Ilya Ayub (34:27)
It's a political vision that does not see the other as human, as having agency, as deserving anything really. It's not like they have an opposing side or an opponent that they want to defeat, but ultimately have some kind of settlement and move beyond that or whatnot. There is no long term plan is what I'm trying to say, I guess and maybe to emphasize a bit more in the case of Lebanon. So what happens next for Hezbollah, for example? I'm not entirely sure. I don't think anyone really knows. It seems clear that the Israelis underestimated their capabilities. But to what extent that will matter if the Israelis continue to just bomb and bomb and bomb Lebanon for weeks on end, if not months on end, so on, I can't tell. What I can tell is that in the same way as the Israelis want to ignore the Palestinian question, but it's still there, it haunts them in a way, because I work on hauntology. In case of Lebanon, there is also that in many ways that if you look at the shift in discourse even within Israeli politics From let's say 70s, but especially 80s onwards, I'm not going to say it was never good, but there was a stronger component of Israeli politicians, let's say a higher percentage of them anyway, that were, for lack of a better term, pragmatic, that were willing to have concessions, that were willing to have whatever, if only because they just did not want to deal with occupying a foreign country that they had no intention to legally annex, as they did with the. Legally, none of this is legal, but within Israeli law, I mean, as they did with the Golan Heights. And so that's what I'm saying in the case of Lebanon, that it's almost like the worst case scenario is what's currently happening and that's completely regardless of what happens to Hezbollah, because Hezbollah can disappear tomorrow and the problem will continue to be the same, if not just get worse. The country has no economy to speak of. The currency was already devalued during the economic crisis, was one of the highest devaluations in the world. And there are no prospects going forward in terms of making this a country that can even sustain itself. It's already very import dependent. But if you exclude South Lebanon and it being a breadbasket, East Lebanon as well, by the way, a breadbasket. And that's another area of Lebanon that the Israelis have been constantly bombarding, to paraphrase that Israeli minister, that like Lebanon is not a state, it's not a nation. It doesn't, it doesn't. It's just a place that's, that's on the map. And that will pose a problem obviously, first and foremost for us, like for the Lebanese and people who live in Lebanon. But it is also a problem geopolitically, It's a problem internationally. It will freak out the EU in terms of the refugee crisis because the EU has actually counted on Lebanon to keep a lot of people in Lebanon. They send like a billion euros, I think it was two or three years ago or something like that. I wrote about it for this year at the Time, actually, because Lebanon had the highest percentage, maybe still does now, I don't know, of refugees per capita, so to speak. Like, compared to citizens in the world, 1 million or so Syrian refugees with roughly 5 million Lebanese or something like that. Along those lines, there's no census in Lebanon. So I'm saying all of this to sort of emphasize why there is this sense of despair in the country and why if that's not even remotely addressed, whatever fires we're seeing now, whatever, like, horrors we're seeing, I just don't see any. Any way they will stop anytime soon. Whatever happens, even to Hezbollah next, there's no reason to imagine that some other group wouldn't be formed at some point because people live there. People are from that land. We're talking about a million people. They have nowhere else to go. It's not like the Lebanese passport is so good that you can just, you know, go on a flight and go elsewhere. There's nowhere else. They're just going to stay in Lebanon. And many of them would want to, of course, go back to south Lebanon. This problem is not going away. But if you hear the rhetoric of yo Netanyahu and your other politicians, like, this is not part of the picture. This has nothing to do with what their intentions are. They're exclusively talking to other Israelis. The debate is not whether we should destroy south Lebanon or whether we should destroy Lebanon itself. The debate is what do we do once it's destroyed. And even that is barely a debate. But, like, that's the extent of where it goes in terms of, like, Israeli discourse. And yeah, I guess maybe just to drive the point home, that if the Israelis themselves are not stopped in one way or another by their allies, obviously America has the biggest leverage, or the EU being the second closest one in one way or another, whatever the means are. Economic boycott, withdrawing your ambassador, as Spain has done a couple of weeks ago, but just like on a global scale, like, even maybe dwarfing the boycott campaign against apartheid, South Africa at the time. This problem is just going to expand. And people listening to this, of course, see a version of that. Iran can just close the Strait of Hormuz and then suddenly everyone. This is everyone's problem. Israel and America bombing those oil depots. And of course Iran has also done that in retaliation, but proportionally, still more the Americans than the Israelis has polluted. I forgot the number, but the equivalent of 84 countries combined in terms of, like, the toxins released in the air, these are things that people in Iran are breathing in. And the entire region relies on desalination plants. And the Americans bombed one in Iran. Iran retaliated and bombed another one in Bahrain. If that continues, who knows? There's been increasing attempts, not just attempts, actual strikes, including just yesterday against, like, nuclear facilities or, like, close enough to nuclear facilities. So who knows what would happen then? To say it's out of control would be meaningless at this point. But there are levels of where this can go. And Lebanon is, in a sense, deceivingly small. There's a book called Beware of Small States that talks about Lebanon, because a lot of the world is happening in Lebanon, to put it maybe metaphorically, and the trends that are being done to the Lebanese or to people in Lebanon, like the dahi doctrine in 2006 was then used in Gaza, obviously. And now they're saying that they're going to use the Gaza methodology in Lebanon, just like it came back to Lebanon, in a sense. But the point is that this will continue. There is no objective reason to believe that if Hezbollah is destroyed and completely disarmed and what have you, that this problem is going to go away, because if anything, a new beast of some kind is going to be created in the fires in the same way that Hezbollah was created in the initial ones. And so, yeah, the problem ultimately, and I say this as someone who has been campaigning, writing, gotten death threats from Hezbollah supporters in 2019 when I was, as part of the protest, we were beaten up by them. This comes from no sympathy whatsoever towards them. It's just an acknowledgement, I'm also a historian, that they come from a certain context. And if that context is not acknowledged at all, and in fact, the conditions that brought them are now much worse than even the 80s, why would we believe that something else won't come along later on in one way or another? And this notion that the Israelis have just a buffer zone and then destabilize Lebanon endlessly, or whatever it might be, it also comes from this sort of imperialist hubris that they believe that this won't harm them in one way or another, that they can endlessly and permanently have a neighbor to their north that has a lot of armed components and also constantly at war, or whatever it might be. It's hubris. It's imperialist hubris, and it's also extremely, extremely dangerous, even beyond just what would happen to people in Lebanon.