Back to basics: Africa’s bid for two permanent UNSC seats (with Amb. Martin Kimani)

Summary

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Into Africa Podcast Summary

Episode Title: Back to basics: Africa’s bid for two permanent UNSC seats
Host: Katherine N. Suzuki (CSIS)
Guest: Amb. Martin Kimani (Executive Director, NYU Center on International Cooperation; former Kenya Permanent Representative to UN)
Date: September 11, 2025

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Episode Overview

In this episode, Katherine N. Suzuki speaks with Ambassador Martin Kimani about Africa’s ongoing campaign for two permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the historical context, the implications of recent U.S. support, and the profound strategic challenges ahead. Their robust discussion addresses the complexity of reform, Africa’s internal leadership questions, the need for meaningful AU reforms, the strategic significance of demographic trends, and the global geopolitical transformation underway. The tone is candid, reflective, and unsparing in its appraisal of both opportunities and obstacles.

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Key Topics and Insights

1. Why Africa Needs Permanent Representation on the UNSC

• Equity & Historical Injustice: The absence of Africa among the permanent UNSC members reflects a colonial legacy, given most African states were under colonial rule when the UN was formed.
  • Kimani: “Africa has no permanent representation and no veto, reflecting the fact that the Security Council and the UN were created at a time when most African countries were colonies.” [02:00]
• African Files Dominate the Council: Most crises handled by the UNSC involve Africa. Permanent representation would “vastly empower” Africa’s own peace and security institutions.
  • Kimani: “The majority of crises that the Security Council handles are African... that peace and security architecture would be vastly empowered by being represented in the permanent ranks.” [02:30]
• Need for Global Leverage: Permanent seats (with veto) would enable Africa to address its security challenges with the necessary global input, recognizing conflicts have regional and international dimensions.

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2. The Long Road to Reform

• Ezulwini Consensus & AU Ambitions: Africa’s collective push for UNSC reform dates to at least 2005 with the Ezulwini Consensus, a reflection of a more ambitious, self-determining continent.
  • Suzuki: “How long have African countries been pushing for permanent representation?”
  • Kimani: “I think it actually started in 2005, if I'm not wrong.” [03:45]
• US Support is Symbolic, Not Decisive: Washington’s recent endorsement for two seats is significant but only marks the beginning of a “long and bruising negotiation.”
  • Kimani: “Let’s not get overly excited... there's no fait accompli... The United States does not get to say this is how global governance is going to go. Those days are passed.” [05:07]

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3. The Critical Question of Veto Power

• Origins & Purpose of the Veto: Originally intended to keep post-WWII powers invested in the UN and prevent conflict between them.
• Africa’s Different Vision: Unlike current P5 members, Africa’s demand for the veto isn’t rooted in global hegemonic ambition, but the right to defend collective interest.
• Unanswered Strategic Questions: There’s little clarity on the practical use or strategic doctrine for an African veto—how it might actually be wielded remains under-examined.
  • Kimani: “Has the veto been thought through by the framers of Ezulwini and other African leaders who keep demanding it? I don't think so. I haven't seen any cogent analysis.” [10:40]

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4. The Hurdles of Charter Reform

• Required Process: Expansion of the UNSC requires:
  • Agreement of all current P5 (each has veto power)
  • Two-thirds majority in the General Assembly
  • Ratification by two-thirds of all member states, including all five P5
  • Possible invocation of Article 109 for a Charter review conference
• High Bar for Consensus: The technical and political hurdles are steep, and mere pronouncements by external powers (like the US) are far from a guarantee.
  • Kimani: “You would have to have the agreement of all P5 members... and then ratification by 2/3 of UN member states, including all P5 members.” [11:50]

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5. Who Represents Africa? Risks of Fragmentation

• Potential for Division: Direct allocation of the seats to specific African countries risks turning the AU “into a club of two giants and 53 minnows.” [15:14]
  • Kimani: “The power of subtlety and even disguise and sometimes even invisibility in geopolitics is underestimated... The African countries that would get picked... may start off as strutting peacocks, but they'll end up as plucked chickens.” [16:13]
• Burden of Responsibility: Permanent UNSC membership is more than status; it entails broad responsibility beyond Africa—engagement in global issues like Ukraine, Gaza, Myanmar, and more.
  • Kimani: "It's not just merely what you do in the Chamber in New York that matters. It's your reach globally." [17:00]
• Current Candidates: South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt are natural contenders, but none presently exhibit the level of responsible, assertive global engagement required.
  • Kimani: “There are a number that have the financial means, they have the regional strength... South Africa and Nigeria... Egypt would certainly have a lot to say for itself.” [20:41]

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6. Alternative Proposals for African Representation

• AU Commission Seat & Rotational Seat:
  • President Paul Kagame (Rwanda) suggested on X: one permanent seat for the AU Commission, a second rotating among African states.
  • Kimani: “The revolving seat... opens up the opportunity to have a sort of hierarchy of worth. Which countries best reflect the aspirations of the decisions made by Africa for itself?” [26:18]
• Vision Over Power: Representation should reward countries advancing continental integration and peace, not just “muscle.”
  • Kimani: “This is not...a contest of strength... We need to flip it from a contest of strength to a reflection of vision, of insight, of principle.” [28:10]

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7. AU and African Leadership: State of Affairs & Necessary Reforms

