Afua Hersh (3:19)

I'm Afua Hersh.

Peter Frankopan (3:21)

And this is Legacy, the show that explores the lives, events and ideas that have shaped our world and asks whether they have the reputations that they truly deserve.

Afua Hersh (3:37)

This is Iran seen from the inside and out.

Peter Frankopan (3:47)

Today we're joined by Professor Ali Ansari, one of the world's most renowned and interesting specialists working on the history of Iran and also a good friend. Ali is professor of Iranian History at the University of St. Andrews and the founding director of the Institute for Iranian Studies there. And for years, his work has helped to open up Iran's past and present to wider audiences without flattening its complexity and richness.

Afua Hersh (4:13)

And what makes Ali's writing and thinking so valuable is the way he places contemporary Iran in a much wider historical frame as a civilization with deep memories of empire, of vulnerability, negotiation and survival, while also being precise about how power actually works inside the Islamic Republic today. From the Supreme Leader's office to the IRGC and to the everyday machinery of

Peter Frankopan (4:39)

the state, at the moment when Iran's relationship with the United States once again feels very delicately poised between confrontation and accommodation, Ali brings a rare combination of historical depth, institutional insight, and calm, skeptical clarity to a story that is too often told in slogans rather than put in context. We hope you're going to enjoy this one.

Afua Hersh (5:00)

Thank you for listening to Legacy. Sign up to Legacy plus to enjoy bonus content, early access, fewer ads, Q&As and more, go to Legacy. Supportingcast FM Ali, it's so lovely to

Peter Frankopan (5:13)

see you and thank you for joining us. As I mentioned, you know, you're a superstar scholar, good to be here as well as a friend. Let's just start us off because not everybody listening is as well versed in the history of Southwest Asia or of Iran, Persia and so on. But just to explain to us why is it that Persia and Iran has played Such an important role in regional and global histories over the course of the last two or three thousand years. Easy question.

Professor Ali Ansari (5:41)

Well, I mean, part of. Yeah, really easy question. I mean, partly it's geopolitical. I mean, it's basically the way in which the Middle east, the lay of the land, so to speak, so that those powers that dominate the Iranian plateau tend to have a reach further out into Mesopotamia and parts of Anatolia and of course, in Central Asia. And I think, you know, it's a sort of geographic reach that it's had in the states that have operated in that area have been able to sort of exert a certain amount of influence, not necessarily as much as their rivals, it has to be said. I mean, the Persians have not been as dominant in the areas. The Ottomans to the west and even, you know, with the Moguls in the east have been, you know, more powerful than one. In absolute terms. The Persians or the Iranians, whichever term you prefer to use, have actually also noted, just simply been sort of political players. They've been, I, and in my view, certainly much more important cultural players. I mean, they, they, they are, in a sense, they've been sort one of the cultural powerhouses of the area and that's been the way in which they've been able to exude influence over a broader territory. Though, you know, as we know, Peter, the sort of the, the Persian world is, is, is that sort of dominant area of the, the Persian language, history and culture. And it's been something that the successive Iranian sort of government regimes have been able to sort of express a degree of soft power throughout the region. So I think, you know, I think when you look at the, the way in which Iran or, you know, the successive states that have occupied that area have been able to exude influence, it's partly, obviously, that sort of the geopolitics, but it's, I think, quite heavily, you know, the, the political culture and the, and the cultural, cultural power it exudes.

Peter Frankopan (7:14)

I mean, here in the uk, you know, we have a kind of imperial legacy and imperial history where we sort of think globally for good and for bad. All the sins and the problems of empire obviously ratchet up in that too. But one of the things that Iran has before the revolution, 1979, of course, and then since, has been the idea that Iran and Persia is an empire that has a much bigger role to play than just looking after its own citizens. It has diasporas. It has those cultural legacies in different, many different parts. Well, not just regionally, but around the world too. How does that kind of imperial thinking reflect in today's Iran in terms of,

Professor Ali Ansari (7:48)

