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Welcome to the LSE Events podcast by the London School of Economics and Political Science. Get ready to hear from some of the most influential international figures in the social sciences.
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Good evening, can you hear me okay? Yeah. That's great. I want to welcome everyone to LSE for this evening's lecture. My name's Peter Tribowitz. I'm a professor in the International Relations Department and the director of the Phelan United States center which is hosting tonight's event. So tonight is the third in our year long series entitled America's Changing Role in the World. The lecture series is premised on the idea that America is having something of a rethink about its foreign policy, its purposes, its foreign policy purposes and priorities, which is very uncertain, the outcome of which is very uncertain. So to help us get some perspective on this, what's happening and what it might mean internationally, we decided to bring in a series of foreign policy experts from the United States, from Europe, from Asia to join the discussion. And I'm very pleased to welcome back to LSE Raja Mahan, a distinguished fellow at the Council on Strategic and Defense Research in Delhi and a visiting research professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore. Raja wears many hats. In addition to his roles at CSDR and nus, he is a columnist for Foreign Policy magazine and Indian Express, was a founding director of Carnegie India and the Asia Society Policy Institute in Delhi. Former member of India's National Security Board and the Henry Kissinger Chair in Foreign policy at the U.S. library of Congress. He's published widely on India's foreign and security policy, Asian geopolitics, global governance of advanced technologies. He has a number of books. This is the most recent one that is called India and the Rebalancing of Asia. We were very keen to get Raja's perspective on what Trump's foreign policy, what America first meant for, for Eurasia. And he was very kind to agree to come here and talk about it. Raja, it's great to have you back here at lse. Here's the drill for tonight. So Raja will lecture for a while, then we will turn move towards discussion. I'll probably put a few questions to him, then we'll open it up to all of you. I will do my level best to get in as many questions as possible. For those of you online, you just need to use the Q and A function. I don't know why I'm looking up there, the Q and A function and just make sure you put your name and affiliation in as well. And for Those of you here in the theater, just raise your hand and they'll come around with a microphone. If you haven't put your cell phone, your mobile on silent, please, please do that now, since this is being recorded. And please join me in giving Raja Mahan a very warm LSE welcome.
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Thank you. Thank you, Professor Bowitz, for that generous introduction. It's wonderful to be here this evening with all of you at the London School of Economics. I see a lot of friends here, and hopefully we'll make some more. You know, I'm sure everyone is only talking about America and America first. So why another lecture? I think Peter answered that question, which is maybe distance gives you some clarity in terms of, or at least a perspective, because Trump is such a polarizing figure, whether it is in the United States or across. Across the pond, it is so intensely divided. I mean, it's almost personalized. The arguments that have become. And it's really for those of us, of course, unlike the Americans, of course, it's their country, so they're going to argue about it. And US, Europe and UK are allies, so they have some influence, at least we think so. And so they have a reason to be argumentative on that. For those of us who are outside the transatlantic world, we, I mean, I believe that we have no influence on what America does. We have to adapt to what America does because America is number one power. So therefore, I think from that perspective, looking at this from a distance and see it a little more objectively and a little more historically than those who are involved in the heat of the argument today within the US and across the Atlantic, I must tell you the timing was not planned for this week. When you have Ukraine peace talks in the front and center, you also have the Taiwan question back in the news. So the Trump's relationship with Russia and China, I think today, promise, whichever way they go, to fundamentally reorder the relationships, the politics of Europe and Asia or more broadly, you can say Eurasia. So I think that is the core assumption of what I'm going to say, that we are today at a phase in the US Engagement with the world which will have significant consequences for the Eurasian region. And I think what I'll try and do is explore some of that. I think when we talk about Eurasia, I think Halford Mackinder, I hope you're not canceled him out. Halford Mackinder was the second director of the London School of Economics. Normally you don't associate Mackinder with this Sidney and Beatrice Webb. He's not a member of the Fabian Society. But the fact is he was the second director, and I think his contribution in bringing geography into the study of politics and economics later, of course, he's well known as a geopolitical thinker, but, you know, geo economics, too. He's currently in fashion. So I think. So when today we talk about Eurasia, I mean, I think it's really the region that Sir Halford talked about, the heartland and the inner crescent, what he called inner crescent, what Spickman calls the Rim lands. I mean, so it is that region today, I think, which is really going to see the biggest consequences of what Trump does. I think there's also another parallel to Mackinder's world, that is early 20th century. Then, as of now, I think there's a lot of talk about the decline of the West, a sense of profound pessimism in terms of the way the west is going, the fear of the other powers rising and what they might do to the historic primacy of the West. So what we have is actually Trump. Whether west is declining or not, Trump is seen as accelerating the decline. Some people might have thought the west will decline elegantly, certainly under Trump. It's not going to be an elegant decline, but it's going to be a lot of confusion, a lot of mess. How this sorts itself out is something we're going to be going to see. But I think the key point is the internal reorientation of the United States, its domestic politics and its approach to the world will have significant bearing on Eurasia, which widely seen as the principal arena for international politics and geopolitics. What I thought I'll do in the next half an hour or so is really one to look at the many strands that constitute the America first ideology, then look at some of the contradictions of that ideology and how that is playing out. Two, look at the idea of Eurasia and how that has come about and why it's important today. And then three, look at the consequence of America first for the Eurasian geopolitical situation. The central claim that I'll make is that America first policies are producing deep turbulence within Europe and Asia. And the outcome of that is really, we can argue about this, the deeper interconnections that are bound to emerge between Europe and Asia, or the Eurasian theater itself emerging into more contested but more fused structure. Now, this might sound like a radically new idea, Europe and Asia coming together, but if you go back to the colonial era, when Americans were far away, Europeans were the colonialists, that no one thought a second thing about Europe, European Colonialists taking over Asia and the integration between the two. After all, Indians, we had 2 million soldiers in the Second World War when 1 million in the First World War. So when we talk about the intra European conflicts, the colonies had a great role, good or bad. So this idea of the integration between the two continents was natural, but it was not seen in that form because it was a hegemonic relationship between Europe and Asia. But today, I think parts of Asia have risen very rapidly. And you're going to see the consequence of any American rearrangement, if not retrenchment, would be bringing back the key entities of this large Eurasian landmass. How they relate to each other then becomes very, very important. So let me go into the first section and look at what is ideology of America first and what are its contradictions? Now, often, I mean, I think the idea of America first, of course, is seen as specifically something Trump has brought about. But of course we know that it has a deep tradition within the American history, not most recently the America first movement of the 1930s and 40s, which wanted to prevent America from getting into the Second World War. But I think this idea itself is much, much deeper. Goes back to George Washington when his first speech where he says, look, we should avoid entangling alliances, or we should not get drawn into the conflicts of the whole world. And along after George Washington as well, this notion, which goes back to the Founding Fathers, that America must be a shining city on a hill, as a beacon for the rest of the world, not one that is engaged directly whether America should lead by example rather than making the rest of the world in its own image. But I think the tension between the two, of course, people can flip it around. The