• A Crisis of Leadership:
  • Kimani: “Africa is dealing with a crisis of leadership... Many African leaders not only bring very little credibility continentally, but even at home are barely holding on.” [31:15]
  • The era of transformative continental leadership (e.g., Mbeki, Meles, Obasanjo) is greatly missed.
• AU Reforms Essential:
  • Implementation of lagging reforms from Kagame’s initiative, especially fully funding the AU independently—“you do not get to be independent... when your bills are being paid for you.” [34:43]
  • Calls for greater decisiveness, re-separating political affairs and peace/security, and more innovative youth inclusion.
  • Kimani: “Africa needs a youth assembly... with structural input into decision making in a big way.” [36:20]

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8. Youth, Demography, and Education

• Future Workforce: By 2050, 1 in 4 people will be African; Africa will comprise much of the world’s working-age population.
• Urgent Education Reform:
  • Kimani recounts meeting with Michael Crow, President of Arizona State University, who told him:
    • “You guys need to be producing not thousands, but hundreds of thousands of engineers... your universities are so conservative... when in fact they should be completely open to innovating new models of producing quality quickly and affordably.” [41:00]
  • The quality and adaptability of education needs radical innovation to realize Africa’s demographic dividend.

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9. Africa in Multilateral Forums (G20 and Beyond)

• Questionable Leverage: AU’s accession to the G20 (now G21) has yet to be translated into substantial collective gains.
  • Kimani: “You wouldn't be asking me that question if it had done so. We would know.” [43:01]
• Strategic Diplomacy: African states need to restructure their foreign ministries to focus on global power platforms (G7, G20, BRICS), not just regions.

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10. Africa and the Changing Global Order

• Africa’s Moment Amid Multipolarity: Africa’s demographic dynamism and growing collective ambition coincide with instability and opportunity in the liberal international order.
  • Kimani: “We have everything to play for. Africa is not a dystopia. Africa is not failing. Africa is actually struggling to emerge... We only need to keep that in mind.” [50:00]
• Calls for Self-Determination: Africans must lead their own agenda, recognizing past global neglect as an opening for agency, not as a disadvantage.
  • Kimani: “We shouldn't be scared of neglect... Africans need to understand that we're going to have to do this on our own. And in fact, we are sufficient to it.” [52:49]
• Collective Self-Love & Pan-Africanism: The episode ends with a hopeful message on cultivating a collective continental consciousness as the foundation for global participation.
  • Suzuki: “A sense of a collective self-love as an act... of Pan Africanism... we need to hold ourselves to high regard.” [58:30]

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Notable Quotes and Memorable Moments

• Kimani on US Endorsement:
  “Let’s not get overly excited... there's no fait accompli... Those days are past.” [05:07]

• On Burden of Leadership:
  “To wish on yourself permanency in the Security Council year after year... is to assume a considerable burden as a state.” [15:55]

• On African Countries Seeking UNSC Seats:
  “They may start off as strutting peacocks, but they'll end up as plucked chickens.” [16:21]

• On Visionary Representation:
  “I'd rather a member of the Security Council that is driven by a vision of African integration and African peace and security more than a country that's trying to measure its muscles.” [28:10]

• On Leadership Crisis:
  “Africa is dealing with a crisis of leadership... many of them are so underwhelming... not because of a sense of mission but... their own very narrow and petty interests.” [32:00]

• On Demography and Opportunity:
  “We have everything to play for. We only need to keep that in mind. Africa is not a dystopia. Africa is not failing.” [50:00]

• On Young Africans:
  “All the failures of leadership are creating their own negation. And the young Africans are not just sitting still.” [56:18]

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Timestamps for Key Segments

• Introduction & Context: [00:01–03:28]
• UNSC Representation & Ezulwini Consensus: [03:28–05:07]
• US Endorsement & Global Negotiations: [05:07–06:48]
• Veto Power Explained: [07:18–11:19]
• Charter Reform Process: [11:19–13:29]
• Risks of Fragmentation, AU Reform Needs: [15:00–20:04]
• Which Countries? Leadership Dilemma: [20:04–24:58]
• AU Commission, Rotational Seat Proposals: [24:58–28:09]
• Leadership Crisis & AU Reform: [30:26–34:07]
• Education, Youth, and Reforms: [37:51–42:36]
• Africa in the G20 (G21): [42:36–45:42]
• Strategic Diplomatic Reordering: [45:42–48:26]
• Africa’s Place in a Multipolar World: [48:26–54:02]
• Concluding Reflections, Pan-African Consciousness: [54:02–59:16]

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Conclusion

Throughout the conversation, both host and guest emphasize the necessity of not simply inclusion, but genuine transformation and agency for Africa within the global order. Africa’s bid for UNSC permanent seats is a test case for broader challenges facing the continent: leadership capacity, strategic vision, institutional reform, and leveraging unique demographic advantages. The conversation is honest about internal deficiencies but ultimately optimistic about Africa’s opportunities in the coming decades.

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Transcript

[A]

By the year 2050, one in four people on the planet will be African. The choices that we make now across Africa will shape the world's collective future. Welcome to the Youth Bloom where we explore the stories, the trends and the issues we face in the present that will define the coming decades. I'm your host, Katherine N. Suzuki. So the good news, the United States now backs two permanent seats for African countries in the all important UN Security Council. But the bad news, the US does not back African countries gaining veto power in the Security Council. So there's still a long way to go for these seats to be created, but some experts are already wondering how they will be allocated. To unpack this, I'm joined by Ambassador Martin Kimani.