I mean, that's an, yeah, that's an enormously important point you make there, actually. And it's a, it's a sort of thing that a lot of, as we say, Johnny, come lately, if I may say so, to the, the whole issue of Iran have tended to ignore because they tend to see Iran as a sort of a, you know, and it's a part of the image it likes to present. Particularly the Islamic Republic is a sort of highly oppressed and, you know, the subject to imperial powers and this, that the other. And of course, it has been, I mean, it has been part of that sort of imperial competition in the region, but that doesn't mean that it, it hasn't been an empire in its own right and it hasn't perceived of itself as an empire in its own right. You know, I mean, I, I always say to people that when I was growing up in Iran, you know, when I was, you know, pre revolutionary, I think I'm one of the few people in the world that actually has a passport which says, you know, subject to an empire, you know, the empire of Iran. I mean, that's the way it was presented. You know, it's, it's, it's, it's a rarity in that sense. But actually that sort of imperial legacy, it casts an enormous shadow in the Islamic Republic. And, and, you know, I find also when I talk, when I used to, I should say, talk to some, you know, officials in the, is our republic, they were very sort of taken by the fact and rather enjoyed the fact actually, that, you know, that what they had is a sort of an imperial presence. And a lot of this is actually presented in terms of the fact that they're the oldest or the longest surviving state in the region. Some of the sort of nationalism goes very haywire, it has to be said. They sort of see themselves as an organic nation, it's sometimes said, you know, for how many thousands of years, I don't know. But it's, you know, it keeps extending. And that in their own mind's eye, gives them a certain sort of precedent, I suppose, them sort of rankings. But it's also. Yes, I mean, I think you're absolutely right to say that. They also feel they have a certain how should they obligation to, to exercise a bit of cultural and political muscle in the region. So, you know, you've seen that obviously in Iraq. I mean, the great paradox, I have to say, is that it was the Americans basically who allowed The Iranians finally to flex their imperial muscles by essentially, you know, in the global war on terror, effectively eliminating the Taliban initially certainly in Afghanistan and then of course, Saddam Hussein. And that allowed, you know, the Iranians to, to explore, shall we say, their broader hinterland. And, and they did so very enthusiastically. And you have this concept in Iran, by the way, that's very prominent. Again, people don't really see this, but it's, it's this sort of ancient Sassanian idea of Iran. Is that the Iran Shah or Iran Zanin, which is this sort of idea of Greater Iran, which is broadly speaking bordered by the Euphrates, you know, the Oxus, the Indus and then up Caucasus. And these are the areas that Iran considers to be near abroad in which it has a perfect right and responsibility actually to sort of, to be involved in.

Peter Frankopan (10:30)

Does that also produce a sort of degree of psychosis though as well? Because if you think of yourself as an empire, you look for your peer group competitors. So Iran sees itself as a kind of, as the most important power in its own region. And okay, you've had Ottomans, you've had different states around that have come and gone, but Iran still stands. Does that mean that Iran positions itself in its own sort of cosmology both before the Islamic Revolution and afterwards as a kind of peer group competitor to Russia, to China, to United Kingdom, to the United States? It sees itself as a great power amongst great powers.

Professor Ali Ansari (11:09)

Yes, I mean, I think, I think that's absolutely right. And right back into the 19th century, you know, they always had a very disdainful view of the Ottomans, for instance. I mean, they never took the, although they were quite fearful of the Ottomans as a military power, they never sort of saw them as sort of realistic sort of competitors in a cultural or a political sense, you know, long term sense. So they often saw themselves really, you know, they, they, they, they sought to identify or compare themselves to the British for instance, or, or indeed the Russians, but actually, interestingly, far more with the British. I mean, they had a sort of relationship with the British which was much more nuanced than I think the history often suggest. Partly because, you know, the British didn't certainly in the 19th century were not perceived as the sort of immediate threat that the Russians were. I mean, the Russians were a very immediate threat to the territorial integrity. But it's very striking. For instance, I mean, one of the things I always talk to students here, there's a, at the end of the Great War when the Iranians go to the palace peace conference and they're not allowed in, by the way. But, I mean, they send this rash delegation, very well prepared. And, you know, Iran in 1919 is politically empty. I mean, it has no power really at all. And yet it goes to the Paris Peace Conference with this sort of notion that the Russian Empire has collapsed, the Ottomans have collapsed, we're here, therefore we're one of the victors of the Great War, you know, and. And then they sort of lay claim to this territorial restitution, which is extraordinary, actually. I mean, they go to the, the British actually look at this and say, you know, you're being ridiculous. Basically, they claimed back all the Caucasian territories that the Russians had taken back to 1828, but then vast swathes of Central Asia and also Anatolia, to which, you know, the, the British sort of say this is completely unrealistic. You know, what, what do you think you're doing? But it, it was. For me, it's, it's a wonderful indication of the sort of cultural confidence and conceit, if you will, of Iranian diplomats in a sense that they so felt that, you know, despite the fact that we're, you know, we have. We don't even have a functioning central government at the moment, we do think that the world owes us because, frankly, we are the granddaddy of the region. And, you know, we are, as quite as you've said, you know, our peer group are, you know, are the major European powers in the United States, so on and so forth.

