Encore: Gorbachev | The Man Who Lost an Empire | 4

Summary

Legacy Podcast: Encore – Gorbachev | The Man Who Lost an Empire | Part 4

Hosts: Afua Hirsch & Peter Frankopan
Release Date: January 13, 2026
Episode Focus: The dramatic final act of Mikhail Gorbachev’s leadership, his downfall, and the challenging fate of his legacy across Russia and the world.

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Episode Overview

In this encore episode, Afua Hirsch and Peter Frankopan conclude their four-part exploration of Mikhail Gorbachev, the last leader of the Soviet Union. The episode chronicles the failed 1991 coup, the disintegration of the USSR, Gorbachev’s difficult post-leadership years, and how his legacy is tangled with the aspirations and grievances shaping Russia’s modern trajectory. The hosts scrutinize whether Gorbachev deserves his reputation as a hero of freedom or the scapegoat for Russian decline.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

The 1991 Coup Attempt and Soviet Collapse

• The episode opens with a gripping retelling of the August 1991 coup, with Gorbachev held hostage in Crimea by hardline communists seeking to halt his reforms and save the USSR (03:42–06:00).
• Gorbachev’s signature policies, perestroika and glasnost, had unravelled into economic hardship—shortages, soaring inflation, and a breakdown in daily life (05:10–05:30).
• The failure to quell growing independence movements (particularly in the Baltic states) is discussed as practically inevitable:
  “I think the barn door is open and the horse has bolted. … Not sure what Gorbachev could have done.” – Peter Frankopan (06:29)
• Afua highlights Gorbachev’s misreading of national identity’s power within the USSR, suggesting he confused repression for allegiance:
  “He really didn’t understand the strength of nationalist feeling… the Soviet Union never succeeded in obscuring those national identities… they always stayed alive.” (07:34)

The Role of Boris Yeltsin

• The failed coup catapulted Boris Yeltsin, Gorbachev’s nemesis, to center stage as a symbol of reform and defiance, particularly with his public stand during the coup (11:23–11:53): “Yeltsin is the one who strides out to the front and puts his own life at considerable risk… that's an act of great personal bravery.” – Peter Frankopan (10:29)
• Yeltsin’s motivations are dissected as less Machiavellian and more about survival and preventing bloodshed:
  “For Yeltsin, it was about making sure that he too would survive…” (11:53)

The Aftermath: The End of an Empire

• Following the coup’s failure, Communist Party activity was suspended and the USSR quickly dissolved, with Yeltsin leading the new Russia and Gorbachev left without a country to govern (15:44–16:29).
• The iconic lowering of the Soviet flag and Gorbachev’s resignation on Christmas Day 1991 signify the end of an era (16:29).

Gorbachev’s Legacy and Public Persona Post-1991

• Gorbachev’s post-leadership years are characterized by efforts to preserve his ideological legacy, speaking tours abroad, and fundraising—famously including a Pizza Hut commercial (17:45–21:10).
• The Pizza Hut ad is seen as both practical (to fund his foundation) and highly symbolic: “It’s also a powerful metaphor… he has to perform in that ultimate temple of capitalism. A TV ad for Pizza Hut.” – Afua Hirsch (20:04)
• Peter wryly observes, “How the mighty are fallen.” (19:51), and later, “What a coup for Pizza Hut… that you can afford to get a man who's sold out the Communist idea in return for money.” (21:10)

Perception of Gorbachev in Russia and the West

• Gorbachev is celebrated in the West for ending the Cold War, but widely despised in Russia for chaos, economic hardship, and “selling out” the Soviet project (21:40–22:32).
• Afua emphasizes Gorbachev’s personal modesty:
  “He never became a billionaire… He was more interested in keeping his legacy alive than in enjoying the trappings of this new world of consumerism himself.” (22:32)

The Rise of Putin & Unfinished Legacies

• The episode traces the succession from Yeltsin to Putin, with Gorbachev initially supportive but later disillusioned, especially as Russia regressed on freedoms (25:15–26:26).
• Gorbachev’s controversial support for Russia’s annexation of Crimea (“Crimea is Russia. Let someone prove the opposite.”) illustrates the complexity of his positions in his final years (26:26).
• By the time of the invasion of Ukraine, Gorbachev is said to have been “devastated and traumatized by Putin’s actions,” though he made no public comment (27:01).

War in Ukraine: Roots and Repercussions

• Hosts debate how much today’s Russian aggression is rooted in unresolved traumas from the USSR’s collapse: “The Russian sense of grievance is one that traces itself back to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union’s collapse.” – Peter Frankopan (28:33–30:10)
• Afua links the unresolved, unfinished nature of the Soviet breakup to the ease with which Putin has mobilized grievance:
  “It wasn’t deliberate. … In the morass of all those unresolved issues, there are so many grievances, and there is so much potential for this populist, nationalist, aggressive, hawkish mentality.” (30:10)

The Final Judgments

• Gorbachev’s death in August 2022 is met with grand tributes in the West and indifference in Russia—Putin even skips the funeral, citing a busy schedule (32:31).
• The hosts philosophically assess whether anyone could have managed the transition better, comparing the case to China’s distinct approach and success (33:05–34:47).
• On whether the former Soviet republics are better off, Peter contends that, broadly, independence and reform have brought greater freedoms, though progress is varied (36:01).
• Gorbachev’s own ambivalence and lingering bitterness are noted—he refused to take responsibility for the USSR’s collapse, insisting it was not his intention (37:34).

