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- [00:05]
A
Welcome to Into Africa, a podcast where we explore Africa's geopolitical landscape, its evolving global role, and the challenges and opportunities shaping the continent's future. I'm your host, Oge Onborgu, Senior Fellow and Director of the Africa Program at the center for Strategic and International Studies Foreign.
- [00:34]
B
We are releasing this special episode to explore the cascading effects of the Iran war on the Horn of Africa. As the conflict between Iran, Israel and the United States intensifies, the world watches the Middle east, but the true shockwaves of the war are often felt across the waters in the already volatile Horn of Africa regions. From the Red Sea shipping lanes, one of the world's most strategically vital waterways, for up to 15% of global trade, to the political maneuvering in Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. The Iran war is not just a distant event. It is a major contributor to rising energy prices, shaky food security, and shifting security partnerships in the Horn of Africa. As the conflict escalates, it could significantly reshape the Horn of Africa's conflicts, alliances, and engagement with Gulf states. Is the Horn of Africa being pulled deeper into a Middle Eastern power struggle? Or is the Iran war reshaping external conditions under which countries in the Horn will pursue their own individual or regional agendas? To help us break down the urgent situation at the Horn of Africa, right now, we're joined by returning guest Samira Gaid to discuss how the Iran war is altering the geopolitical and security landscape for countries in the region. Sameera is a leading regional security analyst and founder and director of Balkis Insights, a think tank dedicated to advancing peace and security in the Horn of Africa.
- [02:14]
A
Sameera, welcome back to Into Africa. So delighted you can join us today from Nairobi, Kenya.
- [02:21]
C
Thank you so much. Thanks for having me.
- [02:23]
A
So let's get right into the conversation on our previous episode, which aired a few weeks ago, and I would really encourage our listeners to go back and listen to that episode on the Horn of Africa. You warned of increasing proxy competition in the Horn. So given the ongoing war in Iran and the latest geopolitics that is playing out in the Gulf region, how much closer do you think the Horn of Africa is to being pulled into this current conflict with Iran?
- [02:57]
C
Yes. Thanks so much. You know, this previous podcast was in the wake of Israel's recognition of Somaliland in late December. So things have changed quite a bit, but not significantly. So first I'd just like to reframe the question slightly because I think it matters how we understand what's happening. So the Horn of Africa is not necessarily being pulled into the Iran war in the sense of a direct military extension of the Middle east conflict. But what is happening is sometimes it appears more structural and in some ways more dangerous because the war is accelerating the dynamics that are already in motion and it's removing the guardrails that were already very weak and barely holding things together. So I'm sure you're tracking a lot of this, but to be thorough, you know, the strikes on Iran began on 28 February and, and within days, you know, the traffic through the Strait of Hormuz dropped by 97%. Insurance premiums surged through the roof. Container shipping through the Red Sea, which had just partially recovered from the Gaza ceasefire, is now being described as impossible for 2026 because vessels are avoiding the Red Sea entirely and going around all the way through South Africa. So for the whole of Africa, you know, the region is very dependent on maritime imports for fuel, for food, for fertilizer and manufactured goods. So this economic emerg is just landing on top of pre existing crises. In places like Somalia, we are having a current drought ongoing. So it's really just compounding the issues we have on the ground. But the economic dimension is one picture. The geopolitical reconfiguration is also important. What we are seeing I think is more hardening of block alignments across the Horn. What we had and we still have for Somalia is the Somalia, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi axis that's defending Somali unity and challenging Somaliland's recent gains. On the other hand you had Israel, uae, Ethiopia and Somaliland alignment that was organized around Red Sea excess and port economics. So these are not clean binaries because we do know Ethiopia is hedging. It reaches out to Qatar and Kuwait even as it deepens its ties with Israel and uae, but the direction of travel is remaining. So even if we've seen some unity by the GCC because of this shared threat and because of the Iran war, we see that that still stands. So for the Horn of Africa, it's not new, but I think we are seeing that more and more a subset of Middle east rivalries. The point that I wanted to make through this is just that the war's primary effect on the Horn is not creation of new conflicts, it's complicating existing ones. It will result and seems to have already resulted in drastic reduction of international attention. There's no diplomatic bandwidth for the issues in the Horn. Financial resources are going to reduce precisely when we need the most, especially with the drought that I was mentioning. And so you'll see that this impacts Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia that also is facing economic shocks because of its fragile reform process. It'll also have impact on Al Shabaab and all these other groups. But I think we'll get into more of that later.
