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- [00:05]
A
Welcome to Into Africa, a podcast where we explore Africa's geopolitical landscape, its evolving global role, and the challenges and opportunities shaping the continent's future. I'm your host, Oge Onobogu, Senior Fellow and Director of the Africa Program at the center for Strategic and International Studies Foreign. The Horn of Africa is perhaps one of the most geopolitically significant, yet unstable regions in the world. The complex interplay of internal conflicts, regional power struggles, and the influence of global actors is shaping the region's security and political landscape. Conflicts in the region, such as the ongoing civil war in Sudan, have gained occasional global attention, but consistent and contextualized coverage is often missing. In this episode, we will only scratch the surface of the many moving pieces shaping the political conflict and security dynamics in the Horn of Africa. The scale and pace of developments in this region can be difficult to track. So today I'm delighted to welcome two guests whose analysis will help shed some light on some of the most important events to pay attention to in the Horn of Africa. Joining me today from Nairobi, Kenya is Ms. Samira Gaid, who is the founding director of Balkis Insights, a think tank dedicated to advancing peace and security in the Horn of Africa. Sameera is a leading regional security analyst who has worked at the highest levels of Somalia's national security architecture. I am also glad to welcome Ambassador Donald Booth, who served as the US special envoy to Sudan and South Sudan between 2013 and 2017. Prior to his appointment at Special Envoy, he served as the US Ambassador to Ethiopia, Liberia and Zambia. I also had the pleasure of working closely with Ambassador Donald Booth when he served as a co Chair of the Sudan's Working Group at the Wilson Centre.
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Foreign.
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A
It's a pleasure to welcome the both of you to this episode. Sameera, let me turn to you. As we look at the complex environment in the Horn of Africa, regional and external players reshaping the balance of power in the region. Where do you see some of these activities turning into opportunities or real risk? And how are countries in the Horn of Africa adapting to all these changing dynamics that we see in the region?
- [02:48]
B
Thank you so much for having me. First of all, I would like to just start by saying, first of all, the countries in the Greater Horn are not passive actors in the face of this shifting geopolitics. They are actively, I believe, calibrating their strategies in response to intensified external interest, economic pressures on their own economies, and then also, to some little extent, climate stress. And so what we are witnessing is a region reacting to that change, but also being reshaped by this convergence of elite survival strategies in some of these countries and external power competition. For instance, in Ethiopia, you know, we do know about the gerd, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and its push for diversified maritime access over the past year. At least we knew that Ethiopia was seeking sea access by Huk Krokor Nook that was supposedly aimed at economic sovereignty and also strategic depth. So we do see that whatever's happening domestically is affecting the region and also affecting the wider international community. Ethiopia's internal political strains, especially around federalism and identity, are also now sort of inseparable from its regional postures. It heads as well towards election quite soon. Somalia is quite different. It's a stark example of how this is happening. The federal government internally is insisting on centralization backed by some international partners in the name of state building and strengthening the state building project. But regional administrations and Somaliland that we'll talk about maybe are left with little choice to also pursue external guarantees for security and economic survival. So I see these actions not as just rogue actions, but rational responses to political center that is promising authority but doesn't deliver on anything else. In that sense, Somalia's fragmentation is structurally produced. Sudan, South Sudan they expose the limits of this regional current political orders. Sudan, quite sadly, the war is simply a failure of mediation, an outcome of decades of international accommodation of militarized elites. External actors are now concerned that there's no ceasefire or lack of a ceasefire. But many have contributed to what we see today with the security architectures that exist with the RSF and others. In South Sudan, the milestone of elections keeps being pushed forward and back. Despite the absence of this institutional reform. We're seeing that this is just a lip service. I think smaller states, Djibouti, Eritrea also adapting, but they also had long standing positions on how to deal with this. Djibouti has mastered transactional sovereignty. They have monetized their territory by hosting these competing foreign powers with these bases. Eritrea is leveraging its Red Sea coastline. So I think everyone is doing what they must. But I believe their most survival strategy is not really development pathways where this could actually be an opportunity. I think it depends really on the international partners, the external partners. We have Gulf states and we have Western partners and also China and Russia in the fray. We would like that these openings, provide these engagements, provide regional dialogue on stuff like water management, cooperation against piracy, the potential for trade corridors, linking the Horn to Asian markets and all of that. But sometimes we do see that this competition on the ground doesn't translate to that. These risks around this unmanaged competition around ports, land, minerals and water. Of course, with Egypt coming into the picture around that, tensions right now between Ethiopia and Eritrea are clear warning that this geopolitical maneuvering could quickly escalate into another interstate conflict. So I would say, in short, yes, the horned countries, the Horn States, are adapting and they are now no longer passive observers. But because of the number of actors in this crowded and increasingly volatile arena, we're seeing them also, you know, tactically align in self interest and survival instincts.