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Notable Quotes & Moments with Timestamps

• On Gorbachev’s sense of impending doom during the coup:
  “Something is happening. Perhaps something terrible… It may end badly for all of us.” – (03:42)
• On national identity under Soviet repression:
  “He really didn’t understand the strength of nationalist feeling…The Soviet Union never succeeded in obscuring those national identities, it never succeeded in diminishing them.” – Afua Hirsch (07:34)
• On the symbolism of the Pizza Hut advert:
  “You couldn't really think of a better way of illustrating the triumph of American capitalism in the Cold War, and how ultimately Gorbachev has to bow at its feet, even to honour his own legacy.” – Afua Hirsch (20:04)
• On Putin and grievances fueling war:
  “The Russian sense of grievance… traces itself back to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union’s collapse.” – Peter Frankopan (28:33)
• Gorbachev’s final verdicts from the hosts:
  • Afua Hirsch: “Bloody, unsuccessful, Leninist.” (38:47)
  • Peter Frankopan: “Idealistic, naive and incompetent.” (38:54)

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Important Segment Timestamps

• Failed 1991 coup and prelude: 03:42–05:47
• Collapse of the USSR and Gorbachev’s resignation: 15:44–16:45
• Pizza Hut commercial and post-Soviet symbolism: 17:45–21:10
• Putin’s rise, Crimea, and legacy debates: 25:15–30:59
• The Ukraine question & connection to Gorbachev: 27:01–32:31
• Final evaluation of Gorbachev’s legacy: 33:05–38:54

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Episode Tone & Style

Frankopan and Hirsch blend historical narrative with pointed analysis and occasional wry humor. Their exchanges are candid, sometimes biting, always deeply engaged with the moral, political, and personal complexities of their subject.

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Summary for New Listeners

This episode delivers a nuanced, gripping account of Gorbachev’s fall and the unwinding of the Soviet empire, while situating his legacy at the faultline between Western optimism and Russian resentment. It’s both a crash course in recent history and an invitation to wrestle with the ambiguity of “great lives”—what they intend and what they leave behind. Whether you view Gorbachev as a hero, a scapegoat, or a tragic figure, this episode offers rich context, sharp debate, and memorable moments that illuminate why his legacy is still fiercely contested.

Transcript

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[Peter Frankopan]

Hello and welcome to a special Legacy encore episode.

[Afua Hirsch]

While we take a short break, we're dipping back into the archive to revisit some of our favorite episodes. And this is is one of Peter's greatest hits.

[Peter Frankopan]

So here we go then. The life and the legacy of Mikhail Gorbachev.

[Afua Hirsch]

We'll let the episode speak for itself, but before we do, here's a quick reminder that the full back catalogue is always there for you to explore. Welcome to Legacy, for the fourth and final part of our series on Mikhail Gorbachev, a man still fondly regarded in the West. Rather less so back in the old Soviet Union.

[Peter Frankopan]

When we left you at the end of episode three, the Berlin Wall has collapsed and Gorbachev is under increasing fire from his critics on both sides. Those who think his reforms are going too far, and those who think they're not going far enough.

[Afua Hirsch]

Only six years into his reign, it's the hard line Communists who try and strike the decisive blow.

[Peter Frankopan]

August 18, 1991. Vilizaria Foros Crimea with the phone cradled to his ear, Mikhail Gorbachev looks out onto the gently lapping waters of the Black Sea. On the other end, his vice president, Gennady Yanaev, confirms the plan for Gorbachev's return from vacation. Tomorrow I'll greet you off the plane myself, Mikhail. For two weeks, Gorbachev and his family have been holidaying in the sun. Each day he swims in the sea, reads and spends time with his grandchildren. But today he has work to do. Later, Gorbachev hears a knock at the door. His bodyguard appears, eyes darting about the room anxiously. Sir, a group of men has arrived. He moves towards the phone on his desk. General Kuchkov and Defense Minister Yazov are with them. Gorbachev feels a prickle of alarm. He's not expecting anyone, especially not a general. He watches the blood drain from his bodyguard's face as he holds up the receiver. The phone lines have been cut. Gorbachev bolts from his study and gathers his family. Something is happening. Perhaps Something terrible, he says. And then he adds gravely, it may end badly for all of us. With fear in her eyes, Raisa squeezes his hand reassuringly. I'll be with you no matter what. Returning to his study, he's shocked to see the men already there. All are familiar to him. Most he considers allies. General Kruchkov announces they are from the Committee on Emergency Rule, convened to stop the country sliding into catastrophe. We demand you sign a letter declaring a state of emergency or authorize Vice President Janaev to do so. Gorbachev feels anger burning in his throat. Who are you to ask me anything? There's a gleam in the general's eyes when he replies, make this easy on yourself. Comradynaev is already with us. Gorbachev feels stab of dread. Yanayev a traitor. Who else has betrayed him? Immediately, Yeltsin's face flashes into his mind. With rising panic, Gorbachev realizes either he's the one behind all this, or his only hope of salvation. From wondery and goal hanger. I'm Peter Frankopan.

