B (28:16)

Now, if your pride glories in the.

A (28:18)

Kinship of women in order to delude thereby the uncouth and the rabble. Still, God does not make women the equal of paternal uncles and forefathers, nor like the paternal relatives and male kindred. For God has made the paternal uncle like a father and in his book gives the mother a lower place. While Al Mansur perhaps did believe that there was some theological justification for Abbasid rule rather than Alid rule, the Shiite Ali, who had already been backing Ali and his descendants, did not agree. The suppression of their rebellions was arduous, but Abbasid leadership managed it, although messianic Alid sentiments were never going to go away. As the winter of 763 gave way to spring, the Caliph Al Mansur had finally guided the Abbasid caliphate past its nascency. Born out of a patchwork of revolutionaries, the new empire had taken a while to stabilize its volatile east and internal factionalism, making the Abbasid throne precarious for its first decade. Almansur, however, even during his initial years of rule, had done more than grimly shoring up power. Almansur, though he had some hurdles to jump during his first few years on the throne, intended to leave an impressive legacy behind, and in this he certainly succeeded. Let's lets discuss some of the things that Al mansur accomplished between 754 and 775 as the second Caliph of the Abbasid empire. We've already discussed the military and political snafus that Al Mansur had to navigate during his first years on the throne, and so we can begin by quickly talking about the first Abbasid military. From the increasingly detailed annals of early Abbasid history, we can begin to get a sense of how the caliphate's army was structured and how it worked. There were, interestingly, what we can think of as military dynasties at work beneath the imperial dynasty. Military leaders, known as kawad, or generals, oversaw divisions of troops, and Abbasid generals passed military leadership down to their heirs. A hierarchy was thus ingrained in the early Abbasid caliphate, wherein the caliph appointed leadership to generals, often members of the Abbasid clan, who themselves handed subdivisions of military leadership down to their heirs. The political and military apparatus of the early caliphate, then, was largely a family affair, somewhat insulated from the ambitions of interlopers. Al Mansur also paid the military well, and he appointed land to those who served. Early Abbasid records attest Dh80amonth for each soldier in the regular army. By contrast, laborers building cities in what is today Iraq were making just 1 or 2 dirhams per month. So military service was a lucrative line of work, while Al Mansur funded the military well. The Abbasid clan more generally was able to align and collaborate with extant interests throughout the 750s, such that after the aforementioned insurrections wound down in 763, the caliphate enjoyed a period of relative peace. The most famous thing that Al Mansur ever did was that in 762, he founded a city about halfway down the Iraqi Tigris, a city that we now call Baghdad. Everything about Baghdad's location made sense. It was centrally located. Iraq was the heart of the Islamic world in 762. Just as importantly, Iraq was one of the two big agricultural moneymakers in the Caliphate, alongside Egypt. The Umayyads had ruled from Syria and been perennially threatened by the ascendancy of this or that wealthy Iraqi governor. The Abbasides, though ruling directly from the Tigris and Euphrates, would never have that problem. Further, the site of this city, home to only a few scattered villages, one of which was named Baghdad, allowed for a clean start. Al Mansur wanted something that was defensible, a town where a central palace that was also a fortress could help withstand any insurrection to come. And Al Mansur wanted a town where he could settle all of the military personnel, many from the eastern parts of the Abbasid empire who had been so valuable to the Abbasid dynasty thus far. Close to the ancient sites of Akkad, Babylon and Ctesiphon, Baghdad was seated in a place rulers had overseen Mesopotamia for thousands of years. As it grew into a vast metropolis over the next century, the centrality and natural resources of Baghdad's immediate region would continue to pay dividends. Baghdad's heart was the round city, home to Al Mansur's palace, military quarters and buildings that housed wings of the governmental administration to the city's northwest. Military leaders were given plots of land, and soon the city spread to the east bank of the Tigris as well. The area exploded in population between Baghdad's founding in 762 and the end of the century, growing to perhaps half a million inhabitants by 800. Various satellite palaces grew over the early Abbasid period and way up along the Syrian Euphrates near the present day city of Raqqa. Almansur founded the city of Raf, likely a predominantly military outpost designed to manage the circulation of troops up along the Byzantine frontier. Abbasid Baghdad, especially early Abbasid Baghdad, is one of history's most famous places, comparable to Periclean, Athens, Augustan age Rome and 18th century Paris. So it's worth pausing for a moment to talk about the city's first century. The Centrality of Baghdad allowed it to become a hub of commerce and luxury, nearly unique at that point in world history. A cosmopolitan metropolis at the seam between Europe and Asia. You could meet people from all over the world on the streets of Baghdad. In the later decades of the 700s, the Chinese travel writer Du Huan, after visiting Baghdad, remarked that everything produced from the earth is available there. Brocade, embroidered silks, pearls and other gems are displayed all over markets and street shops. Just as Baghdad was full of diverse goods, it was also theologically diverse. Built in a scenic bend of the Tigris, the city became a center of operation for Nestorian Christianity and Jews. Over Baghdad's first century moved academies from southern Iraq up to Baghdad, which became a center for Jewish learning. About a century after Baghdad was founded, the historian Atabari notes offhandedly that in the year 858, the festival of sacrifice of the Muslims, Palm Sunday of the Christians and Passover of the Jews, coincided. There is a sense here that these were public holidays that everyone knew about and that their falling on the same day was a coincidence. Curious enough for all practitioners of Abrahamic religion living in the city to note. The second Abbasid caliph, Al Mansur, did something else between founding Baghdad in 762 and his death in 775. This was funding a great deal of writing. The most ambitious emperors in world history have not only tried to control the present and future, they have also endeavored to control the past. We began this season of the Literature and History Podcast with a synopsis of pre Islamic Arabic poetry. Much of this poetry was assembled by the literary historian Mufad Al Adabi on behalf of the Caliph Al Mansur. Al Mansur also sponsored the biographer Ibn Isaq, whose name we heard so often in episodes about the life of the Prophet Muhammad. Ibn Isaq, who died in 768, completed his biography on Muhammad at the apex of O Mansur's reign. And the next major biographer, Al Waqiri, came of age during this same reign writing his own sira, or prophetic biography under some of the most famous Abbasid caliphs. The historical accuracy of the sira, or biographical literature about the Prophet Muhammad, as we've discussed in past episodes, is ultimately hard to determine. Enough of it sounds like hagiography that we can assume a fair amount of fiction went into these Abbasid period biographies of Muhammad. Where the early biographers Ibn Isaq and Al Waqidi most likely did create some innovations are sections of their biographies dealing with Muhammad's uncle Al Abbas Ibn Abd Alab Al Abbas, from whom the Abbasides traced their lineage, became a prominent figure in Abbasid period biographies that are still popular today. Muhammad's uncle in Ibn Isaq and Al Waqdi becomes a sagely figure in tune with the meaning of the Quran. And in the biographer Al Waqity, uncle Al Abbas is more worthy of leadership than Muhammad's son in law, Ali. We have seen these sorts of revisionist history moves before under different historical regimes. Augustus wanted his Julio Claudian ancestors to be figures at the very foundations of ancient Roman history, and the poet Virgil took care of that for him. Constantine wanted to be the summit of Christian cosmic history, and Eusebius made it happen in much the same way. The Abbasides wanted their rule to appear divinely consecrated. And historians willing to give the Abbaside patriarch Abbas a bit of extra sheen and sparkle had powerful incentives to do so. Al Mansur and his successors then commissioned what historian Tayyib Al Hibri calls the most critical phase in the shaping of Islamic textuality and culture. We'll talk more about the literary culture of the early Abbasid caliphate in lots of future episodes. The work of the poet Bashar Ibn Burd and the translator Ibn Al Muqaffah, both active during the early Abbasid period and both ethnic Persians who spent their careers in Iraq, shows the confluence of Persian and Arab culture in Mesopotamia that so thoroughly characterized the Abbasid empire's first century. It wasn't all smooth sailing for the second Abbasid caliph, Al Mansur. After he founded Baghdad and fended off his major rivals. About a year after Almansur founded Baghdad in 762, and for much of the remainder of his reign, he faced a complex problem. This was the issue of succession. Al Mansur's brother, the first caliph as Saffah, had chosen a successor for Al Mansur. This was the nephew of the two brothers, a young man named Isa Ibn Musa. At the time, in the turbulent early 750s, the backup succession plan had been geared to ensure the longevity of Abbasid power. However, once Almanor had settled into his new throne room in Baghdad and eliminated the major rival movements to his power, Al Mansur wanted his son to take over as caliph after he died, rather than his nephew. Al Mansur's son, Muhammad, known today as Al Mahdi, though young, was popular in the military, and as the Abbasid caliphate continued to flourish, Al Mansur's son Al Mahdi seemed to many like a ticket to continued prosperity. Al Mansur then attempted to convince his nephew Isa Ibn Musa, to relinquish his claims to the throne. Al Mansur tried several different strategies, but eventually it was the Abbasid military's strong support of the son rather than the nephew that led Isa IBN Musa to give up his claim to the throne. The way for the third Abbasid caliph, Al Mahdi, was now clear. Al Mansur died in the autumn of 775 while leading a pilgrimage to Mecca in his mid-60s. The Caliph had reigned for more than 20 years, and in doing so, he had brought the Abbasid state to healthy maturity. Al Mansur had not been the messiah that many had wanted. He had left in place systems and legacies from the previous century that privileged some Muslims greatly above all others. But the second Abbasid caliph, Al Mansur's practical, restrained, intelligent oversight of the empire had fostered stability and security. And when his son Al Mahdi took the throne in early October of 775, the young man inherited a functional, healthy state. Al Mansur, between 754 and 775, all told, had proved a deft, talented leader. A harsh, strong man who consolidated a dynasty in the disorderly aftermath of a revolution, but also an intelligent emperor with both foresight and restraint. He is, in hindsight, noted for his combination of authoritarianism and guile, his delegation as well as careful selection of bureaucrats and appointees, and his willingness to micromanage and involve himself in the minutiae of the state. He set his sons and grandsons up for peaceful, prosperous reigns, and over the next 35 years, his immediate descendants presided over a flourishing empire. In 775, the third Abbasid Caliph, Al Mahdi, ascended to the throne. He was in his 30s. His career, which had begun early during his teenage years, had been a military one, based at the beginning near what is today Tehran. In the year 764, the announcement went out that Al Mahdi would be his father's heir, and Al Mahdi came west to join his father, Al Mansur, in the greater security of Baghdad. Father and son ruled together for 11 years, such that when Al Mahdi became Caliph in 775, he was militarily and politically experienced enough to be prepared for the role. His reign of 10 years was relatively short as far as caliphal reigns go, but it was also successful. Al Mahdi's ascension to the throne was a smooth one. Al Mahdi was well liked in the military and appreciated as liberal, with the caliphal treasury funding the construction and enlargement of some important mosques. As a spiritual leader, Al Mahdi was a different creature. Than his father, who had been a secular monarch more than an active Muslim figurehead. Al Mahdi funded improvements to the road between Iraq and Mecca so that pilgrims could more safely stop at watering holes and way stations. And he ordered