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Into Africa
The new Alliance of Sahel States and the future of Africa’s legacy institutions
00:48:46
Catherine Nzuki is joined by Beverly Ochieng, Senior Analyst for Francophone Africa at Control Risks, and a Senior Associate with the CSIS Africa Program, to unpack the forming of the Alliance of Sahel States and more.
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- [00:02]
Katherine Nzuki
By 2050, one in four people in the world will be African. The choices that we make now across Africa will shape the world's collective future. These are the stories, the trends and the issues we face in the present that will define the coming decades. Welcome to the Afropolitan. I'm your host, Katherine Nzuki. Three West African countries, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, have finalized their exit from the Economic Community of West African States, or ecowas. Another thing that they have in common. All three countries are under military rule after coups that took place in recent years. On today's episode, we're examining why these countries have exited their regional bloc and whether this marks a crisis point for the region. To answer these questions, I'm joined by Beverly Ochiang, a security analyst specializing in the Sahel and global power competition in Africa. She is also a senior associate with the CSIS Africa Program. Bev, welcome.
- [01:14]
Beverly Ochiang
Thank you so much, Catherine.
- [01:16]
Katherine Nzuki
It's so cool to have you here to start off. Bev. Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso have chosen to exit ecowas. But before we get to why they have left, could you just give us an overview of the state of politics in these three countries?
- [01:30]
Beverly Ochiang
I mean, as you pointed out, they are all countries that are under military rule. And military coups started off in Mali in 2020, and then there were two in Burkina Faso in 2022, and then there was the final one in Niger in July 2023. And these military governments removed elected civilian leaders partly because they were facing unprecedented security crisis. Militants from Islamic State and Al Qaeda are operating in this region. And even just in extending their influence beyond the three countries, but also because of a widespread sentiment and protest about alleged poor governance by the civilian governments. There had been an election in Mali in 2020, legislative election, which was contested. The opposition leader was even abducted by militants. And then in Burkina Faso, there had been a presidential election. And this did not take place in parts of the east and the north because of the insurgency in Niger, even though it was doing much better in terms of managing militancy, there were concerns about corruption within the government, favoritism, as well as a mismanagement of the insurgency. So they're not about to relinquish power in the next year or two. In fact, just as we're talking, Niger decided to extend military rule by at least five years. Mali, they've extended to about 2027. And in Burkina Faso until 2029, they have been very opaque about plans to hold elections that would allow civilians to come back to power. And critics tend to face Repression. So in Mali, various activists who had actually mobilized against the civilian government which led to the coup have either been detained or arrested or forced into exile. In Burkina Faso, there's been reports of people being forcefully conscripted because of criticizing the government, the transitional government's management of the militancy. And in Niger, many allies of the former president Mohammed Bazoum have either been detained or forced into exile because they cannot speak up against the military rulers. There are some efforts towards inclusivity, but in most instances it tends to be people who favor those military governments. So even those national consultations where they talk about extending military rule, most of the people taking part are activists, movements, politicians who are aligned with the military rulers. So the possibility of having a more robust political process is almost non existent, at least in the coming years for these three countries.
- [03:53]
Katherine Nzuki
You know, this tight grip with which these military leaders are ruling with stands in really sharp contrast to the strong wave of support that they have received. There has been particularly strong support for Ibrahim Traore of Burkina Faso, who is currently the youngest leader in the world. And you know, all three leaders have branded themselves as anti colonial Pan African leaders, you know, casting themselves as throwing off the neocolonial west and charting a new path home. Given all these things, given how unaccommodating these rulers are to criticism and the tight grip with which they're running their countries, are they actually popular in their countries and is this anti colonial rhetoric reflected in their actual governance, the sort of day to day runnings of these countries?
- [04:42]
Beverly Ochiang
I mean, I will say when the coups took place, they were met with a lot of euphoria because people were already disgruntled with the civilian governments, which was seen to be too western leaning, too dependent on the west, especially for security support. France had been one of the biggest players in the region. They had deployed troops as far back as 2013. They were initially successful against militants. Then later on the insurgency continued to spread. By 2015 it was in Burkina Faso and in Niger, and then by 2019 it was in countries like Benin and Togo and northern Cote d'. Ivoire. And so when these militaries took power, they were already in the front line and they were facing the worst of the insurgency, which they used to justify taking power. And they received support because there's a way the militancy, it's not distant for people. These are their brothers, sisters who are being sent to the front line. And so the military intervening feels like a reset of that process. One of the first things these military governments have done is security reforms, and this is all in name. So initially, it was calling for French and other Western forces to leave on the back of protests that had been taking place against the presence of French and Western forces. And that way they gained resonance with the public and people felt that they were representing their ideals. The nationalist policies have now moved to the economic sector, and for them, the mining industry is the biggest. So Niger Uranium, Bukhilafaso, Mali with gold, and now lithium with Mali. And because they were able to now get rid of the Western security apparatus, they have now moved to put policies that would allow them to extract more from the natural resources and put pressure on predominantly Western operators. This has also gained some public resonance because the feeling is we are doing this for ourselves, to be able to build our economies, to be able to build our infrastructure, to be able to fund our militaries. And that's what allowed them to have a sense of popularity. But at the same time, the voices of discontent or of criticism are sidelined, or they are forced to have to leave or they're not given room. So it's often very difficult to be able to get a different perspective, aside from widespread support. When you see the protests taking place, for instance, against Ecowas, when they were imposing sanctions against Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, it felt as if it was very national. It was taking place in different parts of those countries. So there was a feeling that these militaries are legitimized by these protests. But the fact that they've not been able to hold elections yet, I mean, Mali had a constitutional referendum, but so far, nothing beyond that. But their lack of commitment towards democratic reforms in particular, or institutional reforms that are not just bending on nationalist principles is part of the underlying reason for the fragility of their leadership, despite what feels like widespread support.
