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LSE: Public lectures and events
Indonesia in ASEAN: reconciliation, active engagement and strategic reassessment
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So, very good evening. May I extend a very warm welcome to all of you who are here tonight. It's great to see you. My name is Jurgen Harke. I'm a faculty member of the International Relations Department. I'm also the director of the Saucery Hawk Southeast Asia center, which is part of the Institute of Global affairs here at lse. And it's the Saucery Hawk Southeast Asia center that is organizing tonight's event. As you will be aware, the association of Southeast Asian nations, or ASEAN, has turned 50. When my colleagues at SEAG and I discussed last year how we should celebrate this special anniversary, we decided to organize a small lecture series this Michaelmas term. And this evening we will have the first of three lectures on ASEAN. The other two, I should just say, will take place on November 6 and November 20. And then we will be looking at ASEAN as an actor on international fora, as well as at ASEAN's institutional logics and effects. Please join us for those events as well. But tonight our attention will turn to ASEAN and the role that Indonesia has played within it. Now, historically, the establishment of ASEAN is of course more often than not viewed as having been prompted in part by attempts to move beyond the challenging relations that existed between Jakarta and some other Southeast Asian nations at the time of so called confrontation. And in the years that followed, and indeed the decades that followed the late 1960s, Indonesia was often seen as ASEAN's Primus Inter Paris, or first among equals, given its political and increasing economic weight as well as the size of its population, which obviously far out paces that of other ASEAN states. It is important to note though, that at no point did Indonesia endeavor to lead ASEAN in ways which other ASEAN members would have found UN uncomfortable. And I think that makes for an interesting comparison of ASEAN to other regional organizations such as sac. In more recent years, there have of course also been questions about whether ASEAN remains for Jakarta as important as it once was. And I think it's fair to say that such questions may not have been quite resolved as yet. At least not from the perspective of some of the analysts who are looking at Indonesian foreign and security policy now to address the issue of Indonesia or in asean, I could not think of SEAG being able to invite a better positioned speaker than the one that we have here with us tonight. Ladies and gentlemen, I'm absolutely delighted to be able to welcome to LSE His Excellency Dr. Rizal Sukma, Indonesia's Ambassador to the United kingdom and Ireland. Dr. Sukma is a graduate of the International Relations Department here at lse. He was for many years the Executive Director of the center for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta. He also acted as advisor to Joko Widodo, Indonesia's current president. And Dr. Sukhma has been Indonesia's ambassador to in London since February 2016. Now, Dr. Sukman will speak for about 40 minutes. The title of the talk is on there. Indonesia and ASEAN Reconciliation, Active Engagement and Strategic Reassessment. After the talk, we will go straight into the Q and A. And since we don't want to lose any more time, may I ask you to make sure your phones are now on silent. You may of course continue to tweet. The hashtag is lsean. And it's my great pleasure now to invite His Excellency Dr. Sukhma to deliver his remarks.
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Thank you, Dr. Yurgan Haka. Good evening to all of you. And of course, you know, I would like to thank you for spending the evening listening to the 50 years of ASEAN's journey and especially Indonesia's place in it and Indonesia's role. But before I go into the substance of the talk, I really would like.
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To.
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Actually express my probably envy because from 92 to 97, when I did my master's here and also my PhD and also here, I don't think that we have this kind of nice building actually for the lecture and a lot of changes actually around and in fact I still remember it's just around the corner that in Hilton street that was IR departments before, then they moved to the Columbia House now. So it's a much nicer place. So you know, with, with these all facilities and I'm sure that the current IR student here at lesi, almost all of them, you know, can get the best mark or graduate with merits before, you know, I don't think it's, you know, many of us actually get that distinctions when we graduated. Well, anyway, I've been here since late February 2016 and I thought that I would focus more on Indonesia UK relations. I forgot that actually Dr. Hake is at the LIC, you know, who keep actually talking about ASEAN. So in fact I can't actually leave ASEAN behind. And in fact, as I begin to look at ASEAN from a distance, I think I have, you know, change some of my earlier thought, you know, about, you know, this regional grouping of Southeast Asian countries. I mean, it's very clear it is impossible, you know, to ask, you know, a cow to become a horse. So in fact, you know, we often criticize asean, you know, for not being able, you know, to behave like a horse, while in fact ASEAN is a cow. So that's often actually the problem with many of us when we are outside of the policy making establishment, when we are actually looking at it from the outside. Of course it's easy to criticize. I think Jurgen knows very well. In fact, probably he's quite puzzled why I became one of the fierce critics of ASEAN in the past. But as an ambassador, Jurgen, it's been difficult for me to be as critical as I was before, especially when I have some of my staff in the.
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Room.
