LSE Public Lectures and Events Podcast

Episode Summary: Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation Is Failing When We Need It Most

Date: July 11, 2013
Speakers: Thomas Hale, David Held, Kevin Young
Host/Moderator: Stuart Corbridge

Main Theme

This episode explores the argument from the new book Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation Is Failing When We Need It Most by Thomas Hale, David Held, and Kevin Young. The discussion centers on why, despite increasing global interdependence and urgent shared challenges, international cooperation often stalls or breaks down—particularly at the institutional level. The episode analyzes the historical, structural, and systemic reasons for this persistent “gridlock,” discussing key global issues like climate change, financial regulation, and the shifting architecture of global power.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Origins and Purpose of the Book

• The book was inspired by the breakdown of the Copenhagen climate negotiations and similar failures in international agreements (e.g., the Doha Trade Round).
• The traditional approach (analyzing each negotiation failure as unique) misses broader patterns.
• Primary question motivating the book: "Why are international negotiations so unproductive, especially now when cooperation is needed most?" ([03:25], David Held)

Quote:

"Everyone was treating the difficulties at Copenhagen as sui generis...but you could ask the same question about many breakdowns in many international negotiations."
— David Held ([03:52])

2. The Nature of Global Interdependence & Its Management

• Globalization creates a world of complex interdependence (“overlapping communities of fate”).
• Postwar institutions (UN, Bretton Woods) facilitated interplay, spurred economic growth, and set up “self-reinforcing interdependence.”
• These institutions meet new demands for cooperation, but now seem chronically insufficient for today's challenges.

Quote:

"The post war institutional order...created a world of greater interdependence that needed greater management, that created more institutions, and you began to get a virtuous circle that marked basically the prosperous years of the post war period."
— David Held ([09:30])

3. What’s Different about ‘Gridlock’ Now?

• The notion of “gridlock” isn’t just descriptive—it’s a systemic explanation: Past successes in institutionalizing cooperation have produced new, more complex problems.
• Four principal drivers (the “second-order cooperation problems”):
  1. Power Shift: Multipolarity, more diverse parties at the table, more vetoes ([12:02], Thomas Hale; [16:13], Kevin Young)
  2. Institutional Inertia: Old institutions/decision rules (e.g., UN Security Council) no longer match the modern power landscape ([16:54])
  3. Harder Problems: Modern global issues penetrate deep into domestic societies (e.g., climate, intellectual property)
  4. Fragmentation: Proliferation of overlapping, uncoordinated institutions ("the left hand doesn't know what the right hand is doing")

Memorable Analogy:

"Think about your last trip in a car...the problem that they set out to solve and had successfully solved actually then overwhelmed the capacity of that very same technology...The same dynamic applies...the international order...profound deepening of interdependence that they can no longer manage."
— Thomas Hale ([12:37])

4. Case Studies in Gridlock

A) Climate Change – The “Super Wicked Problem”

• Formerly local pollution problems are now global, with new actors and feedbacks.
• Built-in conflict: Rich countries caused historic emissions; developing countries now drive future emissions even as they seek basic prosperity.
• Negotiations remain stuck in 20-year institutional ruts (Kyoto Protocol, annual global talks), despite the scale and urgency.

Quote:

"We've negotiated exactly one treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, which was meant to be a stepping stone to more ambitious measures. It hasn't been."
— Thomas Hale ([21:42])

B) The Financial Crisis and Regulatory Gridlock

• The crisis highlighted the limits of the global institutional patchwork; existing bodies barely managed to prevent catastrophe.
• Multiplication of regulatory actors (G20, Basel Committee, national & regional regimes) has resulted in uncoordinated patchworks.
• Example: Basel III banking rules disrupted global trade finance; solution(s) took months and showed disconnect among institutions.

Quote:

"What we're left with is a very, very loose patchwork, a kind of network of institutions where there's relatively unclear lines of accountability...the left hand doesn't often know what the right hand is doing."
— Kevin Young ([26:14])

5. Shifting Global Power: Multipolarity vs. Old Hegemon(s)

• Not a zero-sum decline of US/EU influence, but "rebalancing": emerging economic powers (especially China, India) can now veto agreements, even lacking alternative hegemonic blueprints ([30:17], David Held).
• Success: Massive poverty reduction, movement of economic "center of gravity" eastwards.
• Challenge: Developed and emerging powers have divergent interests, blocking consensus.

Quote:

"What has changed is that particularly in the last 25 years...the world economy has been rebalanced. The US contribution to global GDP has declined...with a huge rise in China's contribution..."
— David Held ([31:16])

• Doha trade negotiations exemplify new multipolarity: developing countries can now block (not just be co-opted or ignored).

6. Why No New Hegemon? Obstacles to Leadership

• China isn't interested/able to step up as global leader (preoccupied with domestic reforms, prosperity focus—[40:01], Thomas Hale).
• EU, once a “beacon of governance,” hobbled by its own crisis and internal distraction—often absent from the table ([42:00], David Held & Thomas Hale).
• Even transatlantic cooperation (US-EU) regularly runs aground on conflicting regulation and interests ([44:14], Kevin Young).