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Peter Frankopan (14:36)

I don't think we haven't got time this time to go through all the different occasions of interference by outside powers. Particularly the overthrow of Mossadegh in 1953 and the kind of the fiddling around, the disruptions that the west has caused. But in your book that you came out in 2024 on Iran, one of the points you make is about how the 1906 Constitutional Revolution has an important legacy of overspill, of setting up the idea that Iran is all, or Persia as it was. Iran are always being interfered with by other states of powers. You just mentioned the 1820s and the confrontations with Russia. I mean, how does that sense of paranoia. I think probably many listeners will think that that is just a signature of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and as this particular regime. But those ideas about fear of outside powers trying to undermine governments of Tehran has a long, deep history. I mean, how does that flow through into thinking in Iranian politics today?

Professor Ali Ansari (15:35)

Well, I mean, it obviously has a. It does. I mean, so you have to look at Iranian politics in this sort of dual structure. On the one hand, they see themselves as a sort of imperial power with great agency and, you know, their right to sort of interfere in left and right and center. On the other hand, they see themselves as a sort of victim of basically Western imperialism and subjected to that. And clearly in the 19th century, they're caught in this vice between the rival competitions of, you know, the competing powers of the British and the Russians. In strict terms, if you're looking absolute terms, the country that's done more damage to the territorial integrity of Iran has been the Russians. I mean, you know, it's. There's no, there's no competition there where, you know, the British have actually had a very mixed relationship, partly, obviously because of the debacle over Mossadegh, but also because, frankly, you know, the Iraq, the Iranians always felt that the British let them down. I mean, this is the difference. I mean, with the Russians, they had no such sort of expectations that the Russians were going to do any good. I mean, they always thought of the Russians as this great autocracy in the north and whatever with the British. And then latterly the Americans, they tended to feel that there was a sort of a distinction between policy and politics. So they found a lot of the politics of the British quite attractive. And this is the constitutional revolution, the establishment, parliamentary sort of democracy, constitutionalism, which was the British support, but then the British abandoned it. And because the British abandoned it, you know, many people in Iran sort of think, well, hang on a minute, we are basically in some ways emulating ideas that you have developed and this is very much in your favor. Why are you cutting and running? And of course, the British are cutting and running because they want to establish good relations with Russia. I mean, that's basically what it is. And you see this repeatedly, of course, and this is why there are two sort of narratives that grip the Iranian imagination in that sense. One is this sort of idea perfidious Albion, and it's a very sort of black and white primary colors anti imperialism. But the other one more interesting one to my mind, is this view that the west has constantly let us down. I mean, it's not that they are perfidious in that sense, it's that they've been woolly at the wrong times. You know, they have not stood up to the ideals of which they profess to promote. So I think that's a much more interesting dynamic, actually. And it also, you know, suggests to us and helps us understand why despite all these problems, by the way, Iran still remains, in social terms, much more Western leaning than almost any other country in the Middle East. I mean, they always look to the west as this, you know, your point there as the. Your cultural peer in that sense, your cultural equal. They look at the west in that sort of perspective.

Peter Frankopan (18:07)

Just to round that one, that one off, then. I mean, it's partly because that interpretation, analysis is not wrong, that Persia and Iran have been left high and dry and have been let down on significant occasions in the past. And the idea that what you're told across a negotiating table, that the signature on the other side might not be worth anything depending on how the world gets the wheels of the world, geopolitics turn, that there is a basic reality in that that reflects what the past experiences have been.

Professor Ali Ansari (18:40)

There is, I mean, one of the things that I suppose tries to help explain. For instance, now, if you're looking at the situation now, why is it that a number of Iranian sort of quite sort of senior human rights people actually in Iran have said, have called on the west to basically, you know, respond to this responsibility to protect. I mean, you know, they basically said, you know, this is your obligation. Why aren't you coming to help us now? You know, that's caused a lot of consternation in the Iranian communities, of course. I mean, you know, what do we do? Do we call for Western help? Do we not call for Western help? Have the west been, you know, have they betrayed us in the past? I always point out to people that if you have a sense of betrayal, the sense of betrayal is, is. Can only be generated by the fact that you had expectations of that other side to do something. I mean, that you had some sort of friendship with them, that you felt they let you down. And I think if you understand the Iranian relationship, the west in that more complex dynamic, a lot of other things become more apparent. You know, the emotional and intensity of that. Nobody cares about the Russians particularly. They get very anxious about the Russians, but nobody has any expectations for them. So there's no sense of sort of heightened anxiety, emotional betrayal, so on and so forth that might come with it. But they have felt actually that the British and latterly the Americans should have, you know, done something. Now that doesn't reflect really the official line of the Islamic Republic. Of course, that's the revolutionary regime that is vehemently anti Western. But originally, if you remember, you know, the revolution, when it was set up, was meant to be neither east nor West. They, because of political reasons, have obviously chummed it up with the Russians quite intimately. Now, historically speaking, it's not very popular in Iran. I mean, people sort of say, well, why are you cozying up to the Russians? They've never been good friends to us. But of course, there's a political reason for doing it, so they do it. And that just reminds us, of course, that these sort of relationships are deeply, you know, politically motivated, ideologically motivated. You shouldn't necessarily see in them something that is innate or organic or whatever. It isn't. It's more to do with the experience, the ideology and whatever. And the regime has a particular ideology which has fallen flat with the majority of its population. The majority of the population do not see that relationship quite in the way that the regime leadership does.