[B]

I'm Martin Kimani, Executive Director of the center on International Cooperation at New York University. A few weeks ago, I was Kenya's Permanent Representative to the United nations in New York.

[A]

Thank you so much, Ambassador, for joining.

[B]

It's a pleasure being here.

[A]

So maybe to start, let's couch our conversation with the importance of these seats. Africa currently has three rotating seats in the Council. Why is it important for us to gain permanent representation in the Security Council?

[B]

Well, it's important for several reasons. Of course, there is an aspect of equity there with the fact that Africa has no permanent representation and no veto, reflecting the fact that the Security Council and the UN were created at a time when most African countries were colonies. Secondly, the majority of crises that the Security Council handles are African. They involve one African file or the other. And therefore Africans feel justifiably so that we've built a peace and security architecture to try and resolve these conflicts. And that peace and security architecture would be vastly empowered by by being represented in the permanent ranks of the Security Council with the right of veto, which would enable Africa's peace and security architecture to take a global view and have a global input into the drivers of peace and security in Africa. And as is well known, the conflicts in Africa are not merely local, they have important regional and global drivers. And so the ability of African states or of the Africa's architecture to globalize itself would significantly improve Africa's ability to solve its peace and security challenges.

[A]

Yeah. And I'm wondering if you could give us an overview of the effort that that it took for us to get to just this point. How long have African countries been pushing for permanent representation in the UN Security Council?

[B]

Well, the Ezwini Consensus has been going on for a good number of years now. I will not give you an exact number, but this is a Long term effort. I think it actually started in 2005, if I'm not wrong.

[A]

That's correct.

[B]

And really does reflect the rise of the African Union and the rise of an Africa that is far more ambitious in contributing to its own peace and security. And therefore, I think the crafters of the Ezuwini Consensus thought that their efforts in reforming the African Union were incomplete as long as Africa was not at the table when it came to the permanent membership in the Security Council.

[A]

Yeah. And now fast forwarding to the present, the US now backs the creation of two permanent seats for Africa on the Security Council. But crucially, they are withholding veto power from African members. So maybe we could dive a bit more into why veto power is important. And would the lack of veto power diminish our role on the Security Council?

[B]

Well, look, Catherine, let's not get overly excited that my good friend Linda Thomas Greenfield has made this announcement. There's a long way to go. And I take her announcement to only be the beginning part of what's going to be a long and bruising negotiation. So there's no fait accompli. The United States does not get to say this is how global governance is going to go. Those days are passed. In fact, the very reason that the moment for reforming the Security Council is here is that overwhelmingly the world refuses to to kowtow to the post World War II arrangement. So the way Africa joins the Security Council's permanent ranks is going to crucially need American support and acceptance, but is not entirely about America's wishes being dictating the moment. So let's not take this statement as sort of that's what's on the table. No, that's not what's on the table. In fact, right now there's not much on the table. The United States has named said two, but I think every other permanent member has pronounced themselves as being in favor of expansion of the Council to include African permanent members. So this latest announcement, of course, caught the attention of all of us who work on these matters. It is something that is significant but not decisive.

[A]

Yeah. And this is why you are the perfect guest for this. Could you take us behind the scenes at the UN and help us understand the procedure to actually reform the Security Council and add these two seats? What are the steps? What are the changes to the UN Charter that would need to happen for this to to be crystallized and real?

[B]

Well, you'd asked earlier about what the veto is, why Africa would benefit from the veto. Look, to be a permanent member of the Security Council is both a burden and a privilege. It's a form of power, but not cost less power. It comes at a heavy cost. The veto, of course, is the power to say no based on your own sense of a situation. And no matter how many other countries think differently, your no holds sway. So that's a powerful position to have in global politics and on issues of war and peace. And the reason the veto exists is, is really to try and prevent another world war. The idea was that the most powerful countries after 1945 would be able to sit in the same room trying to solve matters of international peace and security, many that involved their vital national security and imperial interests. And they would be able to feel that their interests were ultimately able to be defended by their veto. And therefore there was no need for them to change the facts on the ground. In other words, to go to war so as to defend a particular interest. So they could use the veto as part of their kit of global power. So that is not the vision of the veto that Africa has. Africa is not. African countries that made the Ezulwini consensus do not have any sort of imperial global power ambitions. So you must then see that the veto, when given to African countries or some form of African representation, will reflect a stark departure from how the veto was designed in 1945. Notice how rarely the French and the British use their veto. It's been decades since they vetoed a resolution. And that is just reflecting that they are no longer in the preeminent positions that they were in post 1940, 45. So the question becomes, if you do get the veto as an African country or representation of Africa in any way, how will you use it? To what end will you use it? And of course, the veto is not just the saying of the no, it's the ability to threaten that ultimately you say no, which strengthens your hand when it comes to every single negotiation. The vast majority of times that the veto is used, it is never invoked during the vote. It is just threatened from the beginning of negotiations. It's always the gun on the table where you know when you're dealing with a P5 member that you only have so much that you can push before they then say, listen, I disagree with you completely and I'm going to veto your resolution. So that's what the veto is. Has the veto been thought through by the framers of Ezowini and other African leaders who keep demanding it? I don't think so. I haven't seen any cogent analysis of how this veto would be used to improve Africa's peace and security. The assumption is having it will do so, and yes, having it can do so. But unfortunately it's not merely a matter of wishing. You do have to have an understanding and a strategy.