[Afua Hirsch]

I'm AFWA Hersh.

[Peter Frankopan]

And this is Legacy, the show that tells the stories of some of the most extraordinary men and women to have lived and asks if they have the reputation they deserve.

[Afua Hirsch]

Mikhail gorbachev episode 4 the man who lost an empire. Well, this somewhat farcical coup is led by the Vice President of the Soviet Union, Gennady Yanaev, and assorted military officers who form the snappily named State Committee on the State of Emergency. The coup fails, but what has led us to this stage? Let's rewind a little and fill in what's been happening since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

[Peter Frankopan]

Well, the first thing to say is that Gorbachev's reforms, pierostroika and glasnost have turned into an economic disaster. By 1991, there are serious shortages of food, medicine, fuel and consumer goods. Even buying the basics means standing in line for hours. Inflation is running at 300%, but it's.

[Afua Hirsch]

Communism collapsing that drives the coup attempt. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, socialist governments have been overthrown in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia. And the Warsaw Pact has been dissolved.

[Peter Frankopan]

In the Soviet Union in 1990, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Armenia all declare independence. In Lithuania, Soviet troops are sent in to quell the uprising, but are forced into a humiliating retreat when pro independence protesters, including two of the country's most famous basketball players, set up barricades outside the Supreme Council building.

[Afua Hirsch]

In response, Gorbachev comes up with the new Union treaty aiming to shore up the remaining nine republics into a union of states with a common president and military. The treaty is on the verge of being signed when the coup is staged. So all of this begs the question, was all of this Gorbachev's fault or was it inevitable that it would happen?

[Peter Frankopan]

Anyway, I think the barn door is open and the horse has bolted. I mean, I'm not sure what else could have happened. I mean, the desire for autonomy and for independence had been something expressed at the time of the Russian revolution revolution in 1917. One of the first things that the Bolsheviks had done was to give free determination to all peoples who've been subjects of the Russian czar. And so those desires for the Baltic states and others to be able to choose their own leaders and have their own identities was hugely significant. And there'd been many times in the previous 20 or 30 years where national identities had been suppressed. Not least in Ukraine in the 1970s, any form of expression of national identity had been clamped down on extremely hard. So I think with the freedoms heading out in towards central Eastern Europe, with the demands for independence, I'm not quite sure what Gorbachev could have done. He tried sending the tanks, he did send the tanks into Lithuania. People died as a result. But, you know, perhaps not surprisingly, Soviet soldiers didn't want to fire and shoot at their own families and friends. So I'm not sure much could have been done a bit late by now. I mean, do you think that empires can be patched together once the cement comes out of the wall that holds them up?

[Afua Hirsch]

It certainly seems, and the west interpreted it this way in real time when it happened that the fall of the Berlin Wall was the genie escaping the bot. I mean, it was regarded as the beginning of the end for the entire Soviet arrangement by Western commentators. And it's just so fascinating to me that Gorbachev thought that it could just be a little blip while they managed business as usual. I wonder whether during his life in the Soviet Union, he mistook the repression of the different republics within the Soviet Union as allegiance to the Soviet project, when actually it was by force. And he really didn't understand the strength of nationalist feeling, because the. The Soviet Union never succeeded in obscuring those national identities, it never succeeded in diminishing them. Underneath this greater Communist project, they always stayed alive. And, you know, I'm a big student of identity in different contexts and how powerful a psychological and political force it can be, and the speed with which these countries in the Baltics and Eastern Europe and Central Asia were able to mobilize around this strong narrative that they'd always had a different identity and they always had a different destiny, and that that could be capitalized so quick, efficiently into these independence movements. It seems, and again, hindsight is always a 2020 vision, but it seems inevitable. And I struggle with understanding how Gorbachev couldn't have anticipated that domino effect. And I'm sure all of this was not helped by the catastrophic economic situation. It is an important factor, isn't it, Peter? Things were really, really bad. And when people are experiencing very practical hardship in accessing food and medicine and their standard of living is plummeting and inflation is going through the roof, it's a very bad time to encour, to see you as a leader taking them into new pastures in which they'll thrive. You can have economic hardship and stability elsewhere, or you can have political instability if economic conditions are good. But to have both at the same time is not a recipe for success.