- [06:48]
A
Thank you so much, Sameera. You paint a picture of a very, very important region that is geopolitically significant but really doesn't get a lot of coverage. So, Ambassador Booth, let me come to you. What would you say has been sort of our longstanding US Foreign policy approach to the Horn of Africa, and how do you see this shifting under the Trump administration? How can the US as well adapt to the changing dynamics that we see in the Horn of Africa?
- [07:20]
C
Well, thank you very much for that question. I've worked on the Office of East African affairs back in the early 1980s, so I have been sort of a firsthand participant in various phases of U.S. engagement with the Horn. I would say up until the early 1990s, the US approach to the Horn of Africa was driven really by Cold War calculations, particularly countering the Soviet Union and other perceived enemies, such as Gaddafi in Libya. So, for example, after decades of supporting imperial Ethiopia, the United States quickly shifted to backing Somalia against the communist Derg government that had taken over in Ethiopia. In Sudan, the US Backed the government of Sudan against the avowedly communist Sudan People's Liberation Movement, or splm, which was led by the southerner John Garang. Now, this US Approach really changed, I think, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. I think the US Welcomed then a. A cadre of, quote, new democratic leaders, unquote, Melas in Ethiopia, Museveni in Uganda, Kagame in Rwanda. And the US Supported them with the overriding objective of stability in the region. Then you had John Garang, who, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, made a tactical disavowal of the SPLM's communist roots. He reframed the southern rebellion as African versus Arab, Christian versus Muslim, and as a result gained support on both sides of the aisle in the US Congress. It didn't help also that at the same time, the Sudanese government, which had been taken over by the Muslim Brothers and General Bashir, had allied themselves with terrorist groups, inviting them to come into Sudan and establish camps. So this led to ultimately to US Support for Garang's rebellion and the independence of South Sudan. But I think today we have to look and say that basically US and other efforts to secure stability in the Horn clearly have not succeeded. The Horn is now awash in internal conflicts, as Samira was recounting, internal conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and all of them really are facilitated by an increasing number of outside actors. Saudi Arabia, the uae, Qatar, Turkey, Iran and Russia. There are also interstate conflicts simmering between Ethiopia and Eritrea and. And also, as was mentioned, between Egypt and Ethiopia because of the Nile waters. And I think that today the longstanding US Concern about the humanitarian impact of conflicts is beginning to wane a bit, as we've seen with the dissolution of USAID and the reduction of U.S. humanitarian assistance. And an increased focus seems to be on what benefits the US can accrue for itself and possibly for some of its key Middle Eastern partners by further involvement in the Horn of Africa. I think that the perceived terrorist threats that the US has seen from the Horn, periodically, threats to the homeland, will be dealt with with or without support of regional states. So I guess, in summary, what I would say is that opportunity seems to be edging out stability as the guiding principle of U.S. engagement in the Horn.
- [10:42]
A
Thank you so much, Ambassador Booth. And I think just picking up on that last point that you raised. You know, we're approaching the third year of the conflict in Sudan, and really, by any measure, it's the world's largest humanitarian crisis. And you and I worked together when you co chaired the Sudan's working Group at the Wilson center, and you've been involved in following the conflicts in this region for quite some time, really involved at the highest levels. And after so many mediation efforts with this current conflict in Sudan, why does it seem that it is becoming so difficult to get to a place where we can get the warring parties to reach a ceasefire? What is making this crisis in Sudan more resistant to resolution than previous conflicts that we've seen in the country?