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They might write a report and report to the Foreign Minister. I have four points before I begin talking about how the Indonesia's role in ASEAN actually evolved from well, being, undertaking the reconciliations with the neighboring countries and then, you know, active engagement. Then, you know, probably by 2012, 2013, you know, we begin, we began to undertake the strategic reassessment about, you know, Indonesia's place and also the place of ASEAN in Indonesia's foreign policy. The first point that I think that you should really, you know, keep in mind that the key supporters and participants to the establishment of ASEAN came from a very small group of people who work in a very small office in Tanahabang. This is an area, a street in Jakarta, and some of them later became the founders of csis, the center for Strategic and International Studies, a leading think tank which basically ranked among the top five think tanks in Asia Pacific consistently. This is the place where I spend my like 27 years of careers as an academic, as a policy analyst. So therefore to suggest that what I'm going to say, or me for that matter, is going to be anti aseanism, I think is absurd. So basically I came from that institute that took part in the establishment of the asean. And second, as a researcher, I'm trained really to say whatever I think. Yet now I find myself in a position to think before I'm going to say anything. So that's quite a contrast between researcher and also an ambassador or diplomat. So therefore I would like to apologize if at certain points during this talk or during this lecture, I might sound vague, lack of clarity or even confusing. So this is not, you know, this is not without intention. So because, you know, as a diplomat, you know, I find it useful to be vague, unclear and confusing. So I hope my, you know, friends from the Foreign Ministry agree with that, you know, but you know, I reject the claim that, you know, diplomat is an honest man in one country, sent abroad to life. So I don't think that definition is a good one, even though sometimes we Just don't tell the whole truth, we don't tell the whole story. So therefore, as I'm now on leave as an academic, so what I'm going to share with you is not purely an academic analysis of ASEAN, as probably Dr. Haka would have expect, but probably we can have a lot of discussion from how IC Indonesia's place in asean and also ASEAN place in Indonesia's foreign policy. And third point, that the place of ASEAN in Indonesia's foreign policy and indeed in any of its member states foreign policy, so it's not set in stone, so it has changed, it is changing and will continue to change as circumstances dictated. So yet within that constant change, one will always find continuity. So that continuity is in part found within the collective commitment. So I would call it even obsession of Indonesian foreign policy elite to asean. So this is a good thing. Actually being obsessed with ASEAN is a good thing. It is also because of a dead deep commitment that Indonesia's role in ASEAN has evolved from initially being driven by domestic imperative for regional reconciliation to an active engagement for regional peace and stability. So yet as our national interests change and our strategic environment is also undergoing fundamental changes, so Indonesia feels obliged to undertake strategic reassessment on the place of ASEAN in its foreign policy. And finally, as this lecture is part of the commemoration of the ASEAN's 50th anniversary, so with a special reference to Indonesia's role in it. So please bear with me because I will start this lecture with a brief historical reflections on how Indonesia became a founding member of ASEAN and within what historical context and for what purposes. And naturally this first part of the talk or lecture might be a bit boring to you. In fact, it's actually quite boring for me too. When I was writing this part of the historical assessment of asean, I struggled, actually, you can ask. Hannah is my wife, but you know, she actually saw us graduate, not lse. You know, I fell asleep a couple of times just writing about the background on asean. It's quite boring, so please bear with me. There have been no shortages of academic literature and analysis on Indonesia's role in the establishment of asean. You can just, you know, go and buy Jurgen Hacker's book and then look at the list of literature. Then all the books on ASEAN actually is listed there if you want to know how ASEAN came about and so on. And of course why Indonesia became a founding member of ASEAN has been a product of many factors. But in this lecture I would like to focus only one particular aspect of those many factors that led to the establishment of asean. So ASEAN as a byproduct of domestic political changes in Indonesia. So indeed from the start the formations of ASEAN registers a very strong link with Indonesia's domestic politics. It shows how Indonesia's domestic politics served as a key factor that made it possible for the associations to come to life. So the evolution of ASEAN itself over the last 50 years also suggest that changes in the grouping were shaped by changes in domestic politics of member states. In other words, domestic determinants were often at work at every twists and turns of ASEAN journey, from its conceptions in mid-1960s to its expansions in 1990s and to its procrastinations of today. This is actually very difficult word to, you know, to say the procrastinations. So ASEAN in my view in that state, you know, you always try quite hesitating to move forward, you know, get, you know, on the standstill mode sometime. So you know, we are, you know, in that, you know, in that process. So but you know, if you want to assess or evaluate or judge, you know, the merits of asean, I think you need to look at what Southeast Asia looked like in the pre ASEAN years. So ASEAN obviously was not the first attempt at regional cooperations. In 1955 the US tried to form a Southeast Asia Treaty Organization or Seattle, a collective defence system with the object of countering the spread of communism in the regions. In 1961, Thailand, the Philippines and the federations of Malaysia formed the Associations of southeast Asia. In July 1963 Manila tried to form Mafilindo consisted of federations of Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia. So all these initiatives actually failed with mafilindo lasted only for one month, so it was established and then they tried to have a summit a month later and then basically failed. So why did these earlier experiments at regionalism fail? So one of the reason was the largest country in the region. Indonesia was not an eager participant to the process. Indonesia was opposed to seato, seeing it as a tool of imperialist plot. So the prospect of success for ASA and the Mafilindo was also marred by conflict, distrust and suspicions among the participants. The Philippines and the federations of Malaya were fighting over the ownership of Sabah and Sarawak. Indonesia under President Sukarno was opposed to the creations of Malaysia, manifested in its confrontations policy. So in short, regional politics in Southeast Asia in mid-1960s was a mess, so making it impossible for regional state to engage in regional cooperations and regionalism. But by late 1965 Indonesia politics changed dramatically and consequently it began to change regional politics as well. So after the FALL of President Sukarno In Indonesia, our foreign policy of confrontations was replaced with a foreign policy of moderations and pragmatism. The new government under President Suharto prioritize internal stability and economic development at home. So this new priority required a stable and friendly external environment. So Indonesia ended the policy of confrontation, rejoined the United Nations. In fact, Indonesia was and still is the only country that quit the UN in 1963. I think so no other countries actually quit the UN. So Indonesia was the only one in the world. I don't know what they were thinking at the time, but the diplomats at the Foreign Ministry was quite, I think, wise at the time. They actually did not, I think they didn't follow up in the slickest sense. So it was easy for Indonesia later on to rejoin the membership in the un. We also restored our ties with the west and actively mandated our relations with the neighboring state. And all these steps paved the way for the establishment of ASEAN in August 1967. So for Indonesia, ASEAN was meant to function as a vehicle through which it could seek reconciliations with neighboring countries, especially Malaysia and Singapore. And then soon after the establishment of asean, the new Indonesias government went to work to address its own domestic problems and agenda. We focused on the economic development, but as its economic condition improved, Indonesia became more comfortable with asean. But I think some of you might know that ASEAN didn't have any summit until 1976. So at that time it's basically the basic premise that Indonesia's foreign policy toward ASEAN was let's have this association and then we all could actually focus on our own domestic problem. There are a number of characteristics of ASEAN that will explain why Indonesia was very comfortable with this regional grouping. The first factor, of course, there was no sensitive issues on its agenda of cooperation. In fact, almost there was no agenda for cooperation anyway in 1968. 