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Is Business Broken?
Federal Reserve Governor Stephen Miran on Tariffs, Inflation, and Deregulation
00:31:29
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- [00:01]
A
You're listening to Is Business Broken? A podcast from the Mehrotri Institute for Business, Markets and Society at Boston University Questrom School of Business. I'm Kurt Nickish. In recent years, the Federal Reserve has faced enormous economic challenges. Rising inflation, new trade policies, a pandemic, and a weaker labor market. But beneath the headlines are deep debates. How much are tariffs really driving price increases? How should we measure inflation in a modern economy? And how has bank regulation reshaped the Fed's balance sheet and the role it plays? We explored these questions and more at a live recording at CitySpace in Boston with Stephen Myron, A member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Myron chaired the Council of Economic Advisers, where he helped develop much of President Trump's trade policy. At the Fed, Governor Myron has distinguished himself with a series of dissenting votes calling for lower interest rates than his colleagues, and he's been vocal about deregulation. Here's our conversation. So, first of all, thank you for your time here on campus today. You've done several events and now you're having this conversation. So thanks so much for taking the time to speak to us.
- [01:37]
B
It's my pleasure. Thank you so much for having me.
- [01:39]
A
Let me start with tariffs. Governor Myron, you've expressed skepticism that recent tariff actions are a primary driver of rising goods inflation. And I think a lot of people have been surprised. Right. That the impact of tariffs and all these pending trade deals hasn't had more of a strong effect. Can you tell us more about your thinking on tariffs and what distinguishes it, I guess, from your peers?
- [02:04]
B
Sure. Thank you. So, yeah, I mean, I have had an out of consensus view on tariffs all along, and I think people have been very gradually moving towards my view. I mean, I think a year ago there were people who were predicting that tariffs would cause some horrible recession or they'd cause a. There was even one famous economist saying it would cause a, an inflation spike worse than we saw after Covid. And I always thought it would be, largely speaking, not that huge a deal. My view is that we haven't seen significant tariff induced inflation thus far. And this is still an out of consensus view. But I base my analysis based on two comparisons that I make. One is to compare imported core goods in the United States. That's goods other than food and energy, because at the Federal Reserve, we tend to look past food and energy fluctuation, price fluctuations, because they're volatile and they don't really tell you much about underlying supply, demand balances. They're just more indicative of transient shocks that hit commodity markets. So if you look at overall core goods and you compare them to imported core goods, if you thought tariffs were a very material driver of inflation, you'd expect imported core goods to be experiencing significantly higher inflation than overall core goods. And you don't see that. You see them experiencing relatively similar rates of inflation. Similarly, if you look internationally, if you looked at US Core goods on a chart with core goods inflation and a bunch of other countries, if tariffs were a big driver of inflation in core goods, you'd expect expect to see US Core goods stick out. You'd expect to be able to pick it out of a lineup without labels. And you can't do that. It's right in the middle of the pack. There's not really a significant way, in my view, about how US Core goods inflation deviates from international core goods inflation. So doing those two comparisons, I can't conclude that there's a lot of tariff induced inflation that could change. We could get a data release this week, next week, next month, that I run those analyses again and it tells me, hey, there is something there, but thus far I haven't seen it.
- [03:58]
A
Yep. When you say thus far, are you mainly saying because we're just talking about data points up until today, or do you actually expect it to change?
- [04:06]
B
Well, thus far I'm talking about the data that we have at hand, which is I guess through November. And as I said, we could get a data release in which it changes at some point in the future. The truth is that there's been a lot of international trends which have affected core goods inflation in recent years, and they all could be playing a role in this. Right. If you go back to the pandemic, we had difficulty sourcing medical equipment, and that led to a lot of firms saying, we want to improve the resilience of our supply chains, we want to build in some redundancies, we want to make this more structurally secure. We've also had proliferating export controls, some implemented in the us Some implemented in China, some implemented in Europe. The existence of export controls on various technologies and inputs to production wasn't really a widespread phenomenon a number of years ago, and it's accelerated. So there's a lot going on that could be causing core goods inflation, not just in the U.S. but globally, to remain a bit elevated. And I think it's just a little bit too easy to blame that on tariffs in the last year, when in fact, I think those trends have been going on for longer.
- [05:09]
A
Yeah, you saw the reaction or what people expected to happen with tariffs didn't happen per se. I'm just curious, why do you think that happened?