- [07:29]
Katherine Nzuki
Yeah, and I want to pull on that thread of ECOWAS and the protests against it. Why have Mali, Niger and Bukina Faso made the move to exit Ecowas?
- [07:39]
Beverly Ochiang
So when the military coup took place initially in Mali in 2020, ECOWAS, of course, the first action was to suspend it. And then when another coup within a coup took place in 2021, because, yes, the Mali military ruler was unhappy that the transitional government had sidelined some of his allies in the new cabinet. And so his choice was to remove them. They imposed very heavy economic sanctions. There was a trade embargo, the borders were closed. And the line that kept running up until the point where the Niger coup happened were, these are inhumane, illegal sanctions. It felt like that was the Point where the acrimony really built up. Now, the coups in Burkina Faso and Niger may not have necessarily been inspired or influenced by Mali, because these are countries that were already with militaries predisposed towards intervention. And so they had their own military coups. And they sort of aligned themselves towards this idea that ECOWAS is to blame. Because before the coups happened, there had been protests against governments, there had been a feeling of marginalization, there had been electoral processes that were called into question. And ECOWAS's big role has always been beyond just economic integration, but ensuring that governments and individuals who are in charge obey the rule of law, that they obey the charter, which promotes democracy and promotes proper governance. So there was a perception of a failure of ECOWAS to meet its own charter. And so when ECOWAS took this action against the military rulers and eventually Niger, they wanted to militarily intervene against the military coup. They gave the junta a seven day deadline to return Bazoum into power. They refused. And they started now to activate a force that would then intervene in Niger. There was a lot of opposition within the ECOWAS countries. In Nigeria, for instance, where the northern region, they have a lot of filial connections with Niger. In Cote d', Ivoire, there was some disquiet about that because relations were already quite poor with Mali and Burkina Faso. In Benin as well, in Togo, there wasn't unity around that intervention. But because ECOWAS had become the enemy for the military rulers, they opted to form what they were then calling the alliance of Sahel States. It was meant to be a military force to counter an ECOWAS intervention, but also to protect the military rulers from any form of what they termed interference by external actors, including ecowas, France and other Western partners who were seen to be supporting ECOWAS's stance on sanctions and military intervention.
- [10:12]
Katherine Nzuki
Yeah, and I just really want to underline why this is a important moment. So could you just tell us a little bit about why ECOWAS is actually a really important regional organization? And is the exit of these three countries a crisis moment for ECOWAS and the region, you know, writ large? I would imagine, for example, that it's harder to coordinate a security response to violent extremism in the Sahel without these three states?
