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Welcome to Into Africa, a podcast where we explore Africa's geopolitical landscape, its evolving
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global role, and the challenges and opportunities
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shaping the continent's future. I'm your host, Oge Onborgu, Senior Fellow
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and Director of the Africa Program at the center for Strategic and International Studies. Foreign
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welcome back to Into Africa. I'm Catherine Zucki, Associate Fellow with the CSIS Africa Program. Each season we have an episode dedicated to Africa's youth. And in this episode we're taking a closer look at the incredible volunteer work done by Sudan's emergency response rooms. The emergency response rooms are a network of volunteer led mutual aid groups that that deliver food and essential services across displacement camps. Much of this work is done by local youth and that includes students, graduates and workers alongside members of the diaspora. So to help us understand the origins of the errs, what their day to day work looks like and how the international community can better support them, I'm really excited to be joined by two Sudanese scholars. Noman Moussa is a Political Science PhD student at UCLA focusing on civil wars and state building in Sub Saharan Africa. And Yasir Zaydan is an adjunct lecturer at Seattle university and a PhD student at the University of Washington. And Yasir's research examines the expanding influence of Middle Eastern states in the Horn of Africa. Noma and Yasir, welcome to the show. Over this season we have unpacked the drivers of conflicts and tensions in the Horn of Africa and then we've zoomed in into the humanitarian crisis in Sudan. And I would encourage everybody listening to revisit those episodes. And so in this episode we really just want to dedicate our time to the work of the emergency response rooms. And so to start, Norman, maybe you could help us set the scene. What could a day in the life of an emergency response room volunteer look like?
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C
Yes. Hi Kathleen. Thank you very much. An average day would probably entail making the food primarily in a local kitchen, which is probably, I would imagine, an average sized household in most of these neighborhoods making the food and then working on distributing it for the rest of the day according to each location. I would assume that the the needs and responses for each locality would differ based on intensity of the conflict, the number of refugees, etc. I know some have been focusing more on medications, some more on food, some more on providing shelter. And one thing I've learned is that a lot of them have, for instance, experienced variations in terms of who they're receiving and providing shelter to throughout the past three years of the conflict. So it's not Very consistent. It does accommodate to the changing circumstances according to each city or neighborhood.
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Yeah. And Yasir, just to pick up on this distinction that Noman is drawing, how does the work of the emergency response rooms vary according to region? And to zoom in further, how would their work vary according to whether they're in an area controlled by the military or by the Rapid Support Forces militia?
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B
Thank you, Katherine. And yeah, just jumping on what Noman said. The difference is mainly of how to secure this service. Right. Like how they would get funding, how they will actually distribute food like a neighborhood kitchen, and how also like the intensity of the war in that space. So I think we kind of started seeing the actual effect of these errs when they were working in neighborhood that was mainly like in the center of the war, center of the conflict. So at these spaces they would be trying to get like permits, right, for food trucks, for logistics, or even like just day to day water sources to get in these war inflicted neighborhoods. And like the difference between areas are controlled by the military, areas controlled by the. I don't think they'd be very different. It's the same concept, you know, same kind of logic. Mainly, you know, getting services to people. Just recently they are being more cautious about involving in like politics or like, you know, how they deal with each side. And I think that what made it possible for them to continue providing services for the community.
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I want to get back to that point about politics a little later. But Noman, can you walk us through the history of the emergency response rooms? And am I correct in saying that the predecessor to the errs were the neighborhood resistance committees that played a central role in the campaign against Omar Al Bashir?
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C
Yeah, so I'm not entirely privy to all the history of the emergency response groups. That's a centralized idea that week tend to talk about today outside of Sudan. I would say that according to each city or neighborhood, they probably began this work most probably way before the war. We're talking about a country that has faced a plethora of civil wars, instability and high rates of poverty. But more importantly, what has allowed the Sudanese people to steadfast against most of these calamities has been the collectivist culture ingrained in most of us back home. I think after the protests erupted in 2019, they became more dominant, more active and responding to the current circumstances. So what ended up happening after the war started is that the energy was mobilized from protesting to community service.