7. Pathways Beyond Gridlock: Is War Needed to Trigger Change?

• Historically, only catastrophic wars have sufficiently jolted institutional reordering (e.g., League of Nations after WWI, UN after WWII).
• Challenge: Can avoidance of climate/clash catastrophe provide enough incentive without crisis-level shock?
• Skepticism abounds: national/local priorities dominate, social movements struggle to achieve institutional impact unless “interlock” with governance ([46:00], David Held).

Quote:

"Unless [social movements] connect to institutional politics, they often disappear. Remember Occupy? ... Two years later, Occupy is hard to hear."
— David Held ([48:25])

8. Seeds of Hope: Non-State & Subnational Action

• In climate change, hopeful example comes from states, cities, corporations, and NGOs moving ahead even absent a global deal ([50:40], Thomas Hale).
• Bottom-up efforts need still to reach scale and ambition to compensate for gridlocked institutions.
• The concept of “cooperative decentralization” is gaining traction: perhaps not everything needs (or can have) global agreements ([52:07], Kevin Young).

9. Challenges, Audience Q&A, and Reflections

Key Points from Q&A

• Sustainable Development:
  Progress requires linking sustainability to dignity and inclusion—inclusive growth, not merely limitation ([58:04], Thomas Hale).
• Micro vs. Macro Gridlock:
  National gridlocks (e.g., US Congress) have roots and dynamics distinct from international gridlocks but share lessons on the failures of institutional adaptability.
• World Government:
  The authors do not advocate world government; emphasis is on practical, incremental innovations in global rules, embedding new values (e.g., sustainability) into institutions ([70:32], David Held).
• Responsibility & Identity:
  Tension between global problems and national democracy persists (“rabbit warren not castle” metaphor; [78:08], Thomas Hale).
• Will Crises Trigger Cooperation?
  Skepticism that “shock” from crises will suffice to break gridlock—initial urgency post-crisis quickly dissipates ([78:37], Kevin Young).
• Institutional Participation:
  More inclusive governance must create new channels for non-elite, non-state participation in institutional decision-making ([85:30], David Held).
• Reforming Capitalism:
  Progress in corporate social responsibility and social enterprise realities acknowledged, but state regulation remains vital for meaningful change ([86:59], Thomas Hale).
• Why Didn’t Economists Foresee Crisis?
  Entrenched institutional interests and fragmentation prevented effective warning or response ([88:01], Kevin Young).

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Gridlock as a product of success:

  "These are not cooperation problems that exist sort of in an abstract space that we can theorize...these are problems that have emerged historically as second-order cooperation problems."
  — Kevin Young ([16:13])

• The challenge of bottom-up efforts:

  "The key task before us is really to think about how to make this proliferation of bottom up stuff enough of a substitute or catalyst for the top down institutionalized reforms that are actually going to bring us the rest of the way there."
  — Thomas Hale ([51:31])

• On changing entrenched preferences ("salad dressing" metaphor):

  "How do you get people to try different salad dressings? By tempting them to do so, by giving them the opportunity...showing that the salad dressing they've always had is not the only salad dressing...only when their interests begin to be affected fundamentally...do they begin to say, 'I can't go on like this.'"
  — David Held ([80:11])

• On “the banality of gridlock politics”:

  "If you want to really know what gridlock means, read [the G8 communique]...it calls on the Syrian authorities to commit to destroying and expelling...all organizations and individuals affiliated to Al Qaeda...Assad would have been delighted. That is, as it were, the brutal banality of a gridlock politics that doesn't know how to move on."
  — David Held ([89:54])

Timestamps for Key Segments

• Introduction of Book and Main Speakers: 00:00 – 03:25
• What Is Gridlock? Why Now? 03:25 – 12:02
• The Dynamic of Self-Reinforcing Gridlock: 12:02 – 20:09
• Case Study: Climate Change: 20:09 – 23:17
• Case Study: Financial Crisis: 23:17 – 29:16
• Shifting Power and Multipolarity: 29:16 – 39:39
• Can a New Order Emerge? Leadership Obstacles: 39:48 – 44:42
• Prospects “Beyond Gridlock”: 45:31 – 53:06
• Audience Q&A (Selected Highlights):
  • Sustainability & Standards of Living: 55:51 – 61:17
  • World Government & Institutional Reform: 63:43 – 73:13
  • Identity, Democracy & Globalization: 76:12 – 78:37
  • Crisis as Opportunity?: 78:37 – 80:11
  • Education, Social Change, and Participation: 80:11 – 85:30
  • Corporate Responsibility & Capitalism: 86:59 – 88:01
  • Why Didn’t Economists See the Crisis?: 88:01 – 89:54

Tone & Language

The tone of the event is deeply analytical, rigorous, and occasionally wry. The speakers use historical analogies, vivid metaphors (e.g., car gridlock, “salad dressing”), and a mix of empirical observation and theoretical framing. Audience interaction is inquisitive, sometimes skeptical, but generally constructive.

Summary Takeaway

Gridlock is not just about failure—it’s about how the very institutions and systems that made cooperation possible have now, through their own success, created even more complex problems that they aren’t well-equipped to solve. Power is more diffuse, institutions are messier and less adaptable, and global challenges (like climate change and financial instability) have grown more acute and interconnected. The way forward may rely less on seeking a new “order” or world government and more on piecemeal, practical innovations—by states, sub-national actors, and civil society—coupled with institutional evolution that matches our new reality.

For more, refer to the book Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation Is Failing When We Need It Most, or listen to the full LSE podcast episode.