- [10:38]
Beverly Ochiang
I mean, definitely. So ECOWAS has, since it was formed in the 70s, been the stabilizer of West Africa. It had about 11 member states. Mauritania had been a member before they left over differences about sort of streamlining the monetary. But it has over the years been the stabilizer of West Africa. If you Think about the civil war in Sierra Leone or in Liberia, or even some of the crisis in Guinea Bissau. Ecowas, through its political intervention, as well as sometimes military intervention, has been able to stop the region from essentially fracturing. But the ECOWAS today is a very different Ecowas from the Ecowas I hear about in the 90s, for instance, where they were almost a very hegemonic power and their center was obviously still is Niger. Over the years, Nigeria has been challenged by internal issues, security issues being the primary ones. There's various insurgencies across the country and even politically in terms of representation. When Tinubu, the current Nigerian president, came to power, his rhetoric was that coups have no place in ecowas. But at the time he was speaking, it felt like it was too late. You know, Mali happened, everyone kind of saw it was coming in 2020, then Burkina Faso happened twice, and then everyone really didn't see that. Niger was also at a risk of a similar intervention, given its history as well, despite the fact that Bazoum himself had been perceived as the stabilizer for the Sahel with the Western contingents going there. So ECOWAS has promoted regional integration largely through the economy and through economic cooperation, whereby you can move across the region, you can trade across the region, you can work across the region quite freely. Of course there are some handicaps here and there, but at the same time, it's also been the political voice of reason when it comes to intra regional conflict as well as internal political crisis. But at this point, with the Sahel deciding to leave, it's beyond a crisis point for ecowas. It feels as if it's a complete failure of all the steps that could have been taken much earlier to stop a situation whereby a group of countries decide to chart their own path and do not really have any institution to hold them to account for their actions. That sense of accountability is probably the biggest loss for the regional institution. Of course, for the Sahel countries, they still have another bigger regional bloc that they're part of, the West African Monetary Union, which is largely Francophone, and these are three francophone countries. So they can still bank on that for economic stability. But in terms of political legitimacy and in terms of even having more diplomatic standing, it might be fraught. Even though the exit was soft because given the kinds of statements that had been flying around since 2020 between, say, Mali and Ecowas, then eventually the Sahel and Ecowas, it felt as if we were building towards an acrimonious exit whereby they may forcefully close borders, whereby they might mobilise military forces to face each other off. But the choice to keep the borders open and the choice to still have dialogue, even if the Sahel military rulers have rejected an extension of their exit, means that there could still be a sort of peaceful coexistence. But I suppose for ecowas, taking those as points for when is the point where you do raise an issue? One thing going back to the issue around militancy and the terrorism crisis, one of the criticisms that Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger raised when they formed the AES is that ECOWAS was putting in all the effort to mobilize a counter coup force, but they have spent years not putting together a counter terror force. They had been waiting for Western intervention, for France's intervention. Yet this is an insurgency that is now affecting member states, and it's going to continue affecting member states for years to come. ECOWA seems to be softening. They have said that they want to put resources towards a counterterror force, but whether they will have the coordination of the Sahel, especially with the tensions between not just them and the Sahel as a bloc, but say, Niger and Benin, the border has been closed for now nearly two years. Mali, Cote d', Ivoire, Burkina Faso are at odds with each other, which means it undermines cooperation which would then stabilize even just that tri border region between them. It makes it quite difficult to engage the Sahel in military intervention in the long run, given the kind of fractures we've seen over the years.
- [14:58]
Katherine Nzuki
Yeah. Is there a sense of regret amongst ECOWAS members for the approach that was taken, which was to impose sanctions to threaten military intervention in the case of Niger? Because I imagine it's a particularly difficult situation where on one hand, ECOAS has this legacy of being a stabilizing force in the region, and to accept one coup is to essentially de facto legitimize all of them. Right. But I do wonder if there's some introspection happening now amongst member states as to whether they did the right thing.
- [15:29]
Beverly Ochiang
Yeah, I think so. Because of the sort of recalibration on how to deal with the Sahel. The sanctions have to be there because they are part of the process for responding to what they would term undemocratic takeover of power or unconstitutional change of power, because that is part of the ECOWAS charter. There are guidelines on how to deal with that. I think what ECOWAS might lack is guidelines on how to deal with the things that then predispose these countries to military coups. So outside the Sahel, you have guinea, which is now in its Fourth year of military rule. And it felt like a bit of an anomaly, but obviously does have its own history of instability. And it came much, much later because guinea had a wave of protests from 2019. Alpha Conde, the then president, wanted to change the constitution to allow himself to run for a fourth term. And there had been, you know, this group, the fndc, that had formed itself to defend the constitution. And then there had been issues around the arrests, the detentions of activists, the fact that ecowa's statements felt very detached from what was really happening. They would say things like, we're hoping for an amicable solution. People were dying in protests. There was a feeling that they should have intervened a bit more, mediated more, or called out the president explicitly around the actions to do with security forces, which to some extent ECO as heads of states have to protect each other. But also there's the bit where you may have to call people to account, which is a very difficult line to straddle. Now that happened. The constitution was changed. Alpha Conde was reelected. A coup happened much later on. It felt like ECOWAS was caught off guard, but I think anyone watching would have seen that that was coming. And that was in between Mali itself, because Mali had had its coup in May, and so Ekwah was still trying to deal with that. And then something else happens in September that year and they're not sure. And then in January, you have another coup in Burkina Faso. So it felt like they were scrambling over that period. On what kind of response? At some point, I felt like the statements were just a copy paste of let's change the country and condemn the military takeover.
- [17:30]
Katherine Nzuki
You know, X country.
- [17:32]
Beverly Ochiang
Yes. Like any other country, Guinea Bissau, for instance, is currently in a constitutional crisis. And it's one of those countries that it's hard to keep up with the number of military coups attempted and successful that have happened. But it is a scenario that is likely and the president has delayed the election fairly significantly. This has happened before in 2019 when Vaj was in power. And despite that, I mean, ECOWAS did have a force in the country when there was an attempted coup in, I think, February 2023. But it feels as if some of the mechanisms towards addressing political grievances and calling out political issues and socioeconomic grievances that are likely to turn into these unconstitutional changes of power are not sufficient. So sometimes it feels like a bit of a leader's club. On the other hand, the introspection has come from the fact that the Sahel has not backed down on its decision to Leave, and there's no way to hold them accountable. It makes it hard to hold, say, guinea accountable for its extended transition. Because what if they join the AES? Then what?
