to help, but we want something in return. We don't want you turning up here and telling us you must block your border if, I don't know, somewhere like Georgia, or you must not trade with Russia. We want you to come to us and say in return, we will give you some access to the European Union for your wine or whatever it might, might be. So sanctions are, as we keep saying, part of a toolbox. And the toolbox is a mixture of the sanctions, but also diplomacy. I think that's something which we have not done well in the context of Russia. That's the first point. The second point to Michael, again, yes, we have been poor at indicating off ramps. There is the US treasury review of sanctions from 2021, which makes that very specific point. At the end of the day, the ultimate off ramp is the point that Ian made at the very beginning, which is get the hell back across your own border. Russian military, that's the ultimate off ramp in this case. Whereas there are individuals who don't see a way out of sanctions. At the end of the day, if Vladimir Putin were to reverse his egregious decision, then we would be having a conversation about removing sanctions. So should they be more nuanced in the nature of the off ramp? Absolutely. But there is a clear off ramp.

A (56:33)

There's one.

D (56:37)

How do you measure the impact of.

A (56:41)

Sanctions that go wrong or don't work.

B (56:43)

In terms of money, time and people.

C (56:45)

With no agency that are hurt by them?

A (56:47)

How do you measure that?

C (56:48)

If two thirds are going wrong, how.

A (56:50)

Do you measure that?

C (56:50)

I don't think the two, I don't think it's two thirds go wrong. I think it's two thirds don't have the intended impact. But they do go wrong. They do go wrong. And when they go wrong, countries are very quick to say, this is hurting us. So that's why I say it's a failure of diplomacy not to listen to these countries and figure out how we ensure it was a failure of forward planning to some extent, not to anticipate the spike in energy, the spike in grid, but it's at the end of the day, that was a function of Russia invading Ukraine. It wasn't a function of sanctions.

B (57:22)

Would anyone on the other side of the argument, just maybe either of you like to just take this briefly, be remotely convinced or move towards the cliff edge of your own argument on the off ramp point? If the off ramps were clearer, would that be at all persuasive, that is, if we nuanced the way we talked about sanctions in the round tonight. But of course you could say if there was a way out of them, they might be more attractive to those of you who are in the other position.

A (57:53)

Yeah.

D (57:53)

I've argued long and hard that actually there should be clearly defined measures and steps that Russia could take that would lead to some sort of sanctions reduction over a period of time as part of a peace process that doesn't exist now. There's a complete, complete reluctance to talk about that. And they talk about the kind of the frozen assets in Belgium. These haven't been expropriated yet because Belgium has actually refused to go along with that idea. But if we expropriate those assets, actually that will simply incentivize Russia to continue fighting. The opposite way to look at that will be to say that if Vladimir Putin sits down and agrees, Let me finish some sort of peace process, you know, with Ukraine, then over a period of time, should certain conditions be met, then there may be scope to lift that freeze. Simply looking to.

B (58:49)

Rebecca, just conscious that you're, you're on screen here. Did you want to come in on that or are you happy to pass?

E (58:54)

Yeah, Very quickly, I would say something quite significant about the word off ramp. And I think one of the most interesting events I ever went to was when I was talking at the beginning of the sanctions process about how economic sanctions were not likely, or rather commerce was never likely to constrain Russia for the very simple reason that Russia's attitude towards all of this was one of almost like Stalingrad, it was going to dig its heels in and economic hardship did not matter to Russia or the Russian people in the same way that we might expect it to. And I had Lithuanians and Ukrainians in the audience and they were appalled at the idea of an off ramp at any kind of consideration that Russia would be given any kind of economic benefit from having acted in the way that they had done. And I think that is one of the main constraints of, of sanctions, that finding an appropriate off ramp at the end is very, very hard.

B (59:56)

It's a one way street. I think there was a hand here. I just wondering. Oh, I think there's a lady in the middle over here as well. Can we just start with the lady over here? I'm sorry, just to give us a bit of a wave for the gentleman with the microphone. Yeah, thank you. The invasion of Ukraine is obviously horrific.

