Podcast Summary: Intelligence Squared

Episode: Trump, Markets and The Greatest Crash in U.S. History, with Andrew Ross Sorkin (Part One)
Date: December 1, 2025
Guests: Andrew Ross Sorkin (Author, NYT columnist, CNBC anchor)
Host: Gillian Tett
Event: Live event at Conway Hall

Main Theme and Purpose

This episode centers on Andrew Ross Sorkin’s exploration of the 1929 Wall Street Crash, its key personalities, and the series of policy mistakes that fueled the ensuing Great Depression. Drawing on his new book, "1929," Sorkin examines how the conditions and behaviors leading up to the crash eerily reflect today’s financial climate, from market exuberance to cycles of debt-fueled speculation. The conversation scrutinizes whether the world could face another economic crisis of similar magnitude within the next decade and what, if anything, we've learned that might prevent a repeat.

Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. Lessons from 1929 and Parallels to the Present

[06:23 - 08:53]

• Domino Effect of Policy Missteps: Sorkin emphasizes the crash was just a “domino” in a long line of poor policy choices, not a standalone event.
  • “The Crash of 1929 was just one domino in a series of dominoes. In fact, the book is about the series of dominoes…" (Andrew Ross Sorkin, 06:23)
• Naming the Downturn: President Hoover chose the term "Great Depression" instead of "panic" to avoid alarming the public, ironically giving the event a more enduring sense of doom.
  • “The phrase the Great Depression was chosen by President Hoover… he thought it was less panicky if he told people it was a depression.” (Sorkin, 06:55)
• Are We Doomed to Repeat? Sorkin hopes policy responses have improved, but warns that crashes are inevitable; what matters is the handling afterwards.
  • “Do I think there is a crash that's coming in the next 10 years? Without doubt. I would be shocked if there wasn't… The question is what happens on the other side of the crash?” (Sorkin, 07:41)

2. How the Book Came to Be

[10:27 - 15:18]

• Genesis of Obsession: Sorkin’s interest sparked from being unable to intelligently compare 2008 and 1929, leading to years of deep research.
  • “People… would ask me to compare 2008 to 1929. And I had no good answer. And so I went researching…” (Sorkin, 10:27)
• Detective Work with Primary Sources: Uncovering personal archives, especially those of Thomas Lamont (J.P. Morgan), and the lack of records for key figure Charlie Mitchell.
  • “There was so much of it was a needle in a haystack… The main character… Charlie Mitchell… never kept notes.” (Sorkin, 13:47)
  • Securing never-before-seen Federal Reserve board minutes was a breakthrough, offering “a treasure map” to the era’s events.

3. Personality-Driven Euphoria and Market Excess

[16:27 - 22:18]

• The Culture of Hubris: The late 1920s were marked by excitement, technological breakthroughs, and aggressive extension of credit to ordinary people—paralleling the present AI boom and speculative fever.
  • “The 1920s really was this remarkable period of shocking euphoria and technological change… the ticker symbol is radio was the Nvidia of its time.” (Sorkin, 17:15)
  • “All of this was powered for the first time by debt.” (Sorkin, 17:50)
• Warnings Go Unheeded: Figures like Charles Merrill predicted disaster but were “wrong” until the market turned, as gravity-defying surges continued.
  • “Charles Merrill… tells all of his clients and the public to get out… he was right, but he was wrong… the stock market went up by 90% [after his warning].” (Sorkin, 18:47)
• Crash Dynamics: The ‘29 crash felt like a series of rolling crises, not a single cataclysmic day; the pain was magnified by leverage.
  • “The market fell effectively from mid-October… down from the high of about 50%.… By the end of 1929, the stock market was only down… 17%.” (Sorkin, 20:45)
  • The real catastrophe was ordinary investors’ debts: “when the market fell 50%, it wasn’t just that their equities were down by 50%, it was that they owed 10 times that.” (Sorkin, 21:17)

4. Policy Mistakes and the Prolonged Depression

[22:18 - 31:20]

• Hoover’s Choices: Raising taxes, pushing for wage hikes, imposing tariffs (Smoot-Hawley), and an inactive Federal Reserve compounded the misery.
  • On Smoot-Hawley tariffs: “Every economist in America was screaming from the rooftops… Thomas Lamont was going down there to beg him and he did it. And global trade… fell by 60% 12 months later.” (Sorkin, 23:18)
  • The Fed’s inaction was rooted in fear for its own political survival, as it was still considered “the experiment.”
• Bank Failures and Animal Spirits: The depression deepened due to cascading loss of confidence, inability to print money (gold standard), and banking regulations that prevented mergers and stabilization.