- [18:33]
Katherine Nzuki
Right, right.
- [18:34]
Beverly Ochiang
And even for countries that still have democratic leaders concerns, like in Benin, where no one can talk about the presidential election that's coming up, or in Togo, where the presidential system was changed to extend the president's stay in power and he's the negotiator for ecowas. It puts them in a very difficult place in terms of calling people to account, but they are reflecting on this. The fact that they want to have a counter terror force, even if it feels too late, is a recognition that this insurgency will affect them. The fact that they are still opening doors to the Sahel despite the years of acrimony is a demonstration that sometimes being tough is not always the best way to deal with a crisis.
- [19:14]
Katherine Nzuki
You know, I want to zoom back into those three countries, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, that formed this alliance of Sahel states. How's the AES coming along? Right. Like, is it an organization that is adequately funded and is it robust enough to tackle the collective security crisis in this region? Because correct me if I'm wrong, this seems like a really big detour from the regional politics of the 21st century. It's quite rare, right, to have a bloc leaving an organization like ECOWAS forming their own splinter organization and then actually trying to recruit other states. Right. They were trying to get Chadden, for example. Right, right. And so, you know, the AES feels like a organization that, if successful, perhaps is actually a model for countries that aren't that happy in their regional blocs. But you know, back to the original question, like, how is it shaping up as an organization?
- [20:08]
Beverly Ochiang
I mean, it started off obviously as a sort of counter, like a military force that would counter ECOWAS if they militarily intervene. And then they coalesced around protecting each other from being held accountable by ecowas. So politically aligned, they are military rulers. They have had transitions that have been extended over a period of time, which sort of allows them to sort of run the show for at least the next five to six years. But then they've also started having these very serious concrete steps towards becoming a fully fledged regional alliance. Some things feel very symbolic, but for the most part, they're the sorts of things that build institutions and build credibility. So they launched a passport, for instance, which would allow you to, if you're a citizen of Mali Niger, you get your biometric passport, which is with an, a symbol of, I think an Acacia tree and there's like the sunset. And the flag which was launched has a similar sort of insignia. It's green, which feels hopeful considering. Right. And then you have the tree as well, and you have the Confederation of the Alliance Sahel States. They have joint news bulletins. So every day, if you watch state TV on Mali Niger, they have a segment specifically for news about the AES.
- [21:21]
Katherine Nzuki
Really.
- [21:21]
Beverly Ochiang
It could be about military operations, it could be about, you know, like launching a clinic. It could be about ministerial meetings, but it's about this shared identity. And when they were forming, there were protests, of course, in support of this formation. The flags of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are seen flying in the three countries in very prominent areas within the capitals. And part of it is also posturing towards this identity. There was a festival in central Mali at the start of February where the culture ministers from the three countries were really promoting this idea of they have individual identities, of course, but they're bringing them together to celebrate this union of togetherness in an area that has always faced a lot of militant violence because the Al Qaeda group is active. It was, you know, within a 20 kilometer range. There have been attacks there by the militant group. But it's a brave face to demonstrate that despite the insurgency, we are still celebrating our art, our culture, our identity. They're planning to form a sort of regional force. It feels almost like an inheritor or a successor of what used to be the G5 SAH. Hell, so it'll be a 5,000 strong force, troops from Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. They've already been doing joint military exercises. They're not as effective, but it is a step for them because they also realize they have to take responsibility, having now pushed out some of their former allies. And they have to demonstrate that. I mean, everyone has been seeing the AES as a sort of Russian front destabilizer of the region. But ultimately it is also about these governments showing that they are proactive about this identity. They've had lots of joint ministerial meetings. They plan to form an investment bank, possibly will be funded by some of their more eager partners. It could be China, it could be Russia, it could be Turkey. So there are all of these steps they're making to demonstrate that we are an effective alliance. You've had ecowas all these years and they have their own breakdowns and, you know, some level of degeneration, but we have all of these things and you can come and do business with us. Of course, instability is a big thing. When there was the most credible report of A coup attempt in Burkina Faso in June 2024. Mali sent in special forces to intervene. And I think sometimes when I think about that incident, I think a lot about how the AES is sometimes really heavily pinned on these three men, Chiani, Goita and Taore. And should something happen to one of them, I wonder what the unity of the AES actually will be. Whether they will have to keep on intervening whenever there's some form of instability, whether if, let's say, there was another military coup in Niger, they'd be happy to just carry on with whoever comes into power. That's the bit that sometimes feels like a blind spot, but they are really forging forward with this one identity.