same people, you can use the shining city metaphor to actually say, let's do more things in the world. But I think this tension between the idea of a republic acutely conscious of its own democratic principles, and an empire which wants to establish a global order and take the leadership role. I think these two notions have always been contested. They've never been fully reconciled. And I think we see this play again and again at different points of time. So given that background, I would suggest four broad themes about the America first, one is the, of course, the repudiation of globalization. Trump argues that globalization hollowed out America's industrial base, empowered China, Mexico and a whole lot of other countries, weakened American middle class. And you know that America was robbed by the policies of globalization led by a globalist elite. So which is the core argument. So therefore, you need more Economic nationalism, more tariffs, more reassuring tighter controls over technology flows. All these now become ways of restoring America to its old glory. I mean, at least that is the case that is being made for the tariffs. But this is clearly whether this succeeds or not, it was only nine months or 10 months into this administration that we're going to see quite clearly that what's happened in the last nine to 10 months is a break from the open markets of the kind that we got used to at the end of the Second World War and in 1990 and beyond when the WTO got formed. So the global economy as a result of American policies is in fundamental change. But then for a realist, if the principles don't work for the number one economy, a rule, this is not contrary to the assumption. WTO was not Moses code. It's not set in stone. It was devised by the US if it doesn't work for the us, it's quite happy to rewrite it. The fact that it has. When everyone thought America's dependence on imports was a vulnerability, what Trump has done is to flip it, make it the principal leverage to force a renegotiation with the rest of the world on the terms of trade between us and the rest of the world. Whether this will actually pan out in that form or the domestic reaction, we're seeing some of it already unfold. We're going to see whether that will work out or not. But the fact is the core arguments that were made are having effects on the rest of the world. Second, I think the principle which the MAGA or the America first movement emphasizes, countries are not units of economic efficiency. Countries in the end are communities. Therefore this notion that the Wall street elites or the City of London elites will decide the best interests of capital are the ones. So therefore economic efficiency becomes the mechanism for organizing relationships between states. That that is not acceptable and that what happens in Ohio, what happens in the American heartland of the Rust Belt, that if America is a community as opposed to mere unit of economic efficiency, then the question of how you think about globalization becomes a very, very important one. And I think this is what they mobilized with great efficiency. And one, if you see last three elections, 2016, 2020 and 2024, in all these, this argument had a resonance and I think was the principal mechanism to push Trump to power. There's also, I think along with the idea of nations are communities, a new emphasis on sovereignty by Trump. In the old days, sovereignty used to be our argument, stock and trade. And all the so called developing countries went to the one sovereignty Sovereignty, sovereignty, nobody should disturb our sovereignty. Today's Trump who talks about sovereignty, a sovereignty that's being compromised by the globalist elites under international system that is undercutting the sovereignty of American people. So it's quite an inversion. Now, for that reason alone, it's very, very interesting. A third argument is really the notion of American leadership. Our liberal friends love it, right. Much of the criticism of Trump is he's abandoning American leadership. That leadership with the post war American elites, at least the east coast establishment was so central the notion America was destined to lead, it must continue to lead. Or as John F. Kennedy put it, we must pay any price or bear any burden to defend what we as the American principles or interests. Trump is saying now there's no obligation here to actually pay any price, bear any burden. And in fact, the argument is that paying this price and the burden has affected American people and therefore this needs to be reversed. So it's again a very, very powerful argument whether this argument against alliances, against multilateral institutions, all of which are seen as constraining American sovereignty, is going to last or is going to change again. We'll see something down the road. The fourth, and I think is less debated, but I think is being debated now. It's not only in opposition to the so called liberal international order, it's also an opposition to liberalism. At home today. The kind of speeches that are made against the Europeans, including the Brits on free speech. It's an American stealing the Europeans. When we saw JD Wanze speech in Munich and today what the MAGA people say, look, the Europeans have, are against free speech, the sense of free speech. So this is actually the contest we used to have between democracies and communists, or democracies and autocracies, if you will. But this is an intra Western argument today. It's an argument between MAGA and the European societies. And of course they're finding resonance in Europe. So whether there's again a transatlantic link here between the American right and the new right that's emerging. So therefore this internal argument against liberal values and even the emphasis, I mean those to be used to be China, India and others, oh, we are a great civilizational state. Now some of the MAGA people are saying, yeah, we are a civilization state too. We're a Christian civilization state, and that we need to re emphasize the essence of what is being Western as opposed to simply saying we are just a republic. So here again, I think very deep questioning of core assumptions about what the Western societies are being played out. Now. There are at least Four contradictions in this ideology, because it's one thing you can construct a nice self contained set of principles, but in the politics of mobilization around those principles, and even more complicatedly, the policies of implementing those ideas create a vast set of distance, create a vast set of distance from how you frame the ideology, what actually happens? Because there is politics of mobilization, there's policy, the implementation, the politics of implementation which produces a very, very different set of outcomes, and the individual who is actually empowered to make that implementation, like Trump, who is himself quite a figure. So therefore, here you are. These contradictions unfold even in the last 10 months. We're seeing that Trump, for example, denounces endless wars, restraint, but yet we see simultaneously with the same framing, he talks about peace through strength. There's no cutting of the American defense expenditure close to $1 trillion. All the other countries put together, the top 10 can't match it. He's talking about nuclear modernization and their demands for unilateral demands for territories of other countries, including of very close Anglo Saxon countries like Canada. So this is actually, is this a retrenchment or is it actually a reassertion of unilateralism? So therefore, I think whatever the rhetoric of restraint might be, what you're having is actually a deep assertion of American power because the US is still number one. Second, I think this contradiction between the talk about non intervention and the process of sharpening interventions, that is actually taking place, as we said, Trump rejects liberal internationalism, interventionism, regime change, nation building. If you read them, a lot of us in the outside, the west, if you read a speech in Riyadh, brilliant. He says, guys, you know, we made a lot of mistakes. We, you know, needlessly tried build other societies. We really messed it up. We're not going to do it anymore. No more interventions. That is the first speech he made, the first visit abroad in Riyadh, telling the Middle East American interventionism was bad. And we're going to let you decide what's good for you. Oh, look at these beautiful cities like Dubai. How wonderful. You guys are doing very well. You don't need us to tell you what to do, but there you are, the same. Trump is using convo diplomacy in Venezuela. So non intervention of rules never applied for Latin America. Latin America was a different sphere. How America deals with Latin America, it was always different. But therefore, whatever the talk of non interventionism in the Arabian Peninsula might be, the situation in Latin America was going to be different. Until now, the Latin Americans were complaining, look, they don't get Much attention? No, I don't know if they really want attention of the kind Trump is giving them. But the fact is that interventionism is quite rampant. You have attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran. You have threats against Nigeria. What do you call it? Yeah, I mean, country. Because Christians are being oppressed, we're going to come and attack you with the biggest country in Africa. So this is the way you talk. I mean, forget actual intervention, just the violent use of language against large countries. This