Afua Hersh (3:15)

I can't think of a country that has more importance on the world stage that is as little understood outside the country itself. And part of the reason for that is that it's very difficult for people to go to Iran. It's difficult for the international media to go into Iran. But also I think it's much deeper than that. There is this very complex and thorny relationship that Iran has had with the rest of the world going on generations going back decades and centuries. It feels often as if the conversation around Iran is very reductive. And I'm really keen, Peter, to talk to people who have spent their lives studying, understanding, living with Iran, navigating Iran, both from a personal perspective, but also from a professional perspective, to really see how they are making sense of what's happening now and what it means for all of us.

Peter Frankenpen (4:10)

Hello and welcome to a new episode of Legacy. I'm Peter Frankenpen.

Afua Hersh (4:14)

I'm Afua Hersh.

Peter Frankenpen (4:15)

And this is Legacy, the show that explores the lives, events and ideas that have shaped our world and asks whether they have the reputations that they truly deserve.

Afua Hersh (4:32)

This is Iran, the legacies of 1979. Today we're joined by Kim Gattas, one of the most lucid and important voices writing about the Middle east today. Kim is an Emmy Award winning journalist and an author whose reporting has taken her from Beirut to Washington D.C. and she has covered not just the Middle east, but also American foreign policy as it relates to the Middle east and international affairs. For the BBC, for the ft, for npr. She writes for publications including the Atlantic for foreign policy, the New York Times, Time magazine and the Washington Post.

Peter Frankenpen (5:13)

Kim is one of the most astute and insightful commentators that I know and I'm lucky enough to call her a good friend. Kim's most recent book is called Black Saudi Arabia, Iran and the 40 year rivalry that unravels culture, religion and collective memory in the Middle East. It is a sweeping reinterpretation of how events of 1979 reverberated across the the region. And it received adulation all over the world. It was the New York Times notable book of 2020. Kira's a fantastic scholar and you're going to really enjoy listening to what she has to say.

Afua Hersh (5:44)

Thanks for listening to Legacy. Sign up to Legacy plus to enjoy bonus content, early access, fewer ads, Q&As and more. Go to Legacy Supportingcast FM.

Peter Frankenpen (5:56)

Kim so great that you could join us, one of the most eloquent and important voices about the histories of the Middle east and also US Policy. We're talking at a time where we're right in between discussions between the United States and Iran around a potential nuclear settlement. But let's start with 1979. Your fantastic and really important book, Black Wave looks at the legacy of what happened in 1979 with the Islamic revolution and the parallel revolution in Saudi Arabia. Talk us through why 1979 is such an important shadow of how contemporary Iran looks and feels today.

Kim Gattas (6:30)

So first, great to be on with the both of you. And yes, you know, Black Wave came out five years ago and somehow remains incredibly relevant today to understand and decipher why we are where we are in the region at this moment. I chose to focus on 1979 because it was a pivotal year, not just from a geopolitical point of view, as other years could be 1967 and the Six Day War or, you know, the fall of the Ottoman Empire, but because it set in motion a set of dynamics that are still with us today. The transformation of Iran from a monarchy into an Islamic republic with an entrenched system led by a supreme leader, a theocracy with a very, you know, militaristic system that is also sectarian, trying to export its worldview to Shia communities outside of Iran, or which means that it was able to set up proxies over time in Iraq, in Lebanon, and then later on in a different way in Syria and then also in Yemen. So that architecture of 1979 has persisted over time and is still with us today. And it totally transformed Iran itself. And it set off, of course, that year, set off a competition with Saudi Arabia. The two countries were not close friends before 1979. They were friendly rivals. They were allies and twin pillars in US Policy to contain communism in the Soviet Union at the time. But supreme leader Ali Ruhollah Khomeini, who led the revolution to success and took power in 1979, had grand visions beyond leading Iran. He wanted to lead the Shia community, but also the wider Muslim ummah. And that was a direct threat to the Saudis, who quickly realized that they had serious rival in front of them, whereas initially they'd welcomed him. Sad to see the Shah go, but you know, thinking, well, you know, we could do, we could do business with a man who kind of speaks our language. And so the legacy of that moment, it's almost not even in legacy, it's still very much unfolding.

Peter Frankenpen (8:56)

Tell us Kim, about a bit more detail about that. I mean, like all revolutions, one of the most important things that revolutionaries to succeed, whether it's the Soviet Union or in France, is to go and track down and hunt down traitors, those who are going to betray the revolution. And that revolutionary zeal is still burning in Tehran and in Iran almost 50 years on the idea that the revolution might itself be sabotaged, compromised. Are those ideas today in Iran, are they based on reality or is that just a language that's used to justify keeping order, to use suppression and so on?