E (60:15)

And tragic, but Russia is dictatorship that crushes any dissidents or opposition its people may cause. So the Russian people essentially have no say in what Putin does when he's in power, let alone how long he is in power. When you post sanctions on the population, you ostracize them further, making them poor and thereby entrenching Putin's power in Russia. As Russia's propaganda mostly states that the west hates the Russian people, thereby just kind of alien alienating them even more. Don't you think this is counter effective when it comes to trying to take Putin out of power or weaken his.

B (60:49)

Strength or the hold on the Russian people? Thank you very much. So it affects ordinary people far too much. It's targeted, I feel like on the wrong people, particularly those who are living in an autocracy, if I got that the gist of that. And I think there was a hand.

C (61:03)

Over here just for Tom and Ed. I think it's quite easy to talk about about more individualized sanctions regimes if you're talking about the Magnitsky's and your anti corruption and human rights sanctions because that's targeting the behavior of an individual and getting them to change their behavior. Given the proposition is about a question of their use as foreign policy. If those sanctions are excluded, there is an issue where it may not work in the same way with foreign policy. Individualized behavior is much easier to target with individualised sanctions. So if that's excluded from the consideration, does it still stand that they are a effective tool at foreign policy that such that the proposition shouldn't be agreed with?

B (61:49)

So you're making a distinction there between the use of it on states and on individuals.

A (61:56)

I think it's fair to say that economic sanctions that are designed to bring about regime change through the immiseration of the population don't work very well. You can maybe argue that South Africa economic pressure on South Africa made South Africa poorer and isolated than it would have been and that undermined the apartheid regime. But against that there are other examples like Cuba and so on where the sort of very broad brush economic pressure hasn't worked. And if that was the motion, I might well be on the other side. But that's not what we're discussing. We're saying don't work as a tool of foreign policy. And I'll give you three very clear examples, I think, of things that have worked. One is Belarus. There were some targeted sanctions on Belarus by the Bush administration, now long forgotten to get political prisoners out of prison. And the Lukashenko regiment regime blinked pretty quickly and those prisoners were released. That was a good clear example. There's Jackson Vanik, which was brought in during the Cold War to stop the Soviet Union persecuting Jewish refuseniks who wanted to leave. And that had a very clear off ramp that it was suspended, but it could always be reintroduced. Congress had to vote every year to keep it suspended. And the result was that the emigration controls would lifted and it stayed around for a while and eventually went. And the third just getting away. Finally few from Russia is the American visa sanctions on members of the ira, Army Council and Sinn Fein. And this worked both ways. First of all, it was putting pressure on the Irish Republican leadership. You can't come to D.C. if you're engaged in your bombing campaign. But it was also way of putting pressure on the Brits because finally Jerry Adams did get a visa. And that was a huge wake up call to the Brits. Watch out, you may be losing America. You better keep that peace process going. So all that's foreign policy. In each case it was sanctioned. Each case it worked.

B (63:53)

We do not. Let me just let the other side in one final. Can you perorate very briefly?

A (63:59)

We don't have to prove that sanctions always work or mostly work. They have to argue that they never work.

B (64:05)

Okay, well you put your finger this on scale there a bit. You made it easier on your side than on the other side.

A (64:13)

That's what the motion says. It says they don't work as a tool of foreign policy. We need a few examples.

B (64:19)

Okay. Okay, let's bring it in if you like. I thought anything you'd like to come back with on that in Rebecca. But I did think that distinction between the individual and the state was an interesting one because probably I'd be a bit guilty of that as a reporter on certainly on the, you know, in the former Russia and former Soviet space of sort of taking these big names and thinking, aha, if we could maybe get to this person, if it worked, then we would. We would have made a point that would damn or peel them away from Putin, perhaps. I was maybe conflating these two things and I think the question put a finger on that.

D (64:55)

Yeah, well, I personally sanctioned Dmitry Medvedev and he, he's now threatening to throw nuclear bombs in our direction. So there's no obvious sign that he's threatening.

B (65:04)

But can I just be a bit cheeky and say, well he would, wouldn't he? I mean that's just what Dmitri Medvedev does.

