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- [00:00]
A
Now, our moderator today is Dr. David Luke, an alumni of the LSE. Actually he's coordinator of the African Trade Policy center at the UN Economic Commission for Africa with the rank of Director at the Commission. He's responsible for leading ECA's research, policy, advisory services and so on, training and capacity development focused on inclusive trade policies and in particular the boosting of intra African trade and and the Continental free trade area initiatives. His portfolio also includes the World Trade Organization, the consequences and the possibilities of Brexit, as well as implications of trade for industrialization, gender relations and climate change. David was a panelist in our webinar last week, but now takes on the moderator role. I'm also very pleased to be able to announce that he will be joining the Firos Laogie center for Africa, a professor in practice next year. So we're very pleased to have him again this week. Thank you David for joining us for a second time in a row. And I now hand you over, hand the audience over to you, David, to introduce our excellent panelists.
- [01:19]
B
Thank you very much Tim, for those kind remarks. I'm truly delighted to moderate this webinar and hello everyone, wherever you are joining this event. I'll begin with some remarks to put the subject in perspective and after which I'll introduce distinguished panel of speakers who will be discussing the subject and then we'll get started. So the shock of COVID 19 is obviously a matter of great economic concern. The UN Economic Commission for Africa has put economic growth on the continent this year, which initially was supposed to be at a level of 3.2%. It is now expected to be between 0 and 1% depending on the strength of the recovery in key sectors as well as the trajectory taken by the disease. This is a loss in GDP growth of over $43 billion. The UNECA also estimate that close to 8 million people will be pushed below poverty of the poverty line of 1.$90 per day due to COVID 19. Vulnerable households affected by COVID 19 also face an increased probability of moving into transient poverty by 17.1%. And vulnerable households face a 4.2% increased probability of staying in poverty for a decade or longer and a fall in the probability of moving out of poverty by 5.9%. In other words, we can expect to see a significant reversal in the gains that have been made in reducing poverty. While developing countries have injected trillions of dollars into health care, social safety nets, income support and economic stimulus responses, Africa lacks the fiscal space to respond similarly. In particular, Africa is hamstrung by four challenges. First, high to debt GDP levels. The average is currently estimated to be 64% of GDP. Second, high fiscal deficits at an average of 3% of GDP third, high cost of borrowing and fourth, currency depreciation against major currencies. African governments are also under pressure to keep up payments on debt service and avoid stigmatization in financial markets associated with debt relief. Indeed, stigmatization is of such concern that African finance ministers have only called for a temporary standstill on debt servicing and not for debt forgiveness. Standstill is what in fact underpins the G20 debt service suspension initiative. On average, African governments spend more on debt servicing than on health care, so urgent economic and financial measures are needed to help soften the blow of COVID 19 and as the G20 minister's finance ministers meet again next week, one hopes that they'll be able to go beyond what they've done so far. And clearly a coordinated approach to debt resolution is required given Africa's diverse creditor base of private and official creditors and other arrangements with China. So these unrelated issues will be discussed by our panelists whom I will now introduce. Firstly, we have Emma Amara Ekorushe who is a Research associate at the center for the Study of the Economies of Africa at Oxford. She runs a column, your Nigerian Economist on Steers Business, which is Africa's leading business publication. She holds a Master's in Economic Policy from University College London and a Bachelor's degree in Economics from the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology in Ghana. Her research interests are development economics, macroeconomics and fiscal policy. Consequently, her research experience cuts across key issues in development including government debt and public financial management, South South Cooperation and the impact of Chinese investment in Africa. You can find her work at Brookings, the UN Office on South South Cooperation, Southern Voice, African Portal and on think tanks. Then next we have Professor Anna, who is Agnes N. Williams Research professor at Georgetown Law School, Georgetown University and a non resident Senior Fellow at the Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics. She has published research on government debt contracts and regulation of financial institutions and markets. She has co authored a law textbook on international finance and has contributed to international initiatives on financial reform and government debt. She co directs the Sovereign Debt Forum, a collaboration between Georgetown Law School's Institute of International Economic Law and academic institutions in the United States and Europe dedicated to cutting edge research and capacity building in sovereign debt management. And next we have Eric Lecomte, who is an American commentator on politics, finance and religion. He serves on a working group with the UN Conference on Trade and Development. He is currently Executive director of Jubilee USA Network. And last but certainly not least, we have Dr. Shelley Zeyu, who is a Senior Visiting Fellow in the Institute of Global affairs at LSE and an Asia Fellow with the Ash center and of Harvard Kennedy School. She has a PhD in Political Economy from China's Peking University and a Master's in Government from Harvard University. She has published three books in Chinese, including On China by Ambassadors and the Rise of the RMB and the Fall of the Yen. She has also served as a mentor for Cherry Blair's foundation for International Women. Each panelist will have 10 minutes to make their presentation, after which we'll have an interactive discussion. So please use the Q and A function and chat box as well as Facebook to send your questions and address them to specific panelists if possible. Now let's get started. Our first speaker is Emma Ekorushe. Emma, you have the floor.