- [24:11]
Katherine Nzuki
I really want to hone in on that tension that you're describing between the stated politics of these leaders as Pan African sort of visionary leaders and the lived reality of these being military hunters. Right. And that tension is visible, for example, with the formation of the AES, which, you know, initially was an effort for them to retain power and sort of form this mini NATO style collective where each one is invaded, all response. Right, right. And now it's broadening into this organization that is generating legitimacy using culture arts and so on, even when it comes to the notion of decolonization. Right. They deploy a lot of rhetoric like, we are these decolonial leaders, we are shaking off the west, and ECOWAS is a puppet of the West. But I really struggle with that tension because I'm not entirely sure how the decolonial rhetoric has materially improved lives in that region. Like, I don't know what you think about that.
- [25:11]
Beverly Ochiang
Yeah, no, that really makes sense because I suppose we're very used to getting sad portraits from the Sahel of people who have been deeply affected by the insurgencies, the lost loved ones or lost livelihoods entirely, or lost their homes, people who have been displaced, forced to flee, people who are also living in fear because you're either caught between militant groups who will likely exploit you, kill you, or you are caught with an army which is often accused of rights abuses. And this is the representation of the state that you know. And for the most part, there are certain campaigns that are made to seem as if things are okay. So in Burkina Faso, for instance, there's been this big campaign around agriculture and food production and empowering people by enabling them to grow their food. So Chaure was handing out tractors to people, for instance. So there's the way the government sort of deploys tractors to rural areas so people are able to till their farms. And so on and it helps with just ensuring that there's collective food security. There's other efforts which feel sometimes more destabilizing than stabilizing. And I think about the various militia groups that operate in Burkina Faso. They're called the volunteers that defense the fatherland. They existed even before these military rulers came to power and even civilian governments sort of co opted them within the security apparatus. They are built on patriotism. You are fighting for your fatherland. You are fighting for your life. You are fighting for your people. In Mali, you have the Dogon militia who have been linked to the military rulers in Niger. They were less open about it, but there are some pro government militias within the Tillaberi region and those are seen as efforts towards protecting the country, towards making it more secure, even though in many instances it does lead to more unrest and more deaths. In Mali, again with this whole campaign around the mining sector. Recently they opened what is now the biggest lithium mine in West Africa. And Goita was present, of course, the inauguration. And he talked about how they are getting Malians to be trained to be able to do mechanical operations because they want to get to a point. And it's something that the mining minister has said. We want our gold to shine for us. We want our minerals to shine for us. For us. That gains resonance in Burkina Faso when the military ruler was threatening to withdraw mining permits because they're not receiving support for the insurgency. That also gained resonance because people feel that these resources should benefit them. People will still appeal for government support when they are in distress, which sometimes demonstrates just how much trust they still have in the government. Partly out of choicelessness, but also because that is the only thing that will defend you. When the French have gone, when the UN has gone, when all of the Western forces that were helping your armies are gone, you have your government. There's a sense of resilience, I suppose, also from that, the fact that people will still take part in nationalist campaigns and rhetoric, but also there are groups that are disenfranchised. There are armed movements in Mali that have taken up arms again and are calling for the independence of the north. So we're back to 2012, only worse. In Niger, in the Agadez region, there are armed groups that are targeting the oil pipeline. So it's also seen somewhat sabotaging what should be the economic, you know, framework for this government to actually grow. In Burkina Faso, less so. But of course there's the concern that if you have a very powerful parallel military force, you do have the risk of civil war. So it's a very mixed bag of what the outlook would be for these countries. But I suppose ultimately the military rulers have to sometimes demonstrate that it is worth it. This is for you, even though, for the most part, it doesn't always look that way.
- [28:49]
Katherine Nzuki
Yeah. Oh, gosh. And to complexify this even further, you know, at the Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso level, we have a lot of instability driven by violent extremism, the instability that is brought about by a military coup. Right. And this, you know, so you have that layer, and then you have the West African region that is fracturing in some sense, and that now you have, you know, splinter organizations and so on. That's the second layer of instability. But then the third layer is sort of global politics writ large. Back to your earlier point about all of these foreign players in the region. Russia, right through Wagner, now known as AFC Corps, has been training militaries in this region, but also acting as sort of a regime protection force. Right? So you have Russia, which is continuously growing its presence in the region. And then now, with the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, Russia is looking to relocate its military assets to Libya, which borders Niger. So you have one sort of player there, France has essentially been kicked out of the region. And for all of the complaints about Pansafrique, and there are many, a lot very legitimate, this is a foreign power that have left with their resources. And then you have the US which is very quickly withdrawing from Africa, essentially with the end of USAID and NBC reporting this week that President Trump is considering dismantling the US Africa Command, which again, has been kicked out of, or is not present really, in Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso. But they were a pretty important intelligence partner. And then again, there are a lot of critiques, many of them valid, about, you know, US Presence there. But there's a lot going on in the international system right now. And it feels like we're in a moment where the quote, unquote, liberal international order, or at least the pretense of it, is leaving as naked transactionalism is becoming the modus operandi. And to sum this all together, in this moment of multiple layers of instability, it seems to me that this is a moment that would require solidarity and strength in numbers, like regional bodies, like a strong ecowas that could not only collectively act to address insecurity in the Sahel, but also act as, like a barrier or a bulwark against predatory behavior from foreign states. And so I wonder if these three countries that have removed themselves from ecowas, are they in a weaker position? To engage with the international system writ large. Right. Is the fact that they are isolated in some sense, making it harder for them to form a stronger contingency, to negotiate. Right. To, like, engage in the system that is becoming increasingly transactional? Because we're seeing right now, the worst case scenario right now is Sudan, where you have quite a number of foreign players in the region. And in the case of, let's say, the Afgha corps in Sudan, there's this sort of gold for protection play. Right. So that's like the worst example of this transactionalism. Right. So it's a lot to throw at you. But as somebody who studies the space, what do you think about the alliance of Sahel States as an entity in this global shifts that are happening?
