Podcast Summary:

LSE: Public Lectures and Events — In the Eye of the Storm: The History of Lebanon Revisited
Speaker: Dr. Fawaz Tarabulsi
Host: LSE Film and Audio Team & Middle East Centre
Date: February 18, 2013

Main Theme

This lecture by Dr. Fawaz Tarabulsi provides a critical reinterpretation of Lebanese history, challenging dominant myths and narratives. Drawing from his recent book, he investigates Lebanon’s construction as a “nation,” the shifting roles of sectarianism, social change, war, and memory. The discussion moves between Lebanon's modern history, the impacts of civil war, the entanglement of class and sect, and lessons relevant for broader Middle Eastern contexts—or even contemporary Syria.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. On Writing Lebanese History

• Personal Approach ([06:04])

  • Tarabulsi shares how his move from political science to history was shaped by experiencing the Lebanese wars. He calls himself a "newborn historian," motivated by a need to understand the dynamics of conflict from within.
  • Quote:
    "History is about time and what time does to people." — Dr. Fawaz Tarabulsi [07:10]

• Problems with “Continuity” and “Essence”

  • Myths of origin and attempts to build unifying historical narratives (such as Phoenician heritage) have failed to unite the Lebanese, instead producing stereotypes and divisions.
  • Quote:
    "History has taught me that there are no essences, there is no human essence, and there are no everlasting essences." [10:45]

• Breakdown of Traditional Historiography

  • Most histories of Lebanon focus on elites ("history from above"). Tarabulsi advocates integrating political economy, sociology, and the study of popular movements.
  • Emphasizes the importance of identifying true moments of change and causality, such as the collapse of feudal systems and the 1860 civil war.

2. Lebanon as a Modern Construct

• Formation of “Greater Lebanon” ([18:21])

  • The Lebanon created in 1920 was an artificial construct; its history is not rooted in a unified identity or past.
  • The real history of Lebanon cannot be disengaged from the broader region—Greater Syria or the Arab East.

• Sectarianism Defined by Contradictory Social Locations

  • Sects in Lebanon were historically structured with Christian commoners and Druze overlords, blending social and sectarian hierarchies.
  • This cross-cutting of class and sect is foundational to how sectarianism evolved.

• Role of Economic Elites

  • The so-called "merchant republic" was shaped in the 1940s, when several families took over the economy and transformed Lebanon into a service- and finance-oriented country.
  • The myth of 6,000 years of Phoenician “trading” heritage, he contends, is unsupported by evidence.

3. On the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) and War Memory

• Periodization and Causality ([32:30])

  • Major breaks: Syrian intervention in 1976, Israeli invasion in 1982, and the Ta'if Agreement in 1990.
  • Critiques the common myth that the war was solely due to “outside intervention”; emphasizes internal logic and root causes.
  • Quote:
    "A historian has to answer questions about why, what are the causes of the war. He has to answer questions, does this war have a logic?" [35:52]

• Civil War as Mutation from Social to Sectarian Conflict

  • Before the war, Lebanon saw thriving social movements (1964–74), but conflict transformed these into sectarian battles.
  • Debunks the simplistic idea that "registering" violence or focusing obsessively on war horrors will prevent future wars.

• Memory vs. History

  • Draws a sharp distinction; memory serves history, but does not equate to it or guarantee learning or peace.

4. Class, Sect, and State

• Are classes real in Lebanon? ([40:00])

  • Argues that classes do exist. Sectarianism is often used to mask or mediate deep economic inequalities.
  • Sectarian patronage networks often distribute privilege and state resources unevenly—not just among sects, but among economic classes within them.

• Religious Identity Post-War

  • The increasing use of religion as the main mobilizing force for sectarian solidarity is a post-war, and worrying, phenomenon.

