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- [00:02]
A
By the year 2050, one in four people on the planet will be African. The choices that we make now across Africa will shape the world's collective future. Welcome to the Youth Bloom, where we explore the stories, the trends and the issues we face in the present that will define the coming decades. I'm your host, Katherine Mzuki. The war in Sudan has entered its third year and the two warring parties are no closer to peace. To unpack the war's causes, its terrible impact on civilians and the role of international actors, I'm joined by Cameron Hudson, senior fellow with the CSIS Africa Program. Welcome, Cameron.
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B
Thank you, Katherine.
- [00:58]
A
So, Cameron, you just testified less than half an hour ago in a panel in front of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the crisis in Sudan. And for the record, we're recording on Thursday, May 22nd. I want to get into some of the questions you were asked by Congress. But before we get there, I'd like to start from the very basics. Could you just please walk us through what the causes of this conflict are?
- [01:21]
B
Sure. I would say the immediate causes are of the conflict. Obviously we can go back into Sudan's history to understand really the root causes of all conflict in Sudan. But with respect to the current conflict, I would say that it stems from the 2019 kind of popular revolution that Sudan had that saw people rise up and demand the expulsion of former dictator Omar Al Bashir. The military Sudan armed forces removed Bashir, I think in some respects so that they could preserve power for themselves, get rid of Bashir, but hold onto the regime. And an internationally appointed civilian transitional government was installed. That government was in 2019, 2020 2021, slowly and methodically dismantling the former state, former regime of AR Aldashir. And in so doing, I think they were going after the ill gotten gains of the form a regime that included the military and was looking to reform the broader political system in the country that threatened security services and military interests in the country. And so we saw in 2021 the Rapid Support forces, a successor to the Janjawid militia that had been brought into the government by President Bashir alongside Sudan's army. The Sudan armed forces along overthrow and remove the civilian prime minister at the time. And then they entered into a kind of very complicated and ultimately dangerous governing situation. And what we saw was that in a very short amount of time, the tension between these essentially two security services, rival security services in the country spilled over. When there was no strongman like Bashir or civilian prime minister like Abdallah Hamda to stand between these Two forces, the competition and the rivalry and the tension between them spilled over into open warfare. And now we have entered the third year of this, of this conflict between these two armies in the country.
- [03:25]
A
What's been the toll on civilians?
- [03:29]
B
Yeah, so, I mean, I think the civilians have, have bared the brunt of this, of this conflict right now. So in a country of 50 million people, you now have 26, 27 million people who are in desperate need of humanitarian assistance. There's some 5 million people that are in famine like conditions right now. Thirteen have been displaced from their homes. A million to 2 million are refugees outside the country, mostly in Chad, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt. And more are displaced. Obviously, you know, 9 or 10 million are displaced inside the country right now. You know, I think one of the unique features of this war is that unlike most of Sudan's or all of Sudan's wars, of which there have been many in the past, this one started in the capital. And so the capital has traditionally been insulated from a lot of the violence. And if you think about Darfur, if you think about the war in South Sudan, these are all quite removed from the capital. So the elites of the country never really saw the violence that was being visited on the peripheral regions of the country. And so I think the unique feature is that this war has really been a war about the political control and the political future of, of the country. So it has started in the capital, and we have seen some of the worst fighting and obviously the worst destruction happening in and around the capital city of Khartoum.
- [04:51]
A
And, you know, this war isn't really just a battle between the SAF and the rsf, but it has become internationalized. You said something during your testimony that really stuck with me. You said, quote, sudan is today an international arms bizarre. And the war itself has fully transformed into a battle for influence among a host of local and regional actors who seek economic, geopolitical and strategic gain. In the context of this war. Can you just give us the scope of all the different international actors that are involved in the Sudan war?