- [08:13]
C
Thank you so much, David, for that warm introduction. Today I'll be taking us through an important aspect of why we're here and my presentation is titled Africa's debts amidst the COVID 19 pandemic and the Ramifications for the International Community. So just to give us a brief background on the debt situation before the pandemic sets in, between 2014 and 2019, debt across Africa has been quickly increased by about 50%. So government debts as a share of GDP increased from 31% to 50%. Now what was the reason for this rising debt? After the global financial crisis in 2008, where advanced countries saw unprecedented low interest rates, Africa's debts became very attractive to creditors given the difference in yield. Also, this was happening at a time where African governments, they were interested in developing huge infrastructure projects and as such they needed long term finance. And these are projects that will typically not be funded by the more traditional lenders. Now who were the biggest debtors? For low income countries, we see Tanzania, we see Mozambique, we see Uganda. And for lower middle income countries we see Angola, we see Egypt, we see Ghana, we see Kenya. But what I really want us to take away from this slide is the creditor composition of Africa's debts. So we see how private creditors, which is the ASH series, and to an extent bilateral creditors, you know, are Africa's biggest lenders. And this is a point that you know will reoccur in as we go further. Now, aside the existing fiscal concerns, the pandemic has also brought with it what I've termed twin fiscal shocks. So one is from the slowdown in the domestic economies. Africa, like other continents They've imposed lockdown measures, partial or full lockdown measures. And this has affected sectors, whether it's tourism or aviation or restrictions to trade. And so what we're seeing is that governments across the continent, they're realizing lower tax revenues and also the commodity price shock that was induced by the pandemic. Whether it's oil in Nigeria or copper in Zambia, there's really no demand for these commodities. And so commodity exporters, they've also had a fall in here in their export earnings. And it is all this that has triggered the global call for creditors to provide Africa with debt relief. So far we've had the debt service moratorium package by the G20 provides developing countries, including about 40 African countries, with debt service moratorium packages up until the end of the year. We also have a similar package by the IMF which provides vulnerable countries, including 19 African countries, with debt service moratorium up until October. The IMF also provides finance emergency financial assistance, which are basically concessional loans to its member countries. Now the, you know, the million dollar question is, is this adequate? Is this sufficient for the continent? And I would say it depends on who you're asking and it depends on how long the pandemic will last. So what I've done here is to categorize, you know, countries into three, three groups. We have winners, we have near winners, and then we have those who have been left behind. So for the winners, these are countries who are eligible to both debt service moratorium packages and also they've been able to access the IMF's finance program. And there are a few countries in this group. We have Burkina Faso, we have Mali, we have Mozambique. But most of these countries are LICs. The next group we have the near winners. So for this group, they are either not eligible for the debt service moratorium packages, or even though they are eligible, or even though they are eligible, they failed to access these packages. However, they've been able to get finance from the imf. And a question that would come up is why would a country who is eligible for these packages not access it? Why would they continue to service their debts as they were doing in the pre pandemic era? And the answer is a number of countries, including mine, Nigeria, their governments are a bit wary of coming out to say, look, we. Rather, you know, not boost healthcare spending, for instance, because they are a big warrior of, you know, getting their credit ratings downgraded or, you know, worst case scenario, being locked out of the debt markets. And I know, so what's happening in these countries is they're still servicing their debts as they were. I know for Nigeria before the pandemic we were servicing, we were using about 60% of our revenue for debt servicing. And the latest figures show that we're now using about 99% of our revenue for debt servicing. Which leaves little fiscal room for any other thing. We have Ghana, we have Kenya also in this category. And then we have the third category, those who have been left behind. So these countries, you know, they've not been, they're not eligible for the debt service moratorium packages. And also they haven't accessed the IMF's finance programs. And we have South Africa, a lot of countries in Southern Africa actually they're in this category. We have Zimbabwe, we have also a few countries in North Africa, Algeria and Morocco. Now regardless of the category, a huge concern is the fact that private creditors are not participating in this debt relief programs. And this is because of the creditor composition of Africa's debts. So here I Show how over 50% of Africa's debt is owed to private lenders. And although low middle income countries are more affected by this than low income countries, but at the same time, even for winners who have accessed the debt service moratorium packages and also, you know, have accessed loans at concessional rates, it's also, you know, it also affects them because what could be happening is that they could be using these funds to serve. It's the entire purpose of the programs. Now. Does this mean.
- [16:09]
D
We see that.
- [16:14]
C
Debt will increase significantly? You know, the last, the latest IMF reports they read and you know, the future of the continents in the creditor landscape, you know, towards multilateral creditors. But an important point to notice that governments are beginning to draw increasingly on their local debt markets. As you know, it limits them from exchange rate volatilities which could potentially crowd up the private sector. Also, even though these efforts are a step in the right direction, Welcome development, the continent still does not have such that countries are now increasingly mobilizing resources domestically. So I know that for Nigeria we have a tax on online transactions coming up in the next couple of months. There also talks about digital businesses and you know, while this would be great in saner clients, it's happening in a context where that countries are providing tax relief to the front of the pandemic. Now just to conclude, like I said, while these efforts are a step in the right direction and you know, it's important for. To creditors who haven't joined done so that already been considered in the policy space. But this is just to re echo these recommendations and to show.
- [18:09]
D
The need.
- [18:09]
C
For more to be done. So first is that lenders should be prepared to extend the debt service moratorium period even beyond 2020, depending on when the pandemic would end. Also increase, we encourage the participation of bilateral and private creditors. I know that China is currently in talks to provide countries, I think about 70, upwards of 70 countries with debt service relief, which is, you know, a welcome development. Also, private creditors, you know, are encouraged to join the movements so that African governments do not prioritize debt servicing at this time and no country goes into full blown debt defaults. Also, it would be nice to encourage credit rating agencies to freeze the credit ratings of governments at this time just so that governments are not concerned about being downgraded and being locked out of the debt market and they can actually utilize these packages that are being provided. And finally, the finance being provided should be grant based rather than credits so that we don't see a debt ballooning in the near future. Over to you, David.
- [19:30]
B
Thank you very much, Emma, for that. You've touched on how the pandemic has impacted African countries. You've given us a breakdown of the debt, which countries affected. You've also touched on what's been done so far. And clearly your point is that what's been done so far is not adequate. So without further ado, I'll go straight to Professor Anna Gelpen, who is our next speaker. Anna, you have the floor.