69 and then of course the second factor, the sanctity of the principle of non interference in domestic affairs. Because during the 50s and also early 60s, the problem is really because we intervene in each other and then it would make it difficult for member states to focus on internal development. And the third factor, because ASEAN adopted this so called quiet diplomacy as an instrument of conflict resolutions. And then we love ASEAN because it prefers informality in managing conflict and dispute settlement and also because it enabled leaders in the membership among the members to forge a closer personal ties among leaders. And of course ASEAN move at a pace comfortable to all. So there was no pressure at all. Actually at the early years being in asean, you don't feel it basically that you are in ASEAN because of that agreement at the beginning. So this sort of ASEAN served Indonesia's interests very well. And there were eight Indonesia's strategic interests at the time. Number one, to reintegrate Indonesia into the international society, especially within Southeast Asia. I remember we actually undertook that confrontation policy against Malaysia, Singapore and so on in order to create an external environment by promoting regional reconciliations and also managing intramural disputes. Our second interest at the time is to restore Indonesia's credibility as a responsible member of the international community. ASEAN helped a lot in that regard. And third, to reduce the suspicions of Indonesia's intention in the regions especially this is true for Malaysia and Singapore. Of course they were very suspicious of Indonesia after we launched the policy of confrontations against them. The number five to serve asean. ASEAN is used to serve as a collective bargaining tool via extra regional powers. One case that I can cite especially we had a problem with Japan in mid-1970s because Japan suddenly wanted to develop the synthetic rubber at the time that basically undermined the production of rubber in Indonesia, Malaysia and so on. And ASEAN managed to come up with the common position and put pressure on Japan at the time. So it was very good collective bargaining tool vi the extra regional powers for Indonesia. Six to serve as collective regional diplomatic buffer against external pressures and criticism. And in fact it was good because whenever member states had human rights problems, for example, when we got criticized by the west and then ASEAN usually came to our defense. Especially true after we invaded Istimo in 1975 and then at the UN, ASEAN helped a lot in order to explain to the wider international community about the domestic developments of many member states. This is, you know, I think the so called ASEAN solidarity that became an important part of the ASEAN cooperation. Number seven, the functions of ASEAN for Indonesia's domestic interest is to ensure stable interstate relation in Southeast Asia. And this is, I think it's quite important because we look at the history it managed the Vietnam problem, especially after 1976 and also after Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. It contained communism. And also ASEAN helped and provide a platform through which Indonesia could mediate some of the member states problems. The latest one is of course between Cambodia and Thailand in I think 2012 or 2013. And number eight, this is the thing where things become interesting. ASEAN function as a vehicle to realize Indonesia's visions of regional order. So we tried to reduce the region's reliance on external powers for regional security by advocating regional resilience doctrine and also the Treaty of Amity and Cooperations. And after The Cold War, I think we became even more active especially in our engagement with the efforts to preserve ASEAN centrality and also Southeast Asia strategic autonomy. There were a number of initiatives that we took at the time. So Indonesia actively engaged in regional attempt to shape the post Cold War regional architecture in the regions by ensuring ASEAN centrality while encouraging greater participations by other major powers and also regional powers in the regional processes. And this led to the establishment of the ASEAN regional forum in 1994. Indonesia also backed the efforts to expand ASEAN external relations by deepening the grouping's engagement with all major powers, especially the us, China, Japan and India, and also regional middle powers such as Australia and South Korea. And this led to the establishment of the east asia summit in 2005. As the only member of the G20 from Southeast Asia, we also bridged ASEAN's link with the G20. So we took the lead also in consolidating ASEAN's political cooperations, culminating in the adoptions of the ASEAN political and security community. Then I'm happy to note Ambassador Gary Yusuf, you know, he was the director for the political and security corporations of ASEAN at the time. So we worked very closely together in order to promote this idea of transforming ASEAN into a security community at the time. But actually PAGERI changed it into ASEAN Political and security community in 2003. Then also we took a lot of step to ensure that ASEAN laid the stronger foundation in order to be a global actor after the adoptions of what we call as the Bali Concord 3 in 2013. So despite such activism, however, elements of ambiguity continue to be detected in Indonesia's attitude toward asean. That ambiguity began to resurface during the process of drafting the asean charter in 2007 and 20. At that time, Indonesia argued that ASEAN needed some institutional changes in order to stay relevant and effective. The ASEAN Charter was seen as an opportunity to push ASEAN toward the direction. Yet unfortunately, our regional partners were not convinced. So many Indonesia's proposals were rejected. For one, there was a great resistance to the inclusions of democracy and human rights into the ASEAN Charter. A proposal that ASEAN should have a mechanism to reinforce compliance and regime sanctions was also turned down. Probably you still remember those difficult years. But again, 2004, I think 2007 and 2008, the idea for a new system of financial contributions was thrown out of the window. Proposals for an ASEAN peacekeeping force was rejected. So the ASEAN Charter, when it was approved in 2007, became a source of disappointment to Indonesia. For those who are not familiar with ASEAN on the financial contributions, for example, the Rules is actually every member state should pay an equal amount of contributions. And it's usually we look at which member states that pay the least. So if country A say, well this year I can only pay 1 million, everybody will pay 1 million. So if next year one country say, well, probably this year I'm going to pay like 500,000 per year and then the Sec Gen, the Secretary General will be in trouble because his salary will be cut by half. So that's the method. And in 2007 we proposed, we need to change that. So each member state should take, you know, I mean, should pay differently. So we come up with a formula that almost like the UN system. Yeah. So, you know, take into account the size of the country, number of populations, the GDP and so on. And of course Indonesia and Singapore ranked number one. So we have to pay more. And then again, you know, actually that idea was at the time still rejected, you know, because some countries still worried that if, you know, some countries pay more and some countries pay less, and then those who pay more will think that they are more entitled to run ASEAN or they will think that they are more privileged. But to be frank with you, not as ambassador, basically if Indonesia wants to be dominated, we can, we don't need this to pay more in order to try to dominate the regions. We are half of the region anyway. But we didn't do that because we learn also, you know, in many other regional groupings actually they fail to take off because, you know, one or two countries try to exercise a degree of dominance over others. And in fact there have been a lot of academic analysis about Indonesia's role in asean, you know, because ASEAN works because the largest number willingly, you know, to exercise these restraints, you know, not to try to dominate and then try, you know, to come up with this idea of dialogue, consensus, you know, as the only mechanism through which ASEAN member states reach the agreement and decision. So I think that's the beauty of ASEAN and that we did that actually in a very conscious way because we don't want ASEAN to fail because we do see, as I mentioned earlier, that ASEAN does actually a lot of good for Indonesia. So despite of this disappointment, so Indonesia went along with the wishes of the majority. We realized that