the elimination of partitions in mosques between regular worshippers and then leaders and potentates in the audience. These benign acts in the service of Islam, however, were counterbalanced by less benign ones. Al Mahdi supported sporadic persecutions of those who rejected Islam and gave a Christian Arab tribe called the Tagalib the choice between conversion and death, although he seems otherwise to have treated Christian citizens according to Quranic precepts. For Clemens, al Mahdi, as 775 turned to 776 and 777 faced some of the same challenges that his father had. The new caliph wanted to pass power onto his son, although his cousin Isa IBN Musa had been promised the throne next, just as he had been the one intended to take the throne rather than Al Mahdi himself in the first place. ESA IBN Musa was given another payoff and swept under the rug once more, living the rest of his life out in what is today northern Iraq. In addition to Isa IBN Musa, Al Mahdi also had to manage relations with the Alids, those descendants of Ali and the Prophet Muhammad, who many in the empire thought should be on the caliphal throne. There were numerous Alids active during the early Abbasid dynasty. Some, like the revered Imam Ja' Far as Sadiq, stayed out of politics, passing on the traditions of the Prophet's inner family and contributing to Islamic history with the hadiths and other writings that they left behind. Other Alids were more politically active. The Caliph Al Mahdi, who again came to the throne in 775, seems to have treated key Alids with proactive generosity rather than paranoid harshness. Medina, as it had been a century before, was a center of Alid activity, and Al Mahdi showered money on the city and its Alid connected families in order to demonstrate that he was glad to have them in the empire. Al Mahdi's largesse to the Alids didn't solve the Abbasid dynasty's long term problem with the presence of Shiite Ali in the empire. But diplomacy toward the Alids probably protected Al Mahdi from any serious Alid challengers. In addition to successful diplomatic overtures to the Alids, Al Mahdi's reign also resulted in some governmental and demographic changes that would last for a long time. Al Mahdi employed an intermediary named Yaqub IBN Daoud to help him negotiate with the Alids Yaqub, taking the title of Wazir or Vizier. The Caliphate's Vizier, like contemporary major Domos under the Merovingians and Carolingians, eventually became his right hand man handling many of the affairs of state. And just as the Vizier grew into an important political office, the Kutab, or Bureau of Government Officials also began to solidify into a power block within the empire. The subject of a government bureaucracy doesn't sound like a thrilling one at first glance. Bean counters in cubicles, so to speak, aren't stereotypically as exciting as cavalry charges or naval salvos. However, during the early Abbasid period a lot of interesting things were happening in the world of government departments. The years of al Mahdi's reign again 775, 785, saw the old Umayyad and Rashidun distinctions between Arab Muslims and other Muslims softening at the level of government bureaucracy. When an administration needed a director of postal service or taxation or transportation, that director didn't need to be an esteemed Arab Muslim of noble extraction. In fact, it was often better for the Abbasid regime to just find a freedman or otherwise low born imperial subject. If as a caliph you hired a nobody, that nobody's allegiances were going to be toward you and toward their career rather than toward enriching their familial or clan connections, the Qutb then, or Bureau of Government Officials. And beneath them, the Abbasid bureaucracy became a meritocratic vehicle for hardworking individuals of various extractions, which of course was good for the health of the empire. As scholar Hugh Kennedy writes, the Qutb quickly became a highly educated elite of administrative secretaries, the mandarins of the early Islamic world whose power and wealth were based on the fact that they alone could administer the revenue collecting machinery on which the regime depended. They were also important as patrons of poets and prose writers alike. In particular, an Iranian family called the Barmakids flourished in Al Mahdi's bureaucracy. These Persians of old Sasanian extraction distinguished themselves at various echelons of the Abbasid civil service. By the end of Al Mahdi's 10 year reign in 785, a central government had emerged in Baghdad whose general caliphate wide interests were sometimes at odds with those of regional governors and military leaders. Al Mahdi's reign, in spite of two expeditions against the Byzantines and one further afield in modern day Pakistan, was generally a peaceful one. Later historians memorialized Al Mahdi's 10 years on the throne as politically peaceful and unexciting and Almaty seems to have been a generous, sophisticated, inquisitive, friendly person, fond of hunting. One of his most famous exploits was purchasing a famous singer and musician from Medina and making her his concubine. And with this concubine siring a daughter named Ulaya bint Al Mahdi, who would herself be a poet and a musician and a fixture in the next generation of Abbasid court life. The Caliph Al Mahdi, in his 40s in the 780s, had two sons eligible to rule and he named both of them as successors to use their later caliphal names. The older brother Al Hadi was to rule first and then, in the event of Al Hadi's death, a Rashid was to take his place on the throne. This sort of arrangement is always problematic, but without going into any great detail, when the Caliph Al Mahdi died in a hunting accident in 785, his older son Al Hadi, about 22 years old, ascended to the throne as his father Al Mahdi had intended, and the younger son Al Rashid, settled into a life comfortably away from the public eye. The older son Al Hadi's caliphate was brief. A little over a year he treated the Alids again, the descendants of Muhammad's son in law, Ali, more strictly than his father had, and a minor Alid rebellion in Mecca resulted, which the Abbasids squashed in the summer of 785. Following the rebellion, an Alid leader and descendant of Muhammad named Idris IBN Abd Allah fled to what is today Morocco, where the Idrisid dynasty was soon established in 788, a dynasty which would endure in Morocco and Algeria for almost 200 years and abet the spread of Islam in Northwest Africa other than unintentionally abetting the Idrisid dynasty in present day Morocco. Though the Caliph Al Hadi was unable to achieve a great deal in his brief time on the throne, Al Hadi, like every Abbasid we have met thus far, could not endure the thought that anyone but his own son would inherit his throne. Throne? In spite of previous familial arrangements, and a year into his reign he was planning to ouster his brother. Al Hadi died, however, before he was able to formally declare his young son as his chosen heir. He may have had an ulcer and he may have been assassinated. Stories about this episode in Abbasid history focus on Al Hadi and his brother Al Rashid's mother, who preferred the younger son over the older and evidently had some political aspirations of her own. However, it happened in mid September of 786, the fourth short lived Abbasid Caliph Al Hadi was gone and his brother Arashid's supporters, acting quickly, strong armed Arashid onto the throne. Arashid would have the longest caliphate of the early Abbasid period. All told, 23 years between 786 and 809. Arashid would preside over the most golden era of the early Abbasid empire. So let's spend a bit more time getting to know Arashid. If you have ever heard the name of a caliph, there's a good chance that that name is Harun Al Rashid. A character in the 1001 Nights. A lavish patron of the arts and the leader of a peaceful and flourishing period of Abbasid history, Harun Al Rashid was as generous as he was ruthless. And his 23 year long caliphate, although lauded to no end by Abbaside sources and dilettantish 19th century orientalists, had some different phases and some ups and downs. The image of him and his chief minister Ja' Far strolling through the streets of Baghdad, engaged in leisure and chicaner, is an appealing one in the 1001 Nights. But Arashid, of course, was a real person with a long and complex political career to begin at the outset of his caliphate in the year 786. Like many hereditary monarchs in history, Harun Al Rashid came to the throne at a young age, somewhere between 18 and 20. As a young ruler, he needed a lot of help. Fortunately for him, help was available in the form of a sizable and seasoned bureaucracy. Behind the early Abbasid caliphs was a group I mentioned a moment ago, the Barmakids. The Barmakids were an Iranian family that originally hailed from the Caliphate's far northeast, the city of Balkh in the north central part of what is today Afghanistan. From the first Abbasid Caliph onward, the Barmakid family served the Abbasid caliphs at every level of the administration. Eventually, in the year 787, the Barmakids even acquired the Caliph's seal and the power to make executive decisions on his behalf. When young Harun Al Rashid came to the throne in 785, the Barmakids were already in the midst of taking desks at every echelon of the Abbasid bureaucracy. Harun Al Rashid, content to delegate the responsibilities of ruling the empire to the Barmakids, enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with this bureaucratic dynasty. The Caliph. Harun Al Rashid's relationship with the Barmakids was in fact so close that it can be described as familial, he saw the leading barmakid, Yahya IBN Khalid, as a paternal figure and Yahya's son Ja' Far was the Caliph's dear friend. Friend. These Barmakid handlers made themselves indispensable to the young caliph Harun Al Rashid, deftly collecting taxes from the empire's eastern regions. In particular, the Caliph Al Rashid's grandfather Al Mansur had founded the city of Baghdad with the intention of having a rich capital at the heart of the gigantic Islamic empire. Al Rashid presided over a period of continued centralization. The Abbasid regime and its Barmakid operatives for the first half of AR Rashid's reign of 786 to 809 shored up power at its center. With adept and loyal ministers at his disposal, Al Rashid was able to diminish the importance of provincial governorships, slowly buying up and otherwise acquiring sawafi, or state lands such that tenants and farmers paid dues directly to the caliph. Caliph. In strategic areas of the empire, A Rashid's own power grew and just beneath him, the power of his Barmakid viceroys. At first glance, the Barmakid ascendancy during the first decade and a half of Arashid's reign appears to be a recipe for a coup. After all, a shadow regime occupied in seizing bureaucratic posts in the imperial center and might naturally go for broke and attempt to nab the caliphate for itself. However, the Barmakids were more white collar careerists than military crackerjacks and they were Machiavellian only up to a point. When a number of rebellions flared up in the caliphate between 794 and 797, it became clear that military superintendence was not a Barmakid specialty. And after 797, Harun Al Rashid, by that time over 30 years of age, leaned on his Barmakid ministers less and less. Not everything Ar Rashid did involved bureaucratically convoluted statecraft. A moment ago we learned that Arashid's grandfather Al Mansur had encouraged the creation of the earliest prophetic biographies. Ar Rashid was also interested in Islam's past, surrounding himself with a group of scholars and jurists together focused on the correct recitation of the Quran and the drafting of Islamic laws based on the Quran, hadiths and legal precedents. Al Rashid knew two of the four architects of modern Sunni law. Malik Ibn Anas and Ashafi' I and his sons, who would both be caliphs, studied hadiths with Malik Ibn Anas A Rashid's genuine desire to help codify Sunnism for the future was matched by a shared sense of how religion can dovetail with political theater. The Caliph's southbound journeys from Baghdad to Mecca involved stops at population centers to appear before his subjects. Ar Rashid's wife Zubaydah funded the creation of an 875 mile long highway between Kufa and Mecca with dozens of watering stations to make sure pilgrims could get down to the central Hijaz safely from the Abbasid Caliphate center. Many of the major events from the middle part of Al Rashid's reign happened in the empire's central north. Khazar raiders coming down through modern day Armenia descended into Abbasid territories, and the armies of the caliphate were able to rebuff them closer to home. Al Rashid, over the course of the 790s, seems to have developed an aversion to the metropolis of Baghdad, and he made his residence up in Raqqa in present day Syria, increasingly avoiding Baghdad altogether. Additionally, Ar Rashid worked spiritedly to manage the Byzantine frontier, buttressing Abbasid control of the border and leading the occasional campaign. By the year 800, Harun Al Rashid was in his late 30s. He still had nine years left in his reign, but he had