- [20:03]
E
Well, thank you so very much for this kind introduction and it is an honor to be here and honor to follow, Emma, because I'm not an economist, although probably one of my best years was spent at the LSE studying anthropology. But I've collected the dividends from the word economics in the name LSE probably for much of my life. So I'm a lawyer and I will focus on institutions and structures and processes that we are facing here. The global pandemic magnifies the financing needs and debt vulnerabilities, among other vulnerabilities in Africa and of course around the world. It exacerbates inequality along every dimension, among countries, within countries, gender, racial, you name it. So in this context, and I think Emma started with a really important point, the spotlight on debt is important, but we shouldn't be, we shouldn't focus on it to the exclusion of everything else, because debt is one way of meeting the needs that these countries are facing. And also of course, it is one source of vulnerability, but it is neither the only way of meeting the needs nor is it the only vulnerability. So I'm going to try to elaborate on that for a bit. It is critical that we have a very clear view in each case, in the case of each country, what role debt plays in meeting the needs and adding to or reducing vulnerabilities. Debt relief is not an end in and of itself. It is a means to ensure that urgent humanitarian and development needs take priority. So there are some countries, there's, I think that Emma actually again also pointed out very important variations among countries. In some countries, there is a lot of debt and a lot of debt service that would otherwise be allocated to, that could be allocated to public health priorities and basic human needs. And it's certainly critical that this reallocation happen and this is what suspension and relief is about. But then there are other countries that either don't have a huge lot of debt service coming up in the near term or for other reasons, aren't eligible for some of the current initiatives that are on the table. And that does not mean that they don't have financing needs. Right? So there's got to be a way to independently meet the financing needs of countries that don't happen to have a giant debt payment coming up before the end of 2020 or 2021 or whatever the time horizon is. We can't possibly let lose sight of that. And I think the managing director of the IMF actually even mentioned this yesterday, and it came up in development committee conversations earlier in the spring. There are countries that are not eligible for any of the debt initiatives now simply because they're in the wrong income group and they have profound debt vulnerabilities. They were in debt distress before COVID hit, and they're going to need debt relief in one way or another, again quite independently of the, or at least not as directly related as a function of the COVID shock. It is important to note that markets have been providing liquidity to countries now. And again, the previous speaker mentioned some of the reasons why that might be happening. And all equal. Look, liquidity is a good thing when you need liquidity. But as a lawyer, my first question is on what terms? Right. So a lot of the shifts that we've seen are not just shifts from one group of creditors to another, but, but some of these shifts come with terms that make the debt stock more brittle, that make countries more susceptible to crises down the line. So short maturities, collateralized debt, interest rate structures that exacerbate the effects of economic shocks. Now is the time to really watch the terms of the borrowing and not just, you know, take liquidity when it's coming at you? I think so. Another point I wanted to make is that this crisis comes at a troublesome moment for the debt restructuring regime, such as it is, but it also presents an opportunity. New creditors are at the table, new debtors are at the table. Countries that didn't have market access do also. Many countries borrow through sub sovereign ent state owned enterprises. So there are new borrowers and new debtors that are on the scene, but many of them are not particularly invested and with good reason in the prevailing debt restructuring and crisis management institutions, be it the Paris Club, you know, the long forgotten London club from the 1980s, you name it, right? So now is an opportunity and I think there's an urgent need to really give some to what the debt restructuring architecture is going to look like going forward and how to ensure that all of the new actors, debtors and creditors are invested in this architecture, that they do not feel like this is something that was established without their participation, you know, 30, 50 years ago. And therefore they would just as soon resolve any difficulties on their own in a systemic crisis. These bilateral initiatives, while welcome relative to nothing, I suppose, create really troublesome collective action problems and can contribute to rather than alleviate vulnerabilities. Another thing I wanted to flag again as a non economist, is that there is a wide range of claims on the countries that we're focusing on now and that unlike in past crises.
- [27:33]
B
The.
- [27:33]
E
Nature of the claim does not necessarily tell you much about the creditor who is holding it. So a bond could be held by a bank, a regulated pension fund, an unregulated offshore hedge fund, a sovereign wealth fund, a government reserve manager, you name it. And consider the fact that the net present value of that bond would be different depending on who holds it, because everybody is subject to different accounting conventions, right? And different legal regulatory regimes. So that to the extent that these debts become distressed, how to restructure them, how to renegotiate them becomes a really tricky proposition. Again, when the, when the composition, when creditor composition changes all the time, when debt holdings are very dynamic and when the creditors face very different incentives and even when they might hold the same instrument. So this is very much not the 1980s, the old regime again centered on the Paris Club, the imf, the Bretton woods institutions, and really prioritizing kind of case by case, ad hoc contract based approaches may not work in countries where the Paris Club does not represent even a plurality of claims or bilateral claims. When the IMF's role is not, when the IMF is not in the lead and when borrowers have many private and public alternatives from which they might get short term financing. In particular, coordination is ephemeral at best. Today we don't see a substitute for the old institutions, by the way, which were not all that great. But there was some coordination when it was a transatlantic club. Very problematic coordination in many cases. I think we urgently need a more representative, more broad based coordination regime. We need to be creative, particularly when it comes to deploying public resources. So bilateral multilateral institutions, regional institutions need to focus on how to meet the financing need, whether with debt restructuring or with delivering new money without undermining sustainability. Creative use of catalytic structures, including guarantees, would be great. But I think we need to think very, very hard about where the public subsidy is going. So, you know, I keep thinking this is really 1982, not 1989. And some of the ideas that I've seen floating around about, you know, public subsidies for a six month standstill with capitalizing interest at market rates strike me as puzzling, shall we say, particularly when it comes to building vulnerabilities for countries already in precarious states. Private creditors have a really important role to play in the management of this crisis and should really get proactive about their role here. And again, coordination is the buzzword I keep coming back to. The focus seems to have been on risk management of a particular sort. Making sure that nobody's committed to anything whatsoever. Right. I'm not sure avoiding commitment is, inspires a whole lot of confidence or amounts to a strategy. I think this now is the time to be creative, both with instrument design and institutional participation. We should keep an eye on cases of debt restructuring happening outside Africa. Now, Argentina and Ecuador in particular are in the middle of fairly complicated operations that are testing the prevailing contractual regime. And I don't have a ton of confidence about how the regime will fare in these particular cases. And I think that could have implications for vulnerability, for handling vulnerabilities and crises to come. Going forward. A contract based system works until it doesn't. And if we see a breakdown in middle income countries in Latin America now, this could have implications for a very broad range of countries. The regulatory environment and including the role of credit rating agencies bears emphasis. And this is my last point. I want to reiterate something I've been saying a fair amount. We need to stop fetishizing default, right? Technical default. You know, there have been some fairly puzzling conversations about whether the announcement of a debt suspension somehow amounts to default. This is why smart people get paid the big bucks. This should not default can be, Can accidentally cause a crisis, can accidentally cause a shock. It is our job to focus on substance rather than technicalities and formalities and making sure that formalities don't get in the way of substance. Now default can either default can be the cause of a crisis or default can be a source of financing. There are some cases where avoiding default is just not worth the cost of not meeting basic human needs. And I think that these kinds of discussions should be happening in a very straightforward and fact based way. The role of the credit rating agencies strikes me as a really unfortunate distraction in this enterprise. Credit rating agencies are only important because we let we allow certain consequences to follow from credit rating actions. Right. So there was a big discussion about this in 2008, there is a discussion about it now. It's not what they say, it is how we use them. If there were no credit rating agencies and if there were no ratings downgrades, creditors might or might not charge more under certain circumstances. So I think that we need to rethink the role of credit rating agencies more than we need to rethink what it is that they do. And there are similar points to be made about regulatory treatment. With that I think I want to close and just highlight the fact that the objective has got to be funding essential needs in response to a public health shock. How we get there is a second order question, an important one. But let's not lose sight of the objective and the priorities. Thank you.