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C
Well, let me start by saying that the current fighting, it's primarily between actually two security elements of the Sudanese state, both established by law under the Bashir era, and that is the Sudan Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, or rsf. And while the conflict between the two of them sometimes has been characterized as two generals struggling for power, what is going on today is really a continuation of the civil war that has raged with only minor breaks since Sudan's independence in 1956. And I think if we look at history, we have to recognize that civil wars are notoriously difficult to bring to an end short of a military victory. And I think here of the U.S. civil War, the Nigerian civil war in Biafra. And they're difficult to end because they reflect really fundamental differences among a nation's people. Sudanese have very different visions of how Sudan should be governed and who should get what share of the nation's resources. Just one example of a fundamental difference that Sudanese have not been able to reconcile is you have, on the one hand, you have Islamists who believe that the guiding principles of the state should be Islamic law. And then you have a group like the Sudan People's Liberation Movement north, who believe firmly that Sudan must be a secular state in order for all citizens to be equal. Again, the difficulty resolving this conflict also comes from the fact that the fighting is being facilitated by outside actors who are pursuing their own competition for power and influence in the broader region. And as a result of this outside facilitation, the fighting has become much more widespread and much more deadly than in the past iterations of Sudan's civil war. You now have drones and long range weapons that are bringing the conflict to all parts of the country. And as a result, as you mentioned, it's now the world's largest humanitarian disaster, with close to half the population displaced and man made famine in many parts of the country. So what's been done to try to bring this fighting to an end? Well, first of all, mediation efforts focused on the armed actors in Sudan have failed to secure a ceasefire and humanitarian access because the armed actors continue to receive external backing and thus can believe that military victory is possible. And when you have such fundamental differences of the view of the state, the idea of fighting to victory, you can understand, makes sense if you feel you have the ability, the resources to do that. The current US Mediation approach via the Quad, the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the uae, I believe, has a chance of succeeding if Quad interests can be reconciled and if the Quad can then secure support of Sudan's neighbors in cutting off support for further fighting. You really need to have both of those. And then once you can sort of foreclose the options for fighting, that's where you need to really bring broad spectrum of the Sudanese people together to have a real serious discussion. It's been called national dialogue, many other things, about how Sudan, what type of government can actually enable Sudan Sudanese to live together in peace.
- [14:59]
A
Thank you so much, Master Booth. I will come back to the question on Sudan here, but I want to shift slightly from Sudan to Somalia, where there's a defining moment Here, Samira, according to a recent piece that you just wrote for the New Humanitarian, you know, the security situation in Somalia appears to be stuck in a vicious cycle, despite years of security investments. And in your article, you advocate for a new way for donors to think about their investments in Somalia. I'm wondering if you could elaborate on this a little more about this, your proposed shift in donor strategy and engagement in Somalia.
- [15:42]
B
I believe the shift, just let me say it up front, is partly on the part of the Somalis as well, and then also the international community. But yes, like you've just mentioned, Somalia is at a defining moment, but not because anything is fundamentally new or different, but because we have now reached the limits of, you know, the current donor approach, and they're becoming impossible to ignore. You know, after two decades of security assistance and the state building project, Somalia still remains locked in this cycle. We call it a roundabout where you have tactical gains and then strategic setbacks. The tactical games and strategic setbacks. The AU mission I think at the moment is the biggest change. Where they were supposed to be gradually handing over security responsibilities to Somali forces, we see now that they're also facing significant challenges with their financing. The transition is stalling. Somali security forces on the other side are also not capacitated to the point where they can actually begin to take on responsibilities. So for me, this is not a sudden crisis. It has been predictable. It's because the IC has been funding this AD H model. It's a short term funding model. And the mission is expected to deliver long term stability, the AU mission or even the state building project. So the core problem for me is that we have over invested both Somalis and the international partners in military capacity. Instead of investing in political legitimacy and political reconciliation, the IC has strengthened the center without resolving this underlying political fractures that led to state collapse in 1991. And the result has been this concentration of power and deepened mistrust in the periphery, specifically with federal member states like Puntland and Jubaland. And so what this does is we reinforce the center. The periphery decides to divide the center and not work with it. What we need to do is focus on the political challenges, because this is not a security challenge or a technical problem. It's more political. We can train forces, we can supply equipment, we can fund operations, but without political consensus to work together, the gains will always remain reversible. So for me, the shift should be conceptual. First, the donors need to move from unconditional security assistance to politically conditioned support. They should really benchmark it to what is happening on the governance side is dialogue happening between the center and the periphery and any other actors, anti corruption measures. This has been a big challenge. This federal member state and federal government agreements, that should be what provides the support, not just unconditional security support because of the threat. Second, they must stop equating the federal army with security. I think that's part of the challenge. Somalia's security architecture is wider than the federal army. There's federal member states, there's clan police, these local militias, some with social legitimacy. And we really should see, especially with this funding challenge, how we can accommodate their entire security architecture. And this should be taken on by both the Somalis and the international partners. International partners of course, have got some problems with funding militias and all of that. So we need to work around how this would actually work. And then also the most difficult aspect for me is that humanitarian assistance is now separate from security. There's millions of Somalis in need of life saving aid, chronic underfunding for food. We've had the challenges of that aid being cut, humanitarian assistance being cut. And so all of this needs to be accommodated in the talk when you're talking about security, the mismatch between how much is being spent on security versus all these other arenas. So I would say, you know, we do have great donor engagement though that is diminishing. But we really need coherence from the international partners. They really need to start recognizing that what they've been doing for the past 20 years is not working. That has been short term military wins. And if we are to really deal with the long term stability that we're looking for, we need political settlement and provision of at least basic services for this cycle to end.