- [05:17]
B
Well, I think one reason why the perception was there is because this is the big. We've had the biggest changes to international trade policy in half a century. Right. So I think it's quite natural for that to elevate uncertainty when you have that type of change. Nevertheless, I think there was a bit of an overreaction for a couple of reasons. One is that if you look at the international trade literature, trade economists tend to estimate that the overall gains from trade versus, say, no trade at all is probably on the order of, let's say, 5% of GDP. And maybe it's a little bit higher than that, maybe it's a little bit lower than that. But that tends to be where the trade literature settles out on what are the overall gains from trade versus having no trade whatsoever.
- [05:59]
A
That's interesting. I would have expected to be a lot bigger.
- [06:01]
B
Yeah, it's not huge. And so the idea that you were going to eliminate such a significant portion of 5% with what was a move in tariffs that left you really far from zero trade whatsoever, just seemed to me to be an overreaction.
- [06:16]
A
That's why we have you here for this. The global view, sweeping views on things. You forecasted much more aggressive rate cuts than many of your peers. You've descended on committee votes for this reason, arguing that the current stance is too restrictive and that it poses risks to jobs and growth. But what data are you seeing regarding the labor market, regarding productivity, that gives you a different view than some of your peers on the committee?
- [06:44]
B
Sure. One small correction. It's not that I predicted or forecast, it's that I called for as appropriate policy.
- [06:50]
A
Yeah, yeah, right. You have called for those.
- [06:51]
B
But yes, I do think it's appropriate to have significantly lower policy rates than we do. Now. Let's tackle a couple of those items. Right. Inflation. So when I look at inflation, I see an outsized contribution from a couple of categories that are the result of measurement error. And so, for example, if you look at portfolio management FEES, these have contributed 36 basis points, 0.36% to annual core inflation in November, which is the latest data that we have, versus a historic norm of about six basis, sorry, 32 basis points, versus a historic norm of about 6 basis points. Right. So these have contributed over a quarter of a point of excess of inflation over historic norms. But what this series does is basically just track the stock, stock market. That's how they measure portfolio management Fees. And so my view is that is ultimately conflating a quantity with a price. If you look at actual fees in the asset management industry, they've been in outright deflation for 20 years, right? Fees, every year they get slashed. And there's a news article about how ETF investors or mutual fund investors or whatever are benefiting from new lower fees on their investment products. And so actual investment management fees have been slashed for 20 years in deflation. And yet we're recording abnormally large inflation from this series. Right? That's a bias, that. There's always a bias, but the bias is anomalously large. Now, there's another bias, which is basically in the way that we calculate shelter inflation. And because of the very complex lag structure with which shelter inflation is calculated, it basically is recording the real estate market of 2021-2023, which is a historically anomalous real estate market. It's not the real estate market of 2026, let alone 2027. If you look at market rents, they've been run for a couple of years now. And if you look at measures of all tenant rents versus new tenant rents, they've converged, which basically means that renewal leases are now at about the same level where fresh new leases are, which all together to me indicates that housing inflation is going to normalize, I think, pretty quickly this year. And I think we're going to end up with housing inflation running below what we had before the pandemic.
- [08:54]
A
Well, essentially what you're saying is that you've got a lot of ways that inflation is measured that you think are not really as modern and contemporary as they could be, and that's affecting how inflation is being viewed.
- [09:07]
B
I think that's completely right. Look, the Congress tasked the Federal Reserve with maintaining full employment and price stability. Prices now are higher than they were before the pandemic because of a confluence of fiscal, monetary, supply chain and regulatory factors that drove a large increase in the price level. However, prices are now once again, reasonably stable. Right. We weren't tasked with undoing all price changes ever. We weren't tasked with returning the price level to what it was in 1900. We're tasked with maintaining it relatively stable. And so it is true that prices are higher than they were before the pandemic. It is true that people still are unhappy with the prices of certain goods, but those goods are no longer really changing prices very much. The change in prices, which is the inflation rate, which is what we target, in my view, is now once again stable. And once you Strip out these anomalous factors like portfolio management fees and quirks of the way that we measure inflation. Underlying inflation is growing within noise of our target. It's, you know, underlying inflation is growing within measurement error of where it should be. And so to me, that tells me that, yes, we did have a big inflation problem in prior years, but we don't have a big inflation problem now. Are we still dealing with the scars of that? Yes, we are still dealing with the scars of that, but that is not a good excuse for asking people to lose their jobs.