5. Why the Future Might Be Different—And Why It Might Not

[31:20 - 39:02]

• Tools for Today: Ability to print money was absent in 1929 but available now, as seen in 2008 and the COVID pandemic.
  • “I think the biggest issue is we could print money. That’s the first piece we could print money.” (Sorkin, 31:31)
• Political Tolerance for Bailouts: There was surprisingly little public backlash to emergency interventions post-COVID, unlike after 2008.
• Unknown Risks: Sorkin worries current leverage is hidden in the opaque private credit sector, which ballooned because regulations after 2008 pushed risky lending off bank balance sheets.
  • “If every financial crisis ultimately is a function of too much leverage… today, it’s probably the leverage that’s living in private credit… and we don’t really know the full extent of it.” (Sorkin, 32:31)
  • “The problem with private credit is that it is private and therefore… it's not public… and that creates a lot of problems.” (Tett, 33:42)
• Crisis Dynamics—Pop vs. Hiss: Unlike public stock markets, private credit failures could unwind slowly (“a hiss”) rather than in a spectacular crash (“a pop”), potentially causing prolonged uncertainty akin to Japan’s stagnation.

6. The AI Bubble—Hope or Hype?

[37:30 - 39:02]

• Valuation Disconnect: Investments in AI infrastructure ("building the pipes") don’t mathematically justify sky-high valuations unless miraculous productivity emerges.
  • “If you look at just the math… the math just doesn’t add at all. And it’s unclear whether… it will ever add. And… it is more of a religious belief that if you build it, they will come.” (Sorkin, 37:30)
• AI’s Double-Edged Sword: If AI fulfills its promises, the productivity gains could lead to massive job losses—raising the question: “who’s going to pay for this in the end?” (Sorkin, 38:34)

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

On the challenge of writing the book:

• “The archivist said, you're never going to be able to write this book. And that actually was probably actually why I wrote it. It was a personal challenge.” (Sorkin, 12:42)

On 1920s euphoria:

• “You could walk in and you could put a dollar down and they would literally loan you $10.” (Sorkin, 18:13)

On professional pessimism in markets:

• “It's been a lot more profitable to be on the train and a professional optimist than ultimately to be the professional Cassandra.” (Sorkin, 19:26)

On policy failure and the Depression’s pain:

• “By 1933, I think we had 9,000 banks in America fail.” (Sorkin, 30:15)

On modern financial risks:

• “We don't really know the full extent of it… if everybody sort of runs through the exits at the same time, there could be a problem that I don't think we even can comprehend.” (Sorkin, 33:42)

On the AI investment euphoria:

• “If you really talk to most of the folks in Silicon Valley, they will tell you… it is more of a religious belief that if you build it, they will come.” (Sorkin, 37:40)
• “If AI truly is successful… that only makes logical sense if they create enormous amounts of productivity… it means that all of us lose our jobs…” (Sorkin, 38:34)

Key Timestamps (MM:SS)

• 06:23 — Sorkin on the series of dominoes after the crash and the origin of “Great Depression.”
• 10:27–15:18 — Sorkin traces the research journey for his book and the detective work required.
• 16:27–18:40 — 1920s technological euphoria, hubris, and “Sunshine Charlie.”
• 18:47–19:26 — The challenge of being a Cassandra in a euphoric market.
• 20:45–22:18 — Anatomy of the crash and why its pain lingered.
• 22:18–23:42 — Policy errors: Smoot-Hawley, taxes, and paralyzed central bankers.
• 31:20–32:31 — The advantages and unknowns of current-day central bank tools.
• 33:42–36:12 — Private credit as the modern source of hidden leverage.
• 37:30–39:02 — AI investment hype: math, risks, and existential questions.

Tone and Style

The conversation is lively, witty, and steeped in both narrative detail and economic insight. Sorkin is self-deprecating and candid, while Tett brings both skepticism and amusement in probing the parallels between 1929 and today. The tone is urgent but not alarmist, aiming to draw lessons from history without making deterministic forecasts.

Conclusion

This episode dives deep into how the events and personalities of 1929 continue to echo through financial markets and policy responses today. With Sorkin’s meticulous research and storytelling, listeners are given not just a retelling of the Great Crash, but an urgent set of questions about whether, and how, history might repeat. The debate on whether a financial crisis is inevitable—and what might transform a crash into something much worse—remains open as part two awaits.