[A]

Yeah. And I want to dive into the reforms or at least a consensus of how we could potentially use a veto power. But before we go there, I just wanted to flesh out the question. I asked about the procedures that it would take to make this, these two permanent seats a reality. What sort of steps would African countries have to go through?

[B]

Well, there are people who are much more expert than me on specific technicalities of reforming the Security Council. But so far I think you would have to. We have 15 members right now, five permanent and 10 non permanent. You would have to have the agreement of all P5 members because any of them can veto a proposal for you to reform the Council. You would have to have a 2/3 majority in the General assembly and ratification by 2/3 of UN member states, including all P5 members. You can have this. A lot of it may arise out of the present intergovernmental negotiation that's going on now within the General assembly and that's been going on for years. But either way, it's going to have to pass through the GA with a 2 thirds vote and ratification by two thirds of member states and. And all P5 members to be part of that.

[A]

Yeah. And just the last question on this, because this is like very fascinating. Is there any incentive for the P5 members to share their veto power or for lack of a better word, bestow the two new permanent members with veto power? I can't imagine that there is, but I'm curious what you think.

[B]

Look, by the way, another way, because I forgot to mention it, another way is that Article 109 of the UN Charter can be invoked which holds out the possibility of holding a General Conference to review the Charter. And that conference can be convened by 2/3 vote of the General assembly members and a vote of any seven members of the Security Council. So there are various routes, but they all require a huge consensus in the General assembly. And then that huge consensus becomes okay. When it comes to Africa, the UN is an intergovernmental organization. Will it be two African countries representing Africa or will the fundamental basis of the UN change and have the African Union, for instance, as President Kagame proposed on X, for the African Union Commission to be a member of the permanent ranks of the Security Council, which would fundamentally change how the UN operates. So you can see the hurdles are high and an announcement by Washington is merely the beginning of, I think, really trying to hold the American feet to the fire to see whether they will back actual concrete moves to move forward.

[A]

Yeah, and I want to get to the point you made about His Excellency Paul Kagame, essentially proposing policy as a reply to your Twitter thread. So let's say these reforms take place and we gain the two seats. The question of which African countries will get these seats could lead to infighting. And you tweeted in September that, quote, without proper reforms in the African Union, the US Offer, though welcome, would turn the Union into a club of two giants and 53 minnows, deepening division and fragmenting our collective intent. So please, just talk us through this thread, this wonderful thread of yours and this scenario. What could be the best way to.

[B]

Distribute these seeds in geopolitics? Beware what you wish for, because you may get it. And the power of subtlety and even disguise and sometimes even invisibility in geopolitics is underestimated. And so the look, the other thing I said in one thread of mine is that the African countries that would get picked to be in the permanent members may start off as strutting peacocks, but they'll end up as plucked chickens. So to wish on yourself permanency in the Security Council year after year, decade after decade to perpetuity perhaps, as long as the UN is relevant, is to assume a considerable burden as a state. And the idea that this, this burden would not require transformative change in the state that is carrying it is really to promise yourself that you'll be a plucked chicken sooner rather than later. And by a plucked chicken, I mean a country that's in the permanent ranks and holds the veto, but is of little consequence to the decision making that's going on. Because it's not just merely what you do in the Chamber in New York that matters. It's your reach globally. It's your ability to engage in multiple conflict situations. And not just in Africa. The permanent members from Africa's job will not be deal with African conflicts. They'll have to deal with Ukraine, with Gaza, with Myanmar, with all the files in the Security Council. And each one of those files comes with heavy interest by regional and global powers. So, so the question is, how will those African countries engage on those files? Will they engage as equal leveraged, assertive members, or will they retreat and merely hold their veto and their interests only for Africa, which means almost a half membership and not a full membership of the Security Council? So I think this is A considerable burden for any African country. And so I've been very interested to hear the pronouncements by the Nigerian Foreign minister. Looking forward and expecting that Nigeria will be one of the countries, I assume there are others that are lining up as well. But beyond pronouncing an ambition to be, we need to hear and to understand that the country and its state apparatus has the consistency and the strength and the stability to actually wield that veto on behalf of African interests. How can we be sure of that? And that's why I was saying that without very clear reforms of African Union peace and security architecture, there's really no way of assuring that. And Africa does not need to merely send an African country to the Security Council so that we can say, look, we're included. One of us is sitting there. That's not good enough. Those are low expectations towards ourselves, and I think we can do much, much better.

[A]

Yeah. I'm going to ask you a question that perhaps you can, perhaps you cannot answer. If we stay in the scenario where two states get the seats, in your mind, are there two countries that have that stability, that have that international leverage, that have that clout to take full advantage of these seats.