Afua Hersh (20:47)

I just want to pick up on that, Ali, because one of the narratives, I think, is confusing for people who don't have expertise on Iran, or maybe it's more of an allegation, is that there is this pro Western, I guess by definition, pro Western diaspora that are disproportionately vocal and audible and visible in international spaces, and that we pay attention to them because they're saying what we want to hear, that it's not a reflection of the authenticity view of Iranian people. And of course, you know, because it's so hard for outsiders to go to Iran and it's hard for the international media to be in Iran, it's difficult to really verify the audacity of that. I'm curious what you make of that narrative and whether there's any truth in it.

Professor Ali Ansari (21:28)

Well, I mean, I, you know, I think diasporas, you know, often diasporas can present a much more sort of extreme or, you know, radical version of some of the things that are being voiced inside Iran. But you would be wrong to assume that, you know, in some cases, you know, the diaspora is quite mixed, obviously. I mean, there are some that have come out of dissidents or opposition. They've suffered very heavily in the Islamic Republic. They come out and they multiply their anger when they're abroad. But then there are others in the diaspora who are all in favor of engagement and, you know, wanting to see the other side and this, that. So there's a whole range of views, by the way. And I mean, I think obviously, you know, we latch on to some of the more radical views, particularly once you see, you know, the sort of things that happened in Iran. I mean, my point is that whatever we think about the Islamic Republic, it's not a particularly benign regime. I mean, what it's done in the last two, three months has been pretty horrendous, and it shocked a lot of people, I mean, both in the diaspora and in Iran. And what you're finding actually is that the diaspora, curiously enough, is actually in some ways a few steps behind what is going on in Iran. And so, for instance, just to give you an example, when you look at an ideal with students coming out of Iran on a note that they're recent arrivals, but they're relatively recent arrivals. And when you sort of look at the culture, particularly in the student bodies and whatever going on, you're finding in Iran a deeply, deeply sort of move towards secular, you know, secularism. I mean, religion is no longer playing the sort of role in people's lives that it might have done 20, even 20 years ago, let alone 40 years ago. But also, you know, the whole monarchical term is really an internal dynamic. It's not actually an outside dynamic. It has sort of, it's. The voice is amplified outside. But what has surprised many of us, including myself, by the way, even though, I mean, you know, I did talk about this about 10 years ago and stuff, but I said, you know, there are things going on in Iran that we need to keep an eye on. But I have been quite shocked, actually, at the strength of the sort of pro Pahlavi, pro monarchy, pro monarchy feeling in Iran. And, you know, it shows in some ways that the diaspora is actually out of touch. And, you know, our connections are with, let's say, the Tehran intellectual elite, many of whom are left of center and, and, and, and sort of a particular view of the world and have not really connected with, with many. I mean, there was A. There was an Iranian political science professor who said, actually, I mean, and he should know better. I mean, he's sitting in Tehran. I mean, he's a professor at Tehran, you know, and he said, I never thought in a million years, you know, I would be sitting here and finding students chanting for the Shah. Now when he says that, you know, you've got to sort of say, are you not paying attention to what your students are saying? I mean, or you're not taking them seriously or whatever. And, you know, when. When we have, in some ways, you know, maybe try to explain it away or qualify or whatever. It's amazing the amount of sort of commentary you get from these young people who are absolutely fixated on this. Now, there are reasons for all this and why it's all happened. And, you know, I've discussed it a great length in other pieces, and, you know, one always has to sort of qualify what all this means. But it is an important thing for us to realize that, you know, the diaspora at the moment is probably not as in touch with the views in Iran as some of them think they are. But here's. Here's. Here's the crunch point. It's that in many ways, the people in Iran are far ahead of the diaspora in terms of the radicalization of their views. And, you know, from our, you know, in a simple way, it sort of makes sense. It's the people in Iran who are being shot. So if you're being shot, you tend to be radicalized quite quickly, whereas you're sitting in the comfort of the West. You know, you have the time to indulge in nice theories about, you know, political development. So it's a difficult one. I mean, I would grant you it is a difficult one. It's a confusing one. I think a lot, as, you know, all of us would know. It all depends on our sources. It all depends who we're talking to. It all depends how we gather, I would obviously say, and I think I'd have a sympathetic hearing on this podcast. I think historians have a better, you know, have a clearer eye on this because we can tend to see these things in context and how things are developing and sort of put them in that context. But it is. I mean, I think it's an enormously important question, and it's one that, you know, who knows? You know, we don't have exact answers for. But it, but it is. The answers, in some ways are more counterintuitive, if I can put it that way. The diaspora is not a. Can amplify Some voices. It can contradict some voices, but in some ways, it's been caught on the hop.