- [19:41]
C
Okay, can I jump in here? I fully agree with what Samir has been saying, but I think the fundamental problem is the focus the last 20 plus years has been on trying to build a centralized Somali state with a strong center. And you know, though I've never served in Somalia, I was in neighboring Ethiopia and followed closely developments across the border. And it always struck me that Somalia is a country that is made up of clans and sub clans. And what it really needs is a confederal structure, even more so than a federal structure and certainly not a centralized structure. You know, that worked in the Saeed Bari era of a centralized strongman. But that's. That clearly is not working for Somalia now. So you know, maybe what's really needed is for Somalis to figure out how they can actually live together in peace. And I think the idea that outside assistance for localized militias, et cetera. I doubt very much that that would be needed. I think the clans are still able to police their own areas, control their own areas. And so again, moving away from this notion of the centralized state, I think is going to be key to trying to solve the problems in Somalia. That's just my two cents.
- [21:00]
B
I want to just add on to that. I believe I agree with the ambassador completely that that has been the result of the state building project and the security assistance. While the international community say that they have been supporting the rebuilding of a federal state, that's the federal member states at peace with each other. The reality has been that they for certain reasons still rebuild and recenter their operations to the federal government and insist on dealing just with the federal government and not the periphery. And so that creates this mismatch that forces the government to sometimes overstep, misunderstand its authority or its capacities. We do know that the federal government's reach is limited. The federal member states sometimes have greater reach and greater legitimacy. But what the ambassador was saying is quite important in terms of Somalis seeking to first of all sit down and decide what the next step is. I think from 2000 to 2004, the Somali elite sat down and decided on a federal model. That federal model I think has reached capacity. They're unable now to move beyond the point we are at. And so there's been talk that now we need to again sit down and decide what the next step is. Because clearly a centralized state or a federal state is not working in the current environment. And so confederation has been one of those that has been proposed. Of course, we do have a Somaliland that has declared independence and Puntland also starting to think about whether it will follow suit if it cannot reconcile with the center. So I agree we do need a major political reconciliation, a political conference that can decide this. But I don't know if under the current circumstances that will happen.
- [22:40]
A
So I see a whole new future episode on Just Somalia. Loading. Because we are only just scratching the surface on these issues here and I see that there is room for more in depth conversation on this, but still keeping on Somalia. Samira, you pointed out, you know, the relationship between the center and the periphery. And following several years of advocacy, Somaliland, as you, as you highlighted, appears to be making progress towards achieving its goal of full state recognition. In December last year, Israel became the first UN member state to formally recognize Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state. Somalia, on the other hand, has also accused its longtime ally, the uae, of supporting backchannels to bolster support for the recognition of Somaliland. And in response to this, the central government of Somalia has cut its ties with the uae, strong on its relationships with major partner. So what are your thoughts? I know you've already touched on this briefly in some of the comments that you've made. Can you share some additional thoughts on this push for recognition of Somaliland and the response from the central government of Somalia to this?
