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- [00:00]
A
Hello and welcome to the Hot Seat. I'm Martin Rogers, here with Professor John Seidel of the LSE to talk about the situation in Mali and Algeria. John, welcome.
- [00:09]
B
Thank you very much.
- [00:10]
A
First of all, why is this conflict so important? Why are so many countries involved and why are they spending so much money?
- [00:18]
B
Well, it's yet to be seen how important this might really be. But I think two things have probably stimulated the interest and the flow of money and troops to this part of the world, which has otherwise avoided a fair amount of attention. One is that the seizure of northern Mali over the course of 2012 by Islamist forces associated, however loosely with Al Qaeda, raised concerns in Western capitals. And secondly, the terrorist attack on on the facility and the abduction, kidnapping and killing of foreigners in Algeria also raised the specter of terrorism and anti Western activities. And if you go back to 2003, exactly 10 years earlier, a similar kind of thing unfolded, at least in Algeria, in which a small amount of money that had been thrown at the Sahel, the region under something called the Pan Sahel Initiative, suddenly was multiplied many times by a terrorist incident. So I think as soon as you start talking about Al Qaeda, as soon as you start talking about not just Islamist takeover of some obscure part of some obscure country, but a potential threat to Europe, you get real sensitivity, and you particularly get real sensitivity in France. It's worth recalling that Algeria was not a colony of France. It was an integral part. It was a department of France. And the connections between France and its former colonies are very strong. So there's real sensitivity to the sort of French zone of influence and a very close realm for France.
- [02:08]
A
What's the importance of this particular part of Africa? Why is it particularly Mali and Algeria?
- [02:17]
B
Why is it Mali and Algeria where we see this sort of activism? Well, if we look at this part of the world, however little most people may know about it, and there is a considerable body of scholarship on it, it resembles other parts of the world where you see, for example, as in northern Mali, a separatist struggle among the Tuareg of northern Mali, a separatist struggle whose sort of orientation has shifted from a kind of secular nationalist struggle to something that's been progressively Islamicized. It used to be that this struggle was supported by, for example, Colonel Gaddafi and enjoyed some support in some measure from Algeria as well. But recent shifts, most notably the fall of Gaddafi and shifts in policy in Algeria as well, meant that this struggle then fell into the hands of other elements with another kind of language, another kind of orientation, leadership structure, and set of linkages outside the region. So that's not unusual for separatist struggles, whether in Chechnya or the southern Philippines, or indeed in Kashmir or elsewhere, to drift into that direction in the sort of post Cold War era where when various forms of secular nationalism have faded and another form of anti imperialist rhetoric in the name of Islam has triumphed.
- [03:42]
A
So are we seeing, as has been described in the media, a new front in the war on terror?
- [03:48]
B
Well, the danger is that we'll take at face value the language of this global war on terror and Al Qaeda and so forth, when in fact, as Al Jazeera and other sort of journalistic sources more astute in their coverage have noted, in fact, we're accepting facts that are sort of exclusively presented to us by various governments, intelligence services and militaries. And if we take for example, Algeria, it's a country where a long civil war was fought over the course of the 1990s in a way that involved the infiltration, some say, the creation of, of Islamist terrorist groups and former senior officers in the Algerian military have come out calling it a dirty war and revealing the extent of so called false flag terrorist incidents and so forth. Likewise, in northern Mali, it's long been said that there was an accommodation between the government in Bamako, the government that fell in March of 2012, and elements that describe themselves as Al Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb, which were actually involved in smuggling, actually involved in sort of local rackets and so forth. So it may well be that beneath the veneer of this grand narrative of a global war on terror and indeed a global jihad, that there are really actually not just local rackets and local politics being played out in a more mundane and not so religious fashion. But it may also be that the governments themselves are in various ways implicated. And a number of very knowledgeable sources have raised such doubts and concerns about many of the characters who've emerged on the front pages and on the, you know, the newspaper stories and the TV stories. Who are these people and how do we know so much about them and what are their linkages and so forth. So I don't think we should really assume in any event that Al Qaeda exists as a formal organization. There's Al Qaeda here, there and everywhere as a name brand that some groups have assumed. But there's no centralized structure to Al Qaeda that actually operates. And insofar as it exists on the ground, it only does so in very specific and very constraining local circumstances.
- [06:09]
A
So what is the importance of northern Mali specifically?