Kim Gattas (9:32)

I think it's both. You know, it becomes a sort of self fulfilling cycle or self feeding cycle. I think the Iranian regime, the Islamic Republic is right to be as they say, it's not because you're paranoid that they're not after you. Right. And so amidst all the talk about regime change over time the Iranian regime has developed a hypersensitivity to the possibility that they might come under attack, because they have come under attack before. One of the formative moments for the psyche of this Islamic Republic was actually the Iran Iraq war where for eight years they were face to face with Saddam Hussein, a Sunni strongman who was receiving backing from other Sunni Gulf countries, but also from the United States. And Iran felt abandoned and encircled. Their only ally was Syria of Hafez Al Assad at the time. So that is on an external perspective. And of course over time there have been repeated chit chat talk calls for the fall of the regime in Iran. So they have developed a sense of, you know, besieged, a siege mentality. And internally, yes, ever since, you know, the first moment of this revolution up until now, they will kill anyone who opposes them, including from within. So, so it's not just, you know, Sunnis or you know, non Muslims or critics in faraway countries or critics inside the country. It's especially people from within the community. And we've seen that in Lebanon for example, where as Hezbollah was rising into a powerful Shia militia and then political group in the 80s in Lebanon, they also went after Shia communists and they killed them intellectuals and militants from the Communist party because they wanted to dominate the narrative about resistance against Israel. And of course in Iran itself in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, and then during the 80s and also today, the ruthlessness with which this Islamic Republic hunts down potential threats or critics or anyone who presents an alternative vision is quite consistent.

Afua Hersh (12:07)

I want to ask him, because we've had so much news about protests in Iran over. There have been waves over the years. Recently, there's been an intense interest in protest in Iran. Given what you've said about the persecution of people who oppose the regime ever since 1979, how can we understand these waves of protests? And what is the international media getting wrong in interpreting what it actually means for the regime?

Kim Gattas (12:35)

So, you know, Iran is a very diverse country, you know, with a very active political life despite the oppression of the Islamic Republic. I mean, if you travel to Iran, you can feel it. People are talking politics. Women are active, you know, and they push back against the boundaries that this oppressive system has set for them since 1979. And it's important to maybe just think back to that moment of 1979 and the first years that followed. You know, I think it took some time for people to realize what they were getting with this Islamic Republic. They were so relieved to be rid of the Shah that they didn't quite understand how much more oppressive and ruthless the Islamic Republic of Ayatollah Khamenei was going to be. And they fought back a little bit. You had, you know, the Tudeh Party, the leftists, they tried to push back and they were slaughtered, but they were never cowed into full submission. And you see these waves of protests again and again in the 90s during the term of President Khatami in 2009 with the I Want My Vote movement, the Green Movement, when Ahmadinejad, President Ahmadinejad was reelected, and then repeated, repeated protests. And some of them don't make headlines, and some of them do. The 2009 movement definitely made headlines. The Mahsa Amini movement definitely made headlines, but you have constant, constant eruptions of protests. The problem is that what I think we may not quite grasp, but I think that's a wider issue with revolutions nowadays, is that regimes have understood something that the Shah actually did not, which is that if you don't use force, you will be toppled. And so that's the lesson that this Islamic Republic has learned from watching how they managed to remove the Shah. He did not want to use force against his people. And so, you know, he left. And they are determined to stay in power. And so my fear is that, you know, any change of regime or transformation from within, let alone a war, is going to come with increased sort of, you know, bloodletting inside the country. Just to add one thing, I think, you know, I think we should pay tribute to the incredible perseverance and courage of Iranian people because they are dancing on the streets at funerals to deny their oppressive government the satisfaction of seeing them cowed into silence and fear. So they're transforming mornings of ritual that are downbeat into something joyful despite their pain. To go against this sort of black wave, to use sort of my own title, this sort of black wave that has crushed, you know, that has tried to crush them. And I find that quite impressive and courageous.

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Peter Frankenpen (17:29)

Kim on the demographics of Iran. As you say, it's a vibrant political culture, lots of diverse views, but it's also a very young country. It's got a young population, very connected, very switched on, very urbane. You know, is there a generational shift that happens? I mean, we see people like Ali Khamenei, who's, who's, who's a, a child of revolution. Well, not even a child. He's a, he was around at the time.

Kim Gattas (17:51)

He was the second president of the Islamic Republic.