- [23:55]
B
I think the push for Somaliland's recognition at this point is more, especially with this recent recognition by Israel, is more about the hard realities of power in the Horn of Africa. You know, Hargeysa has long argued that it has, you know, relative stability compared to the south. It has demonstrated its democratic track record since 1991, had several elections. So it's trying to justify its de facto statehood and has for the first time acquired recognition from a UN member state. And this has formally validated what Somaliland has been saying for decades, that it's a functional political entity. I think for Hargeisa, this elevates its relationships with external powers. It gets support from this specific power to get to tables that it didn't initially have. And so that is quite important. But we also have to recognize that this coming at a time where the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is quite important for Red Sea security and commercial logistics. And then just to touch on Mogadishu's reaction, this to me is, you know, a structural tension that is rarely acknowledged. The government in Mogadishu has lacked the capacity and leverage to manage external interference effectively. This has been happening for the past, I would say, two decades or more. We've also had the lack of capacity in dealing with the Somaliland question and engaging effectively when it comes to dialogue for them. So I think Mogadish issue does bear some responsibility in not taking this on earlier. And then you did mention the uae. Somalia decided to servitize with the UAE as a statement of principle. But to me, it was more a reflection of real vulnerability because this is pulling Somalia deeper into the proxy conflict and it's also being instrumentalized in some ways. So for us, I think Somalia can claim sovereignty, but we are challenged when it comes to controlling the instruments of influence that are being arrayed against it in this case. But I just wanted to add that, you know, just this recognition, just this one recognition, does not equal legitimacy. There's been spirited support from the African Union and from the Gulf states, specifically this Saudi Arabia that opposed this unilateral secession and international recognition, specifically from Israel So I think Somalia does have international backing, but what it lacks is that internal coherence and capacity to actually respond to this in a more long term way.
- [26:16]
A
Thanks, Samira. And I think keeping on that point, Ambassador, but let me turn to you on that question too. You know, with Israel's recognition of Somaliland, there is increased speculation that the Trump administration might also formally recognize Somaliland, given the dynamics that are playing out in the region. And just some of the points that Sameera has highlighted where, you know, there are some states in the Gulf that are some are aligned with Somalia, others aligned with Somaliland, how do you see some of these decisions affecting the US Relationships with its allies, specifically the Gulf states, you know, UAE and Saudi Arabia? How do you think these will also affect the partnerships that the US has with these countries, including with countries that are part of the quad that are looking to resolve the crisis in Sudan?
- [27:06]
C
Well, I do know that there are people in the administration who have long been in favor of recognition of Somaliland, viewing it as historically a separate entity. After all, it was British Somaliland, not part of Italian Somaliland Somalia. It voluntarily joined with the rest of Somalia at independence. And the idea that it has held elections, it has been relatively an open democratic part of Somalia, if you will. And so there are those who argue that it should be recognized. I would say, though, that Israel's unilateral recognition has been pretty universally condemned. And from an African perspective, I think it really encourages unilateral changes to the colonial borders that Africa inherited. And if those borders are open to change, I think it could cause conflict in many parts of the continent. That's why the African Union and Its predecessor, the OAuth, held a very firm position of no changes to borders. Now, there were two exceptions to that. You had, first of all, the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia, which was mutually agreed upon and accepted by the OAU at the time. And then you had the independence of South Sudan, which was also accepted. But neither of those examples are particularly encouraging and that they have not led to peace and stability. Now, recognition of Somaliland independence, I think would further aggravate the already intense regional competition between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the uae, Turkey, Qatar and some others for influence and strategic bases in the Horn of Africa. Thus, the question of Somaliland would further complicate productive U.S. engagement with its own Sudan Quad partners, because this is yet one more area where they would have areas of disagreement. But let me just throw out one thought, and that is that it is possible that with the broadening of the range of areas of conflicting interests among quad partners that there's greater opportunity for then securing trade offs that might accommodate differences among them to settle any particular dispute, whether it be Sudan or Somaliland or whatever. It's kind of if you throw enough issues on the table, you might be able to arrange them in a way that everybody can be sufficiently satisfied. Whereas if the fewer pieces on the table, perhaps the room for arranging those pieces is not as great. That's a difficult concept. But all of the conflicts in the Horn of Africa in one way or another have some connection to each other because of the external actors and influencers in the region. And none of these conflicts really can be dealt with solely in a stovepipe manner.
- [30:04]
A
Yeah, really complex situation here. While we've touched briefly on Somalia and Sudan, there is a crisis brewing in South Sudan as the country heads towards contentious elections in December. Somalia and Ethiopia are also expected to have elections this year. There are also tensions rising between Ethiopia and Eritrea. And I know both Ambassador Booth and Samira, both of you have referenced this. So given sort of the changes that we see happening in the global arena and just the weakening of multilateral norms, citizens in the region are also beginning to question the effectiveness of institutions such as the African Union and igad. And we've even seen some countries in the region pull out of igad. So I would love to hear your thoughts on the hope of is there still hope for multilateralism to support peace and security efforts in the region, especially on conflict prevention and mediation efforts? Keeping in mind with the picture that both of you have painted, you know, really another full blown conflict in the region could really destabilize the Horn of Africa. I just would love to hear your thoughts on this. Is there still hope? What are the opportunities here for conflict prevention and mediation efforts?