- [35:56]
B
Thank you very much Anna for giving us in effect a lawyer's perspective on these issues. Covering a lot of ground that yes indeed, debt relief is warranted in a crisis such as this. What attention needs to be paid to what debt relief the public subsidies from it are used for. Interesting points about the new opportunities just given the changing landscape and the composition of creditors and again how much that landscape has changed in recent years and indeed opportunities, creative thinking and action that could come out of this. I think also important point for us to look beyond Africa. Also look at what is happening in Latin America and what we can learn from this. Again underscoring your point about how much the landscape has changed and similar points to those of on the role of credit agencies. So thank you very much for that, Anna. So next I'll go straight to Eric. Eric, you have the floor.
- [37:09]
D
Thank you so much, David. It's a real pleasure to be with all of you today. And in the United States we have a religious community, the Quakers, who when they have prayer services and the people before them already say what they were going to Say, they simply say, friend speaks my mind. And the reality is between the introduction from David, Emma's commentary and what Anna just offered, I can simply say, friend speaks my mind. So let me just add and enhance a bit of what they offered as we continue this conversation today. David began with a very strong introduction of the reality that we're dealing with a very severe global crisis, a crisis that's impacting the vulnerable unlike any other crisis we've seen in our lifetimes. Emma brought that home in terms of what she talked about specifically and how this crisis is impacting Africa, how the debt standstill can help or hinder Africa. The next steps and what Anna did so perfectly before I offer some remarks was noted some of the challenges we're facing and I think even more specifically started to light the path to how we need to improve debt restructuring, how we need to improve financing, how we need to look at how we ensure that development aid, no matter what it is, is available for these countries. So I'd like to share my brief remarks really along those lines, I think to highlight and take it a step forward from what David offered in his introduction. According to the United nations, right now we are looking in the next few weeks for 265 million more people to enter famine, to enter extreme hunger, mostly within Africa. It's a challenge like no other that we faced before. It's an incredible financing need that Africa right now is looking at. It's an incredible challenge and to move forward. You know, in terms of Emma's comments and where we're at, of the 73 countries that are able to take advantage of this debt standstill, 40 countries in Africa so far have said that they're willing. But the majority of those countries have little or no critical care units. The lucky ones have 50 critical care units. So when we're talking about the coronavirus impacting Africa and starting to have a more significant impact on the developing world in Africa, we know that they are not prepared to be able to deal with this growing health crisis that's taking place. And that really brings us to, I think the very powerful comments from Anna in terms of where we're at with the death standstill, where we are at with the financing needs right now. And the reality is, as we've made much progress, as world leaders have come to the plate and stepped up, we're not doing enough. And that's really the conversation that we have to be focused on today in terms of short term, middle term, long term goals. There are many things that need to happen ultimately we do need a new type of financing process, a new type of debt restructuring process in order to be able to deal with the needs that countries have right now. Beyond the reality that we're $12 trillion away from meeting the Sustainable Development Goals in terms of alleviating poverty. The International Monetary Fund just noted that we're looking at a $12 trillion loss to our economy. The head of the International Monetary Fund, Kristalina Georgieva, has said that the Africa crisis is like no other in the past few days. And Kristalina even went further to say that this particular crisis needs a much more significant financing and aid than we're prepared to deliver at this point. So let's take a step back. Let's look at the debt standstill that the G20 and the IMF has moved forward, part of which some of the previous speakers has alluded to. So incredibly exciting and important. 19 countries in Africa are going to see debt cancellation for six months through the Catastrophe Containment Trust Relief Fund of the imf. Great step forward. For countries that count their budgets in the tens of millions who have no critical care units, this is really helpful. Is it enough? It's not enough for the reality that we're dealing with that the majority of IDA countries in Africa, not even including middle income countries, but just talking about the majority of IDA countries in Africa being able to apply for this debt standstill, which could be between 12 and 20 billion dollars of relief, again, really significant. Is it enough? It's not enough for the financing needs. So we need to also look at unilaterally what the finance ministers of Africa have called for. A consensus among every finance minister in Africa is that just this year, for Africa to get through just this year of the crisis, just in debt relief, they need 44 to 45 billion dollars of debt relief of a debt standstill. And so far what the G20 has passed does not even deal with the majority of countries that are looking for this relief in Africa. So it's incredibly exciting that we've been able to move forward actual debt cancellation for the 25 poorest countries, 19 of which are in Africa. For 40 countries in Africa to be able to receive a debt standstill. But the reality is that we also have middle income countries in Africa that include countries with the highest extreme poverty rates across Africa who are not applicable for a debt standstill, let alone debt cancellation. So where does that leave us right now? So we have progress. We have an upcoming finance Ministers meeting next week of the G20. Yesterday there was a very important high level ministerial meeting of 39 countries that was convened by the G20 and we also head to the October meetings of the IMF and World Bank. So where we're at right now is for the 73 poorest countries, we need to extend that debt standstill. That's incredibly important. It needs to be extended into 2021. Beyond that, we need to actually start the process for debt sustainability and debt cancellation for those countries as well as the poorest countries so that they can ascertain where their debt levels are at, if those debt levels are sustainable and what are the vulnerabilities and move towards a process of cancellation as both the head of the World bank and the International Monetary Fund have now called for. We know that from the high level ministerial meeting Yesterday of the G20 that G20 leaders want to look at the reality in terms of how you move forward forward a process of canceling debt for the countries that need it now. Beyond that, in terms of what's left out? Middle income countries, which are the majority of countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia who seriously need debt relief and have serious debt vulnerability issues, are not able to apply for any type of debt relief. They're not able to apply for what all the folks finance ministers have called for in terms of a 44 to 45 billion dollars package in terms of relief. So as the World bank has called for, as Ghana's Finance Minister has called for, we now need to extend relief packages to the developing middle income countries. And that's ultimately what's going to start to create some safeguards and some protections in the continent of Africa. Beyond that reality, we also have to look at the other financing needs that the previous speakers like Anna have noted. One of the most important things that needs to move forward right now is access to the global reserve funds which last were accessed after the 2008, 2009 financial crisis. And that's the special drawing rights. It's a type of currency and aid which really costs nothing to develop to wealthy countries, but could actually create a level of sustainability of debt repayments as well as being able to create the financing for countries across Africa not only to provide the health care needs for their country, but to ensure that bridge finance that can take place as it's taken place in Europe as well as Africa. The other component of this, whether we're talking about low income countries in Africa or middle income countries in Africa, is