Peter Frankenpen (17:55)

But you know, he's now his. In his late late 80s. You know, is this just a vision that's pushed from the top and eventually there will be change as a new generation find that? Well, I don't know whether they can't find their way into having the benefits of a system that supported the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the elites. I mean, how do you see a young population growing through this? If there was no standoff and pressure from the outside world at the moment, could there be a transition in Iran towards a more gentle, more open society? Or would this be something that would just replicate itself through oppression, through protests, through clap downs?

Kim Gattas (18:30)

You have to remember that, you know, the young generation does not all think alike. They're not homogeneous. And many of them are in the ranks of the Islamic Republican Guards, they are in the ranks of the army, they're in the ranks of the besieged. They benefit from the system. You know, they are children of the revolution who embrace the revolution. You know, this regime can still bring out several million people to mourn Qasem Soleimani, for example, the Quds Force chief who was killed in a strike in Iraq by. In a UN American strike in Iraq in January 2020. So it's not because the population is young that it's necessarily transforming uniformly into something softer and more democratic. I think that, you know, given a lot of time, it's possible. But again, because you have parts of this younger generation that is benefiting from the system as it is, there's no need to change. And some of the leaders of this system regime are studying abroad. They're not turning against the republic because they benefit. They're studying abroad or living abroad because they benefit from the system and the money is available to them to live, to live abroad. Right? So the few of them are really turning against this republic, against this Islamic Republic. You are starting to hear members of the regime who are no longer in power, who are saying it's time to transform from within. We need to transform, to change, to develop, to satisfy the population and give them what they deserve, and also to stave off outside pressure and war. But many of them over the last few weeks have been put under house arrest or arrested. So this regime is not yet ready to let go and it is not witnessing key defections from within so far.

Afua Hersh (20:33)

Kim, do you mind if I ask you a bit more of a personal question? You're Lebanese, you're based in Beirut, you write and teach in the us. You're an incredible scholar of many books. I'm so curious how to understand how the 1979 revolution has affected your life personally and what it means to you and why you've made it a focus of so much of your professional work.

Kim Gattas (20:58)

So I grew up in the civil war in Lebanon during the 80s, which ostensibly initially had nothing to do with 1979. And 1979 was not in my consciousness until not that long ago when I started writing a Black Wave. So it wasn't a defining year for me at the time. Growing up, becoming a journalist, what really defined me was, as I said, growing up in the civil war, living through the Israeli invasion, Syrian occupation, inter Christian fighting, fighting against Lebanese army, fighting against the Syrian army. That's what shaped me and that's what made me want to become a journalist. But over time with my reporting, and of course, 1979 was there as a year where, okay, the Islamic Republic was born, et cetera, and gave birth to Hezbollah in Lebanon. And that is now a problem for Lebanon because of how Hezbollah has evolved inside the country into a ruthless militant group, militia, political group that has managed with the threat of violence, to for a long time impose a kind of veto on all state decisions and has assassinated people in Lebanon, including friends of mine like Samir Kassir, the journalist, but also, of course, you know, Gibran Twaini, publisher of an Nahar Rafiq Hariri former Prime Minister of Lebanon but the concept of 1979 as this really defining, pivotal moment that transformed everything the year after which we ask ourselves, as I do at the beginning of the book, what happened to us. That is a result of my evolution in my thinking and my research and my work as a reporter. And now, you know, looking back now, a lot of people say, well, how did we not think of it? You know, and it's become so obvious, but we somehow miss it, because you need the distance of time to understand pivotal years in history or pivotal moments or the impact of certain moments. I mean, I wonder 20, 30, 40 years from now what we will think of this moment of US Iran tension, or what we will think of the Trump administration or the pandemic. We don't yet know exactly how it has. We know a lot, but we don't know fully what dynamics those moments and those dynamics have set off for the long term.

Peter Frankenpen (23:37)

And on that, Kim, I mean, with 1970, you've written also a lot about us understanding or misunderstandings of the Middle east as a whole, and particularly of Iran. I mean, those sort of attempts by successive US Administrations to reset relations with Tehran or to try to outmaneuver Iran. Is there a fundamental way in which we in the west or the United States or different administrations have keep getting Iran wrong in the same way, or do they make their own separate mistakes each time around?