notion that the US has the power. Christians are having a problem in Nigeria, therefore we're going to interfere. I don't think he will, actually, but that's the way you play your domestic politics. But then it creates resonances of its own. Third, third set of contradictions is American presidents have long been criticized. The imperial presidency focused largely on foreign policy. So one of the promises of the last campaign was, no, we'll focus on America. That is what the meaning of America first is. But what we've seen in the last 10 months is hyperactive foreign policy by president who claims he solved eight wars. Seven or eight wars, he's fixed them. He's doing peacemaking around the world. And he's got this special, you know, obsession with the Great power Summitary just announced there might be four summits between President Trump and XI this year. You know, Walter Russell Mead, I mean, he was a great American who often says, look, Trump is like Teddy Roosevelt. He wants the center of attention of everything. He wants to be the baby at every shower, he wants to be the bride at every wedding. He won't be the cops at every funeral. Getting attention of anything that happens in the world, it has to be because of him. So I think this again, so the claim of reduced foreign policy or reduced activism on foreign policy front, an actual record of last 10 months, we've seen unfold quite well. And finally, I would say this whole critique of American empire is not used on the left. I mean, if you see the right, MAGA uses the same framing saying, look, the US Messes around the world. That despite all the talk about reducing that kind of a foreign policy, we've actually seen more use of sanctions, more threats, more bullying of other countries through economic means or military means. So therefore, are we seeing empire light? Are we seeing retrenchment from empire? So the enough reasons to argue for all the talk about American decline or American retrenchment and American withdrawal is actually the same empire trying to assert itself through new means. I mean, you could argue whichever, depending on where you, where you sit. So I Think the contradictions are real. And I think how these contradictions play out in the next few months, I think we'll have a lot of bearing on the Trump presidency itself. And what we're going to see. Actually, many of us who follow the U.S. know how an administration begins is not how it concludes. So three years is going to be long. But I think the tone that has been set need not be the one that actually we end up with. But I think. But this is something we have to engage continuously over the next three years. That brings me to the second part of my title, which is really the idea of Eurasia. I think Eurasia is not just merely about a single name for Europe and Asia, but I think today it has acquired a whole range of political meanings. As I said, look, if the Europeans, going back to the Greek times, the notion Asia was something different, how you imagine the land beyond the Mediterranean, that was always an issue. So in a sense, the framing of Asia as the other different, there was not a automatic framing of as a hostile other, but there was another different from you. That notion went up and down in different forms. And of course, in the colonial era, you saw the idea that, look, Asians are not civilized. They need to be civilized. Therefore, the framing of a rising Europe, how it thought about Asia, were again framed in such a manner. And then there was the opposite of this as well. Many of us in Asia thought we are different. Europe is imperialistic, Europe is hegemonic. Therefore, Europe and Asia are different. Or as people like Asianists, like Tagore or whole lot of Chinese nationalists to frame Asia is one. Asia is different from Europe. We are more spiritual. We're not materialistic like the West. So this constant framing of each other as different entities is a long, long tradition. But then some of it was punctured by Austrian geologist Edward Suez somewhere in the mid 19th century, he said, actually, look, you guys all belong to the same place, that it is actually one continent, that this is not two different worlds, as the assumptions were being made. And actually, later, his arguments were confirmed by the tectonic theory, tectonic plates theory, that you have a Eurasian plate. These are not. But then the geological argument was not good enough because the politics had been invested with the difference, the emphasis on the difference, and the need to use the difference for various political and other purposes. So geological unity is one way of thinking about Eurasia. The second Eurasia is one of strategic Eurasia. You can say Mackinder's famous formulation of the Eurasian hotline that it is vast, rail connected Resource rich could produce a land empire that was capable of challenging the Anglo Saxon or the maritime powers of the West. So that argument was premised on the geopolitical arguments and not on any difference in terms of culture, politics and other things. But there was an interesting resonance between Mackinder's heartland and the idea of a middle land that Russian nationalists developed over the period. The Russian Eurasianist idea. Russian thinkers in the mid 19th century cast Eurasia as a civilization space, Russia as the center. Neither Asia nor Europe, but a uniquely independent space that had its own sense of mission and destiny and its own independent features. Some of the Eurasianist ideas in Russia parallels with the Slavophiles who were assisting the Westernization and modernization in Russia. But so the Russian Eurasianist idea is very popular today under Putin. You can't believe this is the same Soviet Union just 50 years ago was talking about internationalism in its purest sense. But today the framing of Russian arguments are premised on the Eurasian idea. And I think how this gets settled is something we got to see. And then in the Cold War and others. Brzezinski, for example, his book on the grand chess board at the turn of the century, where he talked about Eurasia as a single theater and that the American strategy must remain not to allow a single power or a coalition of powers dominate this vast land. And I think that's the theme of course, this long run in the Western terrorists about how to deal with the Eurasian landmarks. But I think today we see a different form of argument that is emerging, which is the rise of China and the integration of Eurasia through rail networks of the type Russia barely had done in the late 19th century or the early 20th century. You have trains running from Shanghai to Duisburg in Germany. You have goods being carried deep inside the Chinese manufacturing hotline on the east coast, all the way into the European port cities from the Baltic to the Atlantic. So this is actually a form of integration that Chinese rise or the Chinese capital has done in search of its markets. So in some senses today there are integration is much deeper, far more deeper than anyone could have imagined 50 years ago. That's the reality we've also seen reinforcing the belt and road, the deepening ties between China and Russia, of China and Russia coming together to counter the domination of the of the West. So therefore, in fact, much of the argument of Eurasia today is why US China must come together to deal with the hegemonic West. And I think that has reinforced this idea. And it's not just China and Russia coming together. Look at the Ukraine war. We had North Korean troops in Russia. So anyone who thinks Europe and Russia are very different, we had the South Korean weapons, South Korea delivered more weapons to Poland during the war. And you had Japan deliver significant amount of humanitarian assistance to the Ukraine. So you have already. The rise of Asia has already produced conditions under which you're in the heart of Europe, there's a war, and Asians have a role in it. So therefore, to keep thinking that these two regions are different, I think will be an unwise. And then you had actually the Biden administration actively support a policy of bringing America's Asian allies and the European allies together. You had the British being dragged into the Indo Pacific with the Aukus agreement. You had the NATO Indo Pacific 4, where you had the New Zealand, Australia, South Korea and Japan leaders participating in the NATO summits and the European countries outlined their own Indo Pacific strategies all within the last few years. So in some senses, you already see the two regions coming together. And I think that is, I think its logic is in the inherent in the rise of Asia, if you might say so. And if the US does withdraw or US does reduce its role, what are the kind of consequences that we might see? And I think that's where I come to the last part of my, of my presentation here. I would say basically, when America meets Eurasia, America first meets Eurasia, you can roughly think of five broad outcomes that are being debated. You can say one is all of you are familiar with the reverse Kissinger debate, the idea that just as US Used China to isolate the Soviet Union, you can actually use today Russia to isolate China. So separating the two or preventing the consolidation of Eurasian power by any two powers, that strategy is a long one. It's been around. But I think today that idea which has been debated, acquires a new relevance in the context of Trump's policy. Now, this policy of Ukraine peace has not been justified on these grounds, but this argument has made rounds over