- [05:57]
A
So let's break this down even further and look at some of these complications in more detail, as you've highlighted. So, given the current war in Iran, does the focus now of major powers on the war create a vacuum of diplomatic attention that could either accelerate domestic instability in the region, or does it create a power vacuum that could allow other actors, perhaps those not directly engaged in the war, to take on more prominent roles in mediating local conflicts?
- [06:33]
C
I think this is one of the most consequential questions right now. The answer, whether there's a vacuum. The answer is yes, the vacuum is real, but it's being exploited, but not necessarily by the actors that are usually suspected. We can start with, let's say, for instance, in Somalia, where there's the clearest illustration of what's happening. The UN envoy to Somalia, Ambassador James Swan, has departed for Congo. No replacement has been named by the un. And that's really telling because Somalia is in a critical period. And the fact that they do not think this is necessary. Of course, an American diplomat being named to Congo is strategic for its own reasons. But it's interesting that this gap in Somalia and the UN is not thinking it needs to fill it, the international community has been absent essentially from the acute political crisis Somalia is currently facing. We have a group of Western donors called the C6, and they usually intervene whenever there's any political crisis. And what you have right now is that the president signed into law some contested constitutional amendments on 8 March that have fractured the federal system. Immediately after those amendments, an acrimonious process began. You know, some federal member states had already severed ties with Mogadishu, but Southwest State, which is closer to Ethiopia border, severed ties with Mogadishu on the 19th of March. So immediately after armed clashes have broken out on the outskirts of Baibdoa, the federal government is using military means to try and bring that federal member state back into the forest. They used this tactic before in a place called Jubilant, a federal member state called Jubilant and failed. We've seen five federal ministers resign en masse. And so all of this usually brings the attention of the international community very swiftly and even at the level of the capitals. But we have seen complete silence. There's been nothing said by the ic, even a statement, just a tweet by the EU ambassador that they're monitoring the situation. So I would say in Somalia, who's filling the space? One answer is Ethiopia. Ethiopia is quite interesting. Like I mentioned, Southwest state borders Ethiopia and they're very interested in what happens there security wise, if you know much about the problem. The security challenges in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia and Kenya sort of create friendly federal member states to protect their own national security. So Southwest is one of those federal member states. And Isaba is said to have facilitated the return of the president of Southwest to Baidoa, who had been prevented from flying through Mogadishu through normal channels. So there's already, you know, information to that regard. It's a rumor that's making the circles. And so the federal government, the federal member states are all interested in keeping Ethiopia onside. Ethiopia's posture, whether it will mediate or it will allow for this escalation, will prove more consequential than any other external variable. Ethiopia has its own interests. It's not had the best of relationships with the federal government after the MoU of 2004. It has opposed previously the formation of a parallel administration in Gedo region which is part of Jubaland. And so it's interesting for us to watch how relevant Ethiopia is becoming in Somali local politics. Turkey as well is another actor whose role has transformed even if this preceded the war a little. Turkey has engaged Al Shabaab directly in January of this year, deploying tanks and F16 jets to protect installations that it's recently acquired in Somalia. We assume that, you know, just because of the Iran war, it doesn't mean Turkey will reduce its influence or efforts. But I think it's going to remain as engaged in Somalia, but not necessarily as a political mediator of the current crisis. You of course have in Sudan similar dynamics. The Quad members are redirecting their attention to Iran. There's pressure for ceasefire. There was supposed to be a meeting in held in April in Berlin that's supposed to work on the Sudan issue. I don't know how impactful that meeting will be considering what's happening elsewhere. And so I would say there is a vacuum. It's not necessarily empty. It's filled by competing interests, more bilateral interests that are more likely to sustain the conflicts in this region, not resolve them.
- [10:38]
A
And I think following on this thread about different competing interests. So countries in the Horn are host of major foreign military bases and for example, we think Djibouti hosting a US military base. And there are rising concerns that these areas are increasingly exposed to potential retaliation strikes by Iran or its proxies. There are also concerns that Yemeni Houthis could leverage ties with groups like Al Shabaab in Somalia to further disrupt shipping in the Gulf of Aden. What are your thoughts on these concerns that are being shared about what the current situation looks like?