- [06:14]
B
Well, northern Mali in and of itself is not of any great strategic significance in and of itself, I don't think. I think that for France in particular, there has been a pattern of long standing connection and in some measure control over a range of former French colonies, the so called Francafrique. And Gaddafi, when he was in power, he challenged this. He was a major thorn in the side of the French in West Africa and in some measure to former British colonies as well. And with his removal, you've seen shifts in the region that have now required more direct French intervention. But it's really the significance, I think, is in terms of France's greater hinterland and France's interests and sort of profile in Africa at a time when new groups are emerging to fill the void created by the fall of Gaddafi.
- [07:17]
A
How about the particularly recent event in Algeria? How can that be understood?
- [07:24]
B
Well, I'm not sure what explains the specific timing of it. If ostensibly it was a kind of retribution for French intervention and aggression in northern Mali against the fellow comrades in an Islamist struggle, that would be one interpretation which is being passed off as authoritative and most sensible. It may well be that Algeria, in indirect ways as a government or elements within it, are signaling to the French and to other governments that their assistance is needed. And it would not be the first or only case in the global war on terror in which local intelligence services and governments are playing a more ambiguous game, in which the emergence of one or another terrorist attack, one or another terrorist group, is something which adds to the leverage that government enjoys vis a vis foreign creditors, foreign governments that are pressuring it in one direction or another. So I think we should wait and see. If you go back to 2003 and look at the terrorist incident, then that was simply portrayed as an Al Qaeda attack. In fact, subsequent investigation has raised a huge amount of doubt as to who was involved, what really happened and why. So I think at this point, given how limited access we have, even the experts who are being asked, and I'm no expert on the region, they seem to be very cautious both about accepting what's at face value, but also in terms of addressing why this might be happening. I think clearly in 2003 that event stimulated a massive flow of funding to the region in terms of military and intelligence activity. It also enhanced the strength and significance of the Algerian military and intelligence services. That's again what seems to be happening. That doesn't mean that explains why it happened, but that seems to be the result.
- [09:23]
A
And certainly the British government have been keen to stress the historical precedent in terms of for example, Libya and Syria, but not Afghanistan. Does this incident show that liberal interventionism is back on the agenda?
- [09:42]
B
Well, I think in some measure the British are there because the French are. I think the, the French lead on this and in some measure the French lead on Libya is something which the British have been forced or felt forced to follow and to complement and yet constrain because they've recognized France as having its own particular interests in Africa that have been in some measure in tension and competition with British interests. So showing the flag in Libya because of all the embarrassment in this country about the rapprochement with Gaddafi, and I think to serve as a so called honest broker between Europe and the US and to play that role in terms of NATO. I think in part it's that I don't fully understand myself why or to what extent the British really care about this in terms of direct British interests that are really at stake or whether this is a token gesture to make sure that Britain is involved in something that concerns all of Europe. It's part of a larger set of linkages and quid pro quos between the British and French governments. But I think there is an underlying and continuing competition between Britain and France across Africa in different regions. And whether it's Rwanda or West Africa, it's there. And it plays an important if subtle role in regional developments and conflicts throughout Africa. Still, after all these years, in terms.
- [11:20]
A
Of the liberal interventionism, is this something that's back on the agenda, something we're going to see now?
- [11:26]
B
Well, I think clearly the American administration, Washington has very little appetite for sustained active involvement. And therefore, as in Libya, it's the Europeans and in particular the French who are taking the lead. I think that we can see in Syria that there are other concerns and constraints and other actors involved within the Middle East. Pretty obviously here it's really between the French and the British and the Americans now that Gaddafi is gone. So I think the Americans and the British are going to be supportive in a subordinate role. But I also think it allows them, I think, to watch the French potentially constrain what remains a really strongly neocolonial relationship between France and former colonies like Mali, where its troops are on the ground. That's not the first time. Cote d', Ivoire, other incidents which in recent memory where we've seen French troops on the ground back in their old colonies. The. This isn't something we pay much attention to, but the overall pattern is pretty clear of deep French involvement and close, very corrupt relationship between various African governments in Paris that's been well documented and is well known by people in France. So I think that's a big part of the story, as opposed to a grand international community in the name of principles. There's big power politics and competition going on here with France, this being one of the few areas where it can play this kind of role.
- [13:00]
A
Thank you very much. Professor John Suddel. You're off the hot seat.
- [13:03]
B
Thank. You.