Afua Hersh (25:49)

I want to ask this question to both of you, actually, because both of you have written about the catalog of catastrophic errors that the international community has made in Iran. Maybe errors is generous. I mean, there's everything, kind of trickery, deceit, you know, naked greeds, strategic miscalculations, and so on and so on. And, you know, I've learned a lot about the worst of, kind of Western imperialism, if that's the right word to use in this context. From both of your work, I'm curious whether there has ever been any accountability and whether that feeds into contemporary decision making for other nations about how to engage with Iran, because it feels to me, and this is not my area of expertise, so, you know, from just an observer's point of view, that lessons don't seem to be learned, mistakes seem to be repeated, and that no one is ever answerable for the previous generation of terrible mistakes that were made.

Professor Ali Ansari (26:46)

Well, I mean, let me. I've worked a lot on the whole Mossadegh from the coup thing. I mean, one of my big. One of my big criticisms of this is, is. Is partly that actually in Iran itself, in the Islamic Republic, they've never really had a huge amount of affection for Mossadegh, by the way. I mean, they use him very, very effectively to make us all feel guilty. All right, but most, most regime, you know, loyalists have no time for him. But the very simple reason that he's a secular constitution, I mean, he's. He was a secular politician. He wasn't an Islamist, he wasn't interested in the clerical classes. He didn't have it. And also, he was quite close to the American. I mean, he got punished for it, obviously. But I've always criticized people who sort of say, look, you know, there is a historical case here and a historical case that needs to be properly understood within the context of its time, by the way, and lessons learned. But I don't think we should be using these as sort of leverage for policy, which is. Which is basically what the regime in Iran has done. And I always used to say to people, I said, you know, in the 47 years of the Islamic Republic, there hasn't been a single monument to Mosadda ever put up. I mean, I think about five years ago, they named a side street after him. Okay. I mean, that was about it. All right? So, you know, I always say to them, I think the time for apologies is right. When, if and when, hopefully, fingers crossed, you do get a sort of secular democratic system in Iran. You get a constructed government and we can say, look, you know, we really screwed it up and, you know, we're so sorry. And I think the Americans tried, for instance, an apology back in the early noughties. Madeleine Albright, I think, said it and said, you know, we're sorry. You know, we. It wasn't very good. And where did it get them? It got them absolutely nowhere because the Iranians pocketed that. Great, thanks. You know, now meanwhile, I think we need reparations for the Second World War. I mean, that was the next thing. Then they go to the British. You know, it's like never ending. Oh, the famine in 1917, that's something that you need to pay for. Yeah, so. And I find myself, as is often, you know, what's very interesting is that historians in Iran are often very dismissive of these. They sort of say, you know, the government sort of rabbling on about stuff. But of course, that doesn't make the headlines and it doesn't catch, you know, the. The narrative of worst Western perfidiousness. And of course, you know, as you quite rightly say, there's a. There's a litany of this. I mean, there's all sorts of miscalculations. But I think, you know, as I always say to people, don't forget that the Iranians have agency too, by the way. I mean, don't see them purely as victims. I mean, they behaved in various means and ways and sometimes not made the right decisions. So I think, you know, the whole business with Mossadegh is interesting in that sense because it's been used so excessively in a political sense. And I think also people who have done more work on it are now realizing that the regime itself has not been, you know, has not actually paid a huge amount of respect to Mossadegh's legacy at all. I mean, it hasn't done anything. So, you know, why we should be granting them, in a sense, the benefit of the doubt for someone who they don't respect at all anyways, is a problematic one. Whether there should be accountability or there should be, of course. I mean, I think on a historical basis, you know, there is a time when people should be coming up and saying, you know, look, you know, historically speaking, this was a mistake, this shouldn't have happened, or so. And so, you know, whatever you want to do, but it needs to be done in a much more open atmosphere of historical inquiry, I think. And everything needs to be laid down on the table. And I Think at the moment it's so politically emotive that actually these things are quite difficult to achieve. But I've always said that. I said there's a historical case and then there's a political case. And I think we're two weighted on the political side of the matter.

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Afua Hersh (31:01)

I guess my question had two sides. One, which you've answered so well about, when you've kind of showed me that the regime has weaponized, in a way, the legitimate grievance for its own ends. But then the other side to it is, you know, from a British perspective, for example, is our policy informed by a sophisticated understanding of past mistakes. Have we actually learned those lessons in the way we engage with Iran now?