[Peter Frankopan]

No, I think that's exactly right. And the problem is that when you have moments like that, you want someone to appear with a vision that can tell you what the answer is. You know, where do you go? How do you solve these problems? And Gorbachev, despite having been young and tomorrow's man, almost overnight, becomes yesterday's figure. In fact, he tried to stand down before the coup in August, in April, as a way of forcing a process of reform, saying that he's not been taken seriously enough. But that hadn't worked out either. One of his great regrets when he talked about it later is that he wished that he'd resigned sooner. The key, I think, was to find a different vision to the one that Gorbachev had given, because he became the obvious scapegoat.

[Afua Hirsch]

So where is Boris Yeltsin in all this, given that the coup, it later emerged, was actually being orchestrated by hardline communist elements, not by those on Boris Yeltsin's side? Well, it turns out he is the big winner in the failed coup attempt.

[Peter Frankopan]

Well, while Gorbachev is holed up in Crimea and he's held hostage, in fact, that doesn't even work either. I mean, they can't even organise a proper coup to get Gorbachev out the way. Yeltsin is the one who strides out to the front and puts his own life at considerable risk, standing in front of the White House in Moscow to try and get the troops to stand down. And that's an act of great personal bravery. I mean, I'm not sure how many people would have it in themselves to do that because the troops would have had orders to deal with him. But he was popular, Yeltsin, he was seen as a man of the people. I suspect it would be the other way around, and Gorbachev standing there, that he might not have made it. But Yeltsin becomes the great winner of the coup because he's seen as the one who wants reforms, as being brave. He's seen as the person who's going to offer a different future for at least Russia, maybe for beyond. But that comes as a personal problem for Gorbachev, you know, that his nemesis has stolen the thunder and looks like the savior figure.

[Afua Hirsch]

Let's just take a minute to think about the Gorbachev Yeltsin positioning during this coup, because you would think on the one hand that, you know, the old adage, your enemy's enemy is your friend, that Yeltsin, being Gorbachev's nemesis, would align himself with whoever was trying to get rid of Gorbachev. But actually, he makes a different calculation. How insightful do you think that was? Do you think he foresaw that if he successfully prevented the coup against Gorbachev, it would put him in a position where he could leverage that to further his own agenda? Was that a deliberate calculation he made?

[Peter Frankopan]

Well, so the year before the coup, Yeltsin had been elected chairman of the Russian Republic, partly to thumb the nose at Gorbachev. Everybody knew there was rivalry. I think as this all played out, I wouldn't have thought that Gorbachev and his fate were playing high in Yeltsin's mind. I think it was about survival. It was about winding down tanks on the street. And this is two years after the Tiananmen Square, after all, where there'd been bloodshed in the centre of Beijing, where the Communist Party authorities there had unleashed hell. And I think Yeltsin was above all thinking about how to avoid that. And the tanks fired on the parliamentary building in Moscow. And I think for Yeltsin, it was about making sure that he too would survive. You know, personally, if there was to be a revolution of new kinds, then he didn't want to be on the wrong end of it. And, you know, the scene we just heard of Gorbachev when the coup happens and saying something awful is about to happen will remind anybody who's studied their Russian history of the scenes where the Tsar is executed, where people turn up at his house unannounced in Yekaterinburg and execute the Tsar, his wife and their children. And so that process, that change in Russia only happens through drama and through violence is what's playing in everybody's mind here. So I think for Yeltsin, it's not so much can he benefit and catapult himself into the senior position. It's can you manage this transition without very severe bloodshed, which is what it looked like at the time in 1991, watching this all play out, it looked like the tinderbox was all ready to go up. And again, the fact that it was diffused does speak a lot, I think, about personal courage, personal characteristics, and the fact that Yeltsin could convince all the plotters, all the different sides, that they should back off and allow him to have a chance to frame things in different ways. If you're cynical, it's because maybe Yeltsin looked a bit like Tony Blair would be later. All things to all men. And that is a political skill to have that you can get everybody from the spectrum to stand behind you. And Gorbachev obviously hadn't been able to do that.

[Afua Hirsch]

After the failure of the coup, events move rapidly.

[Guest or Interviewee]

Such is the confidence of the Yeltsin supporters that tonight they've dared to deface this KGB monument. Their faith in their own victory has now taken them out beyond just the Russian Parliament building. They're beginning to claim Moscow as their own.

[Afua Hirsch]

After only six years in office, the Gorbachev era is now coming to a brutal end.

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[Peter Frankopan]

The evening after the failed coup attempt, Mikhail Gorbachev returns to Moscow and thanks his old enemy, Boris Yeltsin, for his help in undermining it. Some of the coup organizers take their own lives, the rest are fired and Communist Party activity is suspended. Yeltsin, though, gets in one final dig that it was Gorbachev himself, after all, who'd appointed the men who organised the coup.