- [10:18]
A
Another thing that you've highlighted is deregulation, something that's. We're in a climate of deregulation now, and that is something that obviously impacts the economy, and that is something that you feel isn't sort of being fully incorporated into these forecasts. You've described regulations as kind of infinite taxes that prohibit industries from existing. Can you talk a little bit more about some of those specific taxes and like the energy or housing sectors that you see as kind of the biggest drags on GDP in the US right now?
- [10:50]
B
Yeah, sure. So I think that regulations are really key to determining the supply side of the economy. And look, we just lived through a period in which supply chain constraints played a really big role in the evolution of inflation. And I think you probably would find most people would absolutely agree they played a role. And so if we acknowledge that supply chain constraints can cause inflation on the way up, I think we have to be fair and acknowledge that the relaxation of supply chain constraints through regulation or through deregulation or through other means would naturally drive inflation lower. So that is a channel that I see regulation strike me as an area that economists underappreciate when constructing their forecasts because they can be difficult to quantify. It can be very easy to quantify a tax rate or an interest rate. You've got a 4% interest rate. Someone else has got a 1% interest rate. Let's compare outcomes. Quantifying regulation is much more difficult because you can have thousands of pages of text that affects companies differently based on where they operate, what line of business is, how old they are, how old the business is, how cozy they are with the regulatory agency that does supervision or enforcement. And that just makes it very difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, there have been some advances in quantification of these regulations in recent years. Through AI, through LLMs, through machine learning and natural language processing. We can do better jobs now. And if you consult those, it looks like the deregulatory agenda has actually been pretty powerful. Thus, Far. And also that the increase in regulations in the last few years, before last year, was actually quite aggressive to the upside as well. So my view is that that's very, very important in determining the supply side of the economy, and therefore inflation and price levels and things that follow from it.
- [12:25]
A
Can we talk a little bit about the policy of deregulation? A bit. There's always that. That worry that as you deregulate, you raise the risks of the next financial crisis, you raise the risk of the next environmental disaster. There's also this idea that the economy is regulated, and if the government deregulates more, that the big companies end up managing the economy or those markets to their benefit. How do you cut red tape but also make sure that you're not just helping the giants get stronger and crush innovators, which you also want in the economy?
- [13:01]
B
Yeah, absolutely. That's a great question. But let me sort of separate it into two halves. There's real economy regulations, and then there's financial regulations, including bank regulations, which are what the Federal Reserve deals with. With respect to real economy regulations, those are not regulations that the Fed sets, but I think we need to study them because they matter for monetary policy. I view real economy regulations, not always, but usually as being barriers to entry. They're barriers to entry because in order to comply with a regulation, you need a compliance department. You might need to measure stuff, you might need someone to fill out paperwork, you might need to hire accountants or lawyers, you need to establish relationships with a regulatory agency. And all of that is an expense that a large business is probably better situated to pay than a small business. And if you just wanted to sort of start up yourself and do it, it'd be very expensive. So these are barriers to entry. As an economist, I'd call them markup regulations. And by being barriers to entry, they actually restrict competition. And so that's why very often you end up with incumbents favoring regulations, because they can keep upstarts out. So my view is that we absolutely want more competition. It's disinflationary. It improves productivity and it improves economic growth. And that regulations are often barriers to entry that inhibit that.
- [14:16]
A
I mean, you made the argument that this doesn't help bigger players or established incumbents, but how do you keep them from working the system to their advantage? Because they can set up trade groups that set new standards that everybody has to follow anyway.
- [14:30]
B
In my view, those standards, those regulations, especially when they have the force of law behind them, as regulations can prevent small startups from entering a market. They serve as barriers to entry, and in doing so, they protect incumbents from competition, they reduce the competition and thereby they increase prices and they decrease productivity and economic growth and employment. So this is not true for all regulations. There are some regulations that do the opposite. Right. You know, for example, antitrust regulations. But I think that for the majority of regulations, that's the effect that they have.
- [15:03]
A
Okay, well, let's move to banking then.
- [15:05]
B
Sure.
- [15:05]
A
You stated that the the Fed's balance sheet is now driven more by banking regulations than by monetary policy. Does this mean that the Fed has kind of lost its grip on the steering wheel of the economy to steer it solely through interest rates?