Professor Ali Ansari (31:28)

So if I, If I say. I would say yes. I mean, I would say the British are far more subject to.

Afua Hersh (31:32)

Maybe I should have asked about the Americans, actually.

Professor Ali Ansari (31:34)

Yeah, the Americans are. I mean, the Americans, yes and no. I mean the American. But, you know, there's a difference between the British and the Americans. The Americans can do things that the British can't. Okay, so the British can't do things. I mean, in terms of coercive force. And that's all the Americans can. And they're sort of looking at. But, you know, again, you've got to look at the relationship over the last, you know, 47 years. Opportunities lost on both sides, by the way. I mean, I've charted this and other books as well. There's plenty of blame to go around. But the British side of it, yes, I mean, I would say that actually both the British and the American. And, you know, when we talk about lessons learned, the problems with this, actually, to be honest, is I always find that the wrong lessons, or let's say the right lessons are learned at the wrong time and the wrong lessons learned at the right. Do you know what I mean? People don't actually learn the right.

Afua Hersh (32:22)

That rings very true.

Professor Ali Ansari (32:24)

Do you see what I mean? And, you know, so you've got this tremendous guilt about. Oh, we've got. And I sort of say, well, it's not actually the right time to be learning that lesson. I mean, you know, because basically all you're doing is you're handing them an excuse to do other things, you know, which are going to make matters worse. We saw this in some cases in the nuclear negotiations, by the way. I mean, you know, John Kerry and others would go, you know, wax lyrical. Oh, you know, we overthrew side debt in 1950. Well, great. But that's not really, you know, it. What you're doing basically is you're giving them a better free hand on certain. And, and, you know, the Iranians say, you know, you owe us. Well, you know, the, the Americans should have in some ways said, well, you know, fair enough. But, you know, also, the hostage crisis wasn't a great moment for you, you know, when you seized our embassy. And, you know, the Iranians need to sort of also have an approach to that. Now, I'll tell you this. In the late 1990s, there was a move to do this. There was a move to do this, to reconcile both the coup in 53 with the hostage crisis in 79, and there was a sort of a more moderate government in Iran at the time who thought this was good to sort of square the circle and settle old death, so to speak. But of course, you know, what you found was hardliners on both sides of the equation opposed it. I mean, it was simple as that. People were not willing to. To. To go. And, and, but again, I, I stress there, it's on both sides. You know, let's not forget that. That this was a problem. I mean, your viewers will see I have no hair left. But I mean, it's by basically pulling my hair out, sort of like people sort of like, you know, you know, coming, you know, bending over backwards, you know, about. And saying, you know, I said, well, why are you. Why are you giving the benefit down this. Ah, well, you know, we overthrew the government of Mossad in 1953. And I'd go, what's it got to do with this? I mean, why you tie yourself and knots about it? You know, my view is, is that what you need to be doing is talking to the Iranian people. Not to the Iranian government, to the Iranian people. They're different constituencies. And interestingly enough, I mean, one of the shocking things, actually, I will write about it. Twenty years ago, when I used to look at student protests, the most popular politician was Mossadegh. They always had banners of Mossadegh and they all chant Mossadegh. He's no longer there. I mean, he's just not there. I don't think in the last three months we've heard the name Mossadegh mentioned once among students. It's quite an astonishing turn of events. And again, it goes back to your earlier question. The diaspora have been quite, particularly the intellectual diaspora, if I can put it that way, have been quite shocked at this. I mean, what happened to Mossadegh? Where is he? Well, you know, he's gone because he's no longer, you know, front and center of what students are concerned about.

Peter Frankopan (35:08)

And I suppose that's why. That's why Paklavi has been centered, because there's no other obvious candidate to go for. And that creates its own challenges and problems. But, Ali, while we've got you, I'd also like to just ask about the logistics and nuts and bolts, how power actually works in the Islamic Republic. You've written a lot about the Supreme Leader not being omnipotent and deciding everything, but relying on informal networks and the negotiations. Yeah, just paint a picture for those who, perhaps less familiar with power structures in Iran, about what Actually, when you talk about the Iranian leadership, what that actually means, who sits within it? I don't mean individual names. I mean, in terms of how, how discussions and how policy actually get shaped.