[Afua Hirsch]

In December 1991, the remaining republics agree to form the Commonwealth of Independent States, or cis. The biggest of those states, Russia, will be led by Boris Yeltsin. The Soviet Union is no more. Gorbachev has no country left to govern. It's agreed that he will announce his resignation on Christmas Day.

[News Reporter]

The red flag came down over the Kremlin tonight as President Gorbachev resigned and brought to an end seven decades of Communist rule in the Soviet Union, right to the last. Mr. Gorbachev said he was unhappy at the breakup of the country, but he pledged to do everything he could for the new Commonwealth of Independent Republics.

[Peter Frankopan]

In the United Kingdom, Margaret Thatcher, the woman who brought Gorbachev's name to the attention of the world and who has herself been kicked out of office by her own party, is asked to pay tribute.

[Guest or Interviewee]

You do business with personalities and you look into a character and personality to see whether there is there great sincerity, whether there is there a real desire to change things. And it was a right judgment, wasn't it? We could not only do business with him, but he did great things for the world.

[Peter Frankopan]

Gorbachev's years out of office follow the usual pattern. He spends more time with Raisa, he writes his memoirs. He sets up a foundation to try to keep his ideas alive and to criticize those of Boris Yeltsin. He goes on lucrative speaking tours of the west and the Far East. And he finds other novel ways of making money.

[Afua Hirsch]

November 18, 1997. Pizza Hut, Red Square, Moscow. From his seat in the corner of the restaurant, Mikhail Gorbachev sits blinking into a wall of lights. The smell of cooling pizza wafts up from the table as his granddaughter Anastasia fidgets beside him. He hears a voice call out from behind the camera in front of him, now, sir, if you could pick up a slice of pizza and take a bite. Gorbachev folds his arms and snaps back, I won't eat it. It's in the contract that I don't actually have to eat the pizza. After a short, tense silence, the director replies, what about Anastasia? Gorbachev stares into the cherubic face of his granddaughter. And in an instant, his bad mood is gone. He nods and watches her excitedly plant an oozing piece of pizza into her mouth. As they reposition the cameras for the next shot, he recalls Raisa's worries that taking part in the commercial might harm his reputation. But he was assured the advert wouldn't be shown in Russia. And while he has some reservations, the offer was too good to turn down, particularly with Yeltsin frustrating his fundraising efforts for the Gorbachev Foundation. With the money, he'll build a library and perestroika archive, a lasting monument to his vision of a new Russia. A final word on his time in office. On the next table, a group of actors playing a family are going over their lives. The gruff father blames Gorbachev for the political instability and economic chaos engulfing the country. However, his 20 something son promotes freedom and opportunity as the Gorbachev legacy. The right to eat pizza. As he listens, Gorbachev reflects on what he's hearing. In truth, they're both right. The country's social and political uncertainty is undeniable. But a new generation has been liberated from the burdens of the past. He smiles at Anastasiev and thinks of the money.

[Peter Frankopan]

Sometimes not brings people together like a nice hot pizza from Pizza Hut. God, how the mighty are fallen.

[Afua Hirsch]

It's also a powerful metaphor that in order to fund an archive that keeps the memory of perestroika alive, he has to perform in that ultimate temple of capitalism. A TV ad for Pizza Hut. You couldn't really think of a better way of illustrating the triumph of American capitalism in the Cold War and how ultimately Gorbachev has to bow at its feet, even to honour his own legacy.

[Peter Frankopan]

But just six years after he'd been one of the two most powerful people on earth and you know, no matter what you're getting paid, it can't be worth it. Why go to the indignity of having in your contract that you won't have to eat a slice, that somehow that's the bit you want to answer, that's.

[Afua Hirsch]

How you're holding onto your dignity. I think whatever you think of Gorbachev, it is a sad and undignified end to his political public facing career. And it's something that he is actually remembered for. I mean, that ad lives on on YouTube. And of course, in 1997, it may not have occurred to him that whether or not it was broadcast on TV in Russia, in a few years everyone would be able to see everything everywhere.

[Peter Frankopan]

I guess you've got on the One hand, Gorbachev's bad judgment to do it. You know, just say no or think of other things that might be not quite so bad. But, you know, we've just been talking about a failed coup, but what a coup for Pizza Hut. That the way to show that you are the best fast food company in the world and that how triumphant you are is that you can afford to get a man who's sold out the Communist ide in return for money. I mean, that's really what it's all about.

[Afua Hirsch]

The fact that there is Pizza Hut in Russia is in itself a symbol of what perestroika ultimately led to, which was the floodgates opening to capitalist consumerism.