- [15:21]
B
To an extent. First of all, interest rates are the primary tool of monetary policy. Monetary policy works through financial conditions and through manipulating financial conditions can affect economic growth, inflation, unemployment, GDP growth. If for some reason you can't change the short interest rate, like you may be at the zero lower bound and you need to cut, but you can't cut any further because you can't push interest rates below zero, then there's a role for balance sheet operations potentially to play a role in monetary policy. Outside of that, the short rate is typically how we would set monetary policy with respect to the balance sheet. We expanded it enormously during the global financial crisis, but then continuously for long periods of time thereafter as well, all the way until 2022.
- [16:08]
A
When you say expand the balance sheet, you're talking about quantitative easing. All this kind of infusion of cash into the market, essentially quantitative easing, large
- [16:17]
B
scale asset purchases, emergency liquidity facilities for different asset classes. We expanded the balance sheet for a long time and that increased the footprint of the Fed. In terms of the effects of the Federal Reserve in financial markets. During times that are relatively calm, we try and shrink the balance sheet. We try and reduce the size of the balance sheet by allowing securities to just mature and not replacing them with new securities. Every time we try that, we reach a point at which short term markets start to exhibit some signs of funding market stress. And then we say we have to stop doing that and we have to start increasing the size of the balance sheet again through what we call reserve management purchases. The reason this happens is because of regulations, the banking system regulations that have gradually accumulated since the global financial crisis. Some of them force banks to hold certain levels of reserves through liquidity requirements, liquidity coverage ratios. Some of them encourage banks to hold additional reserves through various guidance or examinations or liquidity stress testing. And some of them encourage banks to hold reserves through various means of supervision and enforcement. What this does is it creates a demand for reserves at the Fed that's a product of regulations. They have to hold those reserves to meet the regulatory requirements to be in compliance with Dodd Frank and the law that limits our ability to reduce the balance sheet. We hit that level and then reserves become relatively more scarce, and then it causes haywire in the funding markets, and then we have to stop and increase the size of our balance sheet again. So we are constrained in our ability to reduce the footprint of the Fed in financial markets, to reduce the balance sheet at the Fed because the regulations force banks to hold reserves. Now, my view is that were the banks underregulated before 2008? I mean, I think that's a reasonable position to hold. Did that contribute to the financial crisis? I have no doubt that there were elements of that in contributing to the financial crisis. Did we start regulating the banks more afterwards? We did, and then we continued regulating them and regulating them and regulating them and regulating them. So probably before the global financial crisis, maybe you could say there was too much of a light touch, but then I think we aired too much on the side of a heavy touc. And so, you know, and so that's impeded the ability of banks to extend credit into the economy. And that's something that I think we're in the process of addressing through the deregulatory agenda being headed by Vice Chairwoman Mickey Bowman for supervision at the banks. But I think that the interaction with the balance sheet is an important part of this. And for all of the, in my opinion, quite ridiculous talk out there of fiscal dominance of monetary policy, the truth is that we actually have regulatory dominance going on in the balance sheet.
- [18:53]
A
It sounds like you're saying we've kind of crossed the line where the Fed is now too much of a player in the market than a strict referee.
- [18:59]
B
That's the consequence of having a big balance sheet. Right? The larger balance sheet we have, the bigger our footprint in the financial markets and the greater the chances that we're distorting them somehow. And so I would like to shrink it more. However, I think that there's a lot of steps you need to take before you can shrink it more.
- [19:16]
A
If you want to shrink that more. There are a number of governors on the committee. If, if every one of them had your viewpoint, right, if you were every one of them, what would the Fed do differently? What would you like to see?
- [19:29]
B
So I'd like to see two things. I think interest rates need to be lower to accommodate the labor market more. I think we are Seeing some signs of stress around part time work for economic reasons, around marginal workers and the non participation versus participation margin for some younger workers as well. I do think that there's labor market slack that can be accommodated by looser policy. I don't see an inflation problem. And at the same time I'd like to reduce the balance sheet because I'd want the Federal Reserve to have just a smaller footprint in financial markets and as well as to keep that dry powder there if we did have another crisis like the pandemic that required us to really expand our balance sheet. Expanding our balance sheet when you're at the zero lower bound in the middle of a financial crisis is the right move. Right. And you should keep your powder dry for when you need to make a move like that. And am I predicting another once in a century pandemic? No, but lots of stuff happens that I don't predict. And so I think it's important to keep our powder in case we ever get to that type of outcome.