D (65:09)

Right. But I'll also go back to the point I made earlier that actually 92% of the individual sanctions impose restrictions that are Practically meaningless in any case. You know, people who've never traveled to the UK and so on. Look, I mean, I think the most important, important individual sanctions are the ones against the oligarch class that have been targeted as part of this London grad package that Liz Truss can have really advanced. And I'm at risk here of saying that Liz Truss actually did something well during her time as Foreign Secretary. But thankfully, I won't have the chance to do that today. I mean, they are not incentivizing oligarchs turn against Putin. There's absolutely no evidence at all they took their money out to Russia specifically to avoid that money being sent stolen by Putin. The idea that they can somehow turn against him as a clan is fanciful. Only Harry Potter would make up something like that.

B (65:58)

Oh, the Harry Potter weapon is being wielded. That's a good comeback for the Casablanca line. Rebecca, just one example hasn't come up, so I just thought I'd throw it your way briefly. And then to Tom and I think I've got another question here. I'm quite surprised that South Africa and anti apartheid sanctions didn't come up. If we just want to take the lens back. And I know you have made the point that in your view that a lot of the application of sanctions has happened within a foreign policy geopolitical compact of the west, sort of telling countries what to do and that you suggested that the sanctions flowed from a bad analysis. What do you think if we look a bit further back? Well, a lot of people would say, well, that was at least it was one arrow in the quiver against the apartheid state in South Africa. What would you say?

E (66:44)

I'd say that you had a huge amount of public support for what was going on with sanctions at that moment in time. You also had a huge public boycott of South African products. There was a public awareness of what was going on in a way that has not been possible to maintain. We're in a very different era these days, and we have to tailor our sanctions policy to match the era in which we're operating. Issues of regime change, issues of shifting the cultural dial or issues of coercing are actually very different now to where they were during that particular campaign.

B (67:24)

Thank you. I just felt that we should maybe have a mention of it tonight. It really is Tom's go. But I mean, let's. Should we take. Now everybody's coming. You see, it's like the end of term here, right. Tom, do you mind going first on the next round just so we can get a few More questions in. If we just get the mic around quickly and be quite brief in your questions, I think we could get one more round in.

A (67:45)

Women are allowed to ask questions too.

B (67:47)

Women are definitely allowed to ask questions too. You'll get extra points.

A (67:53)

Thanks for the interesting debate questions for the form.

C (68:00)

Side, I come from Syria.

A (68:02)

And it's interesting also to hear your.

C (68:05)

Perspective on the sanctions on Syria. So if you think that sanctions don't work as a foreign policy, what would?

A (68:13)

In the case of Syria, for example.

C (68:15)

And for the against side, my question would be the sanctions on the Syrian people have been massive.

A (68:23)

The the impact on the people I.

C (68:25)

Have seen and witnessed firsthand. So the question to you is if.

D (68:29)

This is if this was a valid.

C (68:32)

And effective foreign policy.

D (68:34)

Have you calculated the impact on the normal people? Provided that the Syrian regime have been isolated internationally since the 1960s but the.

C (68:43)

Economic sanctions have only impacted the people.

A (68:46)

Thank you.

B (68:47)

Thank you. We'll take another question. Do we have any lady? Yes, we do have a lady. Hello. Let's go this way. Sorry. We'll go with the lady in the red jacket and then the gentleman. I think I am going to bunch them at this point just for time purposes. So thank you. It's going to be short and sweet.

E (69:01)

Just to on Ian's point about majority of sanctions on individuals having no impact because they're not have no intention of coming to the jurisdiction, what do the sides think about the government's response to that? Which is it doesn't really matter if they don't have any tangible impact because sanctions are all about signaling and it seems to me if you define it in that way, in other words, it's the government saying it's important for us to get our position on foreign policy across even if they don't have any concrete impact. Doesn't that slightly skew the debate towards sanctions? Always working.

B (69:37)

Okay, thank you. And last one over here, who got a microphone on this side of the aisle.