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A
Thank you, Noman. And you know, Yassir, similar question to you, but actually two questions. If there's anything to add on the history of the emergency response rooms and to pick up on what Noma mentioned, this culture or this tradition of collective action. When I was doing the research for this podcast, I came across the word nafir, right. Which I think means collective action. So two questions for you. One, if you have anything to add on the history and two, if you could tell us more about this philosophy or this tradition of collective action.
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B
Yeah, absolutely. Yeah. I think just speaking about what you said about nafir. So it's a Sudanese concept for a long time when I think, you know, we used to have flooding seasons. And what I remember from my time back home is that like people of the same village, the same neighborhood, would actually go back and build these sands dam to protect the village from flood floodings. They work together and they sometimes go in shifts to try to kind of make sure that the village is going to be safe. I think this is not just like Sudanese, but generally I think it also could be in Africa, for example, like this mutual community based or mutual activistness. But as Norman said, this nafir started to have more political shape during the protests in 2019. Right. Because protein protest started in neighborhood. So they were organized together to decide which street they're going to go, what time they're going to go out, and then each neighborhood would get together for like a bigger protest. So this is how neighborhood became like a center for organization. And then after the uprising and of course, like the transitional government, it became like a building block for democratization or like for demanding rights and demanding more liberties. I think the war kind of, you know, also highlighted that this is not just political, but it was also kind of like have an eight side, a humanitarian side they can actually play.
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A
Thank you, Yassir. And I'm curious about how political these groups, right? So prior to the outbreak of the war, we understood them to be as these neighborhood resistance committees, right. Quite political in their nature with a stated aim of democratizing Sudan. And now they operate as mutual aid groups that are focused on delivering immediate life saving, humanitarian assistance. And I wonder if their work has had to be less political in nature or less overtly political in nature in order to be able to operate in areas that are controlled by, let's say, the rsf or if there is an underpinning or a political philosophy that guides the work that ERs do beyond this philosophy of Nafir. So that's for you, Yasir, but also no. Aman.
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B
Yeah, I think this is very interesting, like to go back and look like, how did they choose what the course of action would be? And I just want to also emphasize that I don't want to generalize. Like all neighborhoods moved into being like, err. So some of them chose to be still like political. Some of them chose to take arms, right? Like to kind of contribute in the war itself. So and I just want to also, like, highlight that the war moment was very confusing for many Sudanese. Like the kind of, the politics of it was kind of like, surprising. We tend to see, you know, civilians kind of choosing sides, people from the civilian government, from transitional government. So it was very confusing. And I think for the majority of these neighborhoods, I think they kind of like bypassed that confusing moment by just naturally answering to the needs of their local communities, which is like bringing water, food. That was highly restricted by the war, by the conflict. And the moment also necessarily that they will kind of put aside politics, right? Like, if you want to get access through checkpoints for this, the militia or like other actors as well, you have to be able to go. So I think it was a necessity of the time. And also war erupted very surprisingly.
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Noman, I want to pull on this thread that Yassir has laid out for us about rifts when it comes to the different sides or the different understandings of this war, particularly amongst Sudanese youth. So I'm thinking about the young people that organized through a culmination of campaigning and demonstrations, led to this beautiful moment of revolution that we all saw with the fall of Omar Al Bashir. And as a fellow African, as a Tanzanian, again, I don't know if we really did much with this, but we all change our profile pictures to this blue and followed along this revolution and the iconography of it, the photo of the woman on top of this car waving the flag. And for that revolution that was so hard fought to be snatched away by now, these two warring parties. And obviously there's a lot of, I don't want to erase the nuances, a lot of politics behind the outbreak of this conflict, but here we are, right? How do young people that worked so hard to get to a point where Sudan could be a democracy and Sudan could be free, how do they see this moment, right? Like, what are the different streams of thought? Are there, for example, people that think the international community should pick a side and maybe back one side, like the SAF to get to a resolution in this conflict? Are there people that think that this war will never truly end unless Sudanese civilians are put at the forefront of, of the political process? I'm just curious Oh, I just want to pull out this thread more about the different ideas with the different understandings of this conflict, these rifts that Yassir was mentioning.