also by this point, been on the throne for 14 years. His style of governance over these 14 years had evolved from relying on the Barmakid bureaucrats extensively early on during his caliphate, he had increasingly pulled away from them in Raqqa. Toward the end of his reign, though he had left Baghdad, the emperor was gathering power increasingly at the center of the caliphate by building out provincial towns with nearby bases for Abbasid troops. By the year 800, AR Rashid was thinking about the future. Like every Abbasid leader before him, Ar Rashid wanted to pass power onto his sons. Unlike every Abbasid leader before him, Arashid planned to divvy the Caliphate of Up and to have his older son rule the western half and his younger son, a half brother of the first, rule the eastern half. The decision to divide the empire up was a strange one in many ways. Ar Rashid's caliphate, after all, and the caliphates of his Abbasid predecessors had been characterized by centralization. The Abbasid Empire had become strong because centralization in Baghdad helped keep its centrifugal forces in check. Dividing the caliphate into east and west in particular would underscore the eastern half's already perennial tendency to turn into a culturally Persian breakaway state. Then there was the more obvious problem, that princelings do not share power well with one Another, especially when each princeling has powerful, powerful, motivated backers who want to use him to further their group's political aspirations, in spite of the manifold problems of trying to pass monarchical power down to two heirs simultaneously. As of the year 800, Harun Al Rashid had set one son, about age 13 up in Baghdad, and the other son also about age 13 up in Qur' an in the empire's northeast. Power sharing agreements were drafted in the first few years of the 800s, and by 803 the terms of the coming CO rule had been established and they were on display in contracts in the Kaaba in Mecca. And In January of 803, the Caliph Harun Al Rashid did something every bit as controversial as setting both of his two sons up for co rule. He expedited a quick, quick and ruthless purge of the Barmakid dynasty, those ministers and bureaucrats who had been so instrumental to the success of his early reign. The crescendo of this purge was the imprisonment of Yahya IBN Khalid, who had been a father figure to the Caliph Al Rashid, and the execution and mutilation of Ja', Far, Yahya's son and Al Rashid's close friend. Historians past and present have theorized many motivations for this mass execution. Why would a generally level headed caliph turn on the white collar Persian fellows who had kept the empire running so punctiliously for the first 19 years of his reign? A synthesis of the most likely theories is as the barmaKids as of 803 had perhaps finally become a bit more powerful than the Caliph preferred. Installed in many branches of government, the barmaKids may by 803 have finally developed into a semiautonomous power bloc within the Abbasid state that had become too aggressive a house from the east that in spite of its usefulness and its patronage of the arts and sciences, had become an existential threat to the Abbasid administration that it had helped to create. When Harun al Rashid was young, young, he counted on the barmakids to help him learn the ropes of his job. When he was older, though, and he knew the levers of power better and sought to pass rule onto his sons, he could no longer brook the existence of such a potent organization within the empire. The purge of powerful Barmakids left many important posts open in the civil service, and in the years after 803 they began to be filled with a more diverse array of bureaucrats. There is also a scurrilous and steamy story that survives about Ar Rashid killing his friend Ja' Far because of Ja' Far's illicit relationship with the Caliph's sister. According to this story, Ja' Far and the Caliph's sister Abbasa were part of Ar Rashid's circle and they hung out with him often because highborn women in the empire had to be carefully monitored in order to avoid controversy, Ar Rashid had drawn up a nominal marriage between Abbasa and Ja' Far so that the Caliph could hang out with his buddy and his sister at the same time. However, so the story goes, at some point the nominal marriage got a bit too heated and Abasa got pregnant. She managed to have the baby in secret, but Ar Rashid found out about it. Hence again, according to this story, a Rashid suddenly going berserk in 803 and killing Ja' Far and getting the barmakids out of government. It's a juicy Suetonius style tale of imperial intrigue, which is why I've just offered you the short version. But Arashid's sister Abbasa actually died in 798 and so it's unlikely that a purge that happened and five years later had to do with a princess sexual indiscretions. Following the purge of leading barmakids from government in 803, Harun Al Rashid spent the final years of his reign, between 803 and 809, absorbed in managing the affairs of the empire's two most volatile frontiers. In 805, Al Rashid funded a major attack on the Byzantine Empire Empire in retaliation for an incursion by the new Byzantine emperor Nicephorus. This retaliatory campaign, though it didn't result in much more for the Abbasides than the acquisition of a single new town made excellent press for Harun al Rashid. Beyond the Byzantine Empire. As the Abbasids well knew, in the forests and the mountains of Central and Western Europe and the northern Mediterranean, there were a lot more Christians. The Abbasides had been in contact with Frankish monarchs since Almansor had exchanged embassies with Pepin the Short. And these embassies continued under Charlemagne and Harun al Rashid. Frankish diplomats arrived in Baghdad in 797 and Abbasid diplomats arrived in Pisa in 801 and later in 807. The 801 embassy, very famously in Latin sources, brought with them an elephant probably shipped over from Tunisia, not to mention a brass water clock, exquisite textiles and silk robes, all unlike anything the Latin west of the early medieval period had ever seen. Charlemagne's court historian Einard wrote of Harun al Rashid's great esteem for the first Holy Roman Emperor. In terms that are probably exaggerated, in reality, the Abbasid Caliphate and the Kingdom of Charlemagne shared, for different reasons, hostility to the Byzantines and to a lesser extent, Al Andalus. And so the two empires had some practical reasons to maintain strong diplomatic relations with one another. More pressing to Harun Al Rashid at the tail end of his career than the faraway frosty forests of France, was the ever volatile northeast of Khorasan. The Abbasid Caliphate had been born in Khorasan, and Khorasan always threatened to become a power center to rival Iraq. Al Rashid led a campaign there toward the end of 808, accompanied by his son Al Ma', Mun, who had been groomed to rule in Khorasan. Although the seasoned Caliph probably planned a series of decisive victories in the northeast, Ar Rashid never made it to the frontier. He sickened near the northeastern part of present day Iran, near the border with Turkmenistan. And while the Caliphal army proceeded onto the front, Ar Rashid, in his early 40s, died of an unknown illness. In the early part of 809. Following Al Rashid's death, his unusual succession plans were pushed to the test. His sons were both about 22. One son, whom history would know as Al Amin, was securely enthroned in Baghdad at the empire's center of power. The other son, Al Ma', Mun, was out on the eastern frontier in Khorasan, surrounded by a large military. As it turned out, Al Amin and Al Mamun shared power together peacefully and everyone lived happily ever after. Just kidding. Each co Caliph, albeit for different reasons, turned on the other. The saber rattling began almost immediately upon the death of Harun Al Rashid, and the immensely successful first half century of the Abbasid caliphate quite quickly came to its end. Whatever Al Rashid had imagined happening upon his death, he seems to have forgotten a cardinal rule of the early Abbasid dynasty. And that is that when any new Abbasid Caliph sat down on the Abbasid throne for more than half a second, no matter what sorts of agreements had been brokered, that Abbasid Caliph would begin foaming at the mouth with desire to pass power onto his own son, rather than any other previously discussed heir that made sense for the empire. It happened every single time with every succession. And it happened when our Rasheed's son, Al Amin plopped down onto the throne in battle in 809. Al Amin couldn't possibly tolerate his equally qualified brother as a candidate for a throne for which his brother had been groomed because Al Amin had a toddler. And the most important thing in the universe was that no matter what Al Amin's previous oaths had been and no matter the cost, in human carnage, this toddler had to be seated safely on the abbaside throne so that the child might vomit and drool on its cushion. And what did paternal and fraternal ties and the general well being of an empire matter after all, when a small infant posterior, still clad in diapers and unable to control its emissions, had not yet been guaranteed absolute power? What worth was all human life when an infant with literally no leadership capacity whatsoever, who spent his days whimpering and mouthing his toys, had not been consecrated as the future head of state? State Al Amin wanted his son to be Caliph. So he began what would soon turn into a massive civil war called the Fourth Fitna. The Fourth Fitna was a war between the Caliph Al Rashid's two sons, Al Amin to the west, and then Al Ma' mun to the east. Its first phase, which we will now discuss, lasted for four years between 809 and 813. It had an enormous human cost, and although the two brothers who ended up leading the factions had backers who stoked the fires of the conflict, the war was tragically as preventable as any succession dispute. Hence my overcooked sarcasm a moment ago. The war began with a testy exchange between the two brothers via letters, with Al Amin asking Al Ma' Mun to come to Baghdad because Al Amin needed Al Mamun's advice, Al Mamun declined and asked Al Amin if maybe could Al Amin send his family and relatives out to the East. Al Amin declined, as these family members would be valuable hostages. Al Amin held the main Abbasid control room when hostilities began in 809, and there he declared that his aforementioned baby son would be the next caliph. On the other side of the mountains, Al Ma' Mun made some far sighted moves. At the beginning of the conflict, Al Ma' Mun proclaimed himself as Imam, in other words, the divinely guided spiritual leader of Islam, and in doing so, trying with some success to get some wind in his sails from the messianic sentiments circulating throughout the empire. Al Mamun also cut off his brother Al Amin's lines of communication to the east, thus keeping Al Amin in isolated from what was going on over on the Iranian side of the Zagros Mountains. Coalitions began to form behind each of these young men. But to simplify a great welter of political history, the coalitions were expedients of momentary shared interests more than partnerships anchored in real loyalty. In the east, old Persian families and colonized subjects more generally saw Al Mamun and potential path to political independence in the West. Various stalwarts opposed to Easterners lined up behind Al Amin. Armed hostilities between the two brothers began in March of 811 when a Western force in the service of Al Amin crossed over the Zagros mountains. An eastern force met them on the battlefield, and in this first engagement, the eastern forces of Al Mamun were triumphant. The eastern brother Al Mamun, who had already proclaimed himself Imam around this point, also proclaimed himself Caliph. And back in Baghdad, the Western brother Al Amin fumed, seeing that his bid for absolute power had not immediately succeeded. To add insult to injury, the Eastern brother Al Mamun's army made follow up attacks on Al Amin's forces, chasing them back over the mountain, such that as 811 came to its conclusion, the eastern half of the empire belonged squarely to Al Mamun. As the winter of 811 deepened over in Baghdad, things went from bad to worse. Al Amin, as it turned out, who had reached for the stars by setting his baby son up as an heir, had neither the leadership skills nor the courage to back up his pugnacious ambition. The coalition that had amassed in his favor showed fissures. The most important of these fissures occurred in the Western military. This military was for a long time staffed by lieutenants and regulars of Iranian stock whose families had served in the Abbasid military for more than half a century. An impressive vanguard that had protected the military interests of a number of different Abbasid caliphs. These Iranian military men had failed in the conflicts of 811, and as the western half of the caliphate tried to field armies thereafter, long held prejudices against Baghdad's Iranian vanguard came to the surface. The Western caliph Al Amin soon found that although he had military men willing to fight for