[Peter Frankopan]

Yeah, look, and I think that's one of the ways in why Gorbachev is so detested in Russia. It wasn't just because the Pizza Hut advert, I don't think that moves the needle. But it was that Gorbachev was willing to let his dignity go, you know, that he had got so many of these big calls wrong. And that as the story grew after 1991, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it was that Russia had been treated badly. You know, the consumerism, the rampant capitalism, you know, the fast cars and the obscene wealth that's been generated. Gorbachev was seen as the man who unlocked that. So putting the pizza to one side, it was more that. It wasn't just that he oversaw the destruction of the Soviet Union and led it to the brink. It was that the world that came out as a result. He has responsibility for. For the unpleasant bits of Russia, the uncomfortable bits of Russia that followed. And, you know, he didn't read those tea leaves even after he'd resigned.

[Afua Hirsch]

And it's ironic because he wasn't actually personally somebody who coveted great wealth or excess. After he was no longer Secretary General, no longer president, he lived quite modestly. He never became a billionaire with yachts and jets and huge mansions. And in fact, the reason he did that Pizza Hut ad, and the reason he did lots of his lucrative public speaking was to fund his foundation. He was more interested in keeping his legacy alive than in enjoying the trappings of this new world of consumerism himself. He didn't really participate enthusiastically in it in the way that his successors certainly have. Gorbachev does make a brief comeback to politics in 1996, running against Boris Yeltsin in the Russian presidential elections. Aside from the politics, the one true love of Mikhail Gorbachev's life, his wife raisa, dies in 1999 after being diagnosed with leukaemia, Gorbachev releases an album of Russian romantic ballads sung by himself called Songs for Eisa and writes a book about their romance. He said that since she died, life was not worth living for him.

[Peter Frankopan]

Yeah, look, I think as a devoted man and as a decent man, I don't think there's any problem about that. You know, I think Gorbachev was trying to do the right thing. He just got lots of decisions wrong. I think that was the problem.

[Afua Hirsch]

Quite made decisions quite badly wrong.

[Peter Frankopan]

But, you know, but there were many beneficiaries to, you know, eastern Central Europe to start with, and then identities of peoples all around the former Soviet Union also have him to thank. They might not have respect him, he might not have done it intentionally, but, you know, that was a big change. But, you know, he did live out the rest of his life, I think, watching that world that he'd helped create, inadvertently or otherwise. And he continued to play the retired statement, giving lectures, doing interviews and capitalizing on his fame in the West. But one issue did then throw his legacy back into the limelight, and that's Ukraine.

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[Peter Frankopan]

Boris Yeltsin has succeeded in making history yet again by being the first ever Russian leader to step down voluntarily rather than die or be forcibly removed from office.

[Russian Commentator]

Yeltsin should have left a long time ago, said this man. The country needs changes, not a person who knows only how to drink champagne.

[Afua Hirsch]

When Mikhail Gorbachev's nemesis, Boris Yeltsin, resigns as Russian president in 1999, his deputy is the man to take over. 1 Vladimir Putin.

[Russian Commentator]

A surprised prime minister, Putin hurriedly cancelled plans to travel with his family to St Petersburg, where he'd made arrangements to celebrate the New Year with relatives and friends. Instead, he's now moving into the President's quarters inside the Kremlin.

[Peter Frankopan]

Appearing at Putin's inauguration ceremony is a figure who hasn't entered the Kremlin in eight years. None other than Mikhail Gorbachev.

[Afua Hirsch]

At first, Gorbachev is a supporter of Putin, although to be fair, he'd be a supporter of anyone who isn't Boris Yeltsin. In 2002, Gorbachev praises the Putin government, saying their policies are in the interests of the majority. Putin even seeks Gorbachev's advice on international affairs.

[Peter Frankopan]

Their relationship, though, cools over the years, and Gorbachev alternates between support and criticism of the Russian president. He does, however, support Moscow's seizure of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. Crimea is Russia, says Gorbachev. Let someone prove the opposite. Shortly after 4 o' clock this morning, I spoke to President Zelensky of Ukraine. Because our worst fears have now come true and all our warnings have proved tragically accurate. President Putin of Russia has unleashed war in our European countries continent.

[Afua Hirsch]

By the time of Putin's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Gorbachev is nearing the end of his life and makes no public comment. But friends say he is devastated and traumatized by Putin's actions. So how much can we trace the rise of Putin and the war in Ukraine back to the Gorbachev era? This is a big question for his legacy, because as we record this in 2024, it is the biggest question about how Russia is conducting itself on the world stage. It has reinserted Russia into the Western imagination as a nemesis and a threat to global security. And it feels as if since the annexation of Crimea and everything that's happened since Russia has gone backwards, both in terms of living standards and the economic and social reality inside Russia, but also in terms of how the rest of the world, and especially the west, sees Russia as this threatening aggressor. It feels like a return to the kind of hostilities of the Cold War. Even as we talked in an earlier episode about what it was like living with the threat of nuclear Armageddon in the 1980s, it's not the same as living through the Cuban Missile Crisis or what was happening in the 80s. But there have been moments since the start of the war in Ukraine that people have really felt afraid of what would happen if there was an escalation, if America got involved, conversation about the nuclear arsenal. So it feels like in so many ways a return to the hostilities of the past.