that the private sector has not been a part of the party. Even though we've seen some of the strongest calls in history from the G20 from the wealthiest countries, from the IMF, from the world bank, that all parts of the private sector must be involved in debt negotiations and debt reconciliation and debt relief. We've seen the private sector entirely avoid coming to the party. They've not accepted the invitation. They're not going to come a part of this party voluntarily. And that's a very significant issue that the G20 finance ministers must deal with next week. We can't simply invite the private sector. We must compel the private sector. Because if we don't compel the private sector with strong language as well as with strong authorities, what that leaves us with is the public sector and the taxpayers all over the world just bailing the private sector out. Now, that's not to say that the private sector shouldn't, you know, face in the future some returns and significant returns as we see recoveries. But it doesn't mean that in this current moment, when we're trying to get through this crisis, that the private sector should be trying to exploit the crisis. So this is an important role for the G20 to take place. It's also a very important role in terms of how we move forward with the IMF and World Bank. And finally, I think in terms of where our previous speakers have led us, this also dictates the demand and the reality that we need to move forward in the months and years to come with a new type of restructuring process, a new type of debt relief process. What many of the participants in this call today, many of the speakers are aware of, is the incredible initiative that we've been a part of, like the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative that ultimately essentially created debt relief, debt forgiveness of the tune of more than $115 billion. What did that mean for Sub Saharan Africa? It meant 54 million kids went to school who never would have seen the inside of a classroom. It meant in Tanzania, we built clinics. It meant that school fees were canceled later as we had other debt relief and debt cancellation possibilities. That meant the three countries that were affected by Ebola had their debt canceled and were able to build hospitals and be able to have an incredible amount of debt relief to put countries on a more sustainable level. So what we're really talking about now is we get beyond this current crisis and be able to prevent a future crisis, not only for Africa and the developing world, but the developed world, is that we need a new hipc, a new mdri, a new kind of process that not only cancels debt, that looks at debt sustainability, and debt vulnerability. But we need a HIPC2 that puts a new type of debt relief and debt restructuring process in place that looks at both to the benefit of the lender and the borrower, how you meet the best needs of both the borrower and the lender and their rights in terms of ensuring the that if we have another crisis, we have a process in place in order to restructure debt fairly both to the rights of the borrower and the lender. And without a process like that in place, a new kind of hipc, a new kind of process like that we unfortunately will continue to relay, live crisis after crisis, continue to be able to have these discussions on debt relief and debt cancellation where we're not dealing with the root of the problem. And what our conversation is about today, where we need to be as an international community is how we deal with the root of the problem. Thank you.
- [50:58]
B
Thank you very much, Eric. I think you've made very strong plea for the issue of debt to be looked at in its totality, short, medium, long term issues suddenly to look at the broader question of financing the SDGs as well, but more fundamentally to really get to grips with this issue of sustainability. So thank you very much for that. And we take note that friends did speak your mind at the beginning and that was good. Now I turn to Dr. Shelley Zehu who is our next speaker. Shelley, you have the floor.
- [51:43]
F
Thank you, David and good day. Everyone from all over the world. Take a breather. Over the next 10 minutes or so. I'd like to take you away from the transatlantic view for a minute to look at this. African Debt relief efforts join U.S. financial President and as a result of that, its debt relief efforts in Africa is significant for the continent. And I want to illustrate this with three set of figures. One is to do with size. China currently owns single handedly about 20% of Africa's total debt and it's estimated to be around $143 billion. And of course China does not officially release its debt figures in Africa or indeed to any other parts of the world. And so this is rather a ballpark estimate. So 20% of Africa's total debt in the amount of $143 billion. The other is to do with time. China has had a tradition of doubling or even tripling its long commitment to Africa over the past by and large 15 years or so starting from 2006 under the scheme of the Forum of China Africa Cooperation or under the acronym FOCAC F O C A C. So it started in 2006 with a commitment to Africa for $5 billion. In 2009, it's doubled to 10 billion. 2016, it's tripled essentially to 60 billion. And in 2018, 53 of the 54 African leaders were present in Beijing and at the combination of this China Africa Cooperation Forum. And so China pledged yet another $60 billion in total to African countries, which was no longer a double of its 2015 commitments. But we came to the natural understanding, of course, at the same time that it's impossible for China to continue this doubling and tripling act of its financial commitment to Africa. And So starting from 2016 to 2018, we started to see naturally that whole commitment to Africa by China has sort of naturally come to a plateau. And so as you can see that as we have just illustrated in the figures, out of the current $143 billion that China has loaned to Africa from 2016 and the 2018, it was $60 billion each. And so 120 out of the $143 billion were loaned within the past five years. And they are fairly, fairly new loans. The third has to do with the loan composition. And so the earlier pledges were from China to Africa consisted mostly of interest free loans, or we call it zero interest loans, grants and concessional loans and export credits. From the official language released by China, the overall level of concessionality and the preferentiality of China's loans to Africa is decreasing. Concessional loans, by and large of the largest chunk of China's loans to Africa over the past couple of decades. And increasingly we're starting to see a steady rise of commercial level loans, either loans by corporates or development banks, buckles on a commercial rate. And so their proportion within this total part of China's loans to Africa has been steadily increasing. And I think it's important to highlight that various players behind this enormous amount of debt that we see from China to Africa, because when it comes to debt relief discussions, it's ultimately up to the owners of the debt to make those sorts of decisions. It's really not a homogenous decision that can be made by China. And so next, China's official framework for Africans debt release post COVID 19 diabetes 3 the first one was, and I mentioned earlier, China's commitments along with G20 member countries in the G20 initiative for the world's poorest 77 countries. That was made on April 15th. And so as part of this agreement, China's Foreign Ministry has officially announced that G20 countries, including China, would suspend both the interest payments and the debt repayments from May 1 to the end of 2020. And so China is a part of that. And the suspension is applicable to all IDA eligible countries. So the 76 plus Angola, so 77 countries, including 40 sub Saharan African countries. The second pledge officially that China has made was a month later during the virtual WHO assembly. And it was actually made by Chinese President Xi Jinping himself. And he said China would provide $2 billion. 