Kim Gattas (24:07)

It's a combination of getting Iran wrong and each in the same way. And Making their own mistakes. And I detail some of that in my next book because I go back to the Reagan administration and the 80s and, and I think the mold was set then for how you deal with Iran. And Iran understood then everything it could get away with in dealing with the west. And that involved blackmail. And you know, Iran, through Hezbollah and its proxies in Lebanon, took a lot of Western hostages in Lebanon during the 80s, which is an episode that's been forgotten. And they got a lot in return, including weapons, interestingly enough, with the help of Israel, which was involved with the US in what we know now is called the Iran Contra affair, where the US and Israel were giving Iran weapons in exchange for releasing Western hostages in Lebanon, which is really quite extraordinary when you think of it.

Peter Frankenpen (25:08)

You couldn't make it up.

Kim Gattas (25:09)

Yeah, you couldn't make it up. That's the playbook that Iran Learned in the 1980s. And then it, you know, of course it started when it couldn't take hostages in Lebanon anymore. It started later on taking prisoners in Iran, Western prisoners in Iran and accusing them of being spies or whatever and using that as leverage in its negotiations. So that is one thing that Iran has learned over time. The other thing it has learned, which is crucial today, is that America, Americans cannot sustain casualties of their own for a long time. They will eventually give up and withdraw and leave. And that's what happened in Beirut when the US Embassy was bombed and then the Marine barracks were bombed. The US left, they withdrew. And that is the lesson that Iran learned. I'm not saying that the US should sustain endless casualties and for the sake of facing off with Iran, but, but you have to understand Iran's perspective in this. And I think they're looking at it now, the Iranians sitting in Tehran as this confrontation is about to unfold. And yes, they're calculating that they could face massive bombardment if we were to come to that point, but they're also calculating that the US and its allies in the Gulf are a lot less risk averse and will find it hard to explain rising oil prices and massive American casualties if it were to come to that point. The other thing that I think the Americans, American officials, presidents often don't understand or didn't understand for a while. They probably do now is the exact structure of power in Iran. I remember President Clinton, for example, in the 90s, made an overture directly to Khatami, thinking he could just deal with the President and forget about the supreme leader. But that is just not how it works. Right. So that was a mistake. And Today you have President Trump, through the words of his envoy, Steve Witkoff, saying, we don't understand why they haven't capitulated. And I just find that so puzzling, actually, that they would actually expect Iran to wave the white flag and say, you know, we capitulate. First of all, there aren't that many straightforward capitulations in recent world history. I mean, it requires massive bombing, complete depletion of resources, breaking of ranks, killing of the leadership. It requires a lot to capitulate. And we've seen it in Hamas, with Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon. In Lebanon, we had a forced, you know, ceasefire under massive pressure, regional and other, but Hamas never really capitulated. And so to expect Iran today to capitulate as a state, I think, is a misreading of where they are at. I think they are calculating that they can somehow survive this. Having said that, if Trump decides, the unknown factor in all this is always Trump. If Trump decides that he would like to avert a war, he could take minor concessions from the Iranians and say, beautiful deal, they capitulated.

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Afua Hersh (29:16)

Kim, I'm thinking about what this means for allegiances in the region. I mean, you've mentioned the US allies in the Gulf, 1979's legacy. One of its most salient legacy seems to be the way that it has carved up allegiances in the Middle east and created, in some cases, quite unlikely allyships. Does what's happening now threaten to upend any of those alliances or put them under strain?

Kim Gattas (29:45)

Well, absolutely. We've already seen over the last few years that a lot of Iran's architecture has been destroyed, right? I mean, Hezbollah is a shadow of what it was. It's not, you know, completely out of the picture, but it's a shadow of what it was. They've lost their crucial ally in Syria, the Assad regime, Bashar Al Assad. And that is a key foothold that gave them a sort of geographical continuity from Iran through Iraq to Syria and Lebanon. And that is a real massive blow for the Iranian architecture of allies and proxies in the region that helped, from their perspective and their strategy perspective, keep the enemy far away. And that's why now the fire is coming closer and closer to Tehran, because there isn't any more that ring of fire around them to protect them on the other side. You know, Gulf countries, et cetera. You know, of course, 1979 unleashed the Saudi Iran rivalry. And, you know, we heard Mohammed bin Salman himself, the crown prince of Saudi Arabia, just a few years ago, declare that the supreme leader of Iran, Khamenei, was, you know, similar to Hitler. And then he decided that, you know, you keep your friends close and your enemies closer. So he managed to bring about a detente with Iran in March 2023, which has held so far. That doesn't mean that they've become best friends. And when Saudis or the UAE or other countries caution Trump against a strike against Iran, it's not out of love for the Islamic Republic. It's not because they would like that republic to continue existing. It's because they are deeply concerned about the consequences of another American military adventure in the region, similar to Iraq.