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C
Yeah, I think that's a great question. I think primarily after the war erupted, especially after the first few weeks, we immediately noticed the increase of the salience of ethnic identities and regional cleavages coming to the forefront of the conflict. So maybe before the conflict started, the key demarcating lines between people was based on their affiliation to the old regime versus those advocating for a new government that is distant from the old guard of Amr Al Bashir. Now, even people who were affiliated with the old guard, the younger generation, perhaps like parents who are politicians in the government, you would notice that they were kind of distancing themselves from the politics of their predecessors. Now, unfortunately, after the war took off, this greatly shifted and the key marker became ethnic identity, tribal identity. Of course, when I'm talking here, these aren't in absolute terms. You're going to find some anomalies here and there. But for the average person, average youth, I'm talking in Sudan, that's what mobilized them towards fighting either with the Sudanese armed forces or their allied militias from the other former rebel groups, or with the RSF and their allied militias, etc. When the stakes are very high, security dilemma erupts and most people tend to coalesce around their key tribal identity. So I personally met a few people on both sides of the aisle who are both present in the protests in Khartoum or other parts of the country. Yet now they're fighting on opposing sides of the conflict, unfortunately. Right. If Sudan, let's say, was like 80% militarized, the political sphere is 80% militarized. We're talking about a 99% militarized sphere right now. I don't think civilians in the conceptual framework actually exist in Sudan right now. Civilians on whomever represent themselves as civilians, they extract their power actually by being part of either party. So. So a civilian that actually has organizational support on the ground from just civilians doesn't really exist. Now, that might exist in a lesser form in other forms of quote, unquote, civilians, perhaps tribal leaders or religious leaders. Right. They might still have some sort of legitimacy without military backing due to various reasons, for. But for the most part, I personally don't see an active, vibrant civilian society that we strive for. Even during the transitional period. Right. There was huge popularity for previous Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok just because he was like the new face of the revolution. Yet even then he wasn't able to channel his popularity to political organization that was effective to counter the dominance of the militarized folks. And so he ended up having to succumb to the whims and the desires of the military. And so civilians, in essence today, I would say those who advocate for a civilian government are, in my opinion, advocating for further instability. So it is sort of a conundrum that people are going to be facing if we would want to move to a post war period where there is actual stability and not much influence from armed actors in the conflict.
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A
Fascinating. It's definitely not an insight that I've been able to see so far in D.C. yassir, what do you think of Nauman's conception of the civilian today in Sudan? And the second question would be, have these regional cleavages and tribal identities, have they shaped or worked their way into these emergency response rooms, or have they been a counterexample of what it could look like for Sudanese people to coalesce and organize under one common identity?