[Peter Frankopan]

I think that's right. I mean, we sometimes need to look at it from other points of view and not to validate them, but to see how this seems from Moscow's point of view. I spend a lot of time reading the Russian press, watching Russian tv. And the brutal attacks on Ukraine are seen by many in Russia as restoring Russia's dignity. Other people being taught a lesson, the west being stood up to finally, that the United States and its allies pushed too far, pushed Russia into a corner, and are now getting their just desserts. So, you know, I think that that doesn't excuse what's happened. But, you know, I think that that's why there's a great deal of support in Russia for what Russia has been trying to do, not just in Ukraine, but they've responded to Putin being a strong man who is willing to try and stand up for Russia. And that provides, obviously, the context of the problems we have today, of what looks like it's a statement of defiance on the one hand, being a statement of aggression on the other. But, you know, some of it, I think, is to do with the traumas and the legacies that the Soviet Union and its collapse left on a reasonably small number of people. And now, because of what's happened in Ukraine, so many young professionals have left Russia or tried to leave Russia. And like you said, the economy has faltered, although not as much as some had thought that it would do. But I think that the driving message that Putin's been trying to sell for the last 20 years, particularly over Ukraine, is that Russia is getting what is just, and it will get what's just in its own eyes, in whichever way it means, including if that means shelling theaters filled with children or hospitals. And that's a failure of diplomacy. That's a failure of our ability to talk to each other. But the Russian sense of grievance is one that traces itself back to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union's collapse.

[Afua Hirsch]

I absolutely agree with that. I don't think Putin would be able to rely on that narrative and that grievance if it weren't for the unresolved issues that arise from the ways in which the Soviet Union was disbanded. It wasn't a finished project. It wasn't deliberate. It didn't involve the consensus of Russian people and the constituent parts of the former Soviet Union. And in the morass of all those unresolved issues, there are so many grievances, and there is so much potential for this populist, nationalist, aggressive, hawkish mentality. And we see that in other former empires that have declined that there is this real grievance and this loss of pride that can be weaponized by a cynical leader who wants to pursue their own agenda. It's so easy to fold the vision of rebuilding the once great nation into that agenda.

[Peter Frankopan]

I think it's worse here. I mean, Russia gave territorial and sovereign guarantees to Ukraine and its territorial integrity. Then when you read what Putin has said about Ukraine, what Putin has written about Ukraine saying that there are either states that are colonies, and Ukraine doesn't have the right to be an independent state, you know, so that this is part of a former Russian world or part of a Russian world that deserves to be Russian, that those questions about international law and about recognitions and about guarantees given by the Russian government are changeable. They could be moved around the goalposts. And I think that there Gorbachev was slightly caught in Ukraine. I mean, he was not allowed to go and visit Kyiv because of his outspoken support in 2014. And I think that sort of bewildering trajectory that Russia has chosen over the last two or three years to look for confrontation and to invest into confrontation and war has been astonishing to watch, partly because the goals that Russia gets to achieve in Ukraine by flattening territory and conquering don't seem to be worthwhile. It's such a tiny percentage of land to add to Russia for no obvious benefit. But Gorbachev in Russia is seen as someone who helped pull the threads out and make life harder for Russia, and that those are now being fixed by a strongman who's going to make Russia great again. But I think Gorbachev, in terms of providing the historical grievance and the battlegrounds for those to play out, absolutely is implicated, if not the primary actor in the final years of his life. Mikhail Gorbachev suffers multiple health problems and is frequently in and out of hospital. His death at the age of 91 is announced on 30 August 2022.

[Afua Hirsch]

In the west, there are fulsome tributes to the man who ended the Cold War and brought freedom and democracy to millions. By contrast, the Russian media have little if anything to say about his political career. Vladimir Putin manages to muster deepest condolences, but says he won't be attending the funeral due to to his busy schedule.

[Peter Frankopan]

Mikhail Gorbachev's coffin is lowered in the rain to rest next to his wife Raisa at Moscow's Novodievichy cemetery. And with it, the last surviving leader of the Soviet Union is gone.

[Afua Hirsch]

How then can we, Peter, sum up the legacy of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev after this epic journey we've taken across four episodes?

[Peter Frankopan]

Well, I guess the really interesting question is could anybody have done it differently if instead of Gorbachev there being another bushy eyebrowed old man put in charge, or someone who'd sat on the Soviet Union and repressed on a higher scale, you know, I wonder, maybe the pot would have boiled over more aggressively and worse. Maybe there are outcomes that could have been worse than Gorbachev's.