5. Audience Q&A Highlights

a. Patterns of Sectarian Alliances ([45:53])

• Tarabulsi refutes the idea of a stable pattern where two sects always ally against a third. This is a projective myth from recent history, not a historical constant.
• Quote:
  "There is no way to understand Lebanon if you begin with the assumption that sects are the major actors themselves... That is a product... of the post-war phenomenon." [48:39]

b. Impact of Economic Change and Loss ([47:06])

• Lebanon’s role as a regional financial intermediary has declined, largely due to structural changes outside its own agency.

c. On the Syrian Regime and Lebanese History ([47:44])

• Fall of the Syrian regime would not fundamentally rewrite Lebanese history, but would enrich the documentation of post-Ta’if Lebanon.

d. Legal History & Personal Status Codes ([48:21])

• Lebanon’s sectarian personal status laws were entrenched under the French Mandate (notably the 1926 Constitution and 1936 decree).
• The system ties rights of citizenship to sectarian belonging, reinforcing sectarian divisions through legal means.

e. Mutation from Social Movements to Sectarian Conflict

• The exclusivity of social movements' demands being ignored or repressed set the stage for the quick transition into sectarian violence.

f. On Memory, Complexity, and the Study of History ([64:35])

• Emphasizes that the study of Lebanese history requires balancing sectarian, economic, patronage, and political themes, recognizing complexity and avoiding one-dimensional explanations.

g. Intra-Sectarian Violence and Minorities ([65:59])

• Internal fighting within the Christian and Shia communities (1982–89) was not simply due to minority status, but reflected struggles over political leadership within sects.

h. Textbooks and National Curriculum ([67:48])

• The national curriculum reflects sectarian compromise, but Tarabulsi advocates for plural histories and confronting painful truths, not a sanitized “one textbook” model.

i. Comparisons with Egypt and Syria ([68:59], [70:16])

• Egypt is not close to civil war, since there are not yet two armed camps. Syria, however, is undergoing a civil war with a growing sectarian tinge, but the fighting lines are not yet cleanly sectarian.
• Quote:
  "In Syria, there is a civil war... but the military fighting does not yet run entirely along sectarian lines." [75:35]

6. Colonial Influence, “International” Lebanon, & Reconstruction

• Colonial France’s Legacy ([80:40])
  • French rule institutionalized sectarian division, especially through state frameworks and constitutional articles.
• International Influences
  • While focused on the West and the Arab world, Lebanon felt wider international impacts, particularly through capital flows and regional trade patterns.
• Reconstruction and Urban Divides ([82:10])
  • The reconstruction after the civil war, notably in Beirut, deepened rather than bridged communal divisions. Efforts like Solidère and Hezbollah's projects responded to different logics, reinforcing spatial and social separateness.

7. Sect and Class in Post-War Lebanon

• Modern sectarian politics is now more deeply encoded in religious identity than before. The “religious state” aspect is consolidating, masking but not replacing class hierarchies.
• Quote (from Maxime Rodinson, via Tarabulsi):
  "Sects: the borders of sects are defined religiously but not necessarily... in politics. Now... religion has become the majority component in the mobilization and solidarity of the sect." [83:43]

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “[People] resemble their times more than they resemble their fathers.” — Dr. Fawaz Tarabulsi [06:28]
• “Myths of origin… in the Lebanese case, was not a very successful one. But it created a number of stereotypes for looking at Lebanese history which needed to be debunked.” [12:40]
• “If you look historically at sects, they are not essences… They are reconstructed and constructed on the basis of particular societal and political events.” [41:18]
• “Memory serves history, but memory does not necessarily produce history.” [36:49]
• "You don't get rid of [sectarianism] the Lebanese way... You create institutions, processes, to move to a society based on equality." (referencing lessons for Syria) [90:10]
• "Reconstruction... increased the divisions, the social divisions, rather than create communal spaces." [85:20]

Important Timestamps & Segments

• Introduction & Speaker Bio — 00:00–06:04
• Opening Reflections on History & Methodology — 06:04–18:21
• Challenges of Writing Lebanon’s History, Myths, and Periodization — 10:00–32:00
• The Civil War: Causes, Periodization, and Myths — 32:00–41:00
• Class, Sect, and Social Inequalities — 41:00–44:58
• Audience Q&A Session — 44:58–97:59
  • Sectarian alliances, personal status codes, intra-sect violence, urban divides, history curricula, regional comparisons, reconstruction, sect and class, and colonial legacy.

Conclusion

Dr. Fawaz Tarabulsi’s lecture offers a sharp, critical engagement with Lebanon’s historical narratives, exposing the artificiality of both unifying national myths and monolithic sectarian divisions. He situates Lebanon in a regional and economic context, highlights the shifting dynamics of social movements and sectarianism, and cautions against simplified readings—whether regarding the history of war or the lessons for today’s Middle East. His call is for deeper, more nuanced historical inquiry, honest collective memory, and policies that approach equality over communal or sectarian patronage.