- [05:28]
B
Sure. It's quite a list. You know, I think the, if you think about it in terms of concentric circles, I think the first circle are the neighboring states. And every single neighboring state to Sudan is involved in one way or another. So if I can remember my map of Africa, well, Libya, Chad, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, I don't think I missed anybody. They're all involved in some way, either by hosting refugees, which we have seen in all of those countries, hosting Sudanese Refugees. Right now there has been cross border support. So I think most notably in a country like Chad, which has both been hosting Emirati air bases in their country, but they've also been allowing Chadian tribesmen to fight and be recruited by the rsf. They've been hosting refugees in Chad, similarly in Central African Republic, the same thing. South Sudan, the same thing. So these countries are, you know, both playing host to refugees and assisting the RSF and funneling weapons into the country, making money in that way. I think when you take a step out, we can look at kind of the near region. So Sudan is on the Red Sea, just across the Red Sea. You have Saudi Arabia, you have the UAE up the Red Sea. You of course have Egypt, Turkey, not far away, all of which have a stake in Sudan for a variety of reasons. Gulf states import a lot of their livestock and wheat from Sudan. So there's a real food security issue for many of these countries. They're invested heavily in Sudanese mineral assets, in the real estate, in small businesses. So there's economic benefit to be had in Sudan. There's those countries kind of circle of influence. By having a vassal state on the Red Sea, it's a power projection for countries like the UAE to be able to have influence with a large state on the Red Sea. So this, this battle for competition is helping to fuel the conflict in Sudan among these regional actors. And then of course you have the wider international community. So you have countries like China and Russia which are selling arms into this conflict. Russia, which has a particular interest in also gaining Red Sea access. You have a country like Iran, which again, very interested in expanding its influence outside of Yemen to the western coast of the Red Sea, so seeking relationships with Sudanese armed forces. And then you have, you know, the United States and European allies, which have traditionally played a mediating role in Sudan, which have really been, I think, pushed to the margins of this conflict. In many ways, seeing the influential role that they used to play in previous episodes of violence in the country really minimized as these new entrants have taken over and exerted their influence on the conflict very directly.
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A
Yeah. And I want to get to the role that the US could play in mediating this conflict, given especially how close it is to some of these actors. But I really want to zoom in into how the presence of foreign actors has changed the landscape of this war. This month, the SAF used Turkish drones to bomb an RSF air base, actually killing eight Emirati military officials. Last month, Port Sudan was attacked by drones by the rsf. How Is the presence of all these foreign actors changing the landscape of this conflict?
- [08:58]
B
Well, I think the first thing to say would be that the conflict would not be entering its third year were it not for the role of foreign actors. I think that both the SAF and the RSF would have exhausted their supplies of weapons and ammunition, they would have exhausted their troop strength, and they would still be fighting. If they even still were fighting, they would be fighting a very conventional war using antiquated weapons and machinery and subject to, to all of the vagaries of war. So, for example, the, the rainy season is going to be fast upon us, and typically speaking, there would be a three month lull in fighting during the rains because you can't move heavy equipment and machinery and troops around, around the country very easily. But in the context of a drone war, there is no rainy season anymore. You can fight 12 months out of the year and there is no corner of the country that is going to be immune from conflict. So when you were fighting a kind of low tech conventional war, you could see the battle lines move very slowly around the country, and that gave warning to people to evacuate cities that they thought were going to be sacked by one side or the other. But now you have a conflict. So you just brought up the, the, the tit for tat drone strikes in Nyala and in Port Sudan. Those cities are 1200 miles apart. Right. But in a conventional war, you don't have, you know, you don't have surprise attacks 1200 miles apart, one on the other from one day to the next. But in the context of a new drone war with more sophisticated weapons, you're seeing that play out now. So really there's no, there's no part of the country that is safe. And the predictability that came from a conventional war, being able to see armies on the march taking one city after the other and being able to prepare your citizens to evacuate or to take shelter or what have you that's lost now. And so we don't know where or when either side is going to strike.
- [10:57]
A
Would you go as far as to say that foreign actors like the uae, Turkey, et cetera, are actively derailing peace talks?
- [11:08]
B
Well, no, I don't think that they are, simply because there's no peace talks to derail. Right. I mean, it's been a year since the United States had a special envoy for Sudan. And last summer, Biden special envoy for Sudan tried to convene a kind of traditional peace process, inviting both sides, both of the belligerents to Switzerland to kind of Sit around the negotiating table like you might, you know, think of a classic peace process. And the army didn't show up for that. Those sets of talks. And I think what we saw was that the United States no longer had the power to compel the army to show up to those talks. There was no threat, there was no sanction. There was no leverage that the United States could use to get the army to show up to those talks. That's very different from even a decade ago, when the United States could lead the international community in a peace process and hosting summit meetings and the like. We no longer have that level of influence right now, or at least we're not seen to. And so I don't know that the warring sides are interested in talking right now. Certainly the region is not. Is not interested in a peace process. And so absent the United States using whatever leverage it has left, we are seeing this war continue to drag on.
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A
Yeah. And I want to get into that leverage. I wonder if the Trump administration is uniquely positioned to bring peace to Sudan. We saw yesterday in the Oval Office meeting between the President of South Africa, Cyril Ramaphosa, and President Donald Trump. President Trump really stressed the role that Special Envoy Boulos played in helping mediate or at least cool the tensions right between the DRC and Rwanda. And Boulal seem to have made more headway than the Qataris did. Is there something unique about President Trump that could help bring an end to this conflict?