- [31:33]
B
I do recognize that there is, I think, the greatest need for multilateral institutions specifically at this moment. But at the same time, we do see what the AU and iga, how it manages issues in the Horn of Africa. In the Greater Horn, we saw their quick recognition of elections in Tanzania, in Uganda, despite what somebody's within them, within the AU were saying about those specific elections. So the legitimacy of the organizations themselves are in question. We do see that they are not serving the people more, serving the regimes and the states that are in place. And so for me, I'm conflicted that I do recognize that if we do not have collective action, if we continue in this way, the conflicts that going to multiply and we're going to be in this never ending state of war. But at the same time, we have to recognize that there's serious reform that's required of these organizations.
- [32:27]
C
Well, let me jump in. I think the regional organizations and sub regional organizations in Africa were much more effective in the past in preventing and ending conflicts because the main regional power in the sub region was not part of the conflict. And also the main regional power was willing to act. And here a couple of examples come to mind. I think of Nigeria's role in Liberia throughout the 1990s, South Africa's role in Lesotho around 2000, Ethiopia's role in South Sudan in the peace process. So such regional interventions were affected because you had that main regional power who could act, was willing to act, and they were given legitimacy by the African Union and materially supported by the United nations and the West. Now, today in the Horn of Africa, there is no disinterested regional African power able to lead either a regional or a continental peace initiative. So in today's climate, I think multilateral approaches to peace are still possible, possibly even necessary. But I think they'll come about differently than in the past. Instead of a regional power, African power leading a regional organization initiative with backing of the AU and the un. I think that actors from further afield, like the Sudan Quad, will need to first reconcile their differences and then build support in the region or sub region and then possibly with regional and continental organizations, work to deter or resolve conflicts. You basically have outside actors who now have what they consider fundamental interests and they need to be somehow reconciled. Compromises among them are needed, I think, if you're going to make progress. So I guess the end result might well look multilateral because you will eventually bring many countries organizations into any peace process, but it will not depend on the current existing multilateral institutions and multilateral processes we've seen in the past for success. I think it'll be a different look of multilateralism.
- [34:46]
A
So a very important point that you raised there and you know, seriously taking everything that we have discussed, from Sudan to Somalia to the external influence in the region, I'm trying to just think about what your outlook is for this region this year. It seems there is a lot that is going on. So what's your outlook for the Horn of Africa this year? 2026? Are you hopeful? Are we in a complex, conflicting space? Just what are your thoughts? I'd love to hear your outlook for 2026 in the horn.
- [35:30]
B
Yes, I think I'll go first. For me, unfortunately, I'm a pessimist and glass half empty kind of person. So for me, I do think that the next year is going to be quite difficult. The Sudan crisis might have some changes on the ground just because of the moves, the shifts in the Gulf, the conflict right now that we see splitting loyalties between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia versus UAE in a way. And that might positively affect Sudan, I think, in a way. But for the rest of the Horn, you, the looming elections in South Sudan, in Somalia, in Ethiopia, this renewed Ethiopia, Eritrea tensions, I think they're all creating these conditions where no one can really focus on each of them. And so some might fall off the focus and we might see challenges there on the threat of violent extremism. Somalia is in the thick of it with ISIS and both Al Shabaab that is also resurging. So I think that's problematic. Climatic shocks. I think that also we do know that it's not looking too good for Somalia with failed rains again. But I would just like to say that I do think that diplomacy is still alive. The Nile negotiations, resurging, the AU backing of the South Sudan elections. Some things might change on the ground. But for me, I'm quite concerned by the Somaliland recognition and how Somalia reacts to it, the elections and all of that. That to me, signifies a risk in at least the near future.
- [36:55]
A
Thanks, Samira Bessa Booth.