him for different reasons, they weren't necessarily willing to work together. An attempt to drum up more military support in Syria that same year also failed. And when the eastern caliph Al Mamun ordered an invasion of Iraq in the spring of 812, the eastern armies met with little effective resistance from the splintered Western military. As the army of the eastern caliph Al Mamun slashed upward through Mesopotamia toward Baghdad. In Baghdad itself, a coup broke out. The Western caliph Al Amin was arrested, but then released in a dramatic turn of the having escaped by the skin of his teeth, Al Amin still had to deal with the presence of an invading army. It was by this time the late summer of 812, and between September of 812 and September of 813, Baghdad was under siege. The round city built for defensibility by the second Abbasid caliph, Al Mansur was by the time of his great grandsons, the site of a terminal conflict and war of attrition. The citizens of Baghdad themselves were armed and acted as a defense force, but eventually assailants from the east overpowered the Baghdadis. The western caliph, Al Amin, who had both instigated the war as well as mismanaged his side of it, surrendered, and he was executed. The death of Alamo in 813 marks the end of the first half of the fourth fitna. Although the eastern caliph Al Mamun had emerged as the sole heir of the Abbasid throne, Al Mamun himself was way over in the eastern part of what is today Iran. A year passed between the autumn of 813 and the autumn of 814, and tensions quickly rose between several different factions in the empire. The eastern caliph Al Mamun, had won the civil war with his brother, but he was Also, by late 814, still in Khorasan and seemed to want to rule the Islamic empire from the distant east. Never mind all the centralization that had taken place in Baghdad for the past 50 years. The idea of a Khorasani caliph and moreover, Iranian military boots stomping around the Tigris Euphrates floodplain was unpalatable to many Abbasid citizens who made their homes in modern day Iraq. Thus a simple east west division lay at the heart of the rest of the Fourth Fitna, or Fourth Islamic Civil War. On the right side there was a caliph, in the east and eastern military occupiers who had besieged and broken Baghdad. On the left side or west, there were Iraqis, and beyond them Arab families in Syria, Egypt and Arabia, leery of a Persian power grab. While discord between the empire's eastern and western halves kept the fires of civil war burning after 814, a more immediate source of disruption were the Alids. An Alid rebellion flared up in Iraq during the first weeks of 815, taking control of some important southern states cities, including Kufa. The rebellion, not without difficulty, was put down by the Khorasani military leadership then present in Baghdad. Baghdad, as of 815 was under the leadership of a pair of brothers called the Salids. The Salids were the sons of an Iranian who had converted to Islam from Zoroastrianism, and they were an important power bloc. During the rest of the fourth fifth, the brothers nominally served the victorious caliph Al Ma', Mun, but they also sought power for themselves in Baghdad, generally endeavoring to keep the Caliph Al Mamun way over in Khorasan, so that he wouldn't know how dysfunctional things had grown in the Abbasid epicenter of Iraq. And things had indeed grown dysfunctional. By the summer of 816, a rebellion out of Baghdad had set its crosshairs on the Salid brother. And later that year, the eastern occupiers and the resentful Baghdadis fought an inconclusive battle a hundred miles downriver from Baghdad. A year of messy history followed in Iraq, with the Baghdadi rebels being only slightly less organized and militarily unified than their Salid oppressors. By May of 817, though, the salids, nominally serving the Caliph Al Mamun and definitely serving themselves, had Baghdad and beneath it, Mesopotamia under their control. Around the same time, and in events unconnected with the conflict in Iraq, the victorious Caliph Al Ma' Mun did something remarkable. In March of 817, Al Mamun, around 30 years of age, who had been in power for three and a half very rocky years, announced his success successor. This successor would not be a drooling and unqualified infant, but instead a full grown adult. The successor's name was Ali Ibn Musa Ibn Ja' Far, and he is better known as Ali Arida. Ali Arida was an Alid, or descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, revered today as the 8th of Twelver Shi' ism's 12 imams. Ali Alrida was was older than the victorious Caliph Al Mamun, about 50 years old in comparison to Al Mamun's 30. Al Mamun, it seems, was the first Abbasid Caliph in several generations who made a succession appointment not out of fondness for his own son, but for the health of the empire. Let's review for a moment, just in case you're lost in this whirlwind of military and political history. The Abbasides had always had trouble with the Alids. There was always a ready made contingent in the Abbasid empire who were ready to get behind a descendant of Muhammad's son in law Ali. Against the careful efforts of the Abbasid Caliphs to establish a continuous dynasty in Baghdad, the messianic energy in favor of the Alids created an ambient tension in the empire, a sense that the Caliphal throne was just one succession away from this or that Alid who would suddenly recommence a dramatically better future for the Islamic world. Thus, by naming an Alid Ali Arida as his successor instead of, gosh, I don't know, his own baby son, the 30 year old Caliph Al Mamun was able to accomplish a lot of things at once. First, the Alids and the Abbasides were close kins. Both groups were part of the Prophet Muhammad's Hashemite clan, and both families were eminently eligible for the caliphate, making Ali Arida a very reasonable choice. Moreover, the Caliph Al Ma' Mun knew that there had just been an Alid rebellion out of Kufa two years prior, and that the Alids, seeing an Alid's successor chosen as the next Abbasid Caliph, would line up behind the current Abbasid Caliph Caliph. Whether or not Al Ma' Mun saw his hand picked Alid's successor as an actual successor is open to question. Again, Ali arrida was around 50, so there's a good chance that Al Ma' Mun saw this heir as a political expedient. Anyway, to move forward and finally wrap up the fourth Fitna, let's talk about what happened next. To repeat, in the spring of 817, just as the Khorasani forces of Al Mamun locked down control of Iraq, Al Mamun named Alid as his successor. We might expect that this was the end of the war, but as it turned out, the black lands along the Tigris and Euphrates still had plenty of infighting left in them. Al Mamun's main military superintendents in Iraq were again the Salid brothers, and their incompetence continued when another Baghdadi insurrection broke out. In spite of the Caliph Al Mamun appointing an Alid as his successor, the pro Alid population of the empire centered in Kufa were not confident that a soft power transition to one of their own was actually going to happen. The Salid brothers and their Greater clan, as 817rumbled to an ugly end in Mesopotamia, were obviously losing control. Another Abbasid dynast was suddenly hailed as Caliph in the land between the rivers, Iraq was coming apart at the seams. What's surprising about this period of civil war is that the Caliph Al Mamun, way over in Khorasan, had hardly known about the extent of the tumult to the west. When he learned of it, he finally, at the beginning of 818, left Khurasan to actually come to the heart of his empire. Before he reached Baghdad, the fractious city had largely been restored to peace. The rebel caliph fled and Baghdad fell under the control of a general loyal to the Caliph Al Mamun. It was on August 10, 819, that Al Mamun entered the city of Baghdad as caliph, ending a 10 year period of general strife for the Abbasid caliphate. The fourth fitna was over and Al Mamun, though already 10 years into what had been intended as a co rule still had much of his caliphate ahead of him. Al Mamun's tenure as sole caliph began in 813 and it concluded in 833. His era on the throne was a period of both compromise and incremental success rather than sudden dramatic victories. He emerged as the victor of the fourth Fitna slowly and through a series of concessions. He had wanted to rule from Khorasan, but eventually conceded to come to Baghdad. He may have wanted to squelch the various rebellions in Iraq with decisive military force, but instead did so through attrition and the appointment of an Alid heir. One might say that Al Mamun, like some of his predecessors, came to the throne prepared to rule an empire, but instead found himself overseeing a patchwork of regions under varying degrees of caliphal control. The recent civil war, which had grinded on with varying degrees of intensity for 10 years, had resulted in the Abbasid house losing much of its power and clout in the empire. As the smoke cleared, in what had in some ways been a clash between Eastern and Western interests in the empire, Khorasani and moreover Iranian families, lost primacy in the caliphal military. The Abbasid bureaucracy survived healthily into the second half of Al Mamun's caliphate, and so too did Al Mamun's relationship with one of his most trusty generals, a man named Tahir IBN Husayn. Tahir IBN Husayn had served Al Mamun loyally over the course of the long civil war. As a reward for his trusted general, the caliph, Al Mamun sent his general Tahir to the distant east to govern Khorasan. This appointment was far sighted and extremely successful. The Tahirids would rule in Khorasan for more than 50 years afterward, supporting Abbasid power in Baghdad, enriching themselves in the process, and becoming a defining force in Persian cultural history. Though Tahir himself died shortly after his appointment, his son took over the post of governor in Khorasan, just as other members of Tahir's family occupied important posts of Abbasid government, including the governorship of Baghdad. While Al Mamun found the Tahirids to be loyal supporters over the course of the 820s, as the smoke cleared from the recent civil war, Al Ma' Mun also found a strong backing from his brother Abu Isak, who would later become caliph after Al Mamun's death. Let's stick with Al Mamun for now, though, and focus on his time on the throne following the civil war. Again, the years between 819 and 833 Al Ma' Mun during this period needed all the help he could get. 10 years of civil war had allowed many regions of the caliphate to grow unkempt. Egypt had become divided. Syria had been polka dotted with indigenous rebel groups, and Azerbaijan had fallen under the control of Persian nativist freedom fighters. Al Mamun's enforcers first locked down Syria, treating rebel groups there with clemency. Next on the list was Egypt, which had become subdivided into several different territories. By 827, the western part of the caliphate, through diplomacy and military interventions, had been brought back under the leadership of Baghdad. Azerbaijan presented a more complicated situation. Azerbaijan, during the 7 hundreds and 8 hundreds, was at the northern periphery of the Islamic world. Colonization had taken place there, but as with other porous areas of the Islamic empires, Arab settlers dealt carefully with extant populations who spoke different languages and continued to practice their own religions. With Baghdad enfeebled between 809 and 819, by the fourth fitna, Azerbaijan had fallen under the control of a leader named Babak Khoramdin, a revolutionary of uncertain extraction who supported an eastern return to the glories of the Persian past, including Zoroastrianism. When a governor of Mosul was killed around 827during clashes with the separatist movement based in Azerbaijan, the Caliph Al Mamun dispatched a general to secure Mosul and then attack Babak Khoramdin further to the north. Using the rugged northern terrain to their advantage, Babak's rebel forces outmaneuvered the Abbasid army and the Abbasid general was killed. The Caliph Al Mamun decided to cut his losses. Azerbaijan was abandoned for the remainder of Al Mamun's caliphate. Just as, over the opening decades of the 800s, the Abbasides had lost control over northwestern Africa, let's talk for a moment about the distant peripheries of the Abbasid world. Around the year 830 CE, Empires, as we've observed in literature and history, move like water. An initial splash of military conquest is often followed by a receding of tides as colonized populations reassert their rights to sovereignty. As the waters of empire recede, it becomes clear that not everything was actually conquered and that indigenous cultures and institutions, resilient and obdurate, have sponged up only a small amount of the invading imperial culture. Where the waters of empire are shallow, power changes hands often, and hybrid ideologies and ethnicities commingle into new populations. In time, the waters of a past military conquest evaporate altogether, and what is left behind is a new patchwork of internal polities, self interested and intractable to