ASEAN is also about process, not necessarily about progress. So change has to come, has to be evolutionary. So that I think something that we learned during the process of this drafting of the ASEAN Charter. But I personally realized there was a need to start a new round of debate on how Indonesia should see its role in asean. So a Strategic reassessment of the utility and functions of ASEAN for Indonesia was needed. So this is what the debate on post ASEAN foreign policy all about since my article on the subject appeared in Jakarta post in 2009. So it really created a lot of stir and debate, not only in Indonesia at the time, also I think across southeast asia when 2009. Actually I really didn't mean to create this debate at the time because the editor of the Jakarta Post called me and then asked me to write something about asean. So I just wrote it and then actually created a lot of reaction at the time when basically I argued that because of all these changes, Indonesia probably need to start thinking about opposed ASEAN foreign policy. There are a lot of people, including the Foreign Ministry at the time thought that I was advocating Indonesian exit of asean. So post ASEAN they understood it as like leave or quit ASEAN then. But also it's good misunderstanding at the time because I had to write two or three more articles to explain it and get published on this subject alone at the time time. So. But you know, let me take this opportunity to expand on that particular, you know, issue again and revisit the whole questions of the post ASEAN foreign policy and the utility of ASEAN for Indonesia. I have mentioned that ASEAN is needed to reintegrate Indonesia into the international society, especially within the Southeast Asia. So this is kind of reassessment because that was ASEAN function before. So let's see whether they still play similar functions for Indonesia's international interest. So I think we have achieved that. We are part of the international society. We managed to reintegrate ourselves back into the international society. So for that particular interest, ASEAN is no longer useful because it's become part of the international society. ASEAN also helped Indonesia to restore our international credibility. This has also been achieved. In fact, you know, some, even Indonesia begin to criticize the government, saying that Indonesia is too nice, you know, as a member of international community. So that's why nobody, you know, pay attention to Indonesia. Because we never create, you know, problem for others, you know, so we always, we always agree with everybody, we always try to seek consensus, you know, and so on. So because, you know, we are too nice. And then sometimes people forget that Indonesia is actually exist over there in Southeast Asia. So, you know, restoring our international credibility is actually has been achieved. And asean, I don't think that continue to serve that unless, you know, say like 20 years from now, 25 years from now, some guy become president and then, you know, undertake crazy foreign policy again. Then you know, probably we need ASEAN again. To come back to the international community later. Number four, to reduce the suspicions of Indonesia's intention in the regions. So this is mostly, you know, accomplished as well, but I think still very relevant because you know, I don't think that these suspicions, not only, you know, other countries of Indonesia, but you know, I think, you know, among the ASEAN countries is still there. So ASEAN is a vehicle to reduce suspicions among member states, especially toward the largest one is still, I think quite, you know, relevant. You know, I'm sure that Malaysia, Singapore and others are still quite suspicious. We also suspicious of some other members as well. So asean, you know, this function, number three is actually still very relevant for Indonesia. ASEAN was useful as it enabled Indonesia to focus on internal consolidation and also economic development. So this is again, I think still relevant but not sufficient because if you look at the data, our main trading partners is actually not asean. It's all outside asean. South Korea, Japan, China, you name it. So in that context ASEAN is important, is necessary but not sufficient. So that's why I think in the economic sector. So we need to do that thinking and also to not only to strengthen the intra ASEAN trade and also Indonesia trade with all the other ASEAN member states, but also probably look into other platform as well. The fifth functions to serve as collective bargaining tool viv extra regional powers. So I would say that this function now is less relevant because of the diverse strategic interest among the ASEAN member states, differences in threat perceptions, especially because of the growing rivalry between China and the US and in fact ASEAN could get entangled in the strategic rivalry among the great powers. So in that context, I'm not really sure that ASEAN can provide this can function as the bargaining tool for all ASEAN member states VIP the extra regional powers when we are not sure how to deal with those extra regional powers. Number six, to serve as a collective regional diplomatic buffer against external pressure and criticism. So all the ASEAN solidarity. Again, this function is now less relevant because if you look at Indonesia or even other ASEAN member states, it would be very difficult these days and I think to rally this ASEAN collective support when a member get criticized because of the violation of human rights, because of the domestic problems that we have. So ASEAN no longer can no longer function like it was before in order to provide this collective defense when the member states get criticized for terrible things that happen in each domestic domain. So in that context the function of ASEAN as the diplomatic buffer is less relevant today. So if member states get criticized by international community, the sad reality is that you are on your own man. So you can't Help you. If you start killing your own people, then good luck dealing with the international community. I don't think that ASEAN would really and then provide support for that kind of problem. The function number seven, to ensure stable interstate relation. This is still very relevant today. And in fact this is one of the most crucial elements of the ASEAN corporation. It's actually to prevent war among member states and also to ensure a stable interstate relation. ASEAN was about this and still is and I think will continue to to be about preventing interstate conflicts and war. Function number five, as a vehicle to realize Indonesia's vision of regional order and especially to reduce Indonesia's reliance on external powers for regional security. That is also, I think, quite problematic now because ASEAN as a whole really face a challenge in this area and especially we're still struggling to find the best way to preserve the Southeast Asia strategic autonomy, especially in light of the growing rivalry among the major powers. So it is very clear that the eight functions of ASEAN that I mentioned before, during the 60s, 70s and also up to 90s, have indeed undergone some changes. And second, there have been also changes in Indonesia's foreign policy priorities. Especially between 1999-2014, new agenda came up in Indonesia's foreign policy. For example, under President Yudhoyono, Indonesia tried to project new assets in foreign policy as the third largest democracy and also as the largest moderate Muslim country. So within that attempt to create that new international identity. I don't think that ASEAN matters much because this is the perception of Indonesia that we try to create beyond asean. So it's not very relevant to talk about how ASEAN can help Indonesia to force that international identity at the time, but the new interest of preserving territorial integrity, ASEAN is still very, I think, crucial and very relevance for that particular interest. And then the third priority in our foreign policy during that period, ASEAN ability to respond to new challenges. That's also, I think, problematic because ASEAN is quite constrained in dealing with the great powers. The fourth priority of Yudoyono's government economic corporations to assist domestic recovery, especially, you know, after the crisis in 2008, while we were still recovering from the crisis in 1998. ASEAN is important, but we also need to look beyond ASEAN at the time. And third, there were also this changing strategy environment within which Indonesia finds itself. So East Asia is becoming a new center of gravity of the world with all strategic implications that might entail. So first, China's greater role and influence is inevitable. Second, the perception of American decline persists and the US would soon become a superpower emeritus. So it's not only professor become emeritus, I think that superpower can also become emeritus. So third, there is a possibility of the return of great power politics to the regions. And fourth, while economic interdependence is growing, the region's dependence on China's economic power is also growing. And then five, the