- [13:05]
B
I think there is. I think it's very clear from the trip that he took to the Middle east just over a week ago that he has very good access and very privileged relationships with the leaders of all of the regional states that are playing a determinative role in Sudan, whether that's Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the Qataris, the Turks, the Egyptians. You know, he claims to have, and I think he does have very good relations with all of those countries. And I think more importantly, he has. President Trump has an ambition for making broader Middle east peace. We've heard him talk about reinvigorating and expanding the Abraham Accords. Let's not forget Sudan is a signatory to the Abraham Accords. It was one of the conditions that the Trump administration placed on removing Sudan from the state sponsor of terrorism list in 2020. And so there is a real, I think, alignment of interest here in the Trump administration wanting to make broader Middle east peace. I think they're going to need to acknowledge that the people that they're trying to make peace with are on opposite sides of the war. That you have Egypt and Saudi Arabia and Turkey aligned behind Sudan's army. You have the United Arab Emirates aligned behind the Rabid support forces. So how do we expect to make a kind of broader peace in the region when they're on opposite sides of the conflict in Sudan? I think that at some point the road to Middle east peace is going to have to lead through Khartoum.
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A
And you made a really interesting suggestion during your testimony that actually parts of the infrastructure we might need for the US to engage in a peace process is there in the form of the special envoy to the Middle east and his office. Could you just tell us more about that? You also made a really good point about how if there's an envoy to Sudan, the envoy will have to be somebody that is appointed at the White House level, somebody that does have President Trump's ear. Why is that important?
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B
Well, a couple of reasons. I think that, you know, first of all, we've had a dozen US special envoys to Sudan over the past 25 years.
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A
You've been the chief of staff of some of them.
- [15:19]
B
I have. And I can say that, you know, those envoys have met with varying degrees of success. And it isn't just their, you know, personalities that have driven that success. It has been the perception of, of their proximity to the president of the United States or at least to the Secretary of State. Right. Sudanese want to know that this issue is being prioritized at the highest level. And if they believe that it's not, then they're not going to listen, they're not going to engage. And whatever US Leverage we think we have is not going to be fully utilized. And so I think that goes for all envoy positions. It's not just unique to Sudan. I think the envoy needs to be not a box checking exercise to demonstrate to some constituency group somewhere that we are, you know, quote, interested in what's happening there. We have to put real skin in the game by having someone who has access to the, to the Oval Office. That said, I'm skeptical of the value of a Sudan specific envoy right now because traditionally Sudan envoys have tried to mediate inside the country. They have tried to mediate between the warring parties, and they have tried to bring civilians into the conversation. It's not that I don't think that's a useful exercise. I do. But I think in this, in the kind of the grand scheme of things and how we sequence our involvement and our engagement, I think that what we really need at this moment in time to stop the killing, stop the War, not a peace process, not a transition, but just to stop the war and silence the guns. Or we have to focus on these regional states that we've been talking about. And there, I think our Middle east envoy and his team has unique access. They are already fanning out across the Middle East. They are doing the shuttle diplomacy with the uae, with the Saudis, with the Qataris, with the Turks, with the Egyptians. They already have an open channel of communication that is being utilized right now. We should use that open channel and add Sudan to the agenda that we have with them because Sudan is not going to be solved in a vacuum absent the kind of broader chess game that is being played within the Middle East. Right. And so that isn't to say that we won't need a Sudan envoy at some point because there's a lot of societal healing that's going to need to be done. There's going to be a lot of, you know, internal politicking that will need to happen to rebuild this country and its political system and seek justice and accountability for the crimes that have been committed. And I think the United States again, has a unique role in playing to push for all of those things. But I don't think that that can come before we silence the guns.
- [18:06]
A
And I really want to actually stress why the US Has a really important role to play here because I think, and this is not making a judgment on this trend, but there's a huge anti Western trend sentiment, whatever you want to call it, sweeping through the continent. Right. And so a lot of people might be hearing this and have a knee jerk reaction, which is, why do we need the US to be involved? I want us to look at where the Africans are, you know, my people, where, you know, where is the African Union? Where is the East African community? What role are they playing in mediating this conflict? Because, you know, surprise, the answer is not much. But I would love for you to just explain where, you know, the African peace processes are and why they have struggled so far.