- [32:04]
Beverly Ochiang
I mean, it's funny because I suppose it's because of those global shifts that that is happening. If you think about even just some of the now rhetoric, you know, someone like the U.S. president saying he can take this territory or that territory, the current insurgency in eastern Dr. Congo as a result of Rwanda, the fact that ECOWAS could split in the way it has, and that one side is seen as a Russian sort of, you know, like a miniature Russia, and then you have one side that is seen as the West. It's kind of the result of that to some extent, the world turned away from some of the crisis taking place. And so everyone is allowed to do whatever wanted. The coup in Raleigh happened when Trump was in power for his first term. Covid was also happening. There was so many things putting pressure there and the military intervened and already there was a weak global system to even call it out and a weaker echo us to really call it out.
- [32:58]
Katherine Nzuki
Right.
- [32:58]
Beverly Ochiang
And I feel like they took advantage of that space over the years, especially to now consolidate this alliance, which, yes, as a result of internal crisis, is very fragile and will need a lot of support beyond just its usual allies to become fully fledged. I think ECOWAS could still play a role, even if it feels transactional, in being able to ensure that there's open doors, there's still economic support, and there's still collaboration and coordination between them rather than acrimony. The African Union itself, because thinking back to the summit that just took place against all of this, the global backdrop with Ukraine, with Gaza, with the US and usaid, and not really having a consolidated statement on what their plan will be for the next year. Not that it's not expected. I mean, I was disappointed, but I suppose I didn't really expect much for them to say we are seeing These global shifts. And we feel that we may need to now reflect on, do we now promote the Africa Free Trade Agreement? How do we improve cohesion? How do we improve interregional trade if AGOA is gone? What do we do in terms of our own interactions with either the EU, we have South Africa in the G20. How do we leverage that? There was nothing of that sort. It was still, we're going to set up a credit union because we're not happy with how the west rates our credit. And I was like, wow, that's very profound. So all of this is happening against that. The Sahel will still need support and whether that support is towards, you know, altruistic. Are Russia's intentions altruistic? It's very hard to tell. The changeover from Wagner to Africa Corps has sort of led to a slight shift with how Russia wants to engage. They don't really want to be, from what I can tell, as aggressive as the Wagner group was, you know, sort of banding themselves on social media as lifesavers and, you know, African Sahara adventures. No, the Africa Corps wants to train the militaries. Whether that would be effective is another question altogether because they also don't have the kind of resources that the US and France used to have, which was underutilized ultimately, because some of the disgruntlement within the militaries in the Sahel is they were being asked to train with sticks, you know, that these militaries were not going out to the front line with them in the way that they should have. And so the insurgency got worse under their watch. So they're trying to take control because these are their countries, they're their territories. They can get weapons now more directly from China, from Turkey, from the Russia in the way that they were not quite getting from the U.S. of course there's the caveats around human rights and so on, but they are trying to make sure that that aggressively is working for them. They flaunt drones every so often that they've received for air support, which is what they need to be able to observe and have intelligence around militant movements, which is where they had been for a long time, handicapped. It may not stabilize in the next two or three years. It will take a lot of work and a lot of support and a lot of self reflection from probably African institutions. At what point do they recognize the AES and give them the support they need to now become fully fledged institutions and perhaps through that encourage a democratic process. But for you to criticize, I suppose, the lack of democracy against all of this crisis, I suppose for the Sahel military rulers feels very misplaced and they've been able to exploit that to a point where now they've splintered and they can call for their own independence. So imagine who else will be able to call for their own independence because they're not happy with how their regional bloc is trying to hold them to account. That's the, probably the worrying precedent. And even just, you know, this is off topic, but even looking at what the DRC is doing, they came to eac, the East African Community because they were probably not happy with how the Economic Community of Central African States was not really addressing the insurgency or the Southern African Development Community. So you can also just go and pick and choose whichever regional bloc you want to join. But at some point there's a breakdown. Sudan left igad, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development because they were unhappy with comments they made about the war. Now that's the sort of thing we're seeing that's becoming a lot more commonplace rather than institutions as a semblance of stability and accountability.