central imperial control. This process, conquest and then simultaneous cultural synthesis and cultural resistance was always at work in the Islamic caliphates in 830, in particular, the north central territories of Africa, a region called Ifriqia by the Abbasides, proved very unruly, just as Khurasan, all the way on the other side of the empire, already had. Let's start with Coruscant in 830, since we've already discussed this northeastern region of the empire. If the Romans had, say in the time of Trajan in 117 CE, consolidated all of the provinces that they possessed from modern day Turkey to modern day Iraq, given it a name like Romistan, and crossed their fingers and hoped that it wouldn't explode, they would have had something like Khorasan. Khorasan, by the tail end of Al Mamun's caliphate in 830, was a province that ran 1,000 miles from east to west and included the Hindu Kush and other ranges, rivers, oases and deserts, wastelands and large cities, and pretty much every religion and ethnicity to be found in Central Asia in the early medieval period. In Khurasan, Arab Muslims walked tall in big cities, but old Iranian aristocrats still had deep pockets and a lot of social and political power. Up in the mountains, checkerboards of powerful families, along with subsistence pastoralists and nomads, might live out their lives more or less indifferent to the Abbasid throne in Baghdad, Khorasan was always special, a region with an asterisk next to its name. Different Abbasid caliphs dealt with Khorasan in different ways. Throughout the Abbasid Caliphate, Khorasan was an internal empire into itself, itself with its own factionalism and infighting and its own nativist and messianic rebellions. Al Ma', Mun, the caliph who emerged victorious from the Fourth Fitna, seemed to think of Khorasan as the Abbasid Caliphate's real power center. As he spent the first nine years of the great civil war there. Al Ma' Mun knew that Khorasan was the region that had catapulted his forefathers to power, that Khurasani military forces were keys to Abbasid's strength, and moreover, that the real power of the Caliphate's throne around 830was inextricably tied to the faraway cities of Marle, Balkh and Samarkand, that kingpins of modern day Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan and their descendants were major power brokers for the great Islamic empire so famously held, headquartered in Baghdad. The story of the early Abbasid Caliphate, as I've emphasized several times, is a story that necessarily involves Khorasan and the east, as the region was a volatile and evolving center of gravity in the early Islamic world. But a different region called Ifriqiya was equally unruly. The Abbasids had lost control of their far western regions early on. First al Andalus, around 756, had broken away into an independent emirate ruled by an Umayyad prince named Abd al rahman I. After 756, Al Andalus became the Emirate of Cordoba for a couple of centuries, and its various Umayyad leaders dealt with the Abbasid throne as nominal subordinates, though in reality they enjoyed sovereignty in southern and south central Spain. The first Emir of Al Andalus, precisely three decades into his reign, saw the ascension of the great Caliph Harun al Rashid in 786. And in 786, the emir of Al Andalus began the construction of the Great Mosque of Cordoba, the building that still stands there today as the Mezquita, an emblem of the independence of Al Andalus from the Abbasides. With Spain having essentially broken off back in the 750s, then the Abbasids also had to deal with central North African regions also asserting their independence. To turn to the subject of Ifriqiya, let's first define this region. Ifriqiya can loosely be understood as modern day Tunisia, northeastern Algeria and western Libya. This region, like faraway Khurasan, was on the empire's outer edges. Umayyad and Abbasid garrisons and the towns that expanded under them created colonial populations of Arab Muslims. But beyond the Caliphate's enclaves were Berber groups that had been there since pre Roman times. What happened with these Berber groups during the century between 750 and 850 had a formative effect on North Africa, or Al Maghrib, Al Adna, or the Maghreb that can still be felt today. Several episodes ago, we first met a group called the Harajites. The Haradjites appeared during the first fitna of 656, 661. They are, in medieval Islamic sources, described as extremists, an uncompromising group characterized most of all by the belief that Islamic leadership should be based on Islamic piety and not on clan, tribe, paternity or ethnicity. The Harijites were a diverse group that evolved over time. And yet even as they evolved for the entire duration of the Umayyad and much of the Abbasid Caliphate, they were a force with which each new caliph had to reckon. Caliphs passed the throne down to family members, Haradjites on the contrary, taught that power in the caliphate should go to the devout and faithful and not the highborn. Haradjites then believed in meritocratic leadership rather than hereditary monarchy. Tired of kings and princes and dissatisfied with kingdoms in which some Muslims were clearly more equal than others, the Haradjites preached the appealing message of equality before God. And they were perennially a very powerful force in the early caliphates. By the year 830, where we have paused in our historical narrative, the Harjites had been active in North Africa for a century. There they preached Islamic egalitarianism along with, more generally, the appealing messages of salvific monotheism. The Berbers, like other colonized groups in the early Abbasid Empire, knew what it was like to be second class citizens. Between 7:30 and 8:30, Haradjite orators told Berber listeners that indeed colonizers did not have any right to rule over them. The Berbers listened. A rebellion exploded in 758 in which Berber rebels catalyzed by haragites attempted to throw off the yoke the Abbasid empire. For decades afterward, caliph after caliph tried to subdue central North Africa with varying degrees of success. Eventually, In July of 800, a middle aged scion of a powerful political family was elevated to the position of governor of Ifriqiya. His name was Ibrahim IBN Al Aghalab and he was the first emir of the Aghalabid dynasty dynasty. When he died in 812, Al Amin and Al Mamun were already busy with their civil war. And so the first Aghlabid emir passed power down to his son. And so it went for the next century. By the year 830, the Aghalabid dynasty had reached the period of its ascension. Seated in Kairouan in Tunisia, Aghlabid Ifriqiya was, like other regions at the edges of the Abbasid empire, a place where several generations of colonizers and colonized had hardened into a new culture and state. Islamic, but only partly attached to the caliphate. Berbers, who had increasingly converted to Islam under the influence of the egalitarian Haradjites, formed Ifriqia's majority population by the year 830 and the ideology of the ethnically diverse Haragite believers pervaded Ifriqiya's streets and crop fields. The dominant classes were a hodgepodge of Arab settlers who had been there since the Umayyad period and newer Khorasani military elite. The first Aghlab IBN Emir, again Ibrahim I Ibn Al Aqlab, was of mixed Khorasani and Arab stock, as were his descendants. The central North Africa that we know today came from this confluence that transpired from 7:30 to 8:30 Berbers first and foremost, Arab settlers, Harajite proselytizers and Khurasani military men 3,000 miles away from home. When we learn about the conquests of the caliphates today in the English speaking world, it is too often with the sense that the black flag of the Abbasid Caliphate, and before it, the flags of the Umayyad and Rashidun caliphates, unfurled to spread Islam across the world. And of course, ideological proselytization on behalf of Islam was part of the reason for each caliphate's expansion. The ruling classes of the Umayyads and early Abbasids were Muslims, and Arab Muslims enjoyed a lion's share of wealth and power. But there are important counterpoints to the conventional truism that the caliphates were Islamic empires. First, as we learned in previous episodes, the Umayyad empire, even its twilight in 750, was only about 10% Muslim. Second, Islam also worked against the caliphs and the unity of their empires. The religion, after all, began as an egalitarian ideology aimed squarely at the powerful clan hegemonies of mecca in the 620s generations later, as when the Harijites preached their gospel in North Africa and elsewhere, Islam, which was quickly subdividing into different denominations, was proving that it could dismantle provinces just as quickly as it had helped build them in the first place. And the most famous denominational schism in the early caliphates was, of course, that between the groups that we now call Sunnis and Shiites. While this schism has been the most historically pivotal one in Islam, it has also been misrepresented in Islamic sources for a long time. Put simply, while Sunnism and Shi' ism divide the Islamic world today, these two parent groups took many generations to part company. As we've learned in prior episodes, the basic difference between Sunnism and Shi' ism is as follows. Sunnis believe that studying the ways or Sunnah of Muhammad and coming to an ijma or community consensus, are the best ways for Muslims to conduct themselves individually and collectively. Shiites, on the contrary, believe that a divinely guided Imam, a male genetic descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, is the rightful leader of the Islamic community. And the majority of Shias today believe that a distant grandson of the Prophet Muhammad al Mahdi, a real person born in about 868, is the savior of humanity. With Muhammad al Mahdi having gone into occultation or hiding. In 874, Muhammad Al Mahdi, in the largest branch of Shi' ism today, is understood as the 12th Imam, divinely anointed by God to lead humanity. These 12 Imams in Twelver Shi' ism began with Ali Ibn Abi Taliban and forged their way ahead through the bumpy centuries of the early caliphates, ignored at best by the caliphs and sometimes persecuted by them. During these programs on the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates, I have most often used the word Alid rather than Shiite, as is the convention in scholarship. The reason for this convention is that between ali's death in 661 and the vanishing of Muhammad Al Mahdi in 868, a lot of different people lined up behind a lot of different Descendants of Ali ibn Abi Talib, descendants not numbered among the 12 imams revered by the majority of Shiites today. The descendants of Ali were by the 700s, large in number, and messianic sentiments in the empire sometimes propped one of them up, resulting in rebellions and tensions that various caliphs had to deal with. Late antique Arabs felt clan ties keenly, and so naturally, Al al Bayt, or the people of the House of the Prophet, were a group who had to be reckoned with carefully. The roots of modern Shi' ism by all means lie in the sundry and theologically diverse population of the alids of the 600-7-1200s and 800-00. But Shiism as a codified denomination with its own doctrines, is the product of the middle and later Abbasid caliphate rather than the early period, which now concerns us. And speaking of different denominations, now that we've paused for a moment to consider the complex interplay between the empire's Eastern and Western extremities in about the year 830 and considered the alids as proto Shiites. It's time for us to learn about another one of the most important ideological earthquakes in Islamic history, a movement called Mutazilism. To understand mutazilism and where it came from, it's important to understand the intellectual history of the early 800s. The Caliph Al Ma' Mun won the fourth fitna, defeating his brother in 813. And for the next 20 years, Al Mamun held the empire together in spite of the considerable forces working to disintegrate it. The most famous thing that Al Mamun ever did, however, may have been founding the Bayt al Hikma, or the House of Wisdom, and backing a translation movement to render texts in Greek, Syriac and other languages into Arabic. Al Mamun was not the first Abbasid ruler to support intellectual research or the warehousing of text. The spirit of Abbasid leadership from Al Mansur onward seemed to involve openness toward scientific, mathematical, and medical knowledge, regardless of its source. As scholar Tayyib Al Hibri, the project of patronizing the translation of great works began in the founding days of Baghdad. Throughout the early Abbasid period, we never encounter a clash between caliph and scientists, philosophy and piety, and much less a backlash against those translating texts or an attempt to exclude certain scientists or scholars of translation based on their religious affiliation or specialization. The first Abbasid caliphs were Muslims, ruling over a majority Christian and Zoroastrian empire, its various fringes rich with Chinese, Indian, Greek and Latin culture, its heart, the commingling of Arab and Persian