future shape of regional order due to the competing strategic visions among the great powers becomes uncertain. So it was at the intersection of these three changes, the changes in earlier functions of ASEAN for Indonesia, changes in foreign policy priorities and also changes in the strategy environment that drive Indonesia to undertake the strategic reassessment of asean. So the key question here is not whether we should abandon ASEAN or exit asean. So we instead began to think about how to best pursue our national interest within the context of larger foreign policy. So in other words, Indonesia needs to find a new balance in its approach toward the outside world. One in which ASEAN is still very important, but at the same time also seek to utilize the platform. So this approach is clearly manifested in Indonesia's foreign policy under President Joko Widodo. So Indonesia is now trying to balance past preference for noms buildings with a more action oriented, more realistic and interest driven initiative in foreign policy. So don't get me wrong, norms are important. I think if I say norms are not important, then Jurgen will get very upset because his book is also about norm strategic culture. So because without norms, interstate relation would be dictated by this hierarchy of power. And without norms, the strong would do what they can while the weak suffer what they must. So any IR student here or all. So you know who said that, right? So I got, when I was doing my master's, that's the first book that I had to read here at the lse. And then I couldn't understand the English of that book, you know, the Thucydides Polyponisian War. So where this Malian dialogue, I think until today, at least in my view, still quite relevant, that the strong will always do what they can and then the weak suffer what they must. That's the world where norms have no place. But norms alone are not sufficient. We need to inject a sense of realism into foreign policy and diplomacy. So we need to define our foreign policy in terms of tangible material gains such as trade, investment and tourism, and also in terms of the intangible outcomes such as security and the preservation of sovereignty. So we are trying to find a correct balance between multilateralism and bilateralism in our engagement with the outside world, because for too long we thought that multilateralism was the best course of action available to smaller and middle powers in a world dominated by great powers. For too long. Also we thought that our national interest would be better served if we spend more of time and our limited resources on issues debated in multilateral forum such as the United nations, for example. Until now I can't understand why we have a debate on the disarmament while we know that disarmament will never take place, the nuclear disarmament. But nevertheless, it's important to have that debate for too long or so we thought that all our national interests would be achieved if we sit longer hours in ASEAN meetings, workshops, conferences and dialogues. ASEAN is very good in organizing meetings, workshops, conferences and dialogues. So I hope they will reduce number of workshop or conferences they organize. Otherwise think tanks like CSIS or even Asia Host will run out of I think works because it's been taken up by asean. And we forget within those multilateral frameworks, what matters the most is how to develop our bilateral ties with key partners around the world. We forget multilateralism is not a substitute to bilateralism. Balancing the two is what we are trying to do. So we are conducting a foreign policy that would help us achieve our domestic priorities as well. And some analysts call this a domestic turn in Indonesia's foreign policy. So in fact it should be understood that as a balance expression between national interests on the one hand and international obligations on the other. So President Jokowi was elected with a very clear mandate to fix Indonesia's domestic problems, not ASEAN problem. So it is natural for him to devote more of his time and energy to manage domestic priorities, especially in economy. He also understands that a country's international stature would not matter much unless it is derived from strong domestic base, especially the economy. So revitalization of domestic foundations of foreign policy has become a key priority for Jokowi presidency. And indeed, President Jokowi is a strong believer in the dictum that foreign policy begins at home. So this characteristic of our foreign policy has been misunderstood. Indonesia is seen as becoming inward looking, not interested in building relationship with the outside world unless it brings concrete material benefits to Indonesia. Indonesia is accused of becoming self centered, shellfish and even more suspicious of the outside world. So it is in this context that we are accused of abandoning ASEAN and not interested in playing an active role in East Asia. When we do, our engagement is seen as a superficial and routine and lacks meaningful initiative. The absence of Indonesia's leadership in managing the South China Sea dispute, for example, is often cited as evidence of this. But no one in Indonesia actually advocates that the country should Exit asean. So Indonesia has been and will continue to be a strong proponent of asean. And in fact, for five decades now, Indonesia has always been loyal and committed to asean. Some are even still obsessed with ASEAN somewhere in Jalan Pujambour in Jakarta. And let me assure you that Indonesia will continue to be loyal and committed to ASEAN for the next five decades and more. So in conclusion, let me reiterate two points which basically try to summarize how I think ASEAN after 50 years and then what the next 50 years should look like. First, ASEAN is one of not the only many platforms through which we must seek to defend and fulfill our national interests abroad. So despite the persistent proclamations by some in Indonesia, Foreign Ministry and other circles, ASEAN now is a cornerstone of Indonesia's foreign policy, not the cornerstone of Indonesia's foreign policy. Anyone who argues otherwise is to fool oneself. So because, you know, I think what we have to do now, we just, you know, we work through ASEAN whenever, you know, we, we need, because there are a lot of our interests that can be achieved, you know, through cooperation with ASEAN and then try to push for a certain agenda whenever we can and go beyond it whenever, you know, our interest cannot be fulfilled through our engagement with asean. So this is also, I think, you know, the path that many other ASEAN countries, you know, to take. Because I don't think that one country can actually, you know, get all these interests from one, you know, regional or even multilateral platform. So nothing unique or nothing scary, you know, from this post ASEAN foreign policy. So what I'm trying to do is just, you know, like, you know, ASEAN is one of the mechanism, you know, through which that we should and could fulfill our national interests. But there are also others that we need to pay attention to. And then, in fact, now under President Jokowi, I think one aspect that we often forget, the importance of the bilateral cooperations both within ASEAN and with countries, non ASEAN countries, is being, I think, rectified that new approach. So we begin to look at some of the key bilateral relations for Indonesia and then work harder in order to deepen and also expand that particular bilateral relations. But it doesn't mean that we abandon multilateralism altogether. And second, ASEAN should revitalize, reform and adjust itself for the better. It should constantly ground itself into the changing strategic reality in the regions and beyond, find solutions to the corresponding strategic predicaments, and also preserve Southeast Asia's strategic autonomy. Failure to do so would mean the return of the power politics to the regions and that would mean an end to the ASEAN current role as the manager of regional order. But if you look at ASEAN experience in the different historical juncture, usually we would find a way in how to deal with the changing strategic environment. So we did that during the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, ASEAN got together and then come up with new ideas on how we can strengthen our cooperations. And then secondly, after the Cold War, we also managed to find a way how to deal with that by bringing in all the major players into the regions. And then now I think it's the third critical challenge that we face, especially during this power shift that is taking place in the region then, even though now we don't see yet what sort of the strategy or policy that ASEAN would come up with. But, you know, I think we'll get there, you know, especially when the shape of the emerging regional order is becoming clearer, then I think these conversations and also the imperative for asean, you know, to find a way to deal with that, you know, will eventually, you know, come up. So I think I just stop there and then probably we can have deeper discussions on that. Thank you very much.