the last year and a half within the Republican circles. And we could argue whether this is really the one direction in which America first is actually going to go to. The second, I think, is the. The temptation of spheres of influence. We talk, we hear a lot about hemispheric policies by the US More carrier groups are off Venezuela these days than in Europe or Asia. So is this going to be a permanent feature where America says, look, we're going to stick to in our own hemisphere, we've got to get rid of the Russians and the Chinese from this fear and that we're going to let China and Russia develop spheres of influence of their own. While this looks neat on the paper, it's just not going to be easy to do spheres of influence. Already we're seeing in Europe the idea that Europeans are going to accept West Europeans are going to accept the Russian sphere of influence is just not going to work. Or the idea that Japan, India or others will be happy to live happily ever after under a Chinese dominated Asia, it's not going to work. But I think this notion that a great power diplomacy, that you could work with other major powers to produce some kind of an order, I think that quite clearly is important for Trump at this point of time. Whether this will actually succeed or not is something we're going to, we're going to see a third aspect. I think the consequence we have to is what do the allies do if the US is sending mixed messages? How do you deal with a new US which is uncertain, which is not sure about its security commitments? And I think that brings us into most of the America's allies and partners into real serious question. All of them talk about the language of strategic autonomy, not just India today in Europe. But then here is the problem. As St. Augustine said, oh Lord, make me virtuous, but not just yet. It's all right to talk about strategic autonomy, but you're not going to be able to do it 10 years, 20 years. What do you do in those 20 years when you got to keep Americans in? So that problem of keeping the Americans in for any reasonable stable structure in Europe and Asia is there with us, but at the same time you got to hedge against American uncertainty. So what you're seeing happening in both Europe and Asia is simultaneously trying to please the master, but at the same time try and develop alternatives. And I think we're seeing a lot of that happen. Diversification on the economic front, diversification on the security front. Whether it is the EU trying to do more trade deals in Asia or whether it's Asians, Japanese connecting with Europe to develop economic military capabilities. So broadly, this set of intra cross cutting Europe and Asia economic and security links is a new feature and I think that's going to be with us for a while. The fourth issue, what's happened in the last few months might be, remember the famous abbreviation rbio? Rules based International order is it there still? If the Ukraine peace deal goes through, what does it mean? Even if Russia gains a sliver of territory by use of force? The core principle of what we say is the rules based international order is that you don't acquire territory by use of force. So therefore the notion of the last few years that we have a rules based order was proclaimed. It's not very clear to me whether that will actually survive. And here, remember the Japanese prime minister in 2022 said Ukraine is the future of Asia. You can flip that. Now, if Ukraine's territorial loss is justified as a, in the, in the name of higher peace, can Taiwan be done the same thing? Already we've not been able to stop China from acquiring territory in the South China Sea. Therefore, if the RBIO is not there, does it give license to large countries to do what they want? And if the dominant power is not willing to really defend the territorial status quo? And the fifth set of issues that are coming up I would say is really rearmament. Europe is already talking about rearm Europe. We have 5% defense expenditure. I don't know if that will actually work. But the fact is the promise has been made and I think that's something we got to see similarly in asia too. Japan, 2%. South Korea expanding its defense capabilities. So therefore I think rearmament, given the American uncertainty, more military spending, more military capabilities among the major powers is going to be part of the story. We also have the return of nuclear anxieties, if you will. You saw the British and the French talk about the Lancaster House agreement where they say, look, if American nuclear umbrella is not there, what do French and British do? So I mean, it's really talking about coordination, collaboration, consultation. Really, they're not doing anything more than that. But the fact is that The Lancaster House 2025 agreement on nuclear issues is being talked about. That itself is interesting. Polish, I believe, are interested in the nuclear issues these days. Germany, there's not much of a debate. But I think the question of Germany having a finger on the trigger, that takes us back to the 1960s. The MLF, the Multilateral Force in Asia, of course, South Korea, there's a pretty serious discussion on the nuclear issues. Japan much less. But I think that debate is a matter of time. If China gets more assertive, what do the peripheral countries do? Meanwhile, we saw the US actually support the Aukus. Trump has reinforced the commitment to giving nuclear power propulsion technologies to Australia. Now I believe he's agreed to do the same with South Korea. So you're going to see more nuclear beyond the conventional armament. And I think that's going to be around in our region. So finally, I would say that a US that is uncertain about its security commitments brings us to the core question of what do the region do, what do the regions do to deter Russia and China? So here I think the principal question, I mean I think whether you can do it through military means, alliances, but the problem of deterring Russia from further aggression, deterring China from being adventurous, become the principle questions for regional security and how they get pursued is something we got to, we got to see. So then that brings me to the, the to wrap up, just to say five to broader, broader themes. I think we're moving from an idea of post 91 liberal order to one which is far more geopolitical, geo economic as well, if you will. That this notion that there is a dominant power that will take responsibility for global security, global institutions that doesn't, that's not so certain. So therefore you're going to see a lot more emphasis on geopolitics where nations have to take a lot of the things into their own individual hands. You have in Eurasia. I think that will emerge, as I said, there's going to be a lot more interconnections between the different parts of Eurasia, that is between Asia and Europe. And I think doing more with each other is one way of hedging against American retrenchment or American dilution of American commitments. And I think this is going to be part of the story which again, that is the central feature of Eurasia. Finally, I would say that Eurasia's future, as we said, is going to be contested in terms of how we deter Russia and China, in terms of what are the cross culture, cross regional, cross geographic linkages that we can set up. It's not going to be easy, but I think doing this, that means we need to engage a lot more between geopolitically, strategically and security wise between the Europeans and the American, between the Asians. But historically Europe's weight has been to the transatlantic, the Japanese and the Koreans totally tied to the American debates. But now I think given the situation that we have, we need to do lot more intra regional consultations to be able to secure this new continent. If the US does dilute its support for this region, we have no choice in the part of that hedging to rearm ourselves. I think that's happening. But more importantly, developing regional collaboration mechanisms that can actually at least some idea of how to stabilize the region can be developed. So I'll stop here and we'll look further. Hi, I'm interrupting this event to tell you about another awesome LSE podcast that we think you'd enjoy. Lseiq asks social scientists and other experts to answer one intelligent Question like, why do people believe in conspiracy theories? Or can we afford the super rich? Come check us out. Just search for lseiq, wherever you get your podcasts. Now back to the event.
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B
So, Raja, that was terrific. You covered a lot of ground. I've got a couple questions, questions for you maybe to just start things off. I mean, in some ways you've, you know, US policy towards Eurasia, as you pointed out. I mean, the core idea was to maintain pluralism on the land mass to prevent any single power or group of powers from gaining had. And so it wasn't that the US should control Eurasia, it should just make sure that nobody did. But that was through like engagement, through like forward deployment, and that the US had to be present on both ends, both bookends of the Eurasian landmass. In a way, you're kind of making an argument that we might see from American retrenchment, pluralism. It seems to me, if you're talking about it somehow bringing Europe and Asia in a sense together with a lot of players involved. So that's a very kind of interesting proposition. I think maybe I'd like to hear you just kind of maybe riff on that and. Well, maybe I should just stop there for a second.