Peter Frankenpen (31:42)

Kim, I've got one last question. You've been so generous with your time and expertise. I think here, often in the west, we think of Iran as a sort of being born in 1979 with the Islamic Revolution. And there are lots of good reasons for that. But Iran also has, of course, a long and imperial history. So when you mentioned about Wyckoff and saying that he and Trump can't understand why Iran haven't capitulated. We saw Abbas Arakchi, the foreign minister, reply on social media saying, we don't capitulate because we're Iranians. How does the sort of idea of Iran or Persia work alongside the Islamic revolutionary thinking around Iran as a proud nation that has its own deep history, running back thousands of years, that it sees itself not as a regional power, but as one with much more extensive global connections. Do these marry together smoothly within the thinking of the supreme leadership, with the elites around them? How do the ideas about the past before 1979 fit alongside what we've seen since?

Kim Gattas (32:42)

Absolutely. Even if, you know, for the longest time, the Islamic Republic leaders and Khomeini and Khamenei would kind of deny that Persian past. It is part of Iranian nationalism and pride in their past and their country and past empires. You know, you could argue that what Iran is doing today as an Islamic republic, with its, you know, satrapies, if you want to call them that, or allies, et cetera, is just Another version of what the Persian Empire was doing, you know, back, back in the day. And over time, the Islamic Republic has also come to understand that this young, some, you know, a large majority probably of the young generation, isn't that interested in religion. And so they're starting to use more nationalistic language to appeal to the people. And you saw a little bit of a rallying around the flag during the 12 Day War, because nobody likes to be bombed. I mean, nobody, right? And so you may hate your regime, but these bombs are falling on your streets, on the building next to you. And it's very conflictual for people in Iran. And I've spoken to many friends, still have family there. They really feel stuck. And I want to again return to the plight of the Iranian people. I have so many friends in Iran, outside Iran, who would like nothing more than their country to be part of the world again and be rid of this oppressive regime and who are losing hope because they're faced with a terrible binary choice. Now it's going to be war, which I don't see how it ends well unless there's a inside coup, an internal coup, a swift war, an internal coup, and some kind of agreement for a new leadership to lead this country. But this is really, I mean, you know, so many things have to go quote, unquote, right in this scenario for it to unfold like that. The more likely scenario is chaos, civil war, protracted conflict and so on, which leaves in place this regime or a version of it that will be vengeful and even more entrenched. Or you cut a deal, Trump cuts a deal with them, and they survive and they live on and they entrench and they continue to make the lives of their people miserable. So I would love to be wrong and I would love to see a scenario, a dream scenario, where there's a transformation from within and an opening to the west and Khamenei's fades into the sunset. I just, I think it's too hopeful.

Peter Frankenpen (35:30)

So Kim, I guess in the final analysis is the view of the Iranian leadership that it can and will outrun or outlast Trump and Netanyahu, that if it just keeps on digging in, it will find a way through to keep on surviving. That in fact those calls for reform from within can be kept to one side and that pressure from outside, you can also survive. It is time, the savior here from the Iranian perspective.

Kim Gattas (35:58)

Short answer is yes. I think they feel they can outmaneuver American presidents. They can keep buying time, they can survive an all out assault they might be wrong, but I think that's what they believe.

Peter Frankenpen (36:17)

Kim, you're a superstar. You're so grateful. We're so grateful to you for giving up your time. You speak with such authority. It's such deep knowledge. It's such a pleasure to have you come and join us on Legacy. So thank you hugely for your, for your time. And we look forward to reading your book when it comes out, I guess next spring, something like that. Is that what we're hoping?

Kim Gattas (36:33)

October. October.

Peter Frankenpen (36:35)

Oh my gosh. Okay, October. Well, will you come back and talk to us about your book when it comes out?

Kim Gattas (36:39)

Of course. Anytime. Thank you. I love speaking to you. Thank you so much for having me.

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Peter Frankenpen (37:06)

Thanks for listening to Legacy.

Afua Hersh (37:08)

Don't forget, for bonus content, early access, Q&As, fewer ads and more, sign up to Legacy plus go to Legacy Supportingcast

Kim Gattas (37:18)

FM and you can also watch all

Afua Hersh (37:20)

our episodes on YouTube, so make sure

Kim Gattas (37:22)

you're subscribed there too.

Peter Frankenpen (37:24)

And you can connect those two on Instagram and on TikTok. All the links are in the show notes or just search for Legacy podcasts on social media platforms. I'm Peter Frankopone.

Afua Hersh (37:33)

I'm Afwa Harsh and we'll see you on the next episode of Legacy.