- [49:28]
A
Okay, that means we can now move to Q and A. Thank you very much for this fantastic talk. I'm sure there will be many questions in the audience. I propose to maybe collect two sets of questions. First of all, if you could please identify yourself, say your name, your affiliation, and then sort of ask your question sort of in the middle here. Let's start with that.
- [50:00]
D
Hello, good evening. Thank you very much, Your Excellency and Dr. Jurgen for organizing a very informative and interesting session. Unfortunately, I was a little bit late. I've come in all the way from South London. I've actually come in all the way from the Middle east, where I know some members of the Indonesian community. And I've been watching with interest the developments. I'm not a specialist, but in the ASEAN region, my question to his Excellency is how big a threat are some of the neighbors, particularly China? And I totally get it in an official role, maybe, you know, your answer is somewhat tempered, but it has been a bit of a threat, perceived as a threat, and an actual threat for a lot of the nations and sovereigns in that region and beyond. And, and secondly, how does the government at the central level intend to deal with it? Is it just through the platform of asean? So the threat that China itself is exerting super sovereign rights in the entire region, how is Indonesia dealing with that?
- [51:19]
A
Could you just for the benefit of the audience, still say again who you are?
- [51:23]
D
Sorry, I should have Introduced myself, I'm Asif Sabri. I'm basically a banker based in Dubai and I'm an LSE alumnus from exactly 20 odd years ago.
- [51:36]
A
Thank you very much. The second question I would take from sort of, I think 1, 2, 3, 6, row. Yes.
- [51:45]
C
Thank you Dr. Suma for the insightful presentation. My name is Ben Leong. I'm an IR student here at lse. I am from Malaysia. So you mentioned that my question is actually very similar to the one the guy just mentioned. You mentioned that Indonesia's foreign policy is often a product of its domestic politics. So nowadays we have seen Indonesia as well as some other countries in Southeast Asia are getting more and more Chinese investment due to the benefits that they bring in terms of upgrading the infrastructure, something that President Jolie have emphasized a lot, which is also a means to achieve its higher economic growth. So my question would be how can Indonesia become a role model for other ASEAN countries to maintain this neutrality, especially when the US seems to be getting more and more disengaged and, and the fact that President Trump hasn't advocated, hasn't put forward his agenda in Southeast Asia, how can Indonesia take the lead in, maintain, in sort of reducing Chinese influence politically and geopolitically and economically in the region? Thank you.
- [52:53]
A
Thank you.
- [52:55]
B
Are you okay with us? Sure. Well, we don't see China as a threat actually. That was in 60s. Yes. You know, up to probably around like, you know, 1980s especially, you know, because Indonesia was dealing with this internal threats, you know, of communism, you know, especially during the establishment of the, I mean the consolidation of the Communist Party back in late 50s and also until mid-60s. So China's foreign policy was a problem for us at the time. But since we restored our diplomatic ties in 1990 and then especially after we became a democracy, this is the irony of Indonesia China relations. It's actually Indonesia China relations began to pick up after Indonesia became a democracy when we were authoritarian, actually very difficult to improve that relationship with China from 1990 to 1998. But since 1999, our relationship with China began to improve. So we began to learn, relearn and unlearn about China because we didn't have diplomatic tasks for 23 years. And then in fact, Chinese characters were banned during that time. So since then trade began to increase, economic interaction started to pick up and then there was what I call this growing comfort in Indonesia in dealing with China since say 1999, 2000 up to now. So we don't see China as a threat per se, even though of course we do have some differences and dispute if you like dispute not on territorial issue, but on the fishing issue. Because we thought that the area around the Naduna island falls within our easy. And then there were incidents in the past with China, but we didn't see that as the territorial dispute. So we don't see China as a threat. But in fact the rise of China is a fact is inevitable. And then in fact we look at across the regions the rise of, I mean the Chinese China has become very important factor for also economic development in many Southeast Asia countries. So of course there is a challenge, you know how you manage all the implication or the impact that might be on member state of asean. Both China and also ASEAN state are still learning how to manage those implications. This is related to the questions about the growing Chinese investment in the regions. If you look at the data in Indonesia, I think people tend to see Indonesia and you have China and then look at the numbers it goes up. So now is Chinese investment in Indonesia US$1.6 billion. But in order to get things in perspective you need also to look at the investment from other countries. So in fact the largest investors In Indonesia, Singapore 4.7 billion. And then you have Japan still around 4 billion. And in fact if you look at like 10 years data and then you can see that Japan, Malaysia, Singapore is very high up over here in terms of investment and then China is over here. So what President Jokowi is trying to do to encourage China to actually also increase in investment engagement in Indonesia. So yes, true that China now is I think the third largest investors in Indonesia, but the numbers is still quite I think small compared to Singapore, Malaysia and also Japan. So it's not that Indonesia leaning toward China in terms of trade and investment, but we try to make China to lean more on Indonesia to bring these numbers up. So that's I think the way we should look at it. So I don't think that this indicates that China's investment is dominant already in Indonesia. So in that context I don't think that we should overly worried about China's economic engagement in the regions. How do we deal with the so called China challenge? That's quite tough in fact because the best options for countries like Indonesia and in fact the entire Southeast Asia in dealing with this probably I'm not sure whether we should call it the city, this trap yet that the rise of one country compelled this fear in the existing power and then at the end they will go to war. We're not sure yet whether that to see the distract, you know, will actually apply to East Asia. But this is also a new thing for, you know, many Southeast Asian countries that suddenly, you know, you have the China is really powerful, but at the same time, you know, Japan is still also very important, is very powerful. Then you see also India, you know, coming, you know, to East Asia as a very important player and also is on the rise. And of course, well, the US is a bit different now. You know, it's a bit hard to pin down where the US is going. But even if you leave the US factor out, at least in this region, you have all these major powers at the same time together they're all quite powerful. Of course, China is more powerful in terms of economic powers that they have. So in that context, the best options probably this is the research that Jurgen is working on hedging. So you try to be nice to everybody in case that you get to trouble with one of them and then the others will come to help you. But in reality, our strategy is actually for those who are students will understand this very well. The strategy that we are pursuing is actually by taking this English School of International Relations. So we try to combine norms and power, norm institutions and also balance of power. So we do believe that norms are important. So that's why ASEAN is a bit obsessed with norms. I hope you agree with that because we have all these tac, we have all these Zofan, Jean Fest, you name it all. It's actually aimed at creating norms because we do believe that norms can also modify state behavior. Because we thought norms will do whatever they want with norms, at least they will think twice before they do stupid things. Because they know that reputation is also very important for state. But we also believe norms will not be effective unless it is supported by, by a stable balance of power among the major powers. So it's a bit strange for those who studying IR because you've been told, I think you are still being told that only these three paradigms, realism and then neo institutionalism or Marxist theory of ir. So there is nothing in between. I hate that critical theory of ir. Sorry to say that because I can't understand it at the time. But it's easy to understand this realism and the, you know, normative approach in ir. Is Mark Hoffman teaching.