[B]

Right now? I would hesitate to say an automatic yes or no, and I'm not trying to be too diplomatic about that. Every single African state today that could be chosen to be in the permanent ranks of the Security Council requires major changes in how it operates. Remember, this state will have to be voted for by two thirds of the General Assembly. So it's not merely going to be a fait accompli of some meeting in Addis pickup two that will play a role. But ultimately they have to have at least the tacit support of the majority of countries. If push came to shove, and I was told which are the two countries, I would say that there are a number that have the financial means, they have the regional strength in their own regions, their regional powers. And I think they've shown a certain boldness in their foreign policy. And those would be naturally the leading candidates. And I wouldn't be being controversial to think that South Africa and Nigeria would probably be amongst the leading countries. Egypt would certainly have a lot to say for itself. And there are others. I'm not leaving them out out of disrespect. But you would assume that these three would be sort of in the front ranks. The question is, what are they doing now as regional powers to resolve pressing matters of emergency in Africa that tell us that they are so engaged and so responsible that all they need now is, is the veto and permanent membership and it will allow them to take their efforts to another level. And frankly, I don't see that. I do not see any of these countries being standout in how they're resolving threats to international peace and security in our region.

[A]

Yeah, that's a brilliant point. To garner the support and respect of two thirds of the General assembly, the. There has to be a track record to point to as a force of stabilization in these regions. So let's move on to the second scenario which resonated.

[B]

The track records are there. You know, Nigeria and its actions as leading ecowas in Sierra Leone and Liberia was a very inspiring country. Nigeria, in the strength and determination of its resistance to apartheid. So Nigeria has a lot to be proud of in South Africa. I mean, South Africa, its recent moves in the international criminal criminal justice system in regard to the situation in Gaza, all these things will ensure that they have a lot to be able to bring to the table. But it's not sufficient, in my view. They need to be doing more. My point is you do not start acting like an assertive member of the Security Council the day you go there. You start by acting that way before. And that's a challenge that I have said publicly in the GA during the intergovernmental negotiations when I saw Germany, Brazil, India, Japan with their claims, my, I think significantly frustrating point for them to hear. I said, well, we understand your ambitions, but what we want to know is not your ambitions, it's your responsibility. And what responsibility are you showing now that tells us that if you join the Security Council as a permanent member, you're not merely going to behave like the other permanent members that we are frustrated with right now. Show us, show us. Don't just tell us. And I think that should be the point constantly being made. This is not mere matter of inclusion. These are serious matters of protecting lives. It's not enough for you to be counted just to be there in the room. You need to be there in the room to do a job.

[A]

Yeah, and I quickly want to hear your reflections on the sort of second scenario that was put forward by President Kagame. He replied to your tweet and he said, quote, one permanent seat would have to be held by the AU Commission and a second seat by an African country on rotational basis, not held by any single country permanently. And he emphasized that with exclamation marks. So what are your thoughts on that proposal? One seat for the AU Commission, a second rotating among African states.

[B]

Well, I'm just glad President Kagame is engaging on this. He was the driver of AU reforms and he brought some very ambitious reforms, many that have not been implemented. So he's coming from this. He's coming to this debate as a reformer. And so we just need him to engage in a real battle of ideas with other leaders and for other citizens and think tanks and thinkers to be involved. Because this is going to take a lot more than a closed room somewhere in addis by the C10.

[A]

So.

[B]

The revolving seat. I think it's a good beginning of debate. I don't think that's necessarily where it'll settle, but it's a good beginning. And I think it opens up the opportunity to have a sort of hierarchy of worth. Of worth. Which countries best reflect the aspirations of the decisions made by Africa for itself, like which country is most open to the free trade, free trade area, that is implementing that the fastest, that is involved in regional peace, peacekeeping and conflict resolution and peace building. We should create, we should have some sort of reward system that reflects that. The countries that are the most reflective of acting in line with our decisions surely may be the ones that are most likely to take those interests, our interests, forward. In New York. Yeah, yeah. That would not necessarily be a superpower country, but maybe a relatively small country, but that has visionary leadership that is really looking to move the ball in African integration and making African institutions work. And it does that not just by making speeches, but. But by literally taking those decisions and implementing them. I would much rather that kind of country represent Africa in the Security Council than a country that claims to be a regional power.

[A]

Yeah, right.

[B]

I'd rather a member of the Security Council that is driven by a vision of African integration and African peace and security more than a country that's trying to measure its muscles against other muscles and then it'll come up short. Yeah, your South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt. If it's about muscles, well, sorry, you may have more muscles than countries in your region, but not more than in the P5. So this is not. We need to flip it from a contest of strength to a reflection of vision, of insight, of principle, and have the rest of Africa undertake reforms that allow us to travel with that country or that entity when it's in the Security Council. So that our membership of the Security Council as Africa is not merely to join, to be like the rest, but to join to change the game. And anyone who has thought with any depth about Pan Africanism or African interests in the world will know that Africa, for Africa to rise requires a certain transformation of the Global order, the way that global order is built now has Africa at the bottom and others on top. Africa does not get to compete and go up merely using the logics of the world as it is. So for us to join the Security Council permanent ranks, we need to have a vision that is greater than, oh, I have lots of money and my army is bigger than anyone in my region, therefore I'll go over there and join China, America, Russia. No, their armies are bigger than yours. So if the measure of you being a member of the permanent ranks as an African countries is that you have power, well, you don't have that much power. And why should Africa trust you to perpetrate a game where you're weaker than the others? We've got to change it. But that requires visionary thinking by African leaders.

[A]

And I, I, before we segue to AU reforms, because I, I do want to hear your ideas and your suggestions for how the AU can reform itself. If we just look at the continent now we're in 2024, which leaders come to mind as visionary, as principled? Principled leaders that you would feel comfortable sort of taking us forward.