- [43:13]
A
In many ways, I think this is what the Brits were doing right in Europe for 200 years, not to let any one power dominate Europe. Now, if that was a logical core structural feature, then before the Americans came on the scene, it was done through alliances, mostly European, but in all of which, as I said, look, we all had a part in it. And those of her outside in Europe, the resources of Asian resources had a critical role in shaping those intra European battles, whether it's the two world wars or even before. For those of you who talk to maritime historians, those who talk about world history, the connections between the Carnatic wars and what was happening in America. So the relationship between the Britain's imperial defense versus the European security, there were always interconnections between those two things. And I think that's true of the other imperial powers as well. So this is actually going back and assuming Eurasia without America, it's not going to fully happen. That doesn't bring the world to a close that we have experienced from the past where we need to collaborate. We did collaborate with each other in different forms. And I think that collaboration between to produce a reasonable stability, which means actually a lot more engagement. We saw, I gave you some examples randomly what South Korea was selling ammunition or weapons to Ukraine or North Korean sending troops. I Think we'll see a lot more of this, I think, in the future. Where you need to use the resources of Asia. Asia needs the resources of Europe here. One of the problems is Trump is telling the Europeans, guys, forget Asia. You stay where you are, look after yourself in Europe. We don't want you in Asia. In fact, the story of Elbridge Colby telling the British, do you really need to send a carrier to Indo Pacific? So I think there's a problem. The first term Trump Biden administration actively encouraged bringing the allies and partners together. Today, they're discouraged. So the question then, for us, at least, if we are interested, India and Britain, Japan and Britain already do quite a bit. So the main entities of the Eurasian landmass will have to connect with each other a lot more to be able to see what is it that we can do, both in terms of deterrence, military capability and the technological proofs.
- [45:40]
B
I might also. So I like the way that you characterize the contradictions in US Policy, that there's retrenchment going on, but at the same time there's kind of expansion happening. And so I guess, you know, expansion in the sense of trying to renegotiate the terms of the international order in ways that are more favorable to the United States. And, you know, Besant has talked in precisely those terms and has laid it out. How do you understand, like, what's the source of that tension? I mean, if you cut into problems as a realist, how do you understand the US Simultaneously, in a sense, taking a step back? There's talk about Hemingway, atmospheric retreat and so forth, but at the same time pushing forward and trying to, you know, kind of rebalance the international system or renegotiate the terms.
- [46:46]
A
I think the core of it is, or the costs of. I'm not one of those empire argument, but I would say, look, the cost of American foreign policy is so high and there is a political backlash. The question then is how do you manage the domestic backlash? And what do you, what's it Talk.
- [47:08]
B
A bit closer in the mics.
- [47:11]
A
So then you have to manage the domestic backlash while at the same time your global interests have not just disappeared. That is, you see the fight between American tech companies and the European Union. The empire of norms I see is being. Being pushed back on the tech regulations because the power of the, you know, there's MAGA on one side. There is also the gafa, whatever you call them, the seven Magnificent American companies. So I think the interest of that sections has not disappeared. How you rearrange this equation that One, you need domestically to avoid too many engagements while at the same time preserve the code. In some sense you can say an ideal outcome of this will be two. One rationalization of American policies. And you do not have this. An elite in Washington which thinks it is completely detached from American domestic politics can just doing foreign policy all the time. That is not possible. But it has to pick and choose at least some priorities where you do those things rather than simply, simply said I'm in every corner from Darfur to Fiji to, you know, that this, that we have an obligation to play God in the world. That was always unrealistic. And I think in some sense the tempering of it could be one outcome which is a rational outcome. Other is to European allies and Asia. I mean you got to do more for your own security. I think there is a logic to that that you need, you need to distribute the burden of how you do this rather than simply the American taxpayer will forever pay for European security and for Asian security. But again, I think a good president could have renegotiated these terms in some sense. You saw initial attempts at it in the Biden or under the Trump of saying that look, you can restructure this without disrupting the whole system. But, but I think under Trump there's a danger that in an attempt to reorganize, rationalize, you might actually destroy the system as a whole.
- [49:18]
B
Why don't, I'll open it up. Why don't we start right over here, Gideon, I'll give you the first question right here in the front. Yeah. This gentleman with a pink shirt.
- [49:29]
A
Thank you. Hi, Gideon Rahman from the ft. There's so much in your lecture, lots of interesting points. One I thought that struck me particularly towards the end was where you said if Russia succeeds in taking territory by force, that's the end of the rules based international order. And that could lead to other countries, particular China attempting to do the same. And I was kind of interested because that is the argument the Europeans have been been trying to make to India with, with very little success for the last three or four years. Is that argument finally getting through in Delhi or do you think India still doesn't really kind of accept that, that those are the stakes in the Ukraine war. And even if they do now, isn't it a bit late? Because that seems to be what's about to happen. I didn't say the Americans taking territory. They have not yet taken Canada, but it's no, no. I mean the Russians taking territory. Chinese have already taken. Americans, Russians are taking. No, I Think I'm not speaking for the government of India. I think some of us have argued in Delhi that look, in principle I think it is something we should have opposed Russian invasion of Ukraine because our own position on Kashmir or various other places actually conquering territory by use of force and then doing a fake referendum would just not acceptable to India's own core interests. But then I think you know how countries are. But in this case because Russia is my friend so I'm not going to criticize the Russians now my view is, is from again from a realist point of view, India is not Europe's problem on, on Ukraine, the Republican party which blocked aid for whole year and now Trump himself. So if Trump is going to cut a deal with the Russians, our side silence, hypocritical silence has done less damage to the Europeans than a Trump that says look we're going to cut a deal with Russians, take it or leave it. If you don't do it now, you're going to lose even more territory. So now you are in that territory of argument. So I don't think India has done much damage to European security by not, you know, raising, you know, voting with the UN and the Security Council. Most developing countries did not there again if you we went to Africa, most of the African countries said look, Russia stood with us on the anti apartheid moment. Europe was not there, America was not there till the last moment. So I think that is really a shallow diplomatic play. The real question is if today America says look for Ukraine the best option is to give up territory, then that means something for the rules based order. Right. I mean for whatever reasons you had to sacrifice eastern Ukraine to ensure peace in Europe and Chinese case too. In fact this if you apply Ukraine as the future of Asia, Taiwan argument will be similar. So I think so these issues here are much broader than the Indian prevarications. I thought, you know, we could have done what Turkey had done. Turkey was critical of Russian intervention but they're also at the forefront of peace and actually producing solutions. I think I wish we had done that same thing, something similar Seminole other hands. Thank you very much for your insightful foot hook, Dr. Moran. I was very drawn to your kind of idea of transactional politics that President Trump has kind of filled. I'm just curious if about the kind of especially to the sale of F35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia. America has kind of always included Israel in its kind of Middle east politics. Now you're seeing President Trump kind of focusing more towards Saudi Arabia and the crime monarchies I'm just interested in what your thoughts are on that. Thank you. That's one interesting thing Trump is not saying I won't. He said look, buy, buy, buy, buy from me. Don't try from French, I'll sell you anything you want. So what used to be a politically regulated and I'm not sure Saudis will actually get it. Let's see what Israelis do in the US Congress. They might still block it this what repeatedly it's happened but the fact is Trump is not saying look I'm proliferation, I'm going to deny you weapons, peace and stability, I'm going to deny you weapons. He's saying look, by in fact the whole trade argument is reduce the deficit, buy more from America and in the European case of course is to prevent Europe from actually building its own will also be part of the strategy. I presume so. So I don't think South Korea he told the South Koreans oh you want nuclear propulsion? Be my guest. Even more interestingly, while the non proliferationists in Washington have long argued There was a 1992 agreement in the Korean peninsula, Koreans can't have reprocessing or enrichment while Japanese do reprocess. The Koreans always wanted the discriminatory clause to go. Now it looks like Trump has agreed to say okay, you want different. You want to make your own plutonium, that's fine with me as long as you build nuclear subs in in Philadelphia. So I think this was the combination of economy, commercial commerce, commerce first loosens a lot of the old shall we say the liberal internationalist rules based there is a non proliferation system. Therefore we can't do this to you. You signed an agreement so we can't give you to one by saying look, okay, you build yourself up as long as you buy from me. So this is a new situation. Now it's good or bad is a different story. But I think he's quite open to selling arms. In fact he keeps saying we make the best. Thank you. Just to say There are about 80 people watching online from countries including China, Kenya, Spain, Turkey, India, Brazil, Germany, Italy and the US Our first online question comes comes from Nur Alamin Abbas who is an alumnus of LAC Ideas. They ask do you think the Eurasian do you think Eurasian integration will be limited to the extent of liberal democracies? Will the EU be restrained by its values from more pragmatic relationships with Asia? Thank you.