culture. Accordingly, Baghdad from the 750s onward was not a place conducive to any particular jingoism or xenophobia. Like Rome under Augustus and Florence under the early Medicis, early Abbasid Baghdad was, intellectually speaking, open for business, regardless of race or creed. Simply simple pragmatism drove a lot of the Abbasid Empire's desire for knowledge. The caliphate had irrigation networks to build and optimize, tax percentages to calculate new trade routes to China, and thus nautical techniques and instruments to perfect buildings to build and cities to plan, cartographic processes to standardize, luxury goods to collect, mass produce and sell, and military technologies to hone in. And in all of these cases, knowledge was a tremendous commodity. Thus, when the Abbasides made incursions into Anatolia while fighting the Byzantines and happened on troves of manuscripts, these manuscripts were among their greatest treasures. The Caliph Al mamun in the 810s and more so the 820s, promoted in particular the study of Hellenistic Greek science. And when Ptolemy's Alma to was rendered into Arabic. During these decades, ancient Greek astronomy blossomed within Islamic intellectual history, an astronomical observatory being built in Baghdad. Al Mamun, then, like his Abbasid predecessors, was a patron of intellectual history because doing so was practical and advantageous to a person in his position. And in Baghdad, people from all over the world were around to help nudge the train of knowledge forward. But Al Ma' Mun also seems to have been a bit more intellectually restless than the Abbasids who came before him, restless to the point of being interested in some theological conundrums relatively new to Islamic history. Within the empire at this juncture, there was a sect called the Mutazilah. The Mutazilites were Essentially speculative religious philosophers, the Mutazilites were interested in some of Abrahamic theology's greatest hits. For instance, how did free will square with divine justice? Did predestination exist? How can we understand things like the Word of God? How can we resist anthropomorphizing God? But there was another question, a question about the Quran that became the cardinal theological question of the 9th century in the Islamic world. This question was as Was the Quran created by God at a moment in time? Or was the Quran always in existence outside of time? The position of the Mutazilites was that the Quran had been created. The Caliph Al Mamun became a patron of the Mutaz. In 827, Al Mamun declared his adherence to the idea that the Quran had been created. And around 833 Al Mamun's position on Quranic createdness hardened. It was not enough that Al Mamun himself believed in this central doctrine of Mutazilism. The doctrine of Quranic createdness was now required. Throughout the empire. Al Ma' Mun enacted a program called the Mina, which can be translated as Inquisition. Hadith scholars were all required to endorse the Mutazilist doctrine that the Quran had been created. And if they refused, they were imprisoned. The question we need to ask is why had Quranic createdness suddenly become a controversial issue in 833? Why was the Caliph Al Mamun zealously backing this rather abstract theological idea? Just as Christians had been losing their minds over the exact nature of Jesus for 500 years of Christological debates, all of a sudden a comparable controversy was causing earthquakes in the political center of Islam. Was the Quran as the Word of God effectively co eternal with God? Or had the Quran actually been created at a fixed point in time, for instance, when its verses came to Muhammad as revelations? As with other abstract and insoluble questions in theological history, the issue of Quranic createdness was contentious because political interests lay behind it. The Caliph Al Mamun backed Quranic createdness because in historian Hugh Kennedy's words, if the Quran was created in time, then it was for that time time and could be interpreted or even possibly modified by a divinely guided caliph to suit changing circumstances. In other words, Al Mamun's position may have been that while the Quran was the word of God, it was one instance of the Word of God. And a high born caliph with a direct line to God might himself receive a new revelation that made all of the consensuses and scholarship of the Ulama, or Islamic scholarly class outdated. This scholarly class, after all, with their bookcases full of hadiths and other materials, saw precedent and tradition as the paramount authorities in the empire rather than the Caliph himself. The mainline ulama, unlike the Caliph Al Ma' Mun and the new fangled ideal of Mutazilism taught that the Quran was eternal and unmodifiable and thus that the work of exegetes and religious scholars was the sturdiest way of determining how to live a pious life and be a good person. The ulama. Again, religious scholars of the 830s saw the Caliph aligning himself with the Mutazilite movement as the state lumbering over into the terrain the of of the church. And thus the Mutazilite controversy was at its apex a feud between the king and the clergy. By adopting a hard line position on Quranic createdness and then enforcing this position, Al Mamun was testing out the ultimate limits of his authority. He never got to find out whether or not his imposition was successful. Al Ma' Mun died, probably a food poison poisoning, in August of 833 while on a campaign in Anatolia. He had ruled for 20 years and in spite of incurring the disdain of the ulema for his attempted usurpation of their religious authority, he was among the most impactful leaders in history. Between 813 and 833, Al Mamun altered the Islamic world's center of gravity forever. His caliphal apprenticeship had been in Khorasan and he had begun his rule from Khorasan. And his roots in and dedication to Central Asia nurtured the careers and ambitions of an empire wide Persian political and military elite. The Umayyads had run an empire into the ground by trying to hoard the wealth of much of the world into the hands of a single extended family. Under Al Mamun's more polychromatic administration, a practical, bureaucratic, intellectually voracious state relinquished power to satellite areas and in doing so strengthened its core. The Rashidun and Umayyad past had been Arab kingdoms. After Al Mamun, the caliphate would increasingly be Iranian and Central Asian as much as it was Arab, eventually leading to the rise of a new power bloc from Turkic Central Asia. Al Ma' Mun's patronage of the sciences and later his embrace of Mutazilist rationalism have given him a special place in intellectual history. Saying's collections sprung up about him a decade after his death, in which Al Ma' Mun is a Socratic figure, presiding over salons and rattling off impressive sounding aphorisms in such scenes Al Ma' Mun is a world weary wise man ready to relinquish the Caliphate for the life of an ordinary person, whoever he actually was. And in spite of the religious persecution he spearheaded against fellow Muslims, Al Ma' Mun was clearly a very unique, very intelligent person who marched to the beat of his own drum. Among the many enigmas that remain about him is a final one pertinent to the year833. It is not clear whether Al Mamun sought a succession by his son or by his half brother. And that succession takes us to the final part of today's story. As we wrap up the story of the early Abbasid Caliphate. In this program we need to learn about three more caliphs. Again, the half brother of the previous caliph Al Ma' Mun, whose name was Al mutasim, and then two of Al Mutassim's sons, if Al Mansur back in 754, 775 marked the beginning of the Abbasid Caliphate and then Al Rashid and al Mamun from 786 to 833 marked its bumpy and eventful high noon. The final three caliphs in our story today are its late afternoon and evening. They were very different from one another, but they shared the earlier Abbasid Caliphs overall intelligence and competence on the throne. Let's begin in the year 833 following the death of Al Mamun in the summer of 833, Al Ma' Mun's half brother Al Mutasim ascended to the throne. Al Mutasim would rule from 833 to 842. Al Mutasim continued the Caliphate's traditions of sponsoring the sciences. And Al Mutassim persisted with his half brother's Mutazilist zeal, forcing Quranic creationism on Islamic theologians through state sponsored inquisitions. These are confusingly similar nouns if you haven't heard them. So just to repeat, mutazilism was a 9th century movement in Islamic rationalism and Al Mu'tazim was a caliph who ruled between 833 and 842 and the movement is not named after him. Mutazilism theological movement Mutasim Caliph who embraced Mutazilism although he did not found it moving on what the Caliph Al Mutazim is most known for historically is forging a more militaristic Abbasid empire. One where tax revenue went to a professional soldiery anchored in a new caliphal stronghold in Samarrah, about 60 miles upriver from Bag Baghdad. The ethnic makeup of the new Caliph Al Mu'tasim's army was one of the defining features of his caliphate. Way out to the right hand side of the empire was Khurasan, and north of Khurasan was Transoxiania. From further north still than this distant region, roughly speaking, the southern plains of present day Kazakhstan, came a population that history books have traditionally called called Gilman or Turkic slave soldiers. These soldiers were horse archers, and sources roughly contemporary to Al Mutasim's reign attest to their powers of marksmanship, bravery and skill in the saddle. They were, in the eight hundred thirties, an exotic presence in the Perso Arab heartland of Iraq. These mounted warriors from Central Asia. When these Turkic forces began riding into the region around Baghdad to serve the new Caliph Al Mu'tazim in the early 830s, the median Baghdadi gawked and winced. Horse archers clopping around the glitzy boulevards of the capital. Out of pragmatism and also for reasons of security, Al Mutassim decided to move his center of operations once again to Samarra, about three days walk from Baghdad. Samarra and the fortified palace complex there effectively insulated the Caliph Al Mutasim from the world of Baghdad. The town became home to gigantic palaces during the reigns of future caliphs and a place where a new style of Islamic art, inflected with Persian and Central Asian influences, came into being. One of the Caliph Al Mutasim's successors funded the construction of the Mosque of Samara, a building almost twice the size of the Great Mosque of Cordoba, with a gigantic spiral minaret that still stands today. As one of the most astonishing architectural remnants of the early Middle Ages. Samarra from the mid-830s onward was a place of luxury, spectacle and political theater. A place where a new Turkic military vanguard protected new generations of Abbasid caliphs more confident than ever about the prowess of their dynasty. Though Al Mu'tasim in the late eight hundred thirties sponsored the creation of a lavish new center of power, he was a military man at heart. The Caliph was allegedly strong, vigorous and not very intellectual. His father, Al Rashid had never expected Al Mutasim to be caliph, hence the co nomination of Al Amin and Al Mamun three decades earlier. Yet there were advantages to having a militarily minded emperor. Al Mutasim managed to put down the rebellion of Babak Koramdin in 838, a decade after Al Ma' Mun had given up on Azerbaijan. And just as momentously lastly Al Mu'tasim sacked the Byzantine emperor Theophilus hometown the same year, bringing back one of the city's gates and reusing it as an entrance to his own palace. Al Mutasim died of an illness in 842 after nine largely successful militarily minded years on his throne. His creation of a Turkic professional military was easily the most consequential decision he ever made made. As students of later Roman history know, barbarian mercenary forces are a great idea right up until the point that those heavily armed and culturally unassimilated subaltern groups decide to stop taking orders from the emperor. Al Mu'tasim did not live to see the hillmen or Turkic slave soldiers start doing their own thing. And nor did his son, the next caliph Al Wathi. But the heelman and after them, other professional soldieries in Islamic history made up of immigrant vassals would have a far reaching impact on world history. Al Mu'tasim was the militarily minded caliph who built Samarra. His son, the ninth Abbasid Caliph Al Waq, on the throne from 842 to 847 was more of a scholar than anything else. First seated on the throne at about 30 years of age, Al Wathiq was curious about geography and archaeology. He worked on excavating the pyramids in Egypt. He funded far flung expeditions to look for far off locations mentioned in the Quran, a wall allegedly built by Alexander the Great and a sacred cave in Anatolia. He died of edema after only about six years on the throne and and the succession passed smoothly onto his brother Al Mutu Aqil, our 10th and final Abbasid caliph. For today, Al Mutawakil presided over the hundred year anniversary of Abbasid rule and he was on the