[B]

I'm too much of a diplomat to get caught and make new foes. And but it's an important question because beneath the question is what is the state of African leadership today? You're young, but you're not too young to remember the Africa of Tabombeki, of Meles and of Obasanjo. These are leaders who all had their individual problems and certainly there were problems of governance in their countries, but overall they were so assertive in terms of pursuing continental transformation and they seem to feel a sense of deep responsibility not just for their national affairs, but for continental affairs. So I can only imagine what would be happening in Sudan today if we had those same leaders. I don't think it would be the same. I don't think they would have allowed it to get to this level. So Africa is dealing with a crisis of leadership. And many African leaders not only bring very little credibility continentally, but even at home are barely holding on. And that's reflecting certainly more difficulty in governing, but also that our political classes, rather than growing in their sense of confidence in their sense of ambition throughout the continent, transaction and narrow, self interested transaction has become the style far more than transformation and state capture. Forms of state capture all over the continent are underway where African states are becoming more hollowed out, more unable to govern effectively, while their population is more ambitious and more aggressive than it's ever been. It's a bad formula. And so which are the leaders I have faith in now? There are very few. I tend not to be inspired by them. I've met a number of them and so many of them are so underwhelming. And they come to their positions not because of a sense of mission for their country, but really as the furtherance of their own very narrow and very petty interests. That's the state of our continent now. Which is why it's so important for young people who are listening to this podcast to understand that they're going to have to shape their future.

[A]

Yeah. And I mean, I fully agree with you and I want to dive a bit more into that, specifically AU reforms. What kind of reforms would you like to see to transform the AU into that type of institution that we're talking about that is responsive to cultural change and is underpinned by a culture that I guess adds value, for lack of better word?

[B]

Well, I think, as I said earlier, President Kagame's reforms, many of them have not been implemented. The most important was that we needed to pay for the African Union 100%. You cannot get out of that one. So as President Ruto takes up the mantle of EU reforms, I think he would be well advised to pursue some of those reforms that President Kagame put on the table.

[A]

Yeah.

[B]

And we need to. Essentially, the proposal was to tax each container a certain amount of money, a modest amount of money, and that we were going to be able to pay for the African Union entirely. You do not get to be independent, integrated and assertive when your bills are being paid for you. That's just a fact and doesn't mean that those who are paying the bills have ill will, but you just have to be more responsible for yourself. I heard former President Becky the other day at his retreat talk about that there may have been a mistake in combining political affairs and the Peace and Security Commission. And so I think he has very good ideas about the need to have political affairs stand on its own. The Peace and Security Council needs to make its decisions in a different way and needs to be more assertive. Right now, it's run very much on a consensus line often when it's very sensitive to the political environment, as it should be. But it can certainly, I think, be reformed to be more decisive. Then resolution 2719 on African led peacekeeping operations needs a lot of work, a lot of conceptual and technical work for it to really capture where Africa needs to go. And then those are just some of the reforms I see right off the top of my head. Then there has to be a way for Africa to tap, to very structurally and impactfully tap into the youth population. I don't know how exactly it can be done, but we cannot ignore the fact that we are in such a young continent. And it's not just merely having a youth representative in a meeting. I think Africa needs a youth assembly of some kind that has some sort of structural input into decision making in a big way. I don't know how that can be designed, but this is our chance in the Next. We have 20 years at the outside before our demographic dividend is lost. You can already see collapsing fertility in some African countries. So it's not a given. Within a generation this could be done. And if we don't strike now, we're not going to strike. Or it'll be. I don't know when it'll be. So we have to find some ways to get young Africans structurally built into continental decision making and deliberation in a way that allows young people to see the African Union as their body. You know, this is our thing. Yeah.

[A]

Yes.

[B]

How that's done, I don't know.

[A]

I mean, yes, I. This is actually the genesis of this podcast. I have been thinking about just the one projection that by 2050, one in four people will be African. There's a really good essay that came out in Foreign affairs called the Age of Depopulation that largely explored the rest of the world's declining fertility rates. But like, we are going to be the workforce of the future, but the level of, or the types of jobs that we can take on actually depend on educational reforms we make now. Right. If we want to be the next generation of software developers, we have to start integrating these things into our education system. My second reflection is. Is just that, you know, I think About Ansars in 2020 and the number of people that were young Nigerians that were tweeting at the African Union saying, please do something, please do something, please do something. There is a extremely dismal view of the African Union as it exists now. And it won't help to have young people be dismissive of this organization, which they can argue rightly hasn't come to their help, hasn't come to their side. And then the third thing I think would just be almost before we even get to the African Union being an institution that is reflective of our youth, we almost need to have responsive democracies first because, you know, there's the positive side of this where, you know, we can take advantage of our youth, our demographic dividend and so on. But the flip side is that when you have a collection of young people getting increasingly frustrated and not seeing their countries work for them, unfortunately, you see what happened in Kenya, right, earlier this year or in Nigeria, that that frustration won't remain theoretical, it won't remain online, but young people will take to the streets. That's all. But, yeah, that is, yeah, your reflections.