19 global response and economic relief efforts. And so it's $2 billion over two years. Both pledges won and pledges one and two, the G20 pledge and the WHO pledge, although Africa was significantly benefited, but neither specifically tailor made for Africa. So the third pledge came in on June 18th. This is significant because it happened during the virtual conference of the China Africa Cooperation Conference. And President Xi again pledged himself to African leaders via this virtual conference that China will cancel all zero interest loan repayments due by the end of 2020. This is the first time that China is honoring a specific debt relief program for Africa. And more importantly, it actually touches on not no longer suspension, but actually so this is very significant. And so there are some caveats to what we decide discuss these three pledges that are made by China. One is that the G20 pledge was a suspension. I think David mentioned earlier, it's just about stopping the clock. Basically nothing was forgiven under the G20 pledge. It's significant in terms of the delay, but really in terms of the debt burdens for African countries, nothing was alleviated. And so under China's pledge number three, China actually canceled or promised to cancel debt. And so the cancellation only of course contains zero interest debt and only debt that are due before the end of 2020. And so far it's correct that there are no firm commitments for any debt relief programs beyond 2020. And so the other caveat is that there could be some overlaps in these three pledges. For example, the $2 billion commitment to at the WHO assembly, China earlier had made a $15 million donation, I believe in three batches to the WHO, particularly after the Trump administration has announced that it was going to withdraw from the WHO membership. And so the $50 million donation that China makes to the WHO actually will be counted as a part of the $2 billion total commitment. And so as you could see, these numbers do not really, it's not as a simple addition. So there are quite a number of overlaps in the nuance. And so what gets the relief and what does not. According to the pledge number three, zero interest loans will be forgiven. But it said China first of all doesn't announce the specific amount. So we don't really know what this number does actually translate terms of the actual size of the debt cancellation actually entails. But the understanding is a portion of China's total loans to Africa. Today, the biggest chunk again is concessional loans. The question remains now whether concessional loans are included in any of these debt relief programs to Africa. In China's 2006 pledge to Africa, 50% of the total was in concessional loans. In 2012, again, 50%. 2015, that 60% was concessional loans. And export credits in 2018 was about 25%. So it's actually gone down. And that includes our grants and zero interest loans in the $60 billion cash package. And so so far, the understanding is that the G20 pledge would include suspension of interest payments on concessional loans. But China is not forgiving any repayments on concessional loans at this point. And so this is the biggest chunk really remains the biggest financial concern. And when it comes to commercial loans, which increasingly represent a bigger proportion, of course, it would be virtually impossible to forgive these debt or even talk about for keeping these debts unless the corporates agree to it. And so these are loans that are offered by companies and in many instances, you know, Chinese firms, private companies even, and they have a financial viability consideration. And so that'll take precedence. And it's not as easy as saying, okay, we're going to relieve these debts for Africa. And so can China go further? China has pledged this $2 billion over the next two years as global COVID 19 response. And I think that that is a great gesture, really, of a way of showing that China is stepping up for this global relief efforts. But when the US withdrew its funding to the WHO, the narrative was that what China contributes $40 million a year to the WHO, US does 500 million. So it's not fair. And so we are moving. And so when that happens, and actually when that actually happens, China could be stepping up and say, you know, we're going to fill the gap. And this is a rare moment for China to say, okay, we are going to take leadership and lead a major global initiative at a major global organization. But China yet? I should say so there is a sense that the $2 billion that China has committed would probably be the most that China realistically is willing to commit to global COVID 19 efforts, at least as of this point. And so I think we should be realistic about a lot of these expectations as well. The other thing is that China itself is severely impacted by COVID 19 this year. Chinese Premier recently said that there are 600. Less than 1800 US dollars a year. And so China's per capita GDP hit $10,000 US dollars as of the end of 2019. So that puts China into a very solid upper middle income category. But yet as you can see, 600 million people, roughly 40% of Chinese people, its population are not in that category. And so China you could see because of the economic dispersion in terms of its development phase. China is both a rich country and a developing country at the same time. And so this year is the final year for China to fulfill its commitments under the 13th Five Year Plan for 100% of poverty elimination. And so that is a overarching economic priority. Absolutely, that has to be met. And back in 2019 that whole scenario looked rather promising, but with COVID 19 unexpectedly happened. And this year, I think, you know, a lot of people, the financial, in terms of their financial conditions, you know, they have been regressing rather than developing. And so China absolutely will take charge of these domestic economic priorities. And I think that will trump the domestic poverty elimination, will trump many of the international efforts for 2020. And the next thing is debt to equity swap for Africa can be an option, but a very controversial option. But China's increasing role as a global ascending power will lead China through a natural process from being the largest trading nation, which I believe China hits in 2005, to the world's largest creditor nation, China was that back in 2018 increasingly to world's largest ODI originator. And I think this is just a natural car of an ascending power. It happened to the uk, it happened to the us it's just natural if China can continue to deliver its economic growth. So China will, you know, it looks possible, you know, if the debt becomes not viable, debt to equity swap could be an option, but then that'll be met with a lot of global backlash Topic about debt traps again. And China could offer more development finance as another alternative. China did pledge in 2018 an additional $10 billion in development finance to encourage Chinese companies to invest in Africa. And so these are loans provided to Chinese companies rather than to, you know, loans that are provided to Africa directly. And so this is specific specifically to help Chinese companies to be financed in a way to do equity investments in Africa. And so I think this is likely going to be the future. Through China's equity investments. And in the virtual meeting again on June 18 between Chinese and African leaders, China specifically talked about helping African American to jump start its 5G development, digital economy and smart cities. And I think this is an opportunity potentially for Africa to catch up with global economic modernity, with China's technology backing. But potentially again this is something that the west will be very concerned about and keeping a close eye on. And that relief to Africa is obviously important. But China is not doing that relief, I think purely out of altruism. And I say surely of course not, because China has always had a very mercantilist way of looking at commercial relationships with the world, including with Africa. And so if African countries are not able to sustain its economic stubborn, which potentially can lead to regime implosion, China could potentially lose everything in Africa. So there is no guarantee that any new regimes potentially could when they take over, you know, they would recognize China's debt ownership. And so there's a lot of talks about debt traps all over, you know, China's border rode initiative. But from a Chinese perspective it's a severe economic and the financial vulnerability for China. Imagine China, you know, talking about hundreds of billions that potentially could be completely forsaken. And so for China it is really all about at this point, I think the strategic calculus of saving Africa from a severe economic calamity and the potential regime instability. But by how much? So China does not want to let go of all its state, of course not. Were to do nothing. And so China understands that it's just about finding the strategic balance of the two. And categorically I think Africa does need more relief and China should step up to do more. But given currently the potential global level depression and China's domestic economic restraints, I think the debt relief programs to Africa, according to China's official language, you know, China prefers a bespoke approach, a bilateral approach. China is not likely to bow down to international pressure to do more debt reliefs. And I think it'll be ultimately up to the willingness and the negotiations on both sides between China and African countries.
