Julian Dorey Podcast #343

Guest: Mike Yeagley – "JSOC Data Hacker Exposes Delta Covert Op & Investigates 2017 Vegas Shooting"
Date: October 7, 2025

Episode Overview

In this gripping episode, Julian Dorey sits down with Mike Yeagley—a former software and marketing data analyst turned intelligence contractor—to unravel the astonishing power of commercial data, how U.S. Special Operations Command (especially JSOC & Delta) was exposed by public data, and the transformative role of geospatial, mobile, and marketing analytics in modern espionage, counterintelligence, geopolitics, and society. Yeagley shares inside stories of tracking Russian bodyguards to locate Putin, real-time intelligence gathering for JSOC operations, investigating the 2017 Las Vegas shooting, and the international data arms race involving China, Israel, and everyday Americans.

The episode blends technical explanation, true-crime intrigue, deep operational anecdotes, and critical discussion of privacy, democracy, and global power.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Commercial Data Revolution and Its Applications in Intelligence

• How Mobile Data Is Gathered and Used

  • Apps constantly collect user location and behavioral data—often unnecessarily (e.g., flashlight apps with location access).
  • This information is anonymized using Ad IDs but can be cross-referenced, bought, and used to construct detailed behavioral patterns.
  • "For 20 years, we owned the airspace because we were basically intercepting cell phone signals." (A, 00:38)
  • Commercial data sets originally built for advertising efficiency became foundational for modern espionage and surveillance.

• Private Sector vs. State Surveillance

  • Modern "ad tech" and mobile aggregators accumulate data at scale, often with fewer controls than state actors.
  • Government and intelligence agencies realized private sector data provided a previously inaccessible level of human geography and population movement insight.

2. How Yeagley Exposed Secret Delta Operator Activity

• Unintended Discovery through Open-Source Data

  • Yeagley, while experimenting with available mobile data, accidentally reconstructed Delta Force deployment routes—from Fort Bragg to clandestine outposts in Syria—by tracing anonymized devices frequenting both.
  • Memorable moment:
    • "I draw a little geofence around Fort Bragg, hit play, and the map starts lighting up... but I’m seeing clusters in Syria." (A, 24:02)
    • "If I can do it, we must assume that an adversary can do it." (A, 30:06)

• Operational Security Nightmare

  • Showed that anyone with enough money (~$600,000 for a dataset) and basic software could uncover elite covert ops—previously assumed tightly protected.

• Government Reaction

  • Initial disbelief and suspicion (“charlatan,” “snake oil”), followed by concern and recognition of massive vulnerability.
  • "One guy accused me: Are you doing that remote viewing stuff?" (A, 36:09)
  • Sparked the realization that data privacy for elite operators had become virtually impossible.

3. Evolving Data Privacy, Op-Sec, and Tactics

• Shifts in Privacy Enforcement

  • Apple and Google have restricted third-party app data access; ATT (App Tracking Transparency) limits brokers but consolidates info within platform giants.
  • Location-based permissions now require more explicit user consent, but regular use of essential apps (Uber, Nav) still leaks core data.

• Impossible Countermeasures

  • No “silver bullet” exists—nothing individuals or even operators can do fully defeats Google/Apple/Facebook tracking at scale.
  • Even attempts like Faraday bags can become meaningful anomalies in a sea of noise:
    • "Some devices go dark at very specific times... I'm interested in those hundred devices." (A, 49:39)
  • Modern privacy is about blending in with 'normalcy,' not about invisibility.

4. Mutual Vulnerabilities: Data as Global Chessboard

• Everyone is Playing—And at Risk

  • All major intelligence agencies use these techniques against both adversaries and allies.
  • "There’s mutually assured blackmail, tracking, destruction in a way, around the world... they all can get access to it as long as they know how to read the language." (B, 47:30)

• The ‘Tactical Lifestyle’ as Cover

  • The rise of operator-worship (buying tactical gear, driving trucks, etc.) provides plausible deniability for real operators amid lookalikes.