A (69:43)

So my question is, please, are we seeing the use, possibly a question for Tom and Edward, but potentially everyone, are we seeing the use of the last tools of Western dominance in cases such as in Russia, North Korea, Iran, that we can potentially apply as a means of pressure. And I'm thinking specifically use of Swift, right, a Belgian company to impose sanctions on payments. I'm thinking about the use of the insurance market, Western dominated to impose the oil price cap. In the case of Russia, aside from these two examples, I don't really see much more another tool really being applied as means of pressure in the future. Only until we lose that sort of geopolitical tool as well.

B (70:34)

Right. I think what we do here is usually take what you feel most passionately that you want to speak for, speak against, from those questions. So, Tom, it's going to go to you. I thought it was excellent to hear the Syria angle from the gentleman there, but who also said what was the alternative in the case, a specific case that he was mentioning of his home country. And that's slightly more. It's not a technical point, but you don't have much at your disposal. The west is in some ways running out of tools in the toolbox. This is one of them.

C (71:04)

I'll leave the question from the KC to Edward. So I think on. So Syria, to my mind, is a very interesting case study. And yes, thank you for raising it. Because there, in a way, there was an off ramp because the sanctions were lifted. The question, though, the question, and this is not a question of sanctions, it's a question of foreign policy policy, is were we, as a community of organized countries that were previously sanctioning Syria, were we ready to come in with the kind of support that was needed once the sanctions were lifted? And this is at the heart of this whole discussion, which is that sanctions can be a lazy tool used by policymakers. Put them on, go home, tea and medals. Don't think about the consequences. That has been a failure of diplomacy, in my view, on the technical points. I mean, we could talk about this for hours. It's one of my favorite topics, but I think we're a long way away from exhausting the levers of, if you like, Western financial hegemony. I think people will perhaps find other ways to make payments at some point. Yes, of course the influence is declining, but at the end, end of the day, people want to use kind of the systems that they trust. But it also. Sorry, it's one last small point. It does highlight another issue, which is that there are fashions in sanctions. I cannot tell you how mad it drove me to see people walking down streets with signs saying D. Swift Russia. I bet you the people carrying those banners had no idea what that meant. So I do think we need to be better at the way we can communicate with the public on what we're trying to achieve with sanctions.

B (72:45)

Ian, which of those would you like.

D (72:46)

To pick up on the signalling point? I mean, Putin knows that we're not happy with him. It's made absolutely no difference at all. So I don't really understand the question. Quite frankly, it's not a valid way to measure the effectiveness of sanctions that seek to end Russia's destabilization and destruction of Ukraine. I'm sorry.

B (73:08)

Anyone else?

A (73:10)

Very quickly, just very briefly on the Western. Is this the end of the last gasp of Western hegemony? I point out that non Western countries use sanctions too. India applies systematic sanctions against Pakistan, for example. China's applying sanctions to America at the moment. Sanctions are fundamentally about the exercise of economic and political power. And if you have that power in your pocket, which bigger and richer countries tend to do, then you'll use it. And I'm still grappling with the idea that one can say that sanctions don't work when they are continuing to be used not only by us, but by so many other countries and lead to such robust counter pressure. I mean, what are all these lawyers in London doing earning their thousand pounds and are trying to get their clients off sanctions list if sanctions don't work.

B (74:02)

Or lawyers are just good at charging. That said, your case that sanctions work, if used by, say, China, that would mean that you're not being normative about it. Sanctions don't work in the context of what we're trying to do in Russia, obviously means we're trying to do something good and it's not working. Your argument would say seem to be if anybody is using them, but they, you know, whoever they are, for whatever means, they're just effective, I suppose that winds out.

A (74:30)

Your side is basically arguing that gravity doesn't work. And I'm arguing that there are plenty of examples of objects falling to the ground at whatever it is, 9 meters per second per second. And that to me, I think there is economic gravity. And if you have the power to use it, you do. And there's political reason. And it's the same with visa sanctions as well.

B (74:51)

What I love is just watching. If you could see an eye roll from Abu Dhabi, I saw one from Rebecca, which broadcast rather beautifully on a large screen both in front of and behind me. So that is a perfect moment to say that. Come on, Rebecca, let's get you into the debate here.