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B
This is a very interesting question. And also I like to think about, you know, like the war as for all of us, like young Sudanese and even like young African, when the war start, I think it's a moment for reflection, right? So we have all our hopes, plans for a democratic Sudan and democratization, but the war kind of clarified all the nuances that Noman has mentioned, right? So we were basically organizing. The Sudanese Jews were actually organizing in Khartoum. Basically the sitting was in the center of the capital. These young people were mostly highly educated young people, sophisticated people. But they. I think what the Sudanese just kind of missed is that the other, you know, like uncovered realities about Sudanese politics. What Neumann mentioned, like tribalism, ethnicities, military actors, right? Like, so remember when the transition happened, the RSF was part of that democratic transition, right? There are support forces like who inherited the Janjaweed. So I think we like, as Sudanese use, we were wishful thinking, right? Like that's gonna go away, that's gonna succeed, despite all the negatives of that transition. And that's why I tend to kind of resist this kind of optimism or wishful thinking that comes from D.C. and other kind of Western capitals about civilians should be the center and everything is gonna solve, right? We still haven't thought about, like, civilians are not the only actors or like the only shapers of the state. We need some kind of security. I visited Port Sudan a couple of years ago during the war and visited some refugee camps or displaced people camps. And it seems to me like these people don't think about civilians or democracy or democratization, they only want their a home, they want security, they want food. And without that, I really find it very difficult to think about what we hear in D.C. for example. Right. I feel like we have to look beyond what the revolution of 2019 have kind of portrayed in our mind. Right. We have to kind of get close to the reality and how to move forward with what we have. What happened in Al Fashir, for example, I think this is, you know, this is not a question of like having civilian governor or not. This is a question of like just having human dignity. Like this is like a genocide. So from that to what's happening, I think there is some need to understand the reality and I think the young people there in Sudan kind of get it. So they are really very active in the day to day business in like rebuilding hospitals, especially like those places that has been reclaimed by the military where there is a sense of security. So like Al Jazeera and Khartoum, Al Ubayr, there is this kind of like, go back, rebuild your house, rebuild your neighborhood. Some people are now like, you know, building even like solar panels to get their water resources back without being actively political or calling for civilian government. I think they understand their priorities better than any of us outside Sudan.
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A
Kind of look, really could. Yeah. I mean, on one hand it breaks my heart to know that people have had to become very utilitarian. But on the other hand, you know, all you really need to do is read one article on what the UN has basically said bears the hallmarks of genocide in Al Fasher to understand that this is not. People are, are living day to day thinking about their next meal. This is, you know, the sort of conversations we're having in think tanks in D.C. are removed. They're just so far removed from the reality on the ground. And I, I know the bulk of this conversation was meant to focus on the emergency response rooms, but I am sincerely enjoying this conversation with two young Sudanese thinkers, scholars, political scientists. And so I'm going to ask a very broad question and you can answer it the way that you would like in both of your analyses and your understandings, given all of your expertise, how do you think this war ends? Norman, let me start with you.
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C
Yeah. I think that's not million dollar but billion dollar question. Right?
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Right.
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C
I think for the war to end, we need to understand the origins of the conflict. And I would argue it is the heavily militarized political sphere. Unless we are able to untangle violence from politics, we're going to see this constant recurrence of conflict. And Sudan, unfortunately, has been experiencing that since 1956. We have failed to address our political differences peacefully, whether that's in democratic systems, which failed, didn't last more than three or four years in Sudan's history, or other countries which have experienced some sort of durable authoritarian regimes which kind of succeeded, at least maintaining political stability. Now, I think it would be unwise to jump these steps ahead. Primarily, I think the focus of the international community, and I think it's the time right now is quite conducive to that, is to push for a initial ceasefire. First of all, both sides of both warring parties have kind of maintained their regional strongholds, which makes it probably easier for the talks to begin, because even if talks were to begin today between both sides, it would take a long period of time before people come to a conclusion. But more importantly, I would say the current dynamics in the Gulf are very pertinent to what's happening in Sudan. So there's like three tiers, of course, to the conflict. One, as we all know, between these rapid support forces and the Sudanese armed forces. But then you also have the regional dynamics of the competition. Regional competition between Saudi Arabia, us, uae, Egypt, Ethiopia and other actors in the region. But more importantly, the local dynamics of how we've seen the war polarizing Sudanese based on ethnic and tribal identities. If the regional actors are able to come to an agreement that, yes, this, it's about time that we should discuss amongst themselves as to how Sudan ought to be governed. I think the second part would be between the leaders of the both armed actors. A bit easier, I want to say. Not as easy as what we think, but the more difficult part is the local dynamics of how are you going to rebuild communities back together. We've seen what happened in Al Dina. The Masali tribe and the Arab tribes have had animosities among themselves for decades now, since the earlier Darfur conflict. Basically, you have families, I personally know families who have one side of their family from one tribe, the other from another tribe breaking apart because of this conflict. This is the most challenging part that no one is talking about. The entire focus for the past few years has been between the armed actors and the regional complexities. But the local dynamics are completely overlooked by both regional and domestic actors. And I argue that is going to be the more challenging part because people have grievances, people have family members that have been killed in the conflict, people that have fought, had to flee their homes, etc. The list of atrocities doesn't end and so this is going to be the more difficult part of how do you rebuild and address the grievances that people have experienced the past three years?