Professor Ali Ansari (35:50)

So, I mean, you know, what you have in Iran is a classic sort of like, I mean, I described it in a variety of forms, but I mean, it's like when we talk about dictatorships or authoritarian systems, whatever, everyone has this assumption, you know, I mean, non historians, shall we say, somehow, you know, the. The Supreme Leader sits at Mount Olympus or whatever and issues instructions and everyone gets on with it. I mean, that's. Obviously, it's. No, even the most powerful dictatorships have not worked like that. I mean, I was very struck, you know, when you look at Ian Kershaw's biography of Hitler, for instance, I mean, he shows just what a chaotic system actually the Nazi system was. And you know, how Hitler used to sit at the talk and get people to compete for his affections almost to compete for his. His support. And this is basically what you see in Iran. I mean, what Khamenei does is he has. He's built up over certainly last 20, 25 years, a tremendous sense of sort of authority in his role as, you know, the Lord's anointed effectively. I mean, the person who speaks for the Hidden Imam and who basically is accountable only to God. But of course, in a practical sense, how does he operate? He only operates because he can sort of negotiate a certain sort of like deal and a settlement with those around him or those in his constituency. So there are sort of various sort of formal and informal networks which he operates in. I mean, the clearest one is with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that obviously sit at, you know, I always say, you know, the leadership in Iran, it's a bit like high table. You know, they sit there, the Supreme Leader sits at the chairs, the table, and there's a whole, you know, a variety of different people on that table who talk to them. Now, previously there would have been moderates and conformists at that table, but they've all now been excluded. So basically our problem is that you have a sort of a high table made of sort of fanatics, essentially, or, you know, ideological purists. And, you know, they're basically feeding him a particular line, and he responds to that, and he has to operate within that. The problem we have, really, and I think this is a fundamental thing that people often forget, is that we have a system of government in Iran in which, you know, the Supreme Leader is responsible to no one or is accountable to no one but God. Okay? I mean, this is very unusual system in the modern, in the 21st century where you have this sort of, like, system where, you know, he has absolute authority. Whether the power, whether that reflects itself in power is a different matter. But his authority is absolute and he has the final say on everything. So it's up to him what finally happens or does not happen. Now, recently there have been some disagreements about whether, you know, people are challenging that, but he's been so consolidated over the last 20 or so years, has said that, you know, one of the serious problems Iran has is this inability, inability to be flexible on certain things. Because the Supreme Leader simply said, no. I mean, the supreme leader said, this is a red line and we will not cross it. So nobody has the courage to. And if you notice, one of the things he does is whatever his. His diplomatic negotiating team head off to Geneva, whatever it is, I think they're going to take very frequently, Harmony then gives a public speech where he completely undermines them. I mean, basically, you know, they go off with a certain sort of, like, what they consider to be a certain latitude to discuss things. And Harmony will give a speech and say, I've said to them that, you know, these are off limits. And, of course, that just makes, you know, matters very, very difficult for them and, you know, whether they had that ability to do so anyway. But it does make diplomacy extremely difficult in that sense because he has these red lines. He's not willing to budge. And people have said, you know, that nothing will really change until he's gone. Although I'm not entirely sure that depending on who succeeds him, if anyone succeeds in my say in the current, the current setup, you know, they will be any less, any less flexible. The problem they have, of course, is that I know we're all focused on Trump and what might happen. The problem they have is that basically they're running the economy into the ground. So sooner or later the system is going to implode. I mean, you know, they, they're running out of water, gas, electricity, I mean, all this sort of stuff. So it's, it's, it's sooner or later something's got to give, right? I mean, you simply cannot run a modern economy on this level.

Peter Frankopan (39:43)

That's why the kind of the trade off that's been mooted very early on when the window opened for negotiation was that the demand from Iran saying any kind of deal will require lifting of sanctions because that will put gas back into our system. And as you mentioned, environmental shocks, availability of pharmaceuticals and so on is all highly compromised by quite an effective sanctions regime. Well, that will always be ways around those, but they just add to prices and we see inflation in Iran more or less out of control. I mean, it has been interesting over these last.

Professor Ali Ansari (40:11)

Yeah, but don't believe that all this is down to sanctions, by the way. I mean, sanctions, as I always say, are salt in a self inflicted wound, but the wound is self inflicted. I mean, you know the reason why. I mean, just nobody mentions this, by the way. Everyone's forgotten about it. You know, journalists are not doing a great job if I may say so. But you know, the cause of the recent demonstration, the recent protest and the currency depreciation and December was basically the collapse of a bank, the Oyanda Bank. Now why did that bank collapse? Because of corruption. I mean, massive corruption. I hesitate to say it in my namesake Ali Ansari ran it as a Ponzi scheme. The whole thing collapsed and now we're in a situation in Iran with four other banks are on the verge of collapse because they're running out of money. Now this is not to do fundamentally with sanctions, actually to do with the fact that since for 20 years the Iranian banking system has been organized as a, as a vast Ponzi scheme in which the elites have been lending each other money and other people money in order to increase populism or whatever without any expectation that anyone was going to pay it back. So, you know, basically these banks just effectively Ran out of money and the central bank all is saying now bubbles first. Yeah, yeah, exactly. I mean that's basically what. So don't, you know, the thing is the sanctions even obviously, if for the sake of argument, it's not going to happen, by the way, if for the sake of argument the United States could suddenly lift all the sanctions, yes, it would offer a certain sort of like a sticking plaster to the system. But the problems Iran has are internal. I mean they're fundamentally internal. And you know, we know that from the water crisis in Iran. There are no sanctions on building dams in Iran. You know, I mean there are no sanctions on water management in Iran. This is, this is, this is an internal problem. And again, the tendency has been is for them to sort of blame everyone else because nobody wants to take responsibility themselves. We see this everywhere by the way. I mean it's not an unusual thing, it's not a particularly Iranian thing, but it just happens to be that the Iranians, as you know, Peter, when the Persians do things, they do things to an indulgent excess. So it's, you know, well, you know, we, nobody does decadence like the Persians. Right.