- [60:39]
A
We've moved on, you know.
- [60:40]
B
Oh, okay, good. So that's, you know, I think that the two approach that we are taking, so we create norms, but at the same time, you know, we realize balance of power is also important. So that is the best, you know, course of action. We don't want to be, you know, forced to choose. So because that is not, I think, good options for small and also middle powers. Because for countries like Indonesia and in fact other Southeast Asian countries, alliance will be, I think, will face risk of abandonment. So you choose and then if the two great powers try to reconcile, then they will abandon you, then you will be in trouble. So it's better actually to stay, to start, you know, in the middle. So that's, you know, it's not really, you know, a good policy, but that's the only, you know, options available. So in dealing with China, but we also try to engage in China in many multilateral institutions. China is a very important partner in the ASEAN plus three. China is a very, I think, important, you know, in the East Asia Summit. And also, you know, through all this ASEAN China platform, you know, we try not to engage China. We. Well, of course there are serious strategic issues that we face, but that comes back to the degree of ASEAN unity in order to deal with those strategic challenges that we face. This is a very difficult issue because on South China Sea, for example, there is no one ASEAN view because, well, 2012 was really a reminder that this particular strategic issue can be a serious challenge for asean. So unity is a challenge now. So what I've been trying to tell my ASEAN colleagues, probably if ASEAN want to sustain its centrality, so we need to think in terms of how you maintain that centrality without unity. So it sounds a bit weird, you know, how to be central without unity and then are we going to create this ASEAN community without unity at the same time? So these are the new questions that all of us need to ponder about how you maintain ASEAN centrality without unity. So this is part of the post ASEAN foreign policy that I've been advocating because ASEAN always thinks that all the 10 ASEAN countries should agree on everything. That's, you know, that's delusional because it never happened, you know, that, you know, unless, you know, you really do a very high level of abstractions, then everybody can agree with it, you know, if you go up to norm, that's why ASEAN love norms, you know, because you can't disagree with norms. Right. But you know, in reality. So, you know, I think no, we should not, you know, create an agreement just for the sake of having agreement without looking at now what are issues at stake. So these are the challenges that I talk about because until today I don't think that ASEAN already find a suitable or appropriate strategy in order to deal with that. But again, I don't really suggest that we should see China as a threat. It's not a threat. China because it's big and then it doesn't automatically become threat because I don't think that China ever now threaten any country by invasion and so on. And then mind you, we have been dealing with China for thousands of years. As the Vietnamese, they've been dealing with the Chinese for what, 2,000 years? 2,000 years. So they found a way how to deal with powerful China. That's also I think applies to other countries as well. So I was actually told by one of friends said that be careful, if the US leave East Asia then Indonesia or ASEAN countries can be in a very difficult state of affairs. My reply is just be my guest man. So we've been dealing with China, we can't help it. Then we'll find a way to deal with China again. So it's not really our choice. I mean it's up to us whether the US want to stay or want to leave. But China is there, you can't move it. It's like Singapore, Indonesia, Indonesia and Singapore will be neighbors forever. And also in Australia. So that's why we have all this problem. What the ability to manage it is there.
- [65:20]
A
Okay, loads of questions. Let me sort of go back to one of the rows further up, sort of over there and then we'll have one on this side of the room. Yeah, but first.
- [65:35]
E
Hi Dr. Rizal, my name is Hanan, I'm from.
- [65:37]
A
Speak up a little, we can't hear you.
- [65:39]
E
My name is Hanan. Do international relations from Malaysia. But in no way is my question a projection of my government. My question is not so much on ASEAN but more so on the active engagement and strategic reassessment. In particular on like the two level games that Indonesia has to play between the relationship domestically and internationally. I would like to ask about the international consequences of chronic capitalism in Indonesia and the legacy of Suharto. For example, in 1998, 1999 during the Mr. Habibi's era, IMF was a bit skeptical to provide loan to Indonesia. How is the situation now in with regards to corn capitalism and domestically and what are the international consequences of it currently?
- [66:27]
A
Okay, thank you. And there was a question here on my left.
- [66:32]
B
Hi Dr. Reza.
- [66:33]
F
So my name is Jay and I'm from Singapore. So my question mainly is with regards.
- [66:38]
B
To Indonesia's relationship with Timor Lesti.
- [66:41]
F
So from my understanding Timor Lesti is very interested in joining asean and I was wondering what is Indonesia's stance on.
- [66:48]
B
That and how would you characterize Indonesia's Relationship with Timor Lesti.
- [66:53]
A
Thank you.