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A
Yeah, no, thank you. And Yassir, same question to you. Extremely broad. How does this conflict end? And then I would also love to hear your reflections on what Norman rightly just pointed out, which is a whole new set of grievances that are festered throughout this conflict.
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B
Yeah. As much as is very hard to think of. But I think that's our responsibility, our kind of collective responsibility to think about it and to try to devise some kind of way forward. And I would actually kind of continue what Norman, like, you know, started with the idea of the, you know, the state, the post colonial state that we kind of inherited. And I totally agree. Like, you know, what's happening in Sudan now is not just like, you know, started in April 15th, but this is kind of goes back to the fabric of the nation state that we inherited from the British colonial system. And as Norman said, there is a need to kind of reconceptualize what the state should look like for average Sudanese.
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C
Right.
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B
What their militaries look like, what their security would look like. But I also want to kind of talk about something I think is very important here, is that particularly on the rapid support forces like the rsf, which we tend to think that it has kind of ethnic or tribal background. I think that's true, but it's also kind of misleading to think about it that way. What I think when I would offer to think about the rsf, is that it's actually hijacking those local and traditional institutions in Darfur. Yes, there is an Arab kind of element to the rsf. But, for example, the Hemetti family, the Dagalu family are not the sheikhs or like the chiefs of the Arab tribes in Darfur. And I think I could actually jump on this, but I think Hemidi, with the help of regional financiers like the United Arab Emirates and others, even like the Bashir before, right. The Bashir regime kind of got the power and the money to kind of hijack the whole Arab tribal component of Darfur. And I think that's the point. If we can get kind of like to break or to kind of have distance between the Dagalu family, which I think are not representative of the Arab people of Darfur and which has their own interest, they actually answer to their financier, to their kind of like regional backers. They don't answer to their people. I think that's the way forward. And this is not just like on the RSF side, I think in the SAF or like, you know, Khartoum, Portugal, and kind of these communities, there is a need to look at what Norman kind of mentioned, you know, this kind of ethnic dimension. How do we look to those people, the Arab component of the rsf, and how we should include them in what we think about, like, when a future of the country. Right. This need to be done despite, you know, the genocide that happened in Al Fashir. This need to be done to kind of like differentiate between those who committed crimes and the larger ethnic or tribal communities behind them, which I don't think they bear the same responsibility. I think these topics are not talked about in Khartoum or in policy circles. We tend to think about the military aspect of the war, but I think these kind of tribal elements, tribal politics need to be addressed. And Noaman mentioned Alhaker very clearly. The regional aspect of it. I think without kind of limiting those regional actors, specifically the United Arab Emirates, we're going to be a continuation of the war because mainly they continue to provide weapons, to provide logistics, also to provide instability to all the neighboring countries. I don't see this conflict as being Sudan limited. You have now the RSF is being supported by the Kenyan government in Chad. Now we see a new front opening in Ethiopia, like on the border with Ethiopia in Eastern Sudan. So this could actually impact the whole region, the whole Horn of Africa. So I think there is a need to limit the role of regional international backers. Even though, you know, what Norman said with the current moment, I just, like, I'm not very optimistic.