- [11:24]
C
Yes, I think, you know, the Horn is the immediate neighborhood. There's military bases, of course, you mentioned in Djibouti. The UAE is operating a port and airstrip facilities in Berbera and Somaliland. Turkey now has, you know, deployments in Middle Chevelle and Lower Chevelle. So this is quite interesting to see what the Houthis will do. They've explicitly designated Berbera as a legitimate military target because of its association with Israel and the Emirati operations. They did this in the context of active hostilities and also, you know, the recent recognition by Israel. So far, quite interestingly, the Houthis have not entered the war in the way many feared. Tehran seems to be holding them as a card for later escalation. Or there may be other reasons. But this threat, I think, has been reactivated, and it's actually more pronounced now. You know, traffic through the Babel Mandap is significantly disrupted. Like I mentioned earlier, there is almost no vessels going, going through the Red Sea. And so if this war expands into the corridor through this armed conflict, the Horn will no longer be this secondary impact zone, but it will be directly exposed. So on the Houthis, though, and the Al Shabaab connection, what we do know is there's a UN panel of experts, report from October 2025 that documented this intensified cooperation between them and Al Shabaab, including drone technology transfer, weapons smuggling, IED components, stuff that was brought by DAOs. The Carnegie Endowment published this detailed analysis showing this weapons flow from Yemen to Markah and Barawe in Lower Shabele. And so I don't think it will dramatically. This war will dramatically elevate the strategic importance of this pipeline or this relationship. You know, Iran's conventional supply routes are under military pressure right now, and this might become, you know, more or less likely policed. So we will not see, you know, necessarily Al Shabaab becoming an Iranian proxy. But there's a convergence of interests between the Houthis and Al Shabaab. And this might avail to Al Shabaab, you know, more sophisticated weaponry. And it could also offer the Houthis in Iran, by extension, an alternative route to, you know, project their influence. There's also this underreported dimension currently of piracy. We could see renewed Piracy campaigns in the Gulf of Aden. This could be lucrative for not just Al Shabaab, but other non state actors that operate in that area. So we do have a serious gap when it comes to maritime security and the threat that this war could pose that way.
- [13:49]
A
So, Samira, you know, given the deepening ties between Israel and Somaliland, as you earlier referenced, and we discussed this in great detail in our previous episode, with Israel recognizing Somaliland as a sovereign state, how does Tehran view Somaliland's strategic location and is it likely to become a direct target of Iran backed proxy forces? So in other words, you know, how does Israel's interest in setting up the strategic flank against Iran in Somaliland, how does it threaten to broaden the current Iran war beyond the Gulf states?
- [14:33]
C
So just for additional context, you know, after the recognition the Israeli Foreign Minister visited Hargeysa in January. There's reports right now that Israel is planning a potential military base near Berbera. This was reported most recently. And that security teams, Israeli security teams, have already surveyed the coastal terrain for this. There will be sites for intelligence gathering, drone surveillance and aircraft refueling. So this strategic logic is transparent because Somaliland sits less than 260km from the Houthi controlled territory, directly opposite on the Gulf of Aden. So Barbara is offering to Israel unparalleled vantage point over maritime approaches to Yemen. So from Tehran's perspective, this is deeply threatening. This military presence by Israel Proposed military presence creates this strategic flank against its most important Arab ally, the Houthis, and it extends this geography of war into the Horn of Africa. This is why I mentioned that the Houthis have explicitly threatened that any Israeli military presence in Somaliland will constitute a legitimate military target. So this is not just an external threat. Al Shabaab also has separately said it will oppose Israel using Somaliland territory or Somali territory, as they stated. So Berbera is caught in what we're seeing as a, you know, triple risk. The risk of Houthi strikes from the Gulf of Aden, the risk of Al Shabaab from Somali landmass, and then also the political risk of domestically within Somaliland. A lot of Somaliland clerics have opposed Israel's recognition and any possible Israel military base or security base within Somaliland. So I think there is a real tension right now in Hargeysa about this securitized Somaliland and the need for legitimacy. There's like that dual argument. They need that legitimacy and that recognition, but they also do not want the risk that comes with Israel. So I would say it does broaden the Iran War Berbera is not just Somaliland's most valuable economic assets. It also does, you know, it is a primary conduit for Ethiopian trade and it's Somaliland's main anchor when it claims economic viability. DP World has invested heavily in that port. Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding and was supposed to manage part of the port but hasn't done so. So I would say this would damage this regional trade between Somalia and Ethiopia and it would undermine its entire Somaliland's entire economic model. So it's quite a risk and I think an easy cost effective target for Iran if it were to bring in the Horn into the conflict.
- [17:02]
A
So let's move slightly from Somalia and Somaliland to Sudan. And you referenced some of this in your earlier comments. So in what way could the escalation of the Iran war affect regional dynamics and external support to the warring sides in Sudan?