- [55:28]
B
I'm not sure I can you. I'm not sure I caught it either.
- [55:33]
A
Sure. Do you think that Eurasian integration will be limited to to the extent of liberal democracies. I think neither Americans are talking about it, not Russians and Chinese don't talk about it anyway. But I think at this point, look, the core economic and security considerations, Europeans talk about it, but Europeans today also have to walk away from being the empire of norms and the pure positions they've taken in the past. My sense is diversification is already taking place. If you go to Brussels, the principal objective is diversification on the economic front. Indonesia, Japan, right, sign new trade agreements with India wherever you can get military wise. EU is talking about doing more in the Indian Ocean or working with for example Japan and Italy and Britain are trying to make a sixth generation fighter aircraft. So I think things are happening. Whether this will all add up into real architecture is something we have to see. But the change is if Americans are uncertain, the pressure on. So who are the main actors? There's Britain, there's Europe, there's Turkey, there's India, it's in between if you count the Gulf, Iran, you, you take China, Russia, Japan, Australia. So these are say 10 top actors. So how they going to relate? Those allies as well as adversaries have now to react against potential American downsizing, retrenchment, whichever you want. So I think that is a structurally new situation. Even without Trump, Trump's ability to forward deploy forces against China has become challenging given China's growing military capabilities. The question of how do you. For eight years Americans are sitting on the first island chain. But that's going to be costly for the Americans today given the material change in the Chinese military capabilities. So in a sense the Western Pacific had to rethink its strategies. There was a time, you know, famous quote from Mausitung, I mean probably apocryphal, where he said in the 1950s when all this Kwami Matsu Taiwan crisis was going on, he said, look, Americans are snoring next to my bed. It disturbs me. I don't like it very noisy snoring by Americans. But someday I'm going to tell the Americans, sir, could you just move a bit? So if you see the Chinese strategy last 10 years, the strategy is about getting the Americans to move two ways. One, telling the neighbors, look, Uncle Sam is far away. If you think you can depend on Uncle Sam, think again. That I'm here, I'm growing. I can give you benign terms as long as you accept my domination and telling the Americans at the same time. Look, don't let the small guys come between us. Let's talk about the G2, let's talk about the big things of the world order. So I think Chinese are sitting in a pretty place because their power has grown. They can tell the Americans let's work together and tell the next, tell the neighbors, look, Americans are not going to do defend you. And that I think Trump is actually playing into that field straight away by proving that argument.
- [58:44]
B
Yeah, I mean, just along those lines, I mean there's a whole train of thought, let's say in the American first movement that the US does not need to be forward deployed to the first island chain or even the second, that it can pull back to the third island chain because of these advances in military technology, that it could basically have a hemispheric defense. So I mean this is kind of, and if you are, you are right, this is like catnip on the other side.
- [59:18]
A
The comment by Vivek Ramaswamy when he was in the campaign, he said look, our policy to Taiwan should be, the American policy should be get the semiconductor manufacturing back home. Then we really don't need to defend the Taiwanese. So in a sense, you know, whether this will actually the policy or not, you know, there are questions but I think the issue is that the assumptions that the internationalists have made of what America ought to do, what America can do, those assumptions have been questioned fundamentally and therefore the adjustment to that new situation, both to the rise of change Chinese military capabilities as well as a domestic opposition to forward deployment. So somewhere I think probably they'll come at a new, shall we say mean or new, new point of compromise. But at this point it's, it's open ended.
- [60:10]
B
But to the extent that that happens and the US is moving in that direction, I mean, what does it do to, you know, you were talking about hedging. I mean, what's the incentive to hedge like if you're on the periphery of China at that point? I mean if the US is not present and is pulling back, it would seem to just kind of undermine that. At least for smaller states, maybe not a country the size of India, but for smaller states it would seem that it's much smarter to bandwagon and appease.
- [60:46]
A
That's what we look I think those who are capable of debating nuclear issue nuclear capabilities to some sense build up, you know, bootstraps argument. You've got to build your own capabilities while at the same time see, as long as you can keep the Americans in which you say Japanese strategy is to keep the Americans even the Indians would like to the Americans to stay as long as you, they can because for you at least to get prepared, as you said. By time, I mean. But, but others. But these smaller, even the smaller countries bandwagoning will be. But even a country say Thailand is 100 million people, Philippines is 100 million people, that they will simply roll over and play dead. Because, look, Asia, everybody's a nationalist. This notion, only Chinese are nationalists, I think is wrong. So people will have to find a way. But if you're a small country, Maldives or something, somewhere, I mean, look, what choice do you have? Take what you can get from the Chinese, see if you can get a distant power, someone to balance it, but otherwise make the best of the situation. So there'll be some bandwagon, there'll be some rebooting of military capabilities and some finding, shall we say, asymmetric strategies to deal with Chinese power.
- [62:00]
B
So we'll take some more questions. I'm looking forward. We have any. There any women in the room who've got their hands up that I'm missing? I have students here. Okay, let's. We'll take this. I. I don't. You're pointing to someone.
- [62:21]
A
Oh, okay. Recently we saw when Dick Cheney died that J.D. vance spoke recently and said that since the 2000s, the Republican Party sort of took a different direction in its foreign policy and it doesn't want to return to the sort of open borders, getting involved in wars. But do you think really that the new direction of foreign policy that Trump's taken is that much more dangerous than what Bush proposed of other countries? Problems are our problems. And how much more dangerous is the sort of new foreign policy that Trump's taken on with America first compared to sort of what the neoconservative 2000s Republican Party sort of proposed?
- [63:05]
B
I don't know. There's something about the acoustics in here. It's hard for us to hear the questions. Give it. Give it one. Did you hear it?
- [63:14]
A
I think. How much harder is it to. How much more risky is the current traffic administration policy compared to Trump administration?
- [63:25]
B
Okay, great question.