[Afua Hirsch]

You know what I'm thinking about? Is China. And I think you can't overstate the importance of the economic challenges that the Soviet Union was facing. I think if, if a bushy eyed Politburo nomenclature had been able to crack economic growth, had been able to deliver a system in the command economy that could at least satisfy the basic needs of its citizens, let alone if it, as China has, had been able to grow exponentially. That seems to be the only model for competing in a world where globalized capitalism really is the dominant ideology. China has survived because it has performed this economic miracle and that has allowed it to continue perpetuating political and social repression while delivering this huge growth. And it's also allowed it to emerge as a superpower. Whereas Russia was in decline as a superpower, it wasn't able to meet the basic needs of its citizens. By the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev was having to go with a begging bowl in hand to Western leaders asking for money. There's no way an ideology as opposite it to the west as communism can survive at the same time as having that little control over your domestic economic situation.

[Peter Frankopan]

Well, you know, you mentioned rightly before 2020 vision, with hindsight, no intelligence analyst, no foreign service predicted that this would happen in 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall. You know, everybody thought that the Soviet bloc would hold together, that the tanks would roll through the streets of European cities again if need be. And the speed at which that change happened caught everybody by surprise. So you're right. Now, looking back on it, how on earth could this possibly be viable? You reform, how could you have an economy that was efficient, but you know, they didn't do too badly. You know, they stuck together for the best part of 70 years. The Soviet Union, more than 70 years, blundering on and managing to compete across maybe not every sector, but in quite a few.

[Afua Hirsch]

Do you think this is a big question, Peter, that people in the former countries of the Soviet Union are better off now than they were under the Soviet system? And I'm thinking of the countries of Central Europe. If you look at Central Asia, where there are still political dictatorships, and there are in many of those countries a lack of political freedom, not that differentiated from life under the Soviet Union, where there isn't a distribution of income along communist ideals. Is life better for the average person in Central Asia or in Russia than it was under Gorbachev?

[Peter Frankopan]

Yes, because they have food on their shelves, they have education systems, they don't have complete freedoms. You're quite right that these are in many cases Economies and societies still in transition, some moving at different paces to others. But you look at the Baltic states have been a sort of fountain of innovation of all kinds and of open societies, accountabilities and so on. So I think, taken as a whole, what one probably wants to look at is do people have freedoms that they didn't have in the Soviet Union and whose freedoms are lower than they are today? And in the list of countries, Russia probably sits quite low down that list, whereas others have done much better. So I think that in that sense, from my perspective, independence movements and breakups of empires, I'm sure we're on the same page, are always empowering. They always help minorities, they help people who have been persecuted to be able to flourish. And there are lots of things that could work better in lots of former parts of the Soviet Union. But what you ideally want are conditions of stability that allow you to make decisions. Those get compromised if you have warfare, command economies. And the Russia of today, because of the war in Ukraine, looks more and more like the old Soviet Union, where the government has first dibs on, on resources, on people, on labor, and can choose the direction. And those command economies, they come at a price of all kinds of freedoms. So, you know, I think that it's very hard to tell how this all ends and when it ends, if it ends. But the return to peace allows for societies to blossom and flourish. And the current conditions are ones that are worrying, particularly because it may be that the scenes we see now are going to get worse rather than get better, better.

[Afua Hirsch]

It was really interesting to hear Gorbachev speak about his own legacy. Right at the end of his life, he was so bitter about Putin, wouldn't say his name, clearly felt that he had taken Russia back to the pre perestroika, pre glasnost idea about freedom and openness. But he also refused to take any personal responsibility for the collapse of the Soviet Union. He would not accept that.

[Guest or Interviewee]

He.

[Afua Hirsch]

He brought about that collapse, which suggested to me that he still struggled to reconcile the fact that that had happened. It really wasn't his intention. He did not mean to break up the Soviet Union. He did not mean to let go of this project. And if you judge him, you know, we always talk about, should you judge people by the standards of their time? I mean, we in some way were contemporaries of Gorbachev. We lived while he was alive. It's not about whether we should judge him by the standards of the time, because it kind of still is the time, but it's, should we judge him by his own standards. Standards. And in his own standards as a communist and as somebody who took pride in the existence of the Soviet Union, I think he did a pretty bad job.

[Peter Frankopan]

Well, we're going to find out, Afra, because I'm going to ask you for your three words about Gorbachev to get your final summary of what Gorbachev and.

[Afua Hirsch]

His legacy are Bloody, unsuccessful, Leninist.

[Peter Frankopan]

Not bad.

[Afua Hirsch]

Thanks. What are your three words, Peter?

[Peter Frankopan]

I would probably go for idealistic, naive and incompetent. A little bit of something in there for him. The idealism, you know, I think there's something there, but the execution was terrible. That brings us to the end of our series on Mikhail Gorbachev. Thank you for listening to Legacy.

[Afua Hirsch]

Don't forget to hit subscribe on your favorite podcast player. You can also watch all our episodes on YouTube, so make sure you're subscribed there too.

[Peter Frankopan]

And of course, we're on all the media, social socials and the links are in the show notes for this episode or just search Legacy Podcast. I'm Peter Frankopan.

[Afua Hirsch]

I'm Afua Hirsch.

[Peter Frankopan]

And we'll see you for the next episode of Legacy.

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