- [36:57]
C
Well, I was going to say I'm a qualified optimist. So after listening to Samira, I must admit that she makes a good case for pessimism. You know, we're living in a new emerging world order, and that new order is certainly opening up greater avenues for regional powers like our Sudan quad partners to pursue their competing national interests more aggressively to fuel conflicts in Sudan and the broader Horn of Africa. However, I think the dangers that are posed to national regimes among our quad partners by the increasing global unpredictability and instability may just may inject a cautionary note and lead to greater openness to making compromises for peace in 2026. You know, we've seen how the Emiratis have kind of backed off in Yemen. But I think many of the regional partners may find that funding unwinnable conflicts, such as in Sudan or perhaps other parts of the Horn of Africa, simply siphons off resources needed for the economic transition in their own countries that they say they're focused on, and economic transition in other regional states like Egypt, which desperately needs to boost its economy. So regional powers may come to realize that it's cheaper and more effective to secure influence through trade and investment than through fueling conflicts that pragmatism can offer greater rewards than confrontation. All that said, I think the Horn of Africa will remain a tinderbox in 2026, but I think that effective US diplomacy with the Quad and other regional states can indeed make headway in reducing the availability of fuel for the potential fire. So that's where I say I'm a bit of a qualified optimist. I think there is still room for serious diplomacy to begin to walk the region back from the precipice of so many conflicts that are either ongoing or potentially hanging out there, such as renewed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
- [39:12]
A
Think given the pictures that both of you have painted, I think, and I want us to at least be able to end this episode on a hopeful note, I see that both of you have highlighted that there is still an opportunity for diplomacy here in the Horn of Africa. So I want to end this with asking, and this is for us. We ask every guest that comes on on the podcast, you know, and as you look at the complex situation that you've painted in the Horn of Africa, what are you most hopeful about in this region? And is there an African artist or a musician that you could recommend to our listeners when people who follow the Horn, when you need to lift your spirits as you look at the situation in the region? Sameera, let me come to you.
- [39:59]
B
In terms of what I'm hopeful about is the youth in the region. I've interacted with quite a number of them through my organization, continue to support them through these dialogue sessions and giving them a platform to actually speak up and get involved in political processes in their countries. And I think the youth offer a great hope. The youth are more interconnected because of social media and the digital infrastructure that is now available to them. We have seen them changing how they think about conflict, how they think about clan, integrating much more closely, picking up lessons from across borders. So I do hope that the youth could change the pathways that we see, could not be involved in the conflicts that could come up. So for me, that gives me hope. In terms of music, I would say I'm not a great music listener. Quite random. I don't speak French, but I love a French Malian singer. She's called Aya Nakamura, and she does amazing pop music. So I listen to it just because of the beat and how interesting she is, but I have no idea what she's saying. So I would say that calms me down, it helps me write, it helps me think. That would be my recommendation for anyone who wants to dance to some pop music, African pop Thanks, Samira.
- [41:12]
A
Master Beef.
- [41:13]
C
Well, Samira, I fully agree with you. I find what glimmers of hope there are, frankly in the desires of the people of the Horn of Africa, but especially the women and youth that you referred to for peace and as they say in Sudan, peace, freedom and justice. I think there's only so long that the will of an overwhelming majority of people can be ignored and suppressed. So that is, I guess, the long term hope in terms of spirit lifting in music. I must say I'm a fan of Ethio jazz and really appreciate the talent of, I think the father of Ethio jazz, which is Mulattu Astatky. I also enjoy another young Ethiopian pianist that I met when I was in Ethiopia, Gilma Yefrashua, who plays beautiful classic as well as traditional pieces on the piano. Those are two African musicians styles of music that I really do appreciate.
- [42:15]
A
Well, thank you so much, Ambassador Booth. Samira, thank you for joining us on this episode. You know, the scale and pace of developments in the Horn of Africa is sometimes often so difficult to track and we're so grateful that both of you have been here to joined us today to really explore these issues. I know we've barely scratched the surface on some of the topics here, but you've given us a lot to work with here and I take away with me just from this conversation, hope and thinking about the opportunities for diplomacy to move the conversation forward. It's a very complex environment. Things are difficult and as you rightfully pointed out, we are basically leaving in a completely different, changing global order. And so we have to think creatively about how we get things done. So with that, I really want to say thank you both so much for joining us on this episode and we look forward to continuing this conversation on the Horn of Africa. Thank you.
- [43:25]
B
Thank you so much for having us.
- [43:27]
C
Yes, thank you very much. It was a pleasure.
- [43:32]
A
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