A (11:00)
Yeah, so first and foremost. Yeah, absolutely, gladly, in fact, because this is a persisting problem. So the first and best orthodox essay on this issue of the problem of relations of opposition in terms of the Trinity is Loski's essay Procession of the Holy Spirit in Orthodox Doctrine. Let me get that PDF for you. That one is absolutely necessary. And when you, if you read that and understand that, you really probably won't need any of the other critiques because Lawski is so precise and so clear and so just devastating in this. I mean it's only like 20, I think it's only 20, 15, 20 pages. I'll put it in the chat right here and if you pull it up that you'll get on Google, you'll get the PDF right away. I think it is a chapter in the book Image and Likeness. Yes, it is. So it's chapter four. If you have the book Image and Likeness, you don't have to get the PDF, but there's the PDF. There's multiple levels of critique here. And this is relevant too because if you remember when I had that so called interaction debate, quote unquote with Wagner, Wagner had no idea what I was talking about and he just assumed that everything that I was saying was somehow my ignorance of Thomism had nothing to do with that. I was pointing out that in the Cappadocians, relations of origin or relations of the persons is not the same thing as a relation of opposition. Relation of opposition is a theory that Augustine begins to kind of toy with that really gets solidified in the Medieval Latin Church and in Aquinas. Now Lotsky deals with all this in this essay and he explicates it very well. And some of the main critiques would be first of all in a. This is a critique that Pharrell makes in God History and Dialectics. So I think it's in book. It's either book one or two. This is another book you should get if you can. God History Dialectic Volume 1 or 2. It doesn't make sense in a triad to talk about opposition because opposition in the ancient and medieval world relates to a dyad, right? Because remember, they counted by division. And we've covered this in the debates with the Muslims about counting by division versus counting by identity. In the ancient world, for example, in the Nicene Creed we count by division because we say that God is one and undivided. There's also counting by Identity in the ancient medieval world, too, but specifically for the triad. When the Church Fathers and the early writers talked about. And the medieval writers thought of counting, they counted by division, which means that you have a whole, and then to count to two, you divide that by. By itself and you get two. Right? And then you divide from that and you get three. So they're counting by dividing a whole or a monad. And this is kind of Platonic counting as well. And that's why the creed says one and undivided. Why would they use that term? Well, they're counting by Division. And Dr. Branson has shown this, by the way, in a lot of his essays and debates. They got into this with Jake years ago with Dr. Branson versus Jake in their debate. I got into this in my debate with I think Jake or Hikikachu, one of the two. I forget. But this has come up multiple times to refute the lpt, Right? So the logical problem, the Trinity, you got to understand this kind of stuff anyway, that's separate from this, but it relates because in a triad, you can't have opposition. There is no opposition. If you read the Cappadocians, for example, and Big or Maximus ambiguous number one, he goes to the Cappadocians to say that the Trinity cannot be a dyad. There's no opposition in God, so it has to be a triad because the triad transcends the dyad. This is a numerical argument the Cappadocians make. This is what I was trying to explain to Wagner. He didn't care about any of this, had no concern with it. All he wanted to do was clip a supposed own. But here's the. The problem. If you read Kongar, Kongar has an essay making all the same points that I made to Wagner. So Eaves Congar on the Trinity and relations of opposition in Augustine. And I'm going to give you that essay right here. You'll notice that. Oh, okay. So Jay actually did know what he was talking about between the Roman Catholic theologian and the orthodox theologian critiquing relations of opposition. It's all in these two essays. And actually, Wagner was the one that had no idea what he was talking about. But. But. And I, I since have asked Wagner if he would like to read these things and we can revisit this conversation. He has, to date, no interest whatsoever in looking at any of the materials or discussing it. Now, last point, beyond the fact that, I mean, Kongar in this essay basically says everything that I argue that relations of opposition is not the way that the cappadocians lay out their triad. That's a later medieval specific development in the Latin Church. Loski says there's a really. There's a couple easy points here. Number one, the Cappadocians teach relations of origin, not relations of opposition. And if they use the terminology of opposition, it's not relations of opposition. You can't define persons by what they're opposed to because it begs the question. So the Father is the Father because he's not the Son and not the Spirit. The Spirit is the Spirit because he's not the Father, not the Son. That doesn't tell you who they are, that tells you what they're not. So they're negative statements. And Loski critiques this and says a relation is a predicate, not a subject. So it's confusing subjects and predicates to say that the Father is the relation that he has with the Son. I am not the relation I have to my dad. That's a property or an attribute about me. That's not who I am as a subject. It's just one of the many predicates that you could say about me. So it's confusing subject and predicate. It's so stupid. But Aquinas says person is relation, Persona at relatio. So it makes sense why Tim would argue that way. Because in Thomistic theology, the persons are, because of divine simplicity, the relations that they have to the other persons. But that's preposterous. A person is a subject, not a relation. So the Father is not the relation that he has to the Son. The Father is a divine subject, the Father, the cause, the arche, the fountain, etc. All of those terms that are hypostatic properties go into defining the person's not relations of opposition. And that's why when I said it's hypostatic properties that define the person, something very basic to Orthodox and Eastern and triad and Cappadocian Christology. Tim Gordon had no idea what that even is. What do you mean? Hypostatic properties? What is that? Relations of origin? What is that? Well, just read the Loski essay and it's all right there. I apologize for that long rant there.