- [63:26]
A
I think, See, it's very interesting. I mean, I think when you see The Bush campaign 2000 when he uses the same tropes, America must be humble. America should not mess around the world. We should focus on China. We should, you know, so. So there was this. We don't do nation building. That because Democrats are stupid. They do nation building. We're not going to do it. And you end up actually in Iraq and Afghanistan. So I think there is that familiar thing of saying, we want to be humble. We don't want to do nation Building, but actually sucked back into doing exactly the same thing. Same thing in the current Middle Eastern debate. I mean, if you listen to Steve Bannon, thoroughly opposed to supporting Israel to the extent that Trump has done that. Why is Israel dragging in us into the Middle Eastern conflicts? The whole MAGA was very opposed to attacks on Iran. So there is that section. But, but the. But the President of America, we're not about his power externally, but he has internally has so much room to autonomy to do things. So in the end for us or outside, I mean, can only go by what they do, not by what they say. You can see as if you're a anthropologist of American foreign policy discourse, interesting arguments. But in the end it's really about what America does. So that temptation to do things constantly despite opposition at home, that endures. But whether this is a permanent feature or not, we can't say. So there are some interesting similarities with Trump. But today, in a sense, the challenge that China faces China presence is much bigger. In 2000, Bush said China is the problem, we're going to deal with it. And ended up actually focusing on the Middle East. But today China is second. You know, $20 trillion economy, $250 billion defense budget is producing chips, he's producing AI software. So China is not. Bush didn't have to deal with the China that was a real power. In fact, they were the ones who argued what is it? Responsible stakeholder, let's bring in China in. That was again a Bush, Bush argument.
- [65:40]
B
So how about this gentleman right here?
- [65:44]
A
Thank you, Dr. Raj Mohan. I hope I'm audible. So, okay, my question is regarding the swing states, countries like India, Indonesia and Turkey. So would it be okay to say that, you know, the swing states seek a collective weakening of the west so that it gives them more space to negotiate and more space for their views to get expressed and to from where does this confidence come from for them? Because where is the red line as far as what's happening in Europe is concerned? You know, see these states, a lot of them have agency, certainly. But take for example on the tariffs issue. Here is a problem for most Asian countries. America is the only importer. China doesn't import, import too much. Therefore you need the Americans. You saw the ASEAN summit where they went out of the way to please Trump. But China is actually. China is destroying a lot of their medium industries because China is, you know, is producing so much it. So, so you can say what you want about geopolitics, but on the economic front, the US remains the principal market. So all of Them import from China and exporting to the US So I think that problem, you can't take it away. So near term you got to preserve that access to the American market. And that's the reason why when Trump is, you know, openly challenging the wto, nobody went to WTO to complain. Right? All of them queued up in Washington to get their own bilateral. That's the power of the US market. Now you can say Trump is squandering it, Trump is destroying it. But the fact is at this point, whether it's EU which went and did a deal because they needed American support for Ukraine, that was at least the argument was Indonesia that wants to preserve its access for India, that US is our biggest market. So I think this way Trump actually leveraged the market size to play the game. But whether it's good long term or not, it's a different story. But otherwise they can come together. But the fact is in brics, I'm not sure by just coming together you can make it. Let's take the Gaza resolution that was passed two weeks ago 130 on a resolution thoroughly pro Israel, completely one sided and Russians and the Chinese simply walk away. They don't veto, they don't, they don't even sit there. Russians and Chinese abstain. Why did they do that? Because most of the Muslim countries, even before Trump went to the UN issued a statement saying we are fine with it. Of course they were cheated out. That's a different story. So where is this great. I know if you go to Malaysia, Indonesia and the last few all the only thing they had was Gaza, Gaza, Gaza. Look at Americans genocide. And when it comes to a crunch, none of the BRICS countries voted against the resolution, none of the Muslim countries voted against the resolution. Because for all of them, again keeping the US onside is important and I think this way, I'm not a declinist but I think Americans still have so much power that you can actually mobilize the Muslim countries in a resolution that was thoroughly pro Israel and the only guy who opposes it is the Israeli ambassador after the resolution said that we're not going to implement this anyway, you can say what you want. So I think that's where the power is. And, and in the near term then keeping Americans in remains a key concern for everyone.
- [69:08]
B
Let's take another online here. Yeah, well we got a bunch. Let's. Thank you.
- [69:14]
A
Am I coming through? This question comes from Robert Cutler who asked can you please discuss the place of Central Asia, the South Caucus and the Transcaspian Corridor in relation to the largely great power perspective that has been discussed so far. Thank you. I think here it's called the Trump Corridor. So you can say he's actually, you know, where Americans have largely retreated from Inner Asia. He's trying to come back in some form. So I think this way, I think the US still has enormous possibilities where to do new things. Some of the things I think Trump is taking advantage of, and with the Turks on his side, he's been able to do quite a bit in Central Asia for the first time. You had the U. S. Central Asia summit. Otherwise the Central Asians, you know, barely got to meet the U. S. President. Now you have that. Where actually not just Russia and China that dominate Central Asia, but US US doesn't have the physical access. It can't do too much military. But I think this way, everyone has their contradictions. It's not all of us are losing sleep over the American Empire. Indians are not, because they have a China problem. You have the Japanese have a China problem. So those who want to see the US Balance would continue to see, want to support the US Playing a role. But the problem is today the personalized, you know, rough and ready diplomacy that's going on, which makes it very hard for people to do that investment.
- [70:51]
B
Okay, the gentleman way in the back there?
- [70:57]
A
Yeah, thank you. I have a question related to the last one about Sado focuses, but I want to extend to Central Asia, which is the sort of like continental core of this concept of. Of Eurasia. Where do you think is positioned? And if there is any geographic construct or geopolitical construct for Eurasia in the future, where do you think Central Asia would be? Also especially that the Russians are retrenching. We see more activism for China, Turkey, India was planning, had some visions through the Iranian port Chabar. Where do you think is going to be amid this development? Thank you. Thank you. Paparella from King's College, London. I have a question also on the geopolitical framework that you mentioned during your talk, which I found very interesting. So another contemporary of Mackinder Carlos offer defined for the first time the Indo Pacific. How do you. How do you see the relationship between Eurasia and the Indo Pacific today? Are they alternative to one another? Are they in competition or. Yeah, thanks. Has been cancelled because of, you know, German domestic politics. But actually, I think was actually, you know, he was German military attacher in Tokyo, so he saw the importance of Asia in a way that the most Europeans did not at the time on a strategic sense. So I think they really today I would say Eurasia and Indo Pacific are really, one is land, one is water. So if you think of Indo Pacific actually as the waters of Eurasia, when you leave the Atlantic and someday Arctic will open, but, but otherwise much of the water around Asia, that's why, what is the Indo Pacific? So they're really complementary ideas. And, and I think that takes us back to the same duality, you know, continental versus maritime, heartland versus Rimland, you know, Eurasia versus Indo Pacific. So the. Why do Russians and Chinese hate the word Indo Pacific? For them, this is about actually balancing them, therefore they're, they're opposed to it. So it's, it's actually, in a way, Mahan was also talking about that.
- [73:14]
B
Right.
- [73:15]
A
I mean, of the waters of Asia were important for the US over the longer term. So that, that remains, I think, in the core and I think on Central Asia, I would say, look, I think the landlocked nature of Central Asia makes it very hard. Turkey, because of its ethnic links today, is doing interesting things. It is reaching out to the, you know, there's something called the Turkic Council, Koreans who can bring in money. Koreans are a big place players. Japanese are doing a lot of things. I think India is still very limited because we are double. We are both Pakistan and Afghanistan between us. So I don't see India playing such a dramatic role there. It's really, if you're sitting in Central Asia and you have Chinese and Russians, you want to seek, seek some autonomy from them. That's where Turks offer a solution. Americans might offer even a better solution over the longer term.