- [18:57]
B
Yeah, I mean, it's a great question. I think many of us have been frustrated that the African Union hasn't shown more leadership, more unity. And again, it goes back to what I was saying at the beginning of this discussion. The region is involved. The neighboring states have all taken a stake in this. They're all, yes, they're all suffering from the refugees, but they're also profiting. And the RSF and the SAF have been quite cunning in enlisting the support of the region or isolating regional actors. So there's no ambivalence within the neighboring states. Everyone has, I think, taken a side in this and that complicates the situation. For the African Union, for the Peace and Security Council to chart a path forward takes more unity and consensus than we have seen from, from the neighboring states, first and foremost. And I think that's, you know, that's been a big problem.
- [19:48]
A
And I want to wrap this up with the counter argument. What happens if the US is not involved in mediating this conflict? What's the scenario in which this conflict spills over and sweeps up more nations and so on? I just want to understand, and this is not to make this an either or, like either the US intervenes or, or mass casualties, catastrophe, et cetera. But there is a counterargument which is what could happen if the US doesn't get involved. And you touched on this briefly during your testimony, but I'd love to hear it.
- [20:24]
B
Well, I think we're on a kind of glide path to Sudan being a failed state. I think that there are a host of kind of worst case scenarios that include a failed state status. And what I mean by that is, you know, when you think back to Libya or Somalia or Syria, you know, I warned members today that we could go from a situation where you have two generals fighting a war to 50 colonels fighting a war. Right. Where you have local militias, warlords, where you have generalized fighting and chaos across the country. That isn't to say we don't have a degree of that now with the drones. We. But you know, you could really see a breakdown in state capacity and unity that would invariably draw in, in a much more direct way, conflict actors from, from all of the neighboring states. Right. All of these neighboring states are weak states. They're poorly governed states. You know, they're states with their own non state actors and militia groups, whether that's in Central African Republic, Chad, Libya. I mean, the host of non state actors who are ready to become even more involved than they already are, I think is quite strong. And then of course you add into it the kind of jihadist terrorist element which first of all, Sudan has a history of that kind of behavior. Thirty years on the state sponsored terrorism list. And then you have to Sudan's east Somalia, which has ISIS and Al Qaeda and Shabaab to its west, you have all of the violence and instability in the Sahelian states and jihadism. So there's a sort of perfect storm that could form if the centrifugal forces that are pulling Sudan apart right now accelerate. And you could see a host of kind of non state actors, terrorist actors coming into Sudan and benefiting from the kind of chaotic environment that's going on there. That's a real worst case scenario. But it's frankly on the horizon. And the more the United States chooses to stay on the sidelines of this conflict and not use the leverage that it has to mediate and to get regional states to withdraw their support, I think the more and more likely that scenario becomes.
- [22:43]
A
Yeah, I mean, it won't even be the first time this century that this sort of spillover has occurred. Libya, right. The conflict we see today in the Sahel, the jihadism, the terrorism, the deaths that we see are a direct consequence of the spillover from Libya, where you now have these armed groups not contained in one area, sort of spreading down. And now you have the scenario, the context that Mali, Niger and Burkina FAS are in, where huge chunks of these countries are under jihadist control and they're slowly bearing down on coastal West African countries. This has already happened. We are already seeing the spillover from Libya. And now in this worst case scenario, if Sudan was to follow the same routes, I mean, it would be, it already is incredibly destabilizing. It would make the situation incomprehensibly worse. At a time already when I think a lot of more stable African countries are trying to pivot forward. Right. We're talking about, at least on this podcast, plans that countries may have to leverage their demographic dividend and all that. That's not going to happen if you have like, you know, a huge chunk of the continent in conflict or having conflicts bear down on them. We're already seeing, you know, small incidences of terror attacks bearing down on coastal West African countries. It's a forgotten crisis. And I don't think we have really, we maybe being, you know, the global community, have really wrapped our heads around how important it is. If the moral argument doesn't work, let it be the sort of self centered national argument, which is this will have ripple effects for the whole continent, the whole of the Middle east and really the world. Which brings me to my thank you. Thank you, Cameron, for being a Sudan watcher analyst, for going above and beyond to keep this issue in front of people's minds here in the US thank you so much.
- [24:48]
B
Well, thanks for shining a light on what's going on in Sudan. Again, I think we are, those of us who work on this issue and track it, lament that it hasn't gotten the attention that it deserves. This is the biggest humanitarian crisis in the world, far outshadowing, you know, all these other conflicts that do get a lot of front page attention. So, you know, my hope is that this administration sees both the opportunity and the responsibility to play more of an active role in this region. And I hope we can see that happen in the years to come.
- [25:20]
A
Thank you Cameron. Thanks for tuning in. This podcast is produced by Gina Kim and our music is by Wonder Child. If you have any suggestions for future topics, you can find me on X and Instagram at catherinezuki.
- [25:39]
B
Sam.