- [17:23]
C
Yeah, so you know, the Sudan case is very lead and you have this active war right now intersecting with this deep historic linkages to Iran and the economic dependence, dependence on Gulf states. So the first dynamic is the economic one. Gold remains the backbone of Sudan's war economy. The revenues are increasingly opaque and deferred to sustain military financing. It's significant that Khartoum has been recalibrating away from UAE towards Egypt and Saudi Arabia. When it comes to the gold exports, the majority of the exports are now transiting via Egypt, replacing Dubai as the central hub. So this is more about political repositioning and economic adaptation by Khartoum. Agriculture is at risk. There's dependence on imported fertilisers from Qatar ahead of the 2026 planting season, which is slated for June. And so this is going to be quite risky if this extends beyond the current timelines. Humanitarian funding is already under severe pressure, not just in Sudan, but everywhere that there's a risk because there's global attention and resources shifting to the Middle east ideologically and politically. You have Burhan, the SAF side of this conflict, facing growing friction within his Islamist constituencies who are already embedded within the state and security structures. Iran has intensified external pressure on those Islamist networks. So this is deepening the fault lines for the SAF aligned circles. So there's a risk of, you know, not having that internal cohesion that they need within the south side of the war. In terms of regional maneuvering, Saudi Arabia and UAE have been on opposing sides of the Sudan war. You know that Saudis are said to be backing SAF and the uae, of course backing the rsf. This shared threat has created Pressure for partial reconciliation. We have seen that MBS and MBZ spoke on 28th of February, their first contact since the issues in Yemen and the December rupture. But whether this will translate into a coordinated Sudan policy, I think it's deeply uncertain. Their fundamental interests in Sudan remain divergent, and we do know that, you know, there's just a bit of unity around this threat from Iran. But if this is resolved or if this pauses, they would definitely return back to the original sets.
- [19:38]
A
So let me move from Sudan now and come to Ethiopia and the question on sea access. So with the choke point in the Strait of Hormuz that we've seen with the ongoing war in Iran, the Red Sea is now becoming a primary battleground. We've seen tensions around the Red Sea access for many years, but it's also becoming a primary battleground. So is Ethiopia. Ethiopia's continued push for a port, a strategic necessity for survival, are a dangerous catalyst for another regional conflict. So, in other words, how can Ethiopia navigate the economic and security spillovers of the Iran war while maintaining its strategic push for sea access?
- [20:25]
C
So I would say it's a bit of both. Ethiopia's push for sea access is now much more urgent, and it's also a potential catalyst for regional escalation if pursued recklessly in the current environment with the current realities. Economically, Ethiopia is the largest economy in the Horn. It's being hit hard. The country is dependent on imported petroleum. The central bank has already spent about $1.3 billion, about a quarter of its reserves, supporting the BIR through foreign exchange auctions. If these oil prices remain elevated, Ethiopia will be facing additional financing gaps that are estimated to be about 1.5 to $2.5 billion. So the government has been precautionary stockpiling fuel, and this already driven up domestic prices. Fertilizer shortages are already materializing. Its planting season is a bit earlier than the Sudan. But you know, the threat to the agricultural production in this country, where one failed harvest has immense humanitarian consequences. So for a country also that has quite a number of its citizens working in the Gulf, in Saudi Arabia alone, you have half a million citizens working in Saudi. The remittance channel is also going to be under strain because of this, this war and the Gulf economies contracting. So I would say Ethiopia has multiple threats coming its way and already being witnessed. So their push for this direct sea access, I would say, is not just posturing. It is bringing about this existential economic question that they keep mentioning. Being landlocked and dependent on Djibouti for 95% of their trade. But where it becomes complicated is that with Saudi Arabia and UAE now focused on Iran, Addis might feel emboldened to formalize arrangements either with Somaliland or, you know, there has been the threat of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. So it might decide to take actions now that there's not much international attention on the local dynamics. So this would be quite, you know, problematic. There's also they could decide to go back to the Somalia angle with Somaliland, especially with this current crisis that Mogadishu is maneuvering. But I think it's really up to Addis to maneuver, especially now with elections coming about for Ethiopia as well. The crisis may create, you know, practical alternatives for other landlocked states. You have even, you know, places like Uganda starting to worry about this. Uganda, Rwanda, South Sudan. So for Ethiopia, I think the leaders might have to, you know, view the current international absence as a destruction, as a window for them to make a move. But then I wonder if that will be a miscalculation because of how things change, how conflict changes quite fast in the Horn of Africa.