5. Real World Applications and War Stories

• Vegas Shooting (2017): Data-Driven Investigation

  • Called in by FBI to identify possible transnational or terror links via mobile traces.
  • "We were trying—I was trying—to establish transnational links... couldn't establish it. There was no link to transnational terrorism." (A, 150:39)
  • False positives are easy: data temporarily pointed to explosive experts, but it was just FBI-issued gear at the scene.
  • Revealed both the power and peril of data-driven analysis.

• Tracking Putin (By Tracking His Bodyguards)

  • Instead of chasing the hard target directly, Yeagley used public data to follow the less tech-savvy staff around Putin.
  • "Wasn’t tracking Putin. I was tracking his bodyguards as a means of... if I can do it..." (A, 64:10)
  • Even Russia’s Kremlin had to address Yeagley’s findings publicly.

• Special Operations Real-Time Use

  • Provided near real-time population analysis for JSOC missions—like counting women/children in a building before an op, possibly saving lives.
  • "Trying to understand women, children, men… and I was off by one… 17 people didn’t get killed." (A, 157:31)

6. Business & Geopolitical Ramifications

• Corporatization of Intelligence

  • Commercial data brokers power elite hedge funds, investment banks, and movie studios, all seeking proprietary business "intel."
  • "They all want their own little CIA... They all want their fixer." (A, 58:36)

• China—The Ultimate Data Adversary

  • China aggressively leverages its global diaspora (“United Front Work Department”) and mandates intelligence service by law.
  • Extensive use of commercial and amateur collectors—everyday citizens as inadvertent agents.

• Israel and the Global Surveillance Market

  • Israelis sell leading surveillance gear to Arab powers, creating unlikely alliances.
  • Pegasus-style spyware changed the game: zero-click exploits can compromise devices with impunity.

• TikTok, Narrative Control, and Double Standards

  • U.S. efforts to seize control of TikTok react as much to narrative risk as to national security—raising tough questions about who should own what platforms and how manipulation works both ways.
  • "The minute that it suddenly became a problem for Israel, well, now we’re taking control of it." (B, 131:43)

7. Societal Consequences and Warnings

• Convenience vs. Agency

  • Today, participation in society almost requires surrendering data—e.g., apps for transit, cashless stores, and more.
  • Calls for better understanding by citizens, not just endless compliance.
  • "I don’t think you can have a monolithic attitude... know that you are in control, not the tech companies..." (A, 75:58)

• Surveillance Infrastructure as Global Fact of Life

  • Ubiquitous Technical Surveillance (UTS): ad tech, Wi-Fi, security cameras, all ambiently collecting and cross-referencing data.
  • "There is no defeat button to ubiquitous technical surveillance. It is what it is. It's ambient." (A, 84:25)

• Adversarial Exploitation—We're Losing Ground

  • China secures its own data but exploits global platforms; U.S. adversaries use our own open society as a weapon—propaganda, fentanyl, etc.
  • "They built an app... their algorithm feed is informed by interaction... They rewire your brain." (A, 117:00)

• Mental Health, Isolation, and Modern Information Warfare

  • Exploration of COVID-19’s societal consequences, the "community" vacuum filled by digital tribes, and accelerating generational trauma.
  • "Injecting chaotic circumstances is an advantage [China] seeks to exploit. And that’s how they’re waging geopolitical warfare.” (A, 121:29)

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On the Tyranny of Commercial Data

  • “The government is using open-source intelligence, human intelligence on the ground... but they weren't necessarily taking the public utility of it... That's where you come in.” (B, 12:16)
  • "If I can do it, we must assume that an adversary can do." (A, 30:06)

• On Apple, Privacy, and Power

  • “Tim Cook declared a fatwa on data brokers... but what they’ve done is consolidate the duopoly between Google and Apple.” (A, 8:33)

• On Counterintelligence Nightmare

  • “You see four people leave the White House direct to Dulles and then see them in Brussels... If I can do it, so too can an adversary.” (A, 175:58)

• On Data’s Multi-Purpose Duplicity

  • “The product is us and our data... there are companies you’ve never heard of... but they are the ones who know that you're Catholic, you go to the gym.” (A, 11:14)

• On the Global Intelligence Marketplace

  • “The Israelis are selling surveillance gear… and the country I was working with was buying from the Israelis openly... because it's the best.” (A, 103:05)