throne for 14 years from about 847 to 861. While Al Mutawakil is like each caliph we've covered, an important emperor about whom a lot of information survives lives. For the purposes of this overview of the early Abbasid period, there are just a few key things that we need to know about him to wrap up this long story. The 10th Abbasid Caliph Al Mutawakil ended his father Al Mamun's policy of enforcing mutazilism. Islamic scholars, Al Mutawakil declared after 847would no longer be corralled and forced to admit to Quranic createdness. Islamic scholars and hadith specialists no longer needed to engage with speculative theology. If they didn't want to, they could stick with studying the hadiths as they had been, and with distilling the Sunnah or the ways of the Prophet and coming to conclusions through ijma or collective reasoning rather than imperial proclamation. Al Mutawakil's abandonment of Mutazilism was a watershed moment for Sunni state voluntarily pried itself away from church, so to speak. Islamic theology and jurisprudence could continue their development unhindered, and the 9th century thereafter proceeded on the path on which it had been before the Mutazilist interference. As being the most formative century Sunni doctrine ever had. Al Mutawakil's abandonment of Mutazilist authoritarianism was a net gain for the Caliphate. But the 10th Abbasid Caliph also had a bad habit. To put it most simply, Al Mutawakil spent money conscious of the achievements of his forefathers. Al Mutawakkil built giant extravagant palaces, the apex of his edifice complex being the construction of a new city named after him which had the largest and most garish palace he had yet funded. There was thus, as you might imagine, a pronounced culture clash between the Turkic slave soldiers who had been in Iraq for a decade or two, battle hardened and brought in by Al Mutawakkil's militarily minded father and Al Mutawakkil himself, a not entirely incompetent emperor perhaps, but a spendthrift, more concerned with his own castles than with the martial needs of the emperor. The years of Al Mutawakil's caliphate again 847 to 861, rattled onward with a mixture of achievements and blunders. Though he built the largest mosque in history up to that point, ended the persecution of mainline Sunni scholars and stood by and let his Turkic crack troops handle frontier security successfully. Al Mutaw Aqil also needlessly antagonized Zoroaster in the empire, ordered the destruction of the Prophet Muhammad's grandson's grave in Karbala, thus pointlessly enraging the empire's many alids and drained the treasury building himself palaces where he allegedly kept 4,000 sex slaves. While the Sunni men of letters who wrote so many Works of 9th century Islamic history revered Al Mutawakil to no end for ending the Mutazilist persecutions against them, and he is often called the last great Abbasid caliph, ordinary is probably a word that better describes the mixed bag of his tenure on the throne, and ordinary, with so many adept and hungry new powers in the empire wasn't going to cut it. Al Mutawakkil was 39 years old when it happened. The caliph Al Mutawakkil's oldest son was worried that his status of chosen heir was was jeopardized by his younger brother. The oldest son got into contact with the Turkic slave soldiers, or they got into contact with him. At a party where the king and his courtiers were drenching themselves with wine and enjoying the Abbaside high life. A band of Turks burst into one of Al Mutawakil's palaces and killed him, thus elevating the oldest son to the throne as the oldest son had desired. This began a period historians call the Anarchy at Samarra. And as the name implies, it was not a peaceful period. The Turkic military, by this point, thoroughly installed in the Abbaside seat of power north of Baghdad, became kingmakers. Four Abbaside puppets ruled in the 860s alone. No one could decide which great grandsons of Harun al Rashid ought to rule rule. As for the Turks, they were also fissured into groups, with different regional routes backing different Abbaside heirs. As the grim years of the 860s advanced, the vast harem of the previous caliph was also involved in the intrigues, as some of the dead caliph's concubines were power players in their own right. The Abbasid dynasty eventually sputtered back to life in 870 under the guidance of two sons of Al Mutawaki, who put down a major revolt in southern Iraq. But even after this restoration of caliphal authority, the writing was on the wall. The empire was too big and central Eurasia was too dynamic and populous to be ruled by a hereditary monarchy. The serendipitous series of competent Abbasid caliphs that had stretched fairly consistently from 754 up to 833 had sputtered to a stop with the arrival of number 10. And while the Abbasid dynasty endured until the mongol conquests of 1258, Baghdad during these later centuries was the capital of a much smaller empire. During the second half of the 800s, the Abbasid Empire contracted. Its contraction really had been happening since the beginning. We've already learned about how the Emirate of Cordoba went its its own Way in 756. How the Idrisid dynasty, headquartered in what is today Morocco, became largely autonomous in 788 and how Ifriqiyya came to be under the command of the aghalabid dynasty in 800. The trend continued throughout the 800s. A dynasty had begun in Khurasan, called the Tahirids, under one of Al Mamun's trusted generals in 821 in Transoxiani. Around the same time, an empire called the Samanids arose, a largely Persian Sunni Muslim empire ruled by noblemen of Iranian extraction. In 861, at the outset of the anarchy in Samarra, a dynasty called the Saffarids began ruling over what is today Iran. And a Turkic dynasty called the Tolonids secured power in Egypt and the Levant over the course of the 8th century. This long fragmentation of centralized Islamic leadership was the natural result of various subject peoples asserting themselves against an overstretched state. The Quondam Visigoths of Al Andalus, the Berbers of Morocco and Ifriqiya, the proud old Persian families of Khurasan, and the crack shot Turkic archers who won Abbaside wars. All of these groups and more had plenty of reason to back opposition to Abbasid hegemony. The early Abbasid empire then, as we've learned in this program, was a splendorous, cosmopolitan, complex state that absolutely deserves the cultural esteem that it enjoys in so much of the world today. But all empires are nets cast over the old and indurate topographies of indigenous cultures. And when those nets fray and break, the cultures go back to being the way they were before, albeit with some marks from the nets that covered them. In the case of the Abbasid Empire, and before it, the Umayyad and Rashidun caliphate, the ultimate change is quite simple to Al Andalus and Idrisid, Morocco, Aghalabid Tunisia, Talonid Egypt, Sauron Safarid, Iran, Tahirid Khurasan, Samanid, Uzbekistan. These medieval kingdoms in the provinces of Abbasid Iraq, as the 8007 drew to a close, they were all under Islamic leadership. When the Abbasid empire's string of talented early caliphs was spent in 833, Islam was two centuries old. Though it had taken time to bake in, the religion itself by the mid 9th century had risen into a golden age, independent of empire or geography. And as the Quran did its work, as hadith scholarship and Islamic law continued their all time Greatest century after 833, the religion was no longer the alien ideology of intruding Arab colonists, but instead an enduring part part of much of the earth. Well, everybody, we're almost finished with the central part of our season on early Islamic history. Over this core series of episodes, three on Muhammad, three on the Quran, and then three on the first three caliphates, you've learned how the religion came to be, what the Quran is and how it works, and how a single generation of Meccan townspeople, along with their descendants between 610 and 833 changed the world. In future episodes, we'll return a number of times to the early Abbasid period. In particular, the caliphs Al Mansur, Al Mahdi, Harun, Al Rashid, Al Mamun, and Al Mutasim presided over a wonderful period of classical Arabic literature. In future episodes, we'll learn more about the years between 750 and 861 by exploring some of its poetry and prose in great detail, and in doing so, get to know the glitter, diversity, danger and dynamism of early Abbasid civilization. But the heart of this season on early Islamic history has been the story of Islam itself. And now that we've made it to the 800s, there's a final subject that we need to cover, a subject that we've danced around for the past 10 programs. That subject is the hadiths. Pound for pound, the Sunni hadith collections produced during the 9th century have been the most influential books of the eight hundreds. The six most esteemed Sunni Hadith scholars, Al Bukhari, Muslim, Ibn Hajjaj, Al Tirmidi, Anasai, Abu Daoud, and Ibn Majhah, together with Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, who came slightly before them, funneled an ocean of early prophetic narratives into tidy, organized compilations. If you are not a Sunni, the prospect of learning about the Hadith might sound a little bit dry. The story of a bunch of 9th century theologians speculating about what Muhammad said probably doesn't sound like edge of your seat stuff in the English speaking world. However, in the libraries of millions of mosques and homes across the world, just next to where Qurans sit on bookshelves, there are hadith collections, repositories of wisdom and practical common sense that have been studied and pored over in standard anthologies for well over a thousand years. In this program we learned about how between 827 and 842, the caliphs, Al Ma' Mun and his half brother Al Mu'tasim, persecuted religious scholars who wouldn't admit to Quranic createdness. We learned that this persecution was probably motivated by a desire to undermine the authority of the ulama, or class of religious scholars. The Mutazilist persecution ultimately backfired. By 830, Islamic scholars had already systematized thousands of pages of Islamic law and hundreds of thousands of hadiths. Their mistreatment during the Abbasid present only made them more passionate about collecting and studying the pure Islamic past. To the ulama authority lay not in the hands of the caliph authority came from those who warehoused, evaluated, discussed and understood. The narratives about the Prophet Muhammad and the hadiths belonged to all Muslims devout enough to rise to the task of studying and understanding them. The story of how the hadiths came together is really the tale of how Sunnism reached its predecessor form, but it's also a story about intellectual history during the early Middle ages. During the 7002 and 8002, as the caliphates expanded to encompass former Byzantine and Sasanian territories, Muslims who spoke Arabic encountered many different cultural traditions, including those of ancient Greek philosophy. From Aristotle onward, the ancient Mediterranean had been been fascinated by taxonomy and categories, by logic and syllogism and the collaborative spirit of academic critique. This scholarly spirit began to pervade Hadith studies in the 7 hundreds as muhadiths, or scholars specializing in hadith studies, became increasingly systematic about stockpiling, organizing and cross checking narratives about Muhammad Muhammad. The methodological rigor of Hadith studies by the 800s resulted in the Hadith collection still cherished all over the world today. And the essentially academic spirit behind their production, fueled by the material prosperity of the caliphates and the availability of new intellectual traditions in Arabic, is a key part of the history of Islam and moreover the story of the Middle Ages. So join me next time for episode 123, the Hadiths. There's a quiz on this episode there in your podcast app if you'd like to review what you've learned. The history we've covered in this show is very important stuff and it is worth going over. I did some video interviews recently with my colleague Lantern Jack. He interviewed me on the subject of ancient novels and then again on the subject of Aeschylus, Oresteia and and there are links to those on YouTube. The one on ancient novels in particular is really neat. I also have a song coming up if you want to hear it, and if not, jump ship because I'm about to start singing still here I got to thinking about some of the titans of this period of history and I started wondering what would happen if the celebrated caliph Harun al Rashid were in a bar or an inner inn or a tea house in the year 788 and he ran into his counterpart, the Byzantine emperor Constantine vi. I wonder what the Caliph and the Emperor would talk about. Religion, war, society, dolmas. I got to thinking about what a face to face conversation between the most famous Abbasid caliph and one of the more famous Byzantine ambassadors emperors would sound like. And I wrote this number which is called the Caliph and the Emperor. I hope you enjoyed. And I'll see you next time for our show on the Hadiths. Mind if I sit here?

