A week ago the Copy Fail vulnerability came out, and Hyunwoo Kim immediately realized that the fixes were insufficient, sharing a patch the same day. In doing this he followed standard procedure for Linux, especially within networking: share the security impact with a closed list of Linux security engineers, while fixing the bug quietly and efficiently in the open. His goal was that with only the raw fix public, the knowledge that a serious vulnerability existed could be "embargoed": the people in a position to address it know, but they've agreed not to say anything for a few days.

Someone else noticed the change, however, realized the security implications, and shared it publicly. Since it was now out, the embargo was deemed over, and we can now see the full details.

It's interesting to see the tension here between two different approaches to vulnerabilities, and think about how this is likely to change with AI acceleration.

On one side you have "coordinated disclosure" culture. This is probably the most common approach in computer security. When you discover a security bug you tell the maintainers privately and give them some amount of time (often 90d) [...]

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First published:
May 8th, 2026

Source:
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/wKzWGMoubHoHRC4ng/ai-is-breaking-two-vulnerability-cultures

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Narrated by TYPE III AUDIO.