Peter Frankopan (42:16)

So I'm not going to lie, Ali. When my news flashes came out going Ali Ansari foundation operating a massive Ponzi scheme, I suddenly did wonder whether, you know, you had a good sideline, massive palaces all over the Middle East. But on that sense, I mean that watering down, the pushing out of all of the doves around the table and the sort of emergence of just a hawkish class, I mean, we've also seen that that's also quite popular within Iran too. When possession got elected a couple of years ago, there were 11 or 12 million votes for a hardline rival. So the idea that everyone wants softness of moderate moderation, you know, it's not necessarily reflect on the ground, but I guess looking forward, you're trying to second guess what happens with negotiations. You know, I think we're not going to get drawn into that one. But looking forward to 20 years, you know, what kind of Iran could you see in the best case scenario and I suppose also in a worst case scenario, what would you be looking out for in terms of I think in

Professor Ali Ansari (43:14)

10 and 20 years time, I would like to see a secular democratic Iran. I mean, I think it tended to happen. I think that's unrealistic. There might be some tough moments getting there. I think if you look at the social developments in the country and truly the social revolution that's taking place, I don't think that's unreasonable at all. Now, to go back to afwa's point, it also depends on whether the international community helps that along or hinders it. So, I mean, that does help, but at the end of the day, it's in the hands of the Iranians to pull this out and to do it. I think if you're looking in the long term, I think my long term prognosis is actually not so, not necessarily a bad one. Now, you know, the other options would be, of course, is that we just enter into another cycle where you had, you know, like the sort of Reza Khan cycle of the 1920s with another sort of military style, you know, authoritarian rule. And it. That's also very possible, by the way, because the state of the country is so bad that there's lots of people in Iran are saying what we need is a strong man to come and sort this out. I mean, that's just a natural consequence of this sort of situation. But I think what people would expect and I think where society is heading, is that even if you do get a sort of an authoritarian push to begin with, that this is a truly enlightened one, if I can put it that way, and that this is sort of a liberal authoritarianism that seeks to sort of set down a democratic or constitutional settlement for the country. You know, we mustn't forget that Iran has been chasing this dream for well over 100 years. I mean, there's a lot of democratic architecture in this country. Some of it dismantled by them, much of it dismantled by the Iranians themselves, some of it dismantled by the West. I mean, you know, it's. Some of it by the Russians. I mean, everyone has a bit of a hand in this. So if there is a debt, I have to say that the west owes Iran, it is that, actually. But this constitutional settlement, this democratic settlement, we need to do all we can to help this along, nurture it, give it a bit of a lifeline and encourage them along that particular act. I think in that sense, if we do that, a lot of the sins of the past will be forgiven and, you know, we would look forward to a much more constructive relationship.

Peter Frankopan (45:19)

You've been so generous, so eloquent and so reassuring. Amongst the things, I think that a good takeaway is it's important to pay attention to the history of this region and of Iran, you know, going back not just to the Islamic revolution, but deep into time as well. So your works and your books have been so important in my thinking.

Professor Ali Ansari (45:35)

No, but thank you as well, Peter. So many others you know all that stuff that it's always good to find people who are interested in Persia, Peter. I mean it's always positive.

Peter Frankopan (45:44)

We're amongst friends amongst friends here. So thanks.

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Peter Frankopan (46:23)

thanks for listening to Legacy.

Afua Hersh (46:25)

Don't forget, for bonus content, early access, Q&As, fewer ads and more, sign up to Legacy plus go to Legacy Supportingcast FM and you can also watch all our episodes on YouTube, so make sure you're subscribed there too.

Peter Frankopan (46:40)

And you can connect those two on Instagram and on TikTok. All the links are in the show notes or just search for Legacy podcasts on social media platforms. I'm Peter Frankopone.

Afua Hersh (46:50)

I'm Afwaharch and we'll see you on the next episode of Legacy.

Professor Ali Ansari (46:56)

Sam.