B (138:40)

Assalamu alaikum.

A (138:41)

Nam. Nam what?

B (138:42)

Ah, Tedre.

A (138:43)

Yes.

B (138:43)

Take a seat. How are you?

A (138:45)

Oh, I'm well, thank you. Just very tired.

B (138:48)

You have a noble look about you for a Greek.

A (138:50)

As do you, friend. For a. An Arab. What brings you to an inn in the borderlands?

B (138:55)

Well, I come here to be alone.

A (138:57)

Signal me. I'm sorry, brother. I'll leave you just as you.

B (139:00)

No, no, habibi. Stay, please. I don't mind the company. I like Greeks, truth be told.

A (139:06)

Oh, well, you said you want to be alone.

B (139:08)

Just away from my work was what I meant.

A (139:11)

On that I can certainly relate. I come out here to think and get away from it all.

B (139:16)

Yes, yes.

A (139:17)

Insha'. Allah.

B (139:18)

You're having a good break.

A (139:20)

Does one really ever get away from one's work?

B (139:23)

One never gets away from one's work.

A (139:25)

What line of work are you in?

B (139:26)

I'm. You could say I'm in executive management.

A (139:30)

Really? My work is quite similar. Very stressful.

B (139:34)

Never a break. With great power comes great headache.

A (139:37)

Couldn't have said it better myself. I don't ever get to be alone, if I'm being honest. Do you see those 12 men over there? Yes. Those are my body.

B (139:46)

You don't say.

A (139:47)

It's true. I can't go anywhere without them.

B (139:50)

Do you see those 12 men over there?

A (139:53)

Yes.

B (139:53)

Those are my bodyguards.

A (139:55)

Who are you? An emir. A general?

B (139:58)

No higher than that.

A (140:01)

Who are you?

B (140:02)

A duke? A bishop?

A (140:03)

No higher than that. Who are you?

B (140:07)

I am Abu Ja' Far Harun IBN Muhammad Al Rashid.

A (140:10)

I am Constantine the Sixth.

B (140:13)

You're the Byzantine Emperor.

A (140:15)

You're the Abbasid Caliph. Oh, sh. What do I do? I'm supposed to kill you. But I am on my vacation.

B (140:31)

Well, they just served our food. I am not in the mood for a Roman assassination.

A (140:38)

And two. Yes. I'm tired.

B (140:39)

So am I. And you see, I'm a decent guy.

A (140:42)

Let's talk first, then decide.

B (140:44)

Shaking hands or regicide?

A (140:46)

You first. Know you youu're nice. That's true. Hear me out.

B (140:51)

Will do.

A (140:52)

On who I am and what I have been through. I'm Constantine. I rule the Greeks. At 7:88. I work all day for endless, endless weeks. But my rain's not going great. We're still fairly prosperous. Our priests and troops and yeomen. Our city on the Bosporus, robust and Greco Roman. But I always have to work, tend to affairs of state. Bulgars, Khazars and the Turks. And of course, your caliphate. Okay. Mine is bigger than yours, though. And by mine, I mean empire. And we have a lot more war. I won't get to retire. It's strenuous to say the least. Merely getting through. We've got enemies in the east, even scarier than you. China and Mongolia are always really mad. You've just got Anatolia, so please don't look so sad.

B (141:49)

Wimpy Greek.

A (141:51)

How dare you? I love your beard, though. I've got meetings every day from dawn until nighttime with everyone from priest and to pray to merchants selling wine. I've got paperwork to go through Makes my bookshelves grown Got scars that I could show you from accounting work alone on transport and logistics. Agriculture too. Heretics and mystics, not the least of which is you.

B (142:19)

Your empire is small.

A (142:23)

It's not like I wanted it. This brutal taxing throne, managing a continent with numerous time zones. I've got bags under my eyes. I'm mostly cortisol. My duties are king sized. One false move and I will fall. War's dark and dire and to our west, I often say A middleweight Greek empire that will not go away. I've got you, I've got you, I've got you, I've got you. It's my first night off in three years.

B (142:54)

My first night off in four.

A (142:56)

Shall we put away the swords and spears? Let's talk a little more. I've got factional strife, story of my life. Got problems with my health.

B (143:05)

You rule a commonwealth.

A (143:07)

I'm worried about my succession.

B (143:09)

I'll make the same confession.

A (143:11)

Religious sectarians and a lot of barbarians and I got you, I got you.

B (143:16)

I got you, I got you, I got you.

A (143:23)

I never get to chill and we never will. Marriage is under strain I'm being upstaged by Charlemagne. I sleep four hours a night, oh, I'm up before first light. You understand my plight as to that, you're damn right But I'm glad you're around because when goes down I know.

B (143:42)

It'S just who to blame.

A (143:43)

I also have a name. I got you, you.

B (143:48)

I got you.

A (143:52)

I got you, I got you.

B (144:00)

I got you, I've got you.

A (144:11)

Stupid.

B (144:13)

Good song. Good song. You could be my pal if I were not the Caliph. I wanted to get that rhyme in there.

A (144:23)

But seriously.

B (144:24)

No, of course we're not friends.

A (144:26)

No, no, you're a heretic.

B (144:28)

We're at war.

A (144:29)

Still.

B (144:30)

Still? Yes. If there's another siege, come down to the command tent and say Hi. We'll have tea and talk shop.

A (144:36)

Sure. Come up and see Constantinople. I'll give you a tour. Only way you'll get in, since your armies fail every time.

B (144:45)

That's fair. That's fair. See you around. You pork eating, Greek speaking, indispensable prick.

A (144:52)

See you again, you likable bastard. I pray you get a day off, Caliph.

B (144:56)

You too, Emperor. You too. Literature and History of.