- [66:55]
B
Okay, I'll begin with the easier question. Our relationship with Timor Leste is very good. In fact, Indonesia is the promoter or the sponsor if you like, for, you know, Timor Leste to become a member of asean. We have been, we have been pushing Timor Leste to become a member of ASEAN for the last, I think five, six years and hopefully, you know, will become a reality soon. But you know, other issues almost non existent, you know, in the bilateral cooperation between, you know, Indonesia and Timor Leste. But there are challenges that, you know, Timor Leste actually face, you know, in terms of this regional integration, especially into asean. But, you know, we help them also to overcome those challenges. You know, for example, do you know how many ASEAN meetings per year? 1,000 and 1,000, you know, roughly. Do you know how many officials in the Timor Leslie's Ministry of Foreign affairs? Probably around like 60. So they can't go to all the meetings. Right. So, you know, our argument is that, you know, even as a member of the, you know, asean, do you really need to go to all those meeting? Because I don't think that should be. And that argument is used to block Timor Leste's membership in asean. But I think our Foreign Ministry also run a lot of programs to help Foreign Ministry in Delhi in Timor Leste as well. In fact, it's a very close relation between, you know, the two countries. No, I think the wife of the Foreign Minister is Indonesians, you know, from our Foreign Ministry. So, you know, we will continue to support them, you know, and also encourage them to be a member of asean. I'm not really sure how the implications of that process of settling the maritime boundaries between Australia and Timor Leste, you know, would be. But you know, from what I gather, whatever they, you know, decide in order to solve that border issue will not have much implications on either Indonesia, Timor Leste's, you know, borders or Indonesia, Australia's, you know, borders. One particular issue is actually this small little enclave on the part of the Indonesian part of the West Timor. It's called Okusi. So if you look at the map, it's very, very strange, you know, so because, you know, deep inside the Indonesia territory or Indonesia's side of the Timor, there is this, you know, enclave called, you know, I think district level. Yeah, Okusi, you know, now, you know, whenever they want to go to Timor Leste, I think they have to take a boat. There is no, I don't know, frege there is the borders. I mean, the checkpoints between Okusi and so there was a talk in the past how to create that corridor from the Okusi to Timor Le state. And exchanges between the two countries I think is quite extensive. It's a lot of Timor Le state officials also travel and come to Jakarta. So it's as good as Indonesia. Netherlands relations. We don't harbor this ill feeling despite the fact that Netherlands occupied Indonesia for a long time. I think you've been reading books on these oligarchs in Indonesia, I think. Jeff Winters, or are you writing a thesis on Indonesia's oligarch, the oligarchy, crony capitalism and so on. Right. It's not as bad as it was before, so let's put it that way. So I'm not saying that it's gone, this chronic capitalism, but in certain part of Indonesia, this so called chronic capitalism has been reduced in size. So you can find them more in district level, provincial level, but at a national level it's very difficult now to be part of a crony or even if you want to establish the crony capitalism. But Jokowi's son, you know, he's basically running his own, you know, this Martaba, you know, company. So it's just no way, you know, in Indonesia, I know that, you know, you try to get this access, you know, through power in order to create, you know, wealth anymore. And our anti corruptions commission is one of the most active in the world. Even though people begin to question, you know, despite of like, you know, hundreds and hundreds of officials get arrested, but cases of corruption continue to take place. So in that context, the economy now is a bit, I think, changing in the sense that in the past you know exactly who you should go to in order to get a business done. But these days it's very difficult to do that because there is no census of powers in terms of the allocations of resources in Indonesia because that system I think collapsed as the new order collapsed in 1998. Here we have a friend of mine from Asia House, Michael, you can ask him how the Indonesia economy changed. So we have many players now. Sometimes it makes even more difficult because you have these new players in that context. So I think what make it difficult now for Indonesia in order to attract foreign investment. Not so much because our economy was still characterized or not by this chronic capitalism, but by other factors. Number one, I think because the whole world is having difficulty in terms of this funding fund in order to invest. Number two, of course as Indonesia is still in the process of adjustment, a lot of regulation is being rewritten and so on, some of the investors probably need a clearer view first in the sector. But we are trying our best actually in order to create a more friendly investment environment. You can ask Pat Noodle here, he is the head of the investment board, later on, whether he ever encounters chronic capitalism in bringing all these companies from abroad or not. But, you know, cut short of those, you know, many, many months that you needed in order to start business in Indonesia. Now it's only what, three days, three hours. So you can get this permission to open a business and do things in Indonesia. Three hours at least in Pad Nurol's office. But I don't know whether after you get out of his office, probably you need another three days, especially if you go to the local level. Right. So it's not, it's always easy. But you know, our rank in term of the competitiveness, for example, because of these measures and has increased. So last two years ago, 114, right? 16. 116 in terms of rank is ease of doing business. But now we jump to 94. The Minister for Investment actually is a friend of mine. So he told me the very funny story because, you know, that morning when he received that news that Indonesia has moved from 116, you know, to 94. So he went straight to see the president and then he reported it that, you know, Indonesia's ranking, you know, improved. Then the president asked to what, you know, which, I mean, what's the rank now? And he said 94 from 116. The president get very upset, you know, so go back to your office, make it number 40 at least, you know, so that is basically the, you know, the target.
- [75:00]
A
Okay, there are some more questions. I'll take the question here from the right and then sort of, sort of further up or maybe. Actually I will collect three questions because of the time factor. Yeah. So we'll start with the, the gentleman here on the right.
- [75:23]
B
Hi.
- [75:26]
C
Hi, my name is Hafiz. I'm from the University of Bristol. I would like to ask you about how can Indonesia. Well, how can ASEAN rectify the code.
- [75:38]
B
Of conduct, especially with regards to the.
- [75:41]
C
South China Sea dispute and get China.
- [75:43]
B
In basically and to a certain extent, can Indonesia play a role in mediating as Indonesia is not a claimant of the South China Sea dispute? Thank you.
- [76:00]
A
Okay. I should say that we should only have one question being asked in the interest of time. So the lady who is sitting.
- [76:10]
G
Hi, I'm Rania. I'm studying PPE here at LSE and I'd like to know your opinion on ASEAN right now is moving towards a common market. And I'd like to know your opinion on that and how that would probably affect Indonesia's economy. Thank you.
- [76:26]
A
Thank you. And the gentleman who was sitting right next to her.
- [76:32]
B
Thank you, Your Excellency.
- [76:33]
C
And Dr. Hecker, my question is regarding.
- [76:37]
B
The rejected enforcement mechanism in ASEAN and.
- [76:42]
C
Specifically how that notion can be reconciled.
- [76:45]
B
With the idea of non interference and what considerations there are as to why this was implemented and how we might manage concerns about non interference in general.
- [76:57]
A
Thank you. Okay.
- [77:01]
B
On the last question, first the story was when the ten Wise Men met as members of the, we call it at the time, the eminent person group apg, they were tasked to draft to come up with the proposals for the ASEAN Charter. All of them were asked a very simple question, what is the biggest problem in asean? And all of them answered, implementation. So that was I think, the beginning of this idea of having this mechanism to enforce compliance and also regime sanctions and so on at the time. And then the Secretary General at the time, I think Pa Ong Kangyong from Singapore and then went back to his office and then look at the rate of implementations of all ASEAN agreements. And then he basically found out probably around like 35, 40% of all the ASEAN agreement were implemented. And then of course these 10 wise men had this long debate, long discussion, but it was actually the late Ali Alatas, the great foreign Minister of Indonesia. And also some of us in this room thought that probably especially in the economy, we need to introduce that mechanism to enforce compliance because, you know, you can't go on, you know, forever, you know, on this voluntary, you know, basis. But, you know, mechanism to enforce compliance without sanctions is basically useless. Right? You know, so that's why Indonesia at the time, quite progressive. We were quite progressive. Probably, you know, if other ASEAN countries propose exactly the