• On China’s Strategy

  • "Article 7 of the China Intelligence Law stipulates that every Chinese citizen... is obligated to support and assist China’s intelligence activities when called upon." (A, 180:20)
  • “If we were as adamantly invested in confronting the China problem as we are invested in Israel’s security, that would be a thing.” (A, 186:47)

• On American Leadership and Evil

  • “If we have politicians... that have made those decisions [re: fentanyl], then I don’t know how to describe that as anything but evil.” (A, 123:46)

• On Hopelessness of Data Privacy

  • “There isn’t a silver bullet to defeat [the data system]. There’s nothing you can do on your phone to defeat Google.” (A, 39:11)
  • “You are the product. And that’s part of the deal.” (A, 82:34)

Timestamps for Important Segments

• Intro and Yeagley’s Story—Commercial Data Goes Espionage: 00:00–14:20
• What Your Apps Know About You: 01:28–05:28
• Privacy—Then vs Now: 04:04–08:28
• Data Brokers and the Business of Surveillance: 11:14–16:09
• Yeagley Exposes Delta Op via Open Data: 22:49–31:57
• Government Reaction—"How Are You Doing This?": 31:08–36:04
• Mobile Data and Impossible Privacy: 38:01–44:30
• Tactical Lifestyle as Operator Cover: 44:34–47:23
• Faraday Bags and Op-Sec Problems: 48:28–50:55
• Training Adversaries / Mutual Blackmail: 51:21–55:39
• China’s Data Advantage, Espionage Networks: 179:24–184:08
• Tracking Putin via His Staff: 164:11–170:02
• Vegas Shooting Investigation: 149:35–155:10
• Real-Time Use for Ops—Saving Lives: 157:31–158:56
• Mental Health, Society, and Info Warfare: 118:08–130:54

Tone & Takeaways

Mike Yeagley is candid, occasionally irreverent, analytic, and at times philosophical/critical—the discussion swings from technical explanations and true spy stories to thoughtful lament over the social and political consequences of the surveillance economy. Julian Dorey is curious, fast-moving, mixes humor with hard questions, and frequently acts as the proxy for the bewildered, data-leaking modern citizen.

The episode is a must-listen for anyone interested in:

• Espionage and technical intelligence collection
• Modern surveillance capitalism
• Data privacy and democracy
• The arms race between government, business, and society
• The personal, societal, and global stakes underlying the data economy

Memorable Quotes (Speaker | Timestamp):

• "For 20 years, we owned the airspace because we were basically intercepting cell phone signals."
  — Mike Yeagley | 00:38

• "If I can do it, we must assume that an adversary can do."
  — Mike Yeagley | 30:06

• "Wasn’t tracking Putin. I was tracking his bodyguards as a means of ... if I can do it."
  — Mike Yeagley | 64:10

• "You are the product. And that’s part of the deal."
  — Mike Yeagley | 82:34

• "There's mutually assured blackmail, tracking, destruction, in a way, around the world."
  — Julian Dorey | 47:30

Summary Table

| Topic | Summary | Timestamp | |------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| | How commercial data powers espionage | Open-source mobile data allows tracking of military, political, and everyday targets—with little technical hurdle | 00:00–14:20 | | Accidental Delta Force exposure | Analyzing movement from Fort Bragg exposes secret missions in Syria | 24:02–31:57 | | Government learns vulnerability | Initial skepticism ("charlatan") gives way to concern, recognizing adversaries could do the same | 31:08–36:04 | | Vegas shooting analysis | Yeagley called in to find terror links, illustrates risks of false positives | 149:35–155:10| | China’s "People’s Intelligence" Law | Citizen diaspora mandated to support CCP intelligence efforts globally | 179:24–184:08| | Tracking Putin | Indirectly geolocating Putin by following staff patterns | 164:11–170:02| | Mutual surveillance/arms race | All actors vulnerable; everyone surveilling everyone | 47:30–48:28 |

Closing Remark

Julian and Yeagley finish with the recognition that control over data—its harvesting, exploitation, and defense—now defines not just military power, but democracy, economic fairness, and individual freedom.

The data arms race is not just for spies and billionaires. Every person is now a player, a target, and unwilling product in the battle for information dominance.

Highly recommended for all listeners interested in surveillance, geopolitics, technology, and the future of privacy.