- [23:04]
A
You know, Samira, it's amazing how much things have changed on the ground since the last time we spoke a few weeks ago. And it's reflective of how fluid things are in the region. And so with the escalation of the war in Iran, we're also seeing a profound restructuring of Gulf Horn alliances. So in your opinion, and as you've studied this region for so many years, will the Horn of Africa ever return to a pre2026 security posture, or is it now permanently connected to the rivalries of the uae, Saudi Arabia and Iran? And what's the role of the African Union and other regional buddies here as we see things playing out in the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf at this moment?
- [24:00]
C
Yeah, I think this is a difficult question. The Horn definitely cannot return to the pre2026 security posture. The Iran war will not be a temporary disruption after the way things have been moving, but it does accelerate what transformation was already underway. Like I mentioned before, it's going to contribute to the challenges and the dynamics that were already on the ground. The Gulf states involvement in the Horn over the past decade were already reshaping our political economy. You had Saudi Emir, Qatari and Turkish investment in ports, in bases, in political patronage networks. This made the Horn already a part of this Middle east competition. But what this war is doing, it's deepening this integration and making it harder to reverse the Sudan seaports, the Red Sea ports are Contested already between Saudi, Qatar and Turkish interests. Berbera is now caught between Israeli, Emirati, Ethiopian ambitions. The Djibouti entire revenue model is under pressure because of this shipping route changes that are currently ongoing. So this will not be, I don't think, temporary dislocations. They are just rewiring how this region will function economically and strategically. But about the AU and igad, to be frank, both institutions are struggling to respond to the current moment. I was just speaking to a mentor of mine previously over the past week, and he was telling me that in the past, a decade ago, IGAD would have convened a summit at the highest level to discuss this and to respond to this crisis. But you've not seen that happening. The AU is also not issuing a coherent regional response. The AU mission in Somalia is underfunded, very insecure. As I mentioned, the UN envoy has just left. So we are seeing, I think, most of these multilateral institutions not responding as they should at a time where it is very important that they do so. There is a vacuum, a huge vacuum at this moment from all these institutions. And I would say it reflects a deeper problem. They were designed for a world in which these conflicts in Africa were internal and the international community was just providing diplomatic and financial support. But what we are seeing is this model is no longer the case. The Iran war is coming from afield and impacting the Horn crisis in a way that is making it much more combustible. There's global power competition in the Horn of Africa. Institutions that initially lacked resources and leveraged are now being sidelined even more because no one's interested in them functioning as they should. So I think this is a challenge to the region and leaders in the region to stop treating these conflicts as distant events or uncoordinated events, but to start to think about them in a more holistic way so that it could find a resolution not just for the country that's under attack or that's most affected at the time, but for the entire Horn of Africa.
- [26:47]
A
I think, as you've rightfully said, some of the impact of the war in Iran on the Horn of Africa, some of the impact of the war will not be reversible. And so in your opinion, and just given the work that you've done and the work that you're currently doing in the region, where are the opportunities for moving forward? What are your thoughts on more forward looking thoughts on opportunities for the AU or the individual states in the region? Are there opportunities for them to seize this moment, see some bright light? I don't like seeing bright lights in thinking about conflict situations from a positive lens. But are there any opportunities here at all?
- [27:30]
C
I think opportunities exist, but it really is dependent on the leaders that we have, the leaders of these multilateral institutions or regional institutions and the leaders of the countries of the Horn to sort of come together at this time and not pull apart or focus on internal issues. You know, the west might be busy, but we have other partners that might be quick to step in. But while those actors would want to step in, could we make sure that the regional architecture is not captured by those actors that do not have values that align with the Horn of Africa, with the entire Horn, not individual countries? So I would say there is opportunities in how to respond, but it's really dependent on the leadership and the Horn of Africa. These are not new conflicts. These are conflicts that existed. And so it's for the leaders to pull back from the easy approach, which is to protect internal issues or to protect specific leadership, but to think about in a holistic way to worry about the entire region and the economic fragility of the region in that sense. So I would say we would want them not to miscalculate just because there's some distraction. But there's a window that is open right now and they should work towards finding solutions for the entire Horn.
- [28:42]
A
Thank you so much, Sameera. This is definitely a fast moving and quickly changing situation and we will continue tracking the situation as things evolve over there. But thank you so much for sharing your thoughts with us today on this topic.
- [28:58]
C
Thank you. It's really my pleasure to be here again. Thank you so much.
- [29:05]
A
Thanks for listening to Into Africa.
- [29:07]
B
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- [29:10]
A
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