- [37:15]
Katherine Nzuki
Effy, let's just play that scenario out. Right, so you've got the AES, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, who've sort of left on their own. I am sorry, so fascinated by your thinking about this. That the AES is a response to a fracturing and a global order that has not paid attention to the crisis that's happening in this region for over a decade. Now you've got Sudan, rightly, as you said, leaving IGAD and then the DRC joining the EAC. The Rwandan backed M23 has taken over Goma and huge chunks of the North Kivu region. So yeah, just playing this scenario out. What happens in an Africa that is splintered institutionally, right, that doesn't really have these hegemonic regional powers. So when I think of hegemons, I think of, you know, sadc. They're sort of underpinned by South Africa. Well, Ecowas was sort of, you know, pinned down by Nigeria and so on. Eac, again contentious. But Kenya is a strong like economic entity in the region. So what happens like if we play the scenario out, what does that look like for a continent to have smaller and smaller and smaller and I mean hopefully not isolated but certainly smaller entities. As time goes on, I suppose it.
- [38:31]
Beverly Ochiang
Becomes much harder to even address intra regional issues. So Dr. Congo is a result of two very large regional blocs by either market share or influence not being able to address a conflict that has gone on for years. Of course, you know, beyond them, the Sahel is a result of ECOWAS not quite knowing what steps to take, at what point to be able to either call out or recalibrate their engagement with the Sahel. And then it just means that any other issues or tensions that arise even between different parties. So I think a lot about Niger and Benin. No one, not even China, has been able to resolve that, despite the fact that China is the biggest stakeholder in the crude oil sector. It makes it very hard. It sometimes just sort of freezes a conflict for some time. Even if there's no full blown war. The repercussions are you have no way of coordinating, say, security operations. You have no way of cooperating economically. You undermine the charters around integration, good neighborliness, even just international relations in and of themselves beyond what these institutions represent. And I suppose it just means that these institutions just become a name. You know, there's been a lot of reflection, for instance, about the African Union, given that now they've had the transition of leadership and whether the last few years in particular, because all of these have happened between say 2019, up until now, that's been a huge institutional failure on the African Union as a way of then reflecting how it is that it trickles down to other regional institutions and also goes back to the structure of the AU itself, whereby I'd like to say the European Union, where the European Union leader can call out explicitly and do the au, doesn't quite work that way. There's a lot of politeness around how you interact with the different countries. You know, Chad is not a coup, but Mali's a coup. Gabon is sort of a coup, but Burkina Faso is a coup. You know, there's all those double standards. Of course there are different internal issues that would drive why you would categorize this and that like that. But I suppose the fact that it's hard enough to hold these institutions accountable based on their own charters and credentials.
- [40:38]
Katherine Nzuki
Right?
- [40:39]
Beverly Ochiang
Which then means if you're not able to do that, then what really is the point of all of this integration? You can choose charter, own, you can decide to leave a block because you've been sanctioned. You can decide to no longer take part in meetings, you can decide to close your border with your neighbor for a prolonged period of time. I don't know if this has been a thing that has happened before. I'm really not sure in terms of history.
- [41:00]
Katherine Nzuki
I was actually going to use that as my next question, which is, you know, I think about the decision that was made in the mid-1990s to reform what was previously the Organization of African Unity into the African Union. And part of the drivers of that were the failures, the deep failures of the OAU to actually respond to crises on the continent. The Rwandan genocide is just one example, right, that this approach of non intervention, which was very well intentioned in the post colonial period, led to things like the Rwandan genocide, led to a lot of massacres, led to repeat coups and so on. And the organization looked at itself and said, we have failed our mandate to be this institution that can fight for the rights of everyday people, that can rally together African nations and form this united. It failed, right? They sat down, they said, fine, we're going to become the African Union. And so I wonder if this story of, you know, splintering institutions is really an indictment of the institutions themselves, like the African Union, because I think a lot about not only these coups, right, but I actually think a lot about NSARS, the NSARS protests in 2020. And we were all, you know, online, people were learning how to use Bitcoin to send money to the people protesting. And it was anti, you know, police brutality protests, but just asking for more accountability. And I remember people were just tweeting at the African Union, right? They were like the African Union chairman, the left Moussa Faqi, saying, please, like this organization that could stand for the well being of Africans. And actually the second, which kind of made me sad, the second person that was being tweeted at the most was Beyonce, which doesn't that make you so sad, right? She had just released this Lion King.
- [42:43]
Beverly Ochiang
Album, remember a lot of African artists as well.
- [42:47]
Katherine Nzuki
And people are like, well, Beyonce, you should say something which I mean for me breaks my heart, right? That this one woman, I mean, don't even get me started, but, but I wonder if this is a story of the failures of organizations like the African Union to actually live up to what they were supposed to be. I wonder if these fractures are an indictment of these organizations to respond to crises on the continent. Because as you rightly pointed out, it seemed like ecowas had a more robust response to coups than they did to, you know, years of violent extremism. So I'm curious what you think.