- [69:11]
B
Thank you very much Shelley for that. I think you've essentially made three or four main points. Firstly, that China obviously is an important player when it comes to African debt because it holds about 20% of African debt. The structure of this debt is quite complex and includes export credits, conditional loans, commercial loans, state, other state related financing. You've made clear that China is participating in the G20 initiative, but that the entire picture is not clear given the complexity of the composition of the debt. And I think you ended by making a plea that China can do more and should do more. So thank you for these comments. Now we have about 20 minutes or so For Q and A. And I see some questions that have already been posted to Ima as well as to you, Shelley. So I guess I'll go to Ima first. And this is from someone called Princess, and she's based in the uk she's originally from Zambia. And she says that Ima mentioned that there are some countries that have been left behind concerning debt. And so her question is, what makes a country eligible to access the funding packages? Ima, that's for you.
- [70:49]
C
Thank you, David. So for the countries that are being left behind, it's mostly due to their income category and also in a case where a country has poor macroeconomic fundamentals, where creditors, you know, a bit wary of them repaying that debt back. So a case in point is South Africa. Africa. South Africa has. Because. They do not qualify for either the G20. Thank you, David.
- [71:35]
E
It.
- [72:04]
C
I think David. David's connection has gone off. So maybe. Tim.
- [72:13]
A
Hi. Yeah, thank you for the response, but we've lost David. I hope he comes back again. I noticed there's more than 30 questions. Some of them look very penetrating. And I was looking at it and trying to. To think how will I read them out? Some of them are quite complicated. Can we all see them? Can I just pounce on one of you who would like to kind of respond to one of the questions that are directed at you personally? Eric, There are actually several there that picked up on points that you made about debt cancellation. Is it right if I pounce on you and ask you to respond next to those ones? Because they seem very pertinent to this general discussion that at the moment about which countries qualify and which ones don't? I suppose I'd also like to know. I mean, maybe it's a more difficult, more provocative question, but for you working for Jubilee, what has your organization learned about debt cancellation over the years? At one point, Jubilee was pushing for quite widespread debt cancellation going back to the end of the last millennium. Things have now moved. It's much more kind of subtle approach. And I wonder whether you could just say a little bit about how things have shifted from your perspective, sort of lobbying around these really important issues. Is that fair for me to ask you to do that? Just nod. That would be great.
- [73:40]
D
It is, Tim, thank you very much. And I'll share a few of those points. And I think then it would be relevant for Shirley and Anna and Emma to also offer some further commentary. Again, I mean, the other panelists, the comments were really extraordinary. And I think just to take some of that debt question, who qualifies or not a little bit from the fine comments that Shirley offered. You know, it's interesting, you know, when we look at China, actually our numbers, we look at China's debt for Africa even being closer to 25%. And what does that mean? And kind of the timeline that China's on in terms of understanding its global responsibility and global power in terms of debt, there's no doubt that China really has probably been the most important country to step up to the debt standstill and doing so where China is facing perhaps more significant losses than other G20 countries. So it's incredibly heartening to see that level of leadership. At the same time, we also see there's a lot of pressure on China that all of China's components from China's development Bank, its ex im, its export credit agencies, all of these institutions also are part of the debt standstill. As someone who is very much away from China and just looking at the timeline, as someone who has looked at and worked on debt restructuring for a large part of my life, where you see other G20 countries and others have some understanding of some of the debt restructuring and debt responsibilities, China is really a much newer actor. So it's really just kind of grappling its mind around the powers of the Heavily indebted Poor Countries initiative. And I think, as Shirley put it so well in terms of how they look at a mercantile perspective, or perhaps more a better way to put it as a transactional perspective with Africa and other developing countries. The reality is that's where much of the G20 has been forever. We've seen them move out of that, But China's in a place where it's starting to. But it also makes China all the more important. When we're looking at debt relief and debt cancellation as what Tim was alluding to, because debt is much more complicated than it was in the 1990s or early 2000s. We are dealing, as Anna alluded to so well, much more complex levels of debt. So beyond this whole issue of public sector debt, of the G20 debt, we're dealing with a very complicated issue that Emma did such a fine job of illustrating in her graphics of private sector debt. And some of that private sector debt can only come to the table if it's compelled to. So there is a portion of private sector debt which can make choices, but there's a big part of emerging market debt, of commercial bank debt, that because of other legal responsibilities that I believe they can prove in court, they can only come to the table under a compelling situation. So To Tim's point, in terms of where we are with debt relief and debt cancellation, different from Jubilee 2000, which again, all of us really believed in and were a part of, we're dealing with a much more complicated situation of debt. Many more different types of debt, more countries that are involved, more sectors of debt. And that's where when we talk about right now, yes, we need some immediate debt relief, immediate debt standstill and to be able to trigger real debt cancellation. But what we're talking about, the nuance now and the new moment is what are the new structures that are needed in the financial system in order for us to be able to deal with debt for the long haul? Debt that's much more complicated. And that also gets to, I think what we all believe are real rights that investors, private creditors, governments do have rights and should have rights when they are investing responsibly and lending responsibly to developing countries. Just like developing countries should have rights when they are contracting debt responsibly. When it is publicly transparent, when it is being held accountable, there needs to be a process. And so part of what we look like when we look at when we approach a new HIPAA to or a new kind of process is what are the processes that work in both developed and developing countries around the world? And what we have almost unilaterally around the world is in our own domestic economies. What ensures responsible lending and borrowing, what ensures sustainability in our domestic economies is a legitimate, transparent and neutrally arbitrated bankruptcy process. So that type of real debt restructuring process that brings all actors, private sector, public sector, different type of creditors to the table is totally absent from the financial system. And you know, to quote my good friend Adam Smith, the father of modern economics, Adam Smith continually said, if we want a stable global financial system, we must have a global bankruptcy process. So right now, when we look forward at what we need to do, yes, we need debt relief, we need debt cancellation, we need good taxation systems, we need public budget transparency, we need market and anti corruption principles. All of these things are needed for the financial system. But if we want to prevent the next crisis moving forward, we need the kind of global bankruptcy process that Adam Smith reminded us we need for global financial stability.
- [79:39]
A
That's actually really interesting. Adam Smith talked about the hidden hand. David, are you still hidden?