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A
Yeah, no, I. I mean, thank you both so much. It's quite interesting that I was actually reading Mahmoud Mamdani's Saviors and Survivors, specifically the chapter on the Save Darfur movement and how removed it was from the actual politics on the ground. And so I'm very grateful for this. And you know, in the chapter from Saviors and Survivors that I was reading, I was. I'm maybe showing my age, but I don't really have any recollection of the Save Darfur movement. Like, I was quite young, but reading about how galvanized the international community was. Mom, Daddy would say galvanized based on information that did not match the situation on the ground, but galvanized regardless. Right. And I think there was a level of international pressure that at least led to the ceasefire in 2005. If I'm getting the year right. I wonder today. And I'll start with you Nomen. There's a stream of thought here in D.C. that I think I agree with, that this war is no longer a war in Africa, right. It's no longer nowhere near the realm of African solutions to African problems or that Africa should take the lead, that this has become an incredibly international war. Right. We're seeing drones made in Iran that are being used by different sides of the conflict. We're seeing the uae, the Saudis, the Turkey, especially Turkish made drones. So there's this argument that this is no longer an African war. And for the role for the international community should be to work with other international partners, the uae, the Gulf states, et cetera, to at least deal with that tier of the drivers of this conflict. And as you know, Norman mentioned and drew this really helpful distinction between the conflict or the drivers of the conflict at this international sphere. The conflict as we largely understand it, between the military and the RSF and then these local cleavages. And so Norman, I'm wondering what you think about the role of the international community here. Should the focus be on getting the Gulf states together and finding a way to at least reduce the external drivers of this conflict, or is our role even larger or bigger than that?
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C
Well, my philosophy is that like just looking at my own research, most conflicts in the past number of decades, even throughout history, have involved international actors. Civil wars by definition have been internationalized. You rarely come across a conflict that's just contained within the borders of a country. Very rare, unless it's like a tribal conflict between herders and farms. So that's sort of given. But what's what was interesting about the conflict in Sudan, if we go back in the timeline for the first year, most regional actors were sort of neutral. Just observing, seeing what the situation was looking like. And from what I've heard, this conflict could have been contained had it not been to the diplomatic falters of actors either in D.C. or in the Gulf capital, Syria. But I think even if that is solved tomorrow, right, they're able to come to a sort of agreement. The 90% of the burden falls upon us as Sudanese to get the rest of it working. Because as I alluded to earlier, destruction has been immense in Sudan. Most people have been impacted in great ways. Like I'm talking about, all the strata of society have been impacted. You're talking about the most affluent individuals to the poorest. But I think the international community shouldn't pressure them to come to sign an agreement just so that they could say we ended a conflict. So there's this, especially prior to The Iran conflict, there was this notion that administration of President Trump is looking for another the conflict to end. Right. But that conflict could, like, re erupt before even, like, the ink dries off the paper. So they should, I would argue, not only come to an agreement that they're going to put an end to this conflict, but also to pressurize actors to enact actual military and political reform. If this idea of ethnic armies and militias doesn't come to an end in Sudan, we're going to see the rupture and a recurrence of conflict for more decades to come. And this conflict only exacerbated this issue of ethnic militaries. It's not only the rsf, it's not only the Sudanese armed forces, but all of these former rebel groups and other militias that were formed in the past few years and strengthened will always cause a harm to any political stability. And the issue with that, for like, someone who's not aware of it, is that if you create an army formed of people from the same ethnic or regional background, any sort of political contestation ends up being an existential conflict for them. Right. And so unless that is addressed and fully supported by the international community, any sort of political reform that doesn't depend on these factors is just going to fail. And so not only should the international community focus on coming to an agreement amongst their local or regional actors, but the international community should just pretty much learn from Sudan's history of conflict what went wrong and what didn't. And people I speak to who are kind of more engaged with diplomats would tell me that the diplomats, especially from Western capitals that are dealing with the Sudan issue are not the same people who were sent decades back. The newer generation is not as interested. It is not well versed in the local aspects of conflict and governance in Sudan. And so they don't have the depth and insight to properly address the conflict. So this approach of putting a band aid to a conflict in Sudan every few years I think is what got us to where we are right now. I think we are at a point of no return. Either Sudan addresses most of its political issues in depth and thoroughly, or we are just going to see further and further disintegration. And it's not going to only end here. I would assume that if this conflict continues on, you're going to see fractures within each warring party amongst themselves. The ingredients to the conflict are still there. The modus operandi of both parties seems to be the same and based on Sudan's DNA. So unless a actual very instrumental Change happens. I think the atrocities and humanitarian issues are just going to be further exacerbated. I hope that wasn't too long of a response.