- [20:24]
A
The Fed is meant to be a technocratic island, right? This is where we get into politics a bit. When monetary policy ends up affecting all of these things, and you've mentioned a bunch of them, but we can also mention wealth inequality or housing affordability. It affects all those things so deeply. Is it realistic, even democratic? I guess, to keep it insulated from the political market out there, you have better economic outcomes.
- [20:49]
B
If monetary policy is made for the economic cycle and not anything else like the political cycle, you want monetary policy to be loose when the economy calls for loose and tight when the economy calls for tight, you don't want it to have loose or tight for other reasons like politics. That said, in order for the Fed to maintain its independence, I think that it's important that the Fed stick to its core mission, stick to its knitting, and also strive to be seen as non political and nonpartisan. And that means we really need to sort of stick to independence on monetary policy, not try and and overly exploit our independence for regulations, not veer off of our core mission onto side missions like climate, or onto side missions like highly charged racial politics. If you're going to be a independent body, you need to stick to non political issues like interest rates, like monetary policy, and stay away from the other issues. I just think that's important.
- [21:45]
A
I see a whole bunch of great questions coming in from the audience, so we're going to get to that in just a moment. But briefly, had to be a little bit of a nerd here and bring up the Triffin Dilemma. You've written about it in simple terms. The world needs dollars. The US Runs deficits to provide them. But those deficits have hollowed out the manufacturing base, say a lot of people. Is the dollar status as the reserve currency a net positive or net negative for the American worker, in your view?
- [22:13]
B
I think there's no question about it that it's an enormous net positive. Nevertheless, I think that there have been some consequences of the dynamics that have played out in recent decades, and manufacturing has been one of them. So I think it is important to sort of pay attention to that. From the Federal Reserve's perspective, we don't drive trade policy, we don't drive national security policy, and those are highly intertwined. But from our perspective, we think about financial sustainability and we think about financial volatility and financial stability. And I view continued very, very large trade deficits that are linked to very, very large current account deficits mean borrowing from the rest of the world as creating latent financial instability risks that you'd want to think about addressing. We have a net international investment position about minus $25 trillion, meaning we owe the rest of the world $25 trillion more than we own of it. If that number were to sort of continue growing more and more negative every year because we're running huge trade deficits, that would pose a financial stability risk of the type that would ultimately undermine the international status of our assets. Right. So the fact that we're on the way to reducing borrowing through higher tariff revenue, through higher revenues from potential growth thanks to changing regulatory policies, artificial intelligence, capital deepening from the tax bill that was passed last year, all these things will boost potential growth of the economy and thereby boost revenues. They'll, in my mind, underpin the financial stability of the United States by reducing the risk that we're too reliant upon both borrowing in general, but international borrowing too.
- [23:50]
A
Great. We're going to turn to some audience questions, and I just want to thank everybody. They're wonderful. A couple of them around reducing the Fed balance sheet and the sort of contradiction that goes there if you're also trying to push for lower interest rates. You talked about the steps that you may need to take. Would you keep advocating for as low of a rate as you are now? If you were able to see the Fed's balance sheet go down?
- [24:15]
B
It depends on a lot of stuff. So monetary policy works through financial conditions. We're trying to achieve a certain level of employment and a certain level of inflation. If financial conditions, broadly speaking, are too loose to achieve those, then we can raise interest rates if they're too tight to achieve those, then we can cut interest rates. And as a result, you can adjust the short rate to offset changes in financial conditions from anything, whether it's a move in the dollar, whether it's a move in the stock market, credit spreads, changes in the Fed's balance sheet. And so as long as you're not at the zero lower bound, you can offset any tightening of financial conditions that might occur as a result of changes the balance sheet. Now, you always need an all else equal. Right? And I imagine that if we're sort of taking significant steps in the balance sheet, there may be other things going on at the same time. And so that's sort of an all else equals statement. So therefore it depends on the total confluence of financial conditions that are affecting the economy at the time.
- [25:13]
A
Gotcha. How should we think about the tension between price stability and the affordability crisis that many Americans and small businesses are experiencing?