- [43:19]
Beverly Ochiang
I suppose it's also the set of circumstances, because it could be a generational thing whereby younger people, I suppose we've grown with a lot more democracy, openness, accountability to some extent. You know, things are open. You can open the Internet and find almost anything and you expect that standard from big institutions. You will call them out and you will tweet them and you will, you know, even pick out quotes from their charter and say, this says this. You cannot. I think in Togo, there was a thing about changing the electoral law or the constitution within months of the election, and that was, you know, circulating a bit. How can you allow an electoral process to take place? As Ecowas, you have this clause that says you cannot change a significant law within XYZ months of the election. But this is happening, and the slowness of response, which goes back to bureaucracy and just how institutions and respectability. The average age of ECOWAS leaders, I can't know off the top of my head, but I suppose the Senegalese president is the youngest, and then you have everyone else who's slightly older and established. And, you know, you go through a longer process before you respond to something. You're worried about stepping on someone's toes. When you join regional institutions, there is a level of sovereignty you're giving up. You sign a charter because you will all behave according to what this charter says. And younger people want things to be addressed as soon as they emerge. You're changing the constitution. How can you do that? We are against it. We are protesting against it. Let's have some discourse. Let's have a meaningful mediation process. When I go back to Mali in 2019, 2020, one of the things that came up from the protest movement was ECOWAS did not understand the aspirations of Malians.
- [45:00]
Katherine Nzuki
Right?
- [45:01]
Beverly Ochiang
That's a very strong indictment in the sense that it seemed as if they had no credibility to be driving the mediation process. They did not understand that people were unhappy with the civilian leader then, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. Same thing in guinea, and to some extent the same thing in the other two countries. And these military rulers are of that age. You know, they're like in their. Aside from Niger, which is a bit of an anomaly, they're like, below their 40s. So they are of that tweeting TikTok sort of generation. And they will speak back at you and tell you you represent the West. You are not quick enough to respond to the insurgency. So you cannot come here and tell me that I should be held accountable for seizing power. I am trying to address a situation that has not been addressed over the years. So I guess responsiveness is what people want from institutions, action, not just words or rhetoric. It's something that actually does change our lives. And I think I sometimes feel that sense of frustration. Like when I was waiting for the AU to say something and I was like, oh, that's A credit institution. We're losing aid, guys.
- [46:01]
Katherine Nzuki
Oh, we're gonna come up with new credit rating models.
- [46:04]
Beverly Ochiang
We're not gonna get aid. People have lost jobs. The health sector will collapse. Education might collapse. But. But even the leaders themselves, the things that they say. I think the Kenyan president, when Trump said something about transgender, and he was like, kenya only recognizes men and women, and everyone was like, no, where is this coming from? No.
- [46:24]
Katherine Nzuki
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. What we're gonna do. Gender politics in the middle of, like, bigger things.
- [46:29]
Beverly Ochiang
We don't even have the representation yet.
- [46:31]
Katherine Nzuki
I mean, Right.
- [46:32]
Beverly Ochiang
According to the Constitution. So it feels misplaced. And I think a lot of what these institutions sometimes end up addressing might feel misplaced when you think about the wider issues that are coming about. About democracy, about representation, about leadership, about accountability. So, yeah, it's probably stemming from that. So this is probably the first regional block of the TikTok generation or whatever.
- [46:56]
Katherine Nzuki
I mean, the last quick thought I have is I actually, as you're talking, I'm wondering if it's not an exclusively African phenomenon. I think the United nations is going through a particularly tough time with their failure to really resolve the Israel, Gaza crisis, war, the Ukraine, Russia war, and really their inability to be an effective mediator in so many of these ongoing crises. NATO, Right. Is splintering right now. So actually, I wonder if this is just a global phenomenon where you do have young people that want responsive institutions, and some of them, like somebody once described the UN as an institution that's meant to move slow, that's meant to, you know, engender discourse and so on. So I wonder if it's global. You know, this moment probably is.
- [47:37]
Beverly Ochiang
I mean, with the un, they'll have the. You know, we are deeply concerned about something. It doesn't really feel like it's moving anything in any direction. Things are blowing up beyond proportion. But it's just this very, you know, very same statement for every single crisis and conflict. And it just tells you, institutionalism can be such a problem. Even when you want to do good for the world. So many ropes you have to jump. It's always been transactional, actually. It's always been transactional.
- [48:09]
Katherine Nzuki
That's such a cool place to stop this. Bev. Oh, my gosh. One of the coolest people I know. Thank you so much for joining the Afropolitan. Thank you for supporting the podcast. This has been so fascinating and so good, and hopefully you'll come back and we can just talk some more. And thank you to Gina of Reducer for being so patient with us.
- [48:28]
Beverly Ochiang
Thank you, thank you, thank you for.
- [48:30]
Katherine Nzuki
Tuning in to the Afropolitan. Please subscribe to the Afropolitan wherever you listen to your podcasts. This podcast is produced by Sarah Baker and our music is by Wonder Child.