Podcast Summary: "Britain and the EU"

LSE: Public Lectures and Events
Date: December 19, 2012
Host: Martin Rogers (A), LSE Film and Audio Team
Guest: Dr. Maya Rasmussen (B), London School of Economics
Theme: Examining British Euroscepticism, the nature of the UK's EU membership, and prospects for renegotiation or withdrawal.

Overview

In this episode, host Martin Rogers engages with LSE’s Dr. Maya Rasmussen to explore British attitudes towards the European Union in 2012. The conversation delves into the roots and nuances of Euroscepticism in the UK, Britain's tangible and intangible influence within the EU, and the political realities and consequences of renegotiation or exit. Rasmussen provides a comparative perspective, referencing other non-EU European arrangements, and discusses implications for sovereignty and influence.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Types and Drivers of British Euroscepticism

[00:10 – 02:31]

• Hard vs. Soft Euroscepticism:

  • Rasmussen distinguishes "hard" (desire to leave the EU) from "soft" (seeking change or renegotiation) Euroscepticism.
  • Recent YouGov poll: “49% of [respondents] said that they would like the UK to withdraw.” [00:18, B]
  • Example: “81 Tory MPs voted to have a referendum on British membership with the EU.” [00:18, B]

• Four Types of Euroscepticism (per Katerina Sanssen):

  • Economic: Cost-benefit perspective (budget contributions vs. returns).
  • Sovereignty-based: Support for the single market, opposition to supranational EU powers.
  • Democratic: Concern over EU’s democratic deficit.
  • Social: Critique of the EU as not sufficiently social (more common in France).

• The British Profile:

  • “British citizens have a very strong sovereignty based Euroscepticism and... a more soft economic Euroscepticism.” [01:47, B]
  • “We don't have a social euroscepticism and we only have very limited democratic euroscepticism in the UK.” [02:27, B]

2. Legitimacy and Impact of British Concerns

[02:31 – 03:32]

• “All of these types of Euroscepticism are very legitimate.” [02:43, B]
• The UK has significant power within the EU:
  • “73 MEPs in the European Parliament, which is about 10% of all... seats.” [02:48, B]
  • Shares the highest voting weight in the Council with Germany and Italy.
  • The UK has influenced key EU policies, including liberalization of utility networks.

3. Prospects and Pressures for Renegotiation

[03:32 – 05:26]

• Cameron’s Competence Review:
  • UK departments reviewing “cost-benefit… of the EU membership in all... policy areas.” [03:58, B]
• Renegotiation is highly complex:
  • “It’s extremely difficult to get a treaty deal in Brussels.” [04:09, B]
  • EU treaty changes require unanimity among 27 member states—“seen as a nuclear option.” [04:31, B]
• Unlikely that the UK could “repatriate” powers without full renegotiation.
• Prospect of an in/out referendum becomes more likely given renegotiation difficulties.

4. Alternative Models: Norway & Switzerland

[05:26 – 08:21]

• “A la carte” opt-ins:

  • UK already has some “opt-in” rights (e.g., Justice and Home Affairs), but expanding these would be hard.

• Outside Models:

  • Norway model (European Economic Area):
    • “Norway... adopt[s] all... directives and regulations that the EU decides on and adopts... but they're not part in deciding.” [06:22, B]
    • Called a “fax democracy” —“Brussels faxes all the latest developments... but they don't actually decide upon it.” [07:00, B]
  • Switzerland model (Bilateral agreements):
    • “Negotiated on a case by case basis.”
    • Does not participate in all single market policies, especially social and employment.
    • “This could perhaps be of interest to the UK government, because... [it] has been quite critical towards social employment policies...” [07:56, B]

5. Consequences of Exit for British Influence and Sovereignty

[08:21 – 09:53]

• Loss of Influence:

  • “UK would lose influence politically if it goes for either the option that Switzerland has or that Norway has.” [08:34, B]
  • Would move from “decision maker” to “lobbyist,” still bound by EU product and process standards but without a seat at the table.

• Impact on Sovereignty:

  • “In searching for greater sovereignty outside of the EU, it's quite possible that the UK... would in fact have less sovereignty...” [09:33, A]
  • “It will definitely lose influence on laws that it would have to implement anyway, but would not have a vote upon.” [09:47, B]

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On British Euroscepticism:
  • “What the British population is against… is the supranational aspects of the EU membership…” — Dr. Maya Rasmussen [01:39]
• On Norway’s EU Relationship:
  • “Norway is relegated to a little bit of a lobbyist… some sort of fax democracy whereby Brussels faxes all the latest developments…” — Dr. Maya Rasmussen [07:00]
• On Sovereignty Dilemma:
  • “In searching for greater sovereignty outside of the EU, it's quite possible that the UK… would in fact have less sovereignty than it does at the moment…” — Martin Rogers [09:33]
• On Influence Post-Exit:
  • “You would lose political influence while still having to implement all the product and process standards that the EU decides upon…” — Dr. Maya Rasmussen [08:52]

Key Timestamps

• 00:10 – Introduction to British Euroscepticism
• 01:00 – Four types of Euroscepticism explained
• 02:43 – Legitimacy of British concerns and UK’s influence in the EU
• 03:58 – Discussion on prospects for renegotiation
• 05:26 – Options for the UK: opt-ins, Norway, Switzerland models
• 08:34 – Consequences for political influence and implementation of EU rules
• 09:33 – Paradox of sovereignty loss upon exit

Tone & Language

The episode’s tone is academic, methodical, and reflective, with Dr. Rasmussen providing clear, research-backed explanations and the host guiding the discussion efficiently. The discussion is substantive yet accessible, with minimal jargon, focusing on practical implications for policy and sovereignty.