E (75:07)

Okay, so I am an economist. I'm a trade economist. And the most silent voice on economic sanctions has been the World Trade Organization. And if we believe in free and fair trade and all the good things that Edward and Tom have talked about, then we would say that actually sanctions are going to restrict some countries from trading and allow other countries to trade and that we can use that trade in order to be able to coerce other countries. The key thing here is that it weaponizes trade. It doesn't create the advantages of trade, it weaponizes trade. And as trade becomes weaponized, we begin to see things like in Syria that we saw. And what we saw in Syria was that Russia was circumventing sanctions and was still managing to get used, sectioned 2 millimeter metal tubes into Syria alongside printed publications. That wasn't children's books, that was actually manuals on how to assemble an AK47.

B (76:14)

Rebecca, I'm sorry to cut in, but there's just a question that I'd really just like to ask everyone before we go to our vote and it follows from what you were saying, so forgive me, it was just. We're really beginning to get a bit squidged for time and it's such a good one that's coming online and everyone, you're just going to have to be haiku, like really haiku. Like it's almost a yes, no and a tiny description of your view. We'll start with keep with Rebecca. Are tariffs just another form of sanctions with a different name?

E (76:44)

Yes. Tariffs are economic warfare tools.

B (76:49)

Right. So tariffs are sanctions with a different name, different marketing campaign. Who are we going to get to? Someone from this side. Grab it. Someone.

A (76:57)

Well, I think, I mean, there's a difference between the kind of Trumpian tariffs with their theatrical excitement, where I feel we've suddenly made trade into economics, into a kind of reality TV series which may encourage students to study it more attentively. But there's a difference between that and the kind of rather boring business of the EU's Common External Tariff.

B (77:18)

That's a very long answer to a very short question. Anyway, you put the rest in your roundup comments. It's just. You just said it was different. Ian, did you like that question?

D (77:28)

They are now would be my answer.

B (77:31)

They are now. So tariffs are just another form of sanctions or sanctions are another form of tariffs?

C (77:37)

I would say yes, because Donald Trump says sanctions and tariffs almost interchangeably and confusing himself sometimes and he's always right.

B (77:45)

So you're just.

C (77:47)

I'm going to the US soon. I don't want to be.

B (77:50)

That's a very good point, actually. Yes. That's all right. Now. That's all the time we have for questions and our speakers get about a minute, minute and a tiny bit to summarize their killer points for tonight. And we're going to go the other way around to the opening speeches. And so that means, means that we. Where did we. So we go back to Edward, don't we?

A (78:15)

Yes. Well, moving from Harry Potter to Doctor who, sanctions are not the Sonic screwdriver skating quickly over the fact that I've stolen Tom's punchline. So please delete that. I agree with pretty much all the arguments that our opponents have made. They can be hypocritical, they can be too broad, they can be too narrow, they can be this, they can, they can be that. But remember the motion. The motion is sanctions don't work. And that means if you vote for the motion, you believe they've never worked anywhere ever. And they can never work anywhere, ever. And if you really believe that, you're saying they're either utterly ineffective, which even though our opponents don't believe, or you're saying that the collateral damage they do, which was touched on, we didn't fully answer that, always and everywhere, outweighs any positive effects. And that's not true either. And I think the fundamental point is once you.

B (79:08)

Quick.

A (79:09)

That was much less than a minute.

B (79:10)

It was 48 seconds, your sentences.

A (79:13)

I had another 12 seconds. That's 30.

B (79:15)

Go on, go. Well, just go now you've got six. Go.

A (79:20)

Use them better, use them smarter. Of course, don't abuse them, but don't ignore them.

B (79:26)

Thank you. Right, we go to Rebecca and we would like her unmuted, ideally.