[B]

Are on the money. And if that's what your podcast is here to do, then it's going to do something quite important. Look, education is this big, big word. And you know, I grew up with education being seen as the end all, be all. Many Africans spend exceptional resources seeking education for their children. I know very few places that are as education hungry and that even fetishize education as much as Africans. I think it's the nature of education we need to also be talking about. I happened to meet the president of Arizona State University earlier this summer, Michael Crow. And Arizona State University is revolutionizing the education model. It's very online. I didn't know much about the university, but one of the things they're doing is a very rapid and I think high quality production of engineers. And he told me something interesting. He said, we figured out that with the right preparation, you can start your engineering studies at 16. And he said, it seems to me when I think of your continent, that you guys need to be producing not thousands, but hundreds of thousands of engineers. Right. And technically skilled people. And so you need. And then he said, but your universities are so conservative when I talk to them. He finds them so conservative when in fact they should be completely open to innovating new models of producing quality quickly and affordably. Yeah. So there's a lot of vision and skill required to take this word education and really turn it into the promise that it is. Education is not merely the slow dragging traditional production of degrees. Not for Africa, not if we want to get somewhere in the next 20 years. It has to change now.

[A]

So zooming out a little bit. Africa has also gained more representation in multilateral institutions such as the African Union joining the G20 now, G21. I'm curious how the AU has managed to leverage this recent seat to promote common collective African goals.

[B]

Well, you wouldn't be asking me that question if it had done so. We would know. I don't know now. This is early days yet. It's early days yet. So I have no doubt that there's some planning going on. I actually do think highly enough of the African Union to know that there's thinking going on in Addis about, okay, what do we do with the G20? And I think the seat for the G20 to bring us back to the beginning of our conversation may be a good, maybe a good indicator of what Security Council permanent membership might look like. Okay, so now you have a seat and there's some vital decisions being made at the G20. So are you going to rubber stump those decisions such that now you can't protest? You see, when you're outside the G20 and the G20 makes a decision that is contrary to the interests of Africa, if you're not at the table, you can say, look at this decision. It is a scandal. It is the wrong decision. Now, if you're sitting there and the decision is undertaken, well, what do you have to say? You were there. Why didn't you stop it? So again, what's going to be very clear at the G20 as it will be when the Security Council eventually changes, when it changes, is that without the rest of the collective African voice and interest being behind that seat, it won't amount to much. Yeah. So one of the pieces of advice I gave my former ministry, which unfortunately they did not take up, is every African country needs a G7, G20 and BRICS desk in its foreign policy. And African foreign policy needs to see great powers as a thing in themselves. So a lot of African countries are structured with an Asia desk, a European desk, a North American desk, South American desk, et cetera, Middle east desk. This geography is basically just inherited from the Foreign Commonwealth Office in London. It's a senseless geography because Asia is from China to Bahrain, they're all in Asia. Montenegro to France are in Europe.

[A]

The.

[B]

Caribbean to the United States in the Americas. I think Africans need to reorder global geography in line with their interests. So you need to think of the Indian Ocean Rim in a specific way and structure yourself diplomatically and geopolitically that way. You need to think of the great powers and their relationship with each other as an objective of your diplomatic analysis and engagement. It's not just Russia is in the Asia or European desk, however they do it. But a question of what's the relation between China and Russia and the United States and how does that affect the peace and security, the economic interests that we have? When you begin to play with those geographies in a diplomatic sense, then the what you do with the G20 seat and what you do in the Security Council begin to shift and change. So an example of this is when we were in the Security Council, we explicitly condemned the coup in Myanmar, not just to condemn A coup. But we said the constitutive act of the African Union rejects coups. If that's good enough, this is. We said this. If that's good enough for us, it's good enough for the Burmese. Yeah. And I know Africans like to protest against the universalization of Western culture, but hey, get in on the game. Take your tools. Universalize yourself. Think of yourself as the center of the world. Think of yourself as your values and your way of seeing the world are good for everybody. Not out of arrogance, but just as an analytical lens. And then we will begin to have real leverage first, conceptually and politically when it comes to using these seats. You may discover that you're sitting in the G20 seat at the G20 meeting as the African Union is not just merely about voicing African interests. It's a deep interest you have in how G20 is making decisions about global supply chains, about the emerging technologies. And you're becoming a player because your assessment goes beyond this narrowness of are they reforming the international financial institutions for Africa? Come on, we need to do better.

[A]

No. And this is a fantastic segue to my last question for you because I want to pull all these threads together, the different themes that you've mentioned. The Post World War II arrangement, the global order, great power competition, the global geography, and getting in the game. So this last question is really just an invitation to hear your reflections of this geopolitical moment that we're in. The US and China are vying for competition in Africa. And it's often framed, at least here in the US as great power competition. But the reality is that, of course, it's much more complicated as middle powers like Turkey, India and the UAE are also spreading their reach in Africa. There is a sense that the international liberal order is shifting or maybe even fading away. And then there's also a sense of change and upheaval in Africa too. Again, by 2015, one in four people on this planet will be African American. We're facing issues of debt crises, frustrations with government, governance, and more. So, taking all these things together, what's your view of Africa's place in a multipolar world? And how can we collectively work to leverage this competition to Africa's advantage, to our own advantage?

