LSE IQ Podcast: “China, War and the Civilizational State”

Date: April 9, 2024
Host: Sue Windibank
Guest: Late Professor Christopher Coker, Professor of International Relations at LSE

Overview

This episode explores the idea of the “civilizational state” through the lens of China’s global role, its philosophical roots, and the potential for major power conflict with the United States. Drawing on a pre-pandemic interview with the late Professor Christopher Coker, the discussion delves into how China’s self-perceived uniqueness shapes its domestic and foreign policy, escalates tensions with the West, and redefines the possibilities and risks of future warfare.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Civilizational State Explained

• A civilizational state claims to be more than a nation-state; it draws legitimacy from deep historical and cultural roots, viewing itself as the custodian of a unique civilization.
• Quote:

  “A civilizational state is a state that claims to be more than a nation state. A civilizational state has a value system that spans the modern and the postmodern eras and is not susceptible…to a liberal world order that stems from 200 years ago and very largely from the history of one continent, Europe.”
  (Coker, 01:53)

• China and Russia are seen as civilizational states, with leaderships promoting the idea that their people are “genetically” and inherently aligned with distinctive national values, resisting foreign ideas.
  • Putin has called Russia a civilizational state since 2013, proposing constitutional changes to reflect this.

• Warning: Such rhetoric echoes social Darwinism and the ideology that contributed to the catastrophes of the 20th century.

2. Chinese Exceptionalism: Exporting Values or Defending Uniqueness?

• Unlike the West, which has historically sought to export liberal values, China’s philosophy under Xi Jinping emphasizes “harmony with coexistence,” implying respect for other systems and non-interference.

• Quote:

  “They are not there to export their values or their way of life. Xi Jinping would also argue that civilizational states like China have never done imperialism. They have no civilizing mission...Don’t interfere in our internal affairs, and we won’t interfere in yours.”
  (Coker, 03:47)

• The Chinese government’s narrative holds that liberalism may work for the West but is inappropriate for China and many others.

3. How the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Nurtures Exceptionalism

• Economic rise created a “moral vacuum” due to fading belief in communism, prompting a revival of Confucianism as state-sponsored moral philosophy.
  • CCP now frames China as “a Leninist Confucian state” (04:57); Confucian texts are required reading, and Xi Jinping visits Confucius’s birthplace annually.
  • Quote:

    “Confucian texts, which used…to be denounced by Mao Zedong…are now actually required reading in schools...China is tapping into its human capital…and it has more human capital in its eyes, than any other country in the world, because that country is a civilizational state…”
    (Coker, 05:23)

4. Possibility and Nature of US-China War

• Economic logic and historical experience suggest great power war is irrational and self-destructive, but human psychology—cognitive dissonance, confirmation bias—often leads to conflict regardless.
  • Quote:

    “…You could have a war between the United States and China, and it would probably be occasioned by mischance, mishap, accident, perhaps an incident between two water warships at sea, which could easily escalate. Escalation being another factor, of course, which explains why great powers go to war against each other.”
    (Coker, 07:59)

• The concept of “credibility”—when reputation is at stake, countries may take drastic military action to preserve their standing.
  • 9/11 was cited as a case where restoring credibility cost trillions of dollars and led to protracted conflict. (09:31)

5. Modern Warfare: Nuclear Taboo and Cyberwarfare

• Since 1945, nuclear deterrence has prevented direct superpower conflict, but today, the lack of clear rules in cyberwarfare creates instability.
• China isn’t seeking nuclear parity but aims for minimal deterrence, enough to threaten US cities if attacked.
• Cyberspace has become a “theater of operations,” with US and China effectively “at war” in cyberspace since around 2014.
  • Theft of intellectual property and hacking are rampant, but attribution is difficult, so classical deterrence doesn’t work.
• Quote:

  “We have now such a theater of operations which was not there in the Cold War…that’s cyberspace...I would argue the United States and China have effectively been at war with each other in cyberspace since 2014...There are no rules.”
  (Coker, 10:18)

6. China’s Military: Aims and Structure

• The Chinese military’s main function is regime security—a police force rife with corruption.
  • The Navy is the most modern and strategic branch, aiming to contest US naval supremacy and push American forces back toward Hawaii.
• Quote:

  “The Chinese army is not much shakes, quite frankly. If you’re looking at the most impressive part…it's the navy…”
  (Coker, 12:17)

• Information and cyber warfare are strong points; China is possibly the world leader in cyber operations, ahead of Russia and the US.
• Army’s potential to oust leadership (Bonapartism) is minimal in the Chinese political system.

7. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): Soft Power with Hard Edges

• Ostensibly an economic and soft power scheme, the BRI is also a tool for debt entrapment, expanding China’s potential for projecting power abroad.
  • Example: A Sri Lankan port, costing 73% of government revenue in debt servicing, ultimately leaves the port under Chinese control.
  • Strategic locations in Pakistan and elsewhere can quickly be converted to naval bases.
• Quote:

  “If you default on your loans, the Chinese will come in and own what they’ve built for you. And a port can become a naval base pretty quickly.”
  (Coker, 15:46)

8. Will China Dominate the 21st Century?

• No single country is likely to dominate; perhaps multinational corporations or other non-state actors will eclipse nation-states.
• Only nation- or civilizational states can cause great power wars, which are uniquely devastating.
  • Anti-satellite warfare could create space debris disrupting the global economy on a scale far greater than previous world wars, setting back development by decades.
• Quote:

  “If the satellites go down, that’s a completely different situation.”
  (Coker, 17:21)

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On the dangers of civilizational language:

  “That language of Social Darwinism did, of course, partly help produce the Second World War.”
  (Coker, 02:45)

• On escalation and human error:

  “We’re not quite as clever as we think, and therefore, yes, you could have a war between the United States and China…”
  (Coker, 07:59)

• On leaving listeners uneasy:

  “Okay, well, I started the interview feeling quite reassured, and now I’m terrified.”
  (Host, 18:07)
  “I have to justify the book, Sal.”
  (Coker, 18:12)

Timestamps for Key Segments

• Defining the Civilizational State – 01:53
• China’s Non-Export of Values & Harmony Principle – 03:47
• Revival of Confucianism – 04:57
• Rationality vs. War, Cognitive Flaws – 06:36
• Likelihood and Nature of Great Power War – 09:35
• China's Military and Cyber Capabilities – 12:17
• Belt and Road Initiative and Military Strategy – 15:03
• Will China Dominate the Century? Anti-satellite Threats – 16:24

Conclusion

This episode, dedicated to Professor Christopher Coker, provides a sobering and intellectually rich exploration of China’s claim to unique civilizational status, its rivalry with the US, the nature of 21st-century conflict, and the limits of classical notions of deterrence. Through historical reflection and contemporary analysis, Coker argues for the enduring dangers of great power rivalry and the unpredictable consequences of technology, ideology, and human error.