Prior consistent statements strike again in this week’s episode as Sam and Trevor discuss United States v. Brown, __ M.J. __, 2026 CAAF LEXIS 418 (C.A.A.F. 2026).

With prior consistent cocktails in hand, the duo review the CAAF’s recent decision analyzing Mil. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)(ii), the rule covering prior consistent statements offered on “other grounds.” A majority of the court found that a military judge did not abuse his discretion when he admitted a prior consistent statement from the complaining witness. This is because trial defense counsel attacked her credibility on “other grounds,” i.e., her “inconsistency,” thereby opening the door for admission of the prior consistent statements. As Sam and Trevor explain, this new(ish) rule under (B)(ii) runs the risk of having the exception swallow the rule. As the Chief Judge says in his concurrence, this is the “mischief” lurking behind the court’s Brown opinion.

During this episode, Sam and Trevor reference Episode 97, which covered United States v. Ruiz, 86 M.J. 75 (C.A.A.F. 2025), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 993 (2025). They also discuss the differences between Mil. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)(i) and (B)(ii) and the specific applications of United States v. Frost, 79 M.J. 104 (C.A.A.F. 2019), United States v. Finch, 79 M.J. 389 (C.A.A.F. 2020), and United States v. Ayala, 81 M.J. 25 (C.A.A.F. 2021). They end with some helpful practice tips about how to limit the impact of Brown and a brief remark about utilizing the Benchbook instruction for inconsistent statements.

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