[B]

I think we're living through the most exciting and opportunity filled days as Africans. I agree the crises we have are real. They're deadly. You only need to look at Sudan to see how much trouble we have. But we have to be able to recognize those challenges are taking place at the same time as you've never had this number of Africans alive before, they've never grown in this number. Underneath all global politics is demographic politics, and it's a game that many of the established parts don't want to talk about because it is such a huge factor in who you are and how the world turns. And right now, Africa, courtesy of African women, is having more children than everyone else. Yeah. And then. And who are these young people being born? They're being born with a sense of frustration. They're growing up with a sense of frustration because they want so much more than they saw when they were growing up. The desire, the ambition, it's not just, oh, they see it on social media and they want it. It's not just. It's that they do not want to be bound by the geographies and the poverty that they grew up with. They believe they deserve better. And then at the same time, the ingenuity that is there continentally, the amount of genius training to be released and pushed into the world is stronger than ever before. We have everything to play for. We only need to keep that in mind. Africa is not a dystopia. Africa is not failing. Africa is actually struggling to emerge at a moment when global power is so destabilized, the rivalries between the major powers are growing such that their attention on Africa in terms of suppressing African agency are also weaker. Yeah. So when somebody goes to the White House and says uses s word against African countries, I don't get angry. I just think, oh, wow, maybe you don't understand.

[A]

Yes, you don't understand.

[B]

You may leave me alone for me to do what I need to do.

[A]

Exactly.

[B]

And we shouldn't be scared of neglect. We shouldn't be scared of, oh, they have other priorities. Because we've never been that high in anyone's priority anyway. Even in those days when they say, oh, they were thinking about Africa, were they really? Or were they just thinking of their own power over Africans and globally? So Africans need to understand that we're going to have to do this on our own. And in fact, we are sufficient to it. We can, we can. We do need visionary leadership. And by visionary leadership, it's not just a placeholder, just words is we need those people who are so invested in having a destiny of leading a successful country who have something to prove, and we have to create an elite consensus around that. How we do it will vary country to country, but it's never been more important than it is now. And I think the elements are there. So I'm excited. Even as I occasionally despair about things that are going on.

[A]

I know I'm excited too. I entered the field of international relations at such an exciting time. And a lot of people are now doing a retrospective of Biden's approach to Africa, Biden's legacy in Africa. And maybe even a decade ago it would be framed as a disadvantage to Africa. But I look at US policy now and I'm like, no, the disadvantage is yours. We have the geopolitical advantage of numbers, just sheer numbers, of demographics, of geography, of just so many things, Right. And so it's no longer at Africa's loss, even though that is very, very simple simplification of this. It's now US law. So whoever fails to register that we are at a moment of immense international political shifts, right? And so, yeah, yeah, it's exciting, it's exciting. It's exciting to say, well, that's okay, if no one else is interested in renovating the Tazara Railway in East Africa, China is right. And that then pushed the US to say, well, we want to expand the libido corridor, whatever, like the competition can be good for us. But the catalyst that I think, as you rightly pointed out, that's still missing for us to translate this global competition or these shifts to our advantage is that visionary leadership, right? It's that non transactional leadership. It's the, the moral backbone, the moral integrity it would take to translate all of this to a collective good for Africans. It excites me. I also do despair sometimes when I look at our, you know, leadership landscape. And I'm just like, I just, I just wish, gosh, I just wish we had the selflessness perhaps to come together as a continent and say, okay, this is what's happening elsewhere. How are we turning this to our collective good?

[B]

But all the failures of leadership are creating their own negation. And the young Africans are not just sitting still. What you're not doing, they're seeing. And they're starting to, to push back hard. I mean, from 2011, what is called the Arab Spring is young Africans. Yeah, the people who were in Tahrir Square, young Egyptians, the overcome Sudan today. Why is Sudan in this mess? Because young Sudanese decided they could not live with dictatorship and one party rule and authoritarianism anymore. And they made their move and it's been captured and it's been deformed. But you cannot forget that it's a young Sudanese who made this happen. And even today, many of the best things happening in Sudan are being driven by young people who are the ones taking up the responsibility of humanitarian outreach so young people are not standing still. All we need to do is make sure that they're informed and platformed and given their voice carries. Africa requires forms of unity, but those unity is not unite Africa. It's wherever Africans are, whether it's on Wall street or in think tanks or in Silicon Valley. They need to be taking their separate activities and having a common ground of African humanity and a sense of self love and a sense of coming together for greater purposes. So whether you guys are techies or think tankers or politicians, we all need to have this orientation and too many of us don't so that we'd spend a lot of time blaming politicians in Africa, even while we ourselves, in our personal lives and our professional lives, are practicing deep forms of disunity and lack of common purpose.

[A]

Oh, what a beautiful way to end this. I like how you phrased a sense of a collective self love as an act, maybe of Pan Africanism, because I lead, you know, I read old Pan African texts and I'm always struck by the urgency with which they say we need to love ourselves like we need to hold ourselves to high regard. So I think that's a beautiful way to put this all together. Ambassador Kimani, you are brilliant. You're fantastic. This has been an honor. Thank you for being so generous with your reflections, your thoughts, your analysis. Thank you. This has been truly a fantastic, wonderful conversation with you.

[B]

Thank you very much. I really appreciate it. It's a pleasure.

[A]

Thanks for tuning in. This podcast is produced by Gina Kim and our music is by Wonder Child. If you have any suggestions for future topics, you can find me on X and Instagram Atherinezuki.

[B]

SA.