- [74:04]
B
How about the gentleman in the blue sweater? Or light? Yeah.
- [74:12]
A
Thank you very much. I took a lot of notes. Ewan Grant, UK Defence Forum. I did write a review for Chatham House of the original edition of Tim Marshall's Prisoners of Geography. I mean, what a book, what a message it says. My question for you is, and it's only partly based on the news this week about the US Constellation frigate program. My question is, how long do you think it will be before China takes Taiwan, either by assault or more likely by throttling.
- [74:53]
B
Can you hand a mic to the person right to your left?
- [74:57]
A
Well, yeah, thank you for the talk. Recently we saw China announce construction of.
- [75:06]
B
A dam along the Brahmaputra River. As you know, that's a major river.
- [75:12]
A
For India and it's a already water, a country with less available water capacity. And my question, I guess, to you was given the US withdrawal from Asia and China's increasing rise, we saw that China did not actually announce construction along.
- [75:41]
B
The Indus river because it runs primarily.
- [75:44]
A
Through Pakistan, which is a Chinese ally. Do you believe that that China's neighbors will be more likely to negotiate renegotiate the relationship on terms that China finds more favorable? Okay, that's great.
- [76:01]
B
Can you hand it up to the woman right in front of you? Right there. Perfect.
- [76:07]
A
Hi, I'm a sixth form student. My question to you is. Oh, sorry. Do you think that China's relationships with Africa and Latin America are mutually beneficial or more leaning towards self interested like US involvement? Great.
- [76:32]
B
I think that we'll let this younger student down here get the last question in and then I'll let you take it at home.
- [76:43]
A
Roger, thank you for a brilliant talk. Just a quick question about India. I mean India obviously has always argued that multi alignment and rail politic shapes the world. Now we seem to be in a world like that. What does this, what does this situation that you've described so well mean for Indian foreign policy interests, particularly vis a vis China and Pakistan? Okay, on Taiwan I think I'm an outlier on this, but my sense is Chinese will keep rattling the cage. They think they can do this without actually use of force, take advantage of just as they took advantage of Nancy Pelosi's visit to ramp up pressure. They're going to take advantage of what Takaji San statement and they're going to keep ramping up the pressure. And internally in Taiwan, I mean I think it's divided between the government and the Democratic Party, so, so there will be differences in terms of how to deal with China. That again I think gives China a lot of options to keep pushing and salami slicing rather than do a big invasion. Because the problem, after seeing what Putin has done and failed to do, military intervention and not win hundred percent will be a disaster for Xi Jinping. So time is on their side. They don't have to do very much just keep, keep up the pressure. Americans will start Trump is doing half the job for them. So if you create uncertainty, Trump has generated so much uncertainty. So I think it's China is really don't have to do work too hard to raise the temperature. On Taiwan, I think on dams, look, China has done this before on Mekong. So Chinese capacity to do these kind of things without much resistance has been in evidence. The question is Americans are not going to come in and somebody un is not going to come and say guys, you are doing a bad thing. So I think this way might is right will work. It's always worked on Mekong. Certainly it's going to at least on the Brahmaputra. I don't know much of the there is a large amount of catchment or rain takes place south of the Himalayas as well. So it's not as if they can block all the water because some of the water actually is collected below the south side of Himalayas. But but it's interesting. I mean I think Chinese Communist Party has been called Communist Communist Party of Engineers. So there's big projects. I mean I think I don't have seen the recent book America is run by lawyers and China is run by engineers that the temptation to do these big projects is very difficult for lower European states to contest and challenge it given the overall power of China. And I think we're going to see China get away with a lot of those on now which is the the question on China Africa. Right. Look, I think here again I think what Trump is doing is actually helping China. Trump on one side talks about look, we got to go back to Africa. Let's focus on trade and not aid. Let's work with them. And next morning you tell the Nigeria is a disgraceful country. You have actually stop go kind of engagement with Latin America in Africa. While China is steadily last 20 years. China today has a $300 billion trade with Africa. But it has created a lot of problems as well. But, but I think given where the US own unpredictability and China's capacity to bring in resources, capital, technology, you name it. So I think they're going to continue to grow and this way Europe has not done much in Africa where it should be actually historic role. Actually what little role they had is also they're losing some of it. The French have been pushed out of Africa quite a bit. So I think if in any Eurasian strategy for the future I think the other actors if they don't pay attention to Africa, I think the Chinese gains would be phenomenal if the uncontested their current positions in Africa. Latin America is a different story. Where actually again America's though it's a natural space for the United States the way US is playing its cards today will I think create some backlash. You see, Brazil has a fantastic trade with Africa with China. One reason why Brazil could withstand American pressure was they had a huge Chinese market for the soybeans for a whole lot of other things. So people are going to, you know not going to be just on a high principle. This is where I think if you say Americans are squandering their power by overdoing things by pushing countries needlessly, that's Where I think that presents itself quite, quite evidently in Latin America and in Africa as well. What's the last one we. India. Yeah, look, I'm not a fan of multi alignment. I mean how are we going to align with the Chinese? Chinese are sitting on my territory. So it's, look, I think, you know, we shouldn't take the foreign policy rhetoric always literally. Like Americans say we're promoting democracy.
- [82:02]
B
Right.
- [82:03]
A
If you're sitting in Pakistan today, you get a general into the dining room twice with the main political leader sitting in the jail. I don't know today's rule rumor is that he's been killed. I mean it could be entirely, you know, disinformation by somebody. But the fact that you look at the, the Trump effect on Pakistan, thanks to Trump's interest in, in Munir, you see he declares himself a field Martian, changes the constitution. But this is what every time the Americans do things with Pakistan you have actually internal Pakistanis dictatorship, military gains even more so I think. But you shouldn't take this literally. The slogans, all foreign offices have to have a narrative, right? A meta narrative to fit in. But if you see objective realities today for India, most of India's trade is with the US, with Europe, even UK. I was shocked to discover we've almost $75 billion of trade with the Brits. It's one of the largest. So if you see objectively India's economic orientation is with us, UK and sorry US, Europe and the Anglos. Where are Indian people going to study to work? Too many of them I presume here. But nevertheless here they go to five English speaking countries. So what are the rhetoric of foreign policy might be structurally, economically, we tried much closer to the, to the best. Now within that there are problems when trouble suddenly says look, I'm going to do something on Kashmir or I'm going to do something else. But in the end the economic structure, the links between India and the west are today so deep. And One reason why Mr. Modi has not attacked Trump, normal Indian instinct would have been tear him down. Every time he said he mediated, we would say look, that's a lie. We said it the first time, now we zipped because you don't want to pick a fight fight with your main economic partner. And our whole strategy has been to keep the ship going, don't let Trump sink the whole ship while we have a problem on the trade and tariffs. So I would say the logic of economy, this is not the same India of the 19 in the cold War. Our economic connections are with the west, we have a China problem and Russia is not a solution for either of these problems. So the multi alignment is really a framing device, not an operational strategy.
- [84:25]
B
We're going to leave it there. We've hit 8 o'. Clock. I want to thank you for just a terrific lecture and discussion. Please join me in thanking Raja Mahan.
- [84:40]
A
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