- [36:55]
A
No, no. It's the nuance we actually need to hear. And you know, Yassir, just to help us wrap up, Nomen's done a great job of explaining the role of the international community when it comes to sort of political process to get to some sort of ceasefire. I want to look at what Noman just mentioned at the end, which is the humanitarian response. Right. Part of why these emergency response rooms are so, to me, so miraculous in their work, so fearless in their work, is that these are pretty ordinary young people filling in the massive gap left by the sharp decline in overseas development assistance, made worse by the implosion of usaid. And I, I'm struck by how one, what you think, let me ask about the fact that, you know, ordinary young people have had to step in into this gap that has been left by international agencies. And two, why you think there is such a sharp difference between the humanitarian response to prior conflicts in Sudan and today. And sometimes I hear this, I don't like it and I don't really like saying the term, but people speak of a donor fatigue or a Sudan fatigue. Is that real? Do you think that's why we are in this moment? I would just love to hear your reflections.
- [38:28]
B
Yeah. And if I can also, like, I think I want to add some to what Norman said actually, and it might be a point of disagreement. Yes. While both sides have, you know, committed like some kind of crimes and they have like, you know, ethnic dimensions. But I don't think there is any kind of even like you cannot compare between the RSF and the Sunni military. This is what I think is missed in D.C. and other international policy circles is that yes, there is some, if you can, like misdeeds or negative aspect of the military coup in 2021, you know, like the fall of democracy that the military kind of is responsible for. But there is no way that we can compare the military still an institution. It might be a corrupt institution, but it's not a tribe based or like a family based institution or organization like the RSF, for example, although we have some kind of majority within the military from the specific areas. But this kind of represent most of Sudan, like the Nuba, the South, the east and even from Western Sudan. So I just would like to kind of emphasize here it is very misleading to kind of put them at the same place. And what I really push the international community is like, you don't have to pick a side, but there is specific, specific events. I think we need the international community to have a voice, like, what happened in Al Fashir was horrific. And those who committed this should be held accountable, right? We know who did it because of new technology, because of the Yale Research center that kind of, you know, use the satellite to even, like, figure out, like, blood that has been in the grounds of Al Fashir. So without this accountability, without holding those responsible accountable for their crimes, we can't see, like, for example, like the brother of Hamidti traveling around, like European capital and Western capital cities. Why don't we see Hemity himself, who is responsible for that genocide to be hosted in Nairobi and Kampala? Why don't we hold the uae? There's so many reports that kind of highlighted and shown and proven their support for the RSF to be held accountable and give them the free pass. So I think that with the international community and what they should do to not let. Not say, stop the war, but stop the crimes. Stop war crimes, right? There is genocide that the UN said, as you said, like, happen in Al Fashir in terms of the ERR and their response. So I really, like think about these young heroic people is that they will manage their own business without any need of support. I don't like to kind of mention or kind of ask for the international community to take their burden and like to increase aid to Sudan, because for the four years, we learned that these young people could actually survive and they can manage without any foreign support. What we learned is that the resilience of them, their continuation of support is something that I think will continue despite international efforts. But I think what we, as Sudanese, as African, I think what we need to think about is how we can improve these efforts, right? How we can, like, do more training, more access to international financial institutions. So, for example, like the diaspora, sending money to Sudan, how we can make this easier, how we can make it more easier for them where there is no Internet connection, how we can provide, like, you know, like these satellite Internet devices is doing a great job for them, right? Like, if we can provide these to these local ers, it's a game changer for them. So I think with what's happening, you know, with the usaid, with international kind of, what do you call it, fatigue, I call it, like, carelessness. I think we still have. We still have room to play as Africans, as local Sudanese, to increase our kind of, you know, visibility. And I think, yeah, this podcast is the right step to do Right. To highlight these people and to call for all African diaspora to support and to show that we can still make some room for these solutions to grow.