- [79:47]
B
Yes, Tim, I'm back and I do apologize. I had a power cut, but I am back and I do have another question that's in front of me for the whole panel is from someone called Rehan, who is an A level geography student. And the question is there has been many debt relief schemes for Africa in the past. The most recent and biggest is probably the HIPEC scheme. Do you think this scheme was effective and what would you change about it? I guess anyone in the panel could take this. Emma, do you want to have a shot at it?
- [80:30]
F
Yes.
- [80:31]
C
Yes, David. So with regards to the effectiveness of the HIPIC and MDRI debt relief initiatives, yes, to a large extent they were effective. So after 1996 and 2005, we saw that debt levels across the continent reduced significantly. But I think the bigger question is, have these countries learned from their past experiences? And you know, like I said earlier, we're seeing debt levels picking up again at an increasing pace. And you know, we just hope we don't get to a point where we need such large scale debt relief initiatives again.
- [81:24]
B
Yeah, okay. Yes, Shelley, please go ahead. Go ahead, Shelley. To add to that, I just wanted.
- [81:31]
F
To echo what Eric said just now for the earlier question, if that's okay, because I thought that those are important points. One is that I want to re emphasize that China is actually indeed, in terms of financial relief, stepping up to become a global example. I think in this particular effort, one is that just now I specifically mentioned China unilaterally is canceling zero interest loans to Africa that are due before the end of the year. So we're talking about potentially billions that are canceled by China this year. And on top of that, China is committing a $2 billion to the WHO. And I think all of these things matter in the sense that no other country unilaterally has actually provided a global COVID 19 specific relief funding. And so China needs to do more. But this is, I think, quite a. We should recognize the efforts there. And the other thing I want to point out is why China's debt relief out of this whole equation is so crucial. It's because when you talk about all these multilateral Brenton woods institutions, you know, IMF or wto, these member countries, if they were to provide, say what Eric talked about and you know, SDR special drawing rights and so forth to Africa. So essentially China owns every $1 out of every $5 of debt in Africa. So these loans will be used to pay China essentially, you know, every $1 out of every $5, say for example, WTO or IMF loans to Africa will essentially be used to repay China's loans. And so that doesn't cut it because the other multilateral members, they are not going to be happy with this scenario. And so Africa is essentially Stuck here. And so I think by China stepping up in this, singularly China doing this Africa debt relief initially initiative, the more China does in this regard, the more it is easier for the multilateral institutions to continue to finance African countries in this COVID 19 efforts.
- [83:47]
B
Okay, thank you for that, Shelley. You know, certainly I think your point goes very well with also the point that Emma was making. And it underscores that the debt landscape has changed significantly since hipic. China's participation is clearly an important dimension of that. And as Eric has also said, As Eric emphasized, we do need to find sustainable solutions. So thank you for that. I think we have questions. We have time for just one last question. And this is from Carol, who is also a student. And her question is as follows. She says prominent economists such as Dr. Dambisa Moyo have opposed aid as postulated in her book Dead Aid. Is there anything in particular which differentiates the corona induced recession in nature which leads debt skeptics call for aid in this time? Perhaps. Who would like to take that? Perhaps we could ask. Anna, would you like to comment?
- [85:07]
E
I'm probably least equipped to answer the question about the economics of aid delivery. So I'll try to zoom out and make three broad points that I think I see through the stream of questions. There are basically three kinds of questions. One is about, and I think it's relevant to the one that you just asked, this relationship between meeting the enormous financing needs and the tension between that and increasing debt vulnerabilities. Right. These countries need funding, but getting the funding, particularly in debt form, ends up getting them into a deeper hole. And then we get into this really bizarre cycle of, you know, accumulating debt and then writing it off. Right. Which we see over and over again. I think it's very much a sign that we need to reconsider the form of financing that we're providing. So there were some questions about swaps, you know, debt for policy, debt for equity. I think Shirley mentioned already contingent instruments. There is no such thing as sovereign equity and with good reason. But I do think that when we're lending to vault countries, debt has got to be more flexible. So there's got to be, and I see absolutely nothing wrong with having debt instruments, particularly from the official sector, that embed standstills and relief tied to human rights, public health outcomes. If 1% of your population is dead, you really shouldn't be paying all the, you know, making all the interest payments that you promised in great times, whether it should be capitalized on what terms it should be rescheduled etc, etc. That's why folks are paid the big bucks to design this stuff. But I really think that it's time, looking at this history of.
- [87:29]
F
You know.
- [87:29]
E
Debt accumulation and write offs. And then the last point, I think goes to the series of questions on creditors. So, you know, are private creditors all that great? Why is IMF better than China? Why is China better than the imf? I think these kinds of questions, it's sort of a. They get us into a cycle of whataboutism that we should not get dragged into. The issue is how to get the good elements from all of this lending and use them for the benefit of the vulnerable populations and for development purposes rather than getting drawn into finger pointing. Now is an opportunity to change the regime. This is not about a few bad apples. This is about creating a more equitable regime for financing humanitarian, you know, basic human needs and development objectives. So we should do that in a creative way. And I'm really sorry I didn't address the Dembisa Moyo thesis. It's a big one and probably merits more time. Thank you.
- [88:51]
B
Thanks very much for that. I can assure you, I'm sure that the B.C. moyo question was not a trick question. This was a student really trying to see how aid, debt and all that can come together for sustainable solutions and development financing. Well, I think time is up. As always, there's not enough time to get into all the issues, but I think this has been a great exchange of views on.
- [89:38]
D
I think we lost David and Tim. You're on mute.
- [89:43]
A
Am I on mute? Unmute.
- [89:48]
D
You're off. Can you hear me? Yep, I'm off.
- [89:50]
A
Can you hear me? Oh, I'm just. I'm just completing. I'm just coming in to say thank you everybody. I thought the Moyo question actually was a very interesting question. We could have a whole nother session on aid and debt. I mean, one of the interesting things about the Moyo book, just while I've got the floor at the end, is of course she wrote that before the financial crisis. So would she have written quite the same book after the financial crisis before it? And also very interesting at the beginning of that book, she makes a distinction between what she calls aid in the money given to governments and emergency assistance. In fact, she specifically says she's not writing about emergency assistance. So are we in a different space here? So that suggests we need another, another webinar to discuss that. But I'd like to thank everybody here today for what's been a really fantastically interesting discussion. And I'd like to thank all the participants and for all the audience for listening and the really extraordinary, interesting questions, some of which I'm still thinking about and I don't know the answers to. So many thanks for everybody. Many thanks for everybody. Thanks for attending. Bye.
- [91:11]
D
Thanks, Tim, David, everyone. Lsc thank you.