E (79:37)

So this is just to say that this isn't about access to holidays in the uk, it's not about individual behaviours, it's about our assumptions around an order that we in the past have used our economic power to dominate. Trade is being diversified around the world. Russia has not been starved of cash in the way that we expected it to, and it has not achieved our foreign policy goals. But what we have seen is an increased likelihood of the fact that we are at economic war. If you look at the tools of economic war, then every single one of them now, including sanctions and export controls and trade measures, are being used. So this is actually a very serious moment in time. We need to think seriously about our use of sanctions in foreign policy and we need to be very careful and very coherent. As President Putin said on 28 February 2022, just after he'd invaded Ukraine, we think that sanctions are an existential threat. And I'd like to remind the audience that anything that was regarded as existential threat after Russia altered its nuclear doctrine in 2019 warranted a nuclear response. We are atomic war.

B (80:56)

Thank you, Rebecca, for that. And we will go to Tom Keating. Round up.

C (81:00)

Well, Edwards written me an apology for using sonic screwdriver and I can't actually read what it says, so I'm just going to plow on. So the point I was going to make is, look, before 2022, we had the UN generally that we could rely on to issue sanctions or the U.S. in Europe, we were observers. But since 2022 in Europe, we've had to work to make sanctions work. Political leaders were lazy back in 2022. They hoped that sanctions would achieve the magic that Edward referred to. But they are. Here we go. A tool in a toolbox. They're not a sort of screwdriver. They don't sit there by themselves in the toolbox. They sit there with other tools. We need stick and we need carrot. It's hard work, but they do contribute to foreign policy. They do work as a tool of foreign policy. And so you should oppose the motion.

B (81:53)

That gives the final word to our learned friend. Being proud.

D (81:57)

I'd just like to say to Edward, I'm really impressed with his Harry Potter skills because he managed to magically up things I said that I didn't actually say, but I did actually agree with Edward on one key point and actually with his colleague that actually there should be a toolkit, there should be military deterrence, there should be diplomatic engagement, and yes, potentially there should be sanctions within that mix. But that is not the case. You know, we refuse to send and have refused to send our military to fight in Ukraine to save it against the Russian aggression. And we have also refused to talk to Vladimir Putin, cutting off any diplomatic avenues available to us. You know, we have a tiny army and we have practically no diplomats in Moscow and nobody really listens to them in London anyway. So sanctions are our foreign policy and our foreign policy has failed. Please support this motion.

B (82:53)

Well, on that note, it's time for you, the audience, to decide, so please submit your final vote for or against the motion. Sanctions don't work as a tool of foreign policy if you haven't made up your mind or remain unpersuaded by both sides. Next to me, you vote undecided. Please use the same QR code that used for the pre vote, which you can see on the screen behind me. And then there's a little bit of magic that now happens. Until we get the final numbers, maybe I should remind us in the meantime of where we were at the first vote, which was 36% agree. Just over a third disagree was 41% at that point, and undecideds were 23. So let's see what gradually emerges. So here we go. So agreeing with the motion. Sanctions don't work now. 27% disagreeing, 63% undecideds a mere 10% 27 agree 63 disagree undecideds 10% that is someone can calculate swing. There must be some brilliant support or maths grad in the audience. But that's a big change, isn't it? From 36 agreed when we came in, that went down to 27%. Disagree went from 41 to 63 undecideds. Well done undecideds for coming to a view. You went from 23% when you came in. So 22% swing to 10%. A 22% swing if Edward Lucas can be reluctant to speak without challenge from the other side of the argument. But that is really quite a dramatic difference. So it showed that our debate tonight did seem to make some difference and to resonate. So thank you very much indeed. It is a wrap. We hope we've given you some food for thought. Certainly has to me both made me remember a lot of occasions when I've thought thought about sanctions and I'm sure we will in the future and also question some of my own conclusions. So particular thanks of course to our brilliant panel for making it work. That's Ian Proud, Rebecca Harding, Edward Lucas and Tom Keating. To you the audience into intelligence squared with globalsanctions.com for putting it all together. A very good night to you.

A (85:22)

Thanks gq.

B (85:33)

Thanks for listening to Intelligence Squared. This episode was produced by Hannah Kay and it was edited by Mark Roberts. To join us at future events, head to intelligencesquared.com attend to see our full program. You've been listening to Intelligence Squared. Thanks for joining.

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