- [43:08]
A
Yes. And this is such a lovely note to wrap up with, like celebrating the incredible resilience of the young people that volunteer for the err. So Noman, I'll give you the last word. You know, I wonder what you think of the idea of the emergency response rooms as a model for community driven humanitarian action that can be adopted elsewhere in the world. What are your thoughts on that?
- [43:34]
C
So, yeah, I could I respond to you a quick point that Yasir, a very important point that Yasir made because I think what's probably good about this podcast is that you're getting two Sudanese people from like different perspectives on the conflict. But I think yes, the track record of the Sudanese armed forces the past few years has been better in terms of dealing with the areas that it controls. But for me that's just reducing our issues to this time period. If we were to put an end like war in of itself was bad, even if both sides committed the same levels of atrocities, I don't think we would still advocate for war. And so this is a huge discussion, especially if you notice the Sudanese in the diaspora. It's a very polarizing issue, the issue of atrocities. But for me, atrocities are a symptom, byproduct of war. And if we don't address war end of itself, we're going to experience another war. But moving on to the issue of the err. So actually one more point before that is the issue of, yeah, the Sunnis army, yes, does have a semblance of nationality, but yeah, it is dominated by officers within specifically Northern state. And this isn't only specific to Sudan. Like Kristen Harkness has done her book on ethnic armies in Africa and has showed how like different countries, Ghana, Senegal have addressed these issues of ethnic armies and leadership. It's just a byproduct of colonization. But like now for instance, Darfur is completely cut off from like most government services, telecom, et cetera. So most people there sort of feel that they are being cut off from the state. They're now forming their new identity. And I'll give you an example. I have a lot of relatives from Darfur and every once in a while I'd get someone with a Chadian phone number or Ugandan. I'm like, who's texting me? And apparently they can't access Sudanese numbers so they have to get cell phones for their WhatsApp numbers from other countries. And so if, like, the Sudanese army doesn't actually take an initiative to show people. Hey. That the conflict isn't being against specific people or regions, it's between the rsf, you're still going to find political support for the RSF in these regions. And it's happening on both sides of the aisle. So now back to your question on the err. I would say it's going to vary according to each culture. Like Sudan, this is the dominant form of how we kind of dealt with another. For instance, it's not only the past three years, but a lot of mosques of famous or like central Sufi sheikhs have been feeding people for decades, not even century by now. And they've been continuing to do this. And even throughout the war, they've maintained an apolitical position because they feel that their roles serve the community, not to serve warring parties. And so, yes, it could be copied, but at the end of the day, if you don't have the local propensity to deal with it, I don't think it's going to succeed as much because you're talking here about a country where people I know personally have spent most of their life savings just the past three years supporting their family members. I don't know to what extent other cultures might be willing to spend, I don't know, 10, $15,000 on relatives who are refugees all over the globe. So, yes, while it is feasible in theory, but in practice, you need to have the cultural support for it to succeed.
- [47:07]
A
No, I mean, that's such a great place to end this. Noman Mousa, Yasir Zaydan, you are both fantastic, brilliant scholars. It's just a pleasure listening to you both. Our Sudanese brothers and sisters have this concept of nafir, but to Yassir's earlier point, we can see it across Africa in Tanzania and East Africa, Tugiema in South Africa, it's Ubuntu. And to see these philosophies that have some similarities, but for them to manifest in such a selfless nature in Sudan is striking. And it's just a level of generosity and community and kindness that is rare to see, especially amidst a conflict. And so thank you both so, so much for your time, for your reflections, for your thoughts, for being willing to agree and disagree. I think it added a lot of nuance to this episode. Thank you.
- [48:04]
B
Thanks for listening to Into Africa.
- [48:06]
A
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- [48:14]
B
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- [48:17]
A
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B
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