- [25:23]
B
So the job of the Fed is to keep prices stable. It's not to reduce the price level. There's only one way to really reduce the price level. And from the Federal Reserve's perspective, and it's not a great policy because it requires widespread unemployment. Right. If we were to cause a massive recession to get the price level down, it would improve affordability, but it actually would hurt the economy a lot because we'd be tightening so much and lots of people would lose their jobs. Price stability is viewed as on an ongoing basis, not making up for past fluctuations. Not really. Many people think that we should return the price level to what it was in 1850 at the cost of 80% unemployment. It's not plausible, it's not reasonable. The affordability crisis is a product of the price level shift that occurred in prior years, but now prices are relatively stable at a higher level. So my expectation is actually that a lot of those prices will ultimately, I think they're going to be relatively stable for a period of time while real economic growth continues thanks to productivity improvements from things like deregulation, AI capital deepening, and that the wages in the economy will grow into the higher prices, that real prices ultimately come down, but with a system of generally stable nominal prices, which from the Fed's perspective is actually pretty great.
- [26:44]
A
Right. How do you feel about dollar devaluation? Should the Fed play any role to change any dollar price in relation to other currencies? And if so, how so?
- [26:54]
B
The dollar as a policy matter is the purview of the Treasury Department. And so what should the dollar policy in The United States be should be directed to Secretary Bessant who if I just quote him, has said the United States strong dollar policy is still there. Nothing has changed on dollar policy from the Federal Reserve's perspective. It's an input into our process. We care about price stability and we care about full employment. And if financial conditions, including the dollar change that would lead you to change your forecast for those, then you may need to change your policy rate to offset it. Now that said, the US is a relatively close world goes. We have a smaller share of trade in our economy than small open economies. We're the reserve currency, which means that invoicing is also often done in dollars, which means that the pass through from currency changes into US Inflation is much smaller. So it doesn't tend to be a major driver of inflation in the United States and it also doesn't tend to be an enormous driver of the business cycle in frequencies that matter to the Fed. So it matters a lot for other parts of the government. But from our perspective it's an input to our process. And I don't see anything really there that really strikes me as caus for concern.
- [28:05]
A
Big question here. What do you think is the best strategy to reduce the federal deficit? And do you think this can be done without significant cuts to entitlement programs?
- [28:14]
B
So in the medium term I'm actually quite more optimistic about the deficit than I was say a year ago because policies have changed so dramatically. So the CBO estimates that the tariffs are going to raise about $4 trillion over a 10 year period. If you get potential GDP growth up by a point, it'll also raise about $4 trillion of GDP over a 10 year period. I don't know that I think potential GDP growth is going up by a full point, but I think it's probably going up by close to it as a result of various changes. Deregulation, the tax law, AI. I think all of these things drive potential growth up. And so between those two, I think you probably can get at least a couple of points of GDP off of the primary deficit that will also. That reduction in primary deficits that will start to emerge in coming years will also drive more confidence in markets which will reduce interest rates and thereby reduce the interest expense, which is the largest discretionary outlay. So I'm actually more sanguine on fiscal deficits than I was say a year ago. I think this is great for financial stability from a monetary policy perspective. It reduces what we call the neutral interest rate of monetary policy, which is a function of the supply demand balance for loanable funds in the economy. But basically by reducing national borrowing, it's going to reduce what we call the neutral rate and thereby interest rates more broadly. In the very, very, very long run. The entitlement situation is something that I presume will ultimately see some attention, but it's not something the Federal Reserve can accomplish.
- [29:41]
A
What do you say to people who say they're losing faith in markets, in institutions, in capitalism? Does the Fed have a role here to increase the faith in the American economic system? You hear that on college campuses. You read that in social media. You hear that sentiment. What's your response to that?
- [30:01]
B
My response to that is that the best thing for policymakers to do, whether at the Fed or elsewhere, is to do our job and make sure that we're creating the best economic outcomes that we possibly can. And by creating good economic outcomes, people will experience better situations and those views will prove to be hollow. You know, in the long run, the best thing we can do is to do is to do our job. And that's why that's all I advocate for.
- [30:28]
A
Governor Myron. This has been great. Let's please give him a big hand. It's been really, really great. That's Stephen Myron, a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, at a live recording at City Space in Boston. And we'll be back soon with more episodes. We'll be launching our next season in just a few weeks. In the meantime, we would love it if you would please follow Is Business Broken? Wherever you get your podcasts, and that's where you can rate the show and listen to any episodes you may have missed. Thanks for listening to Is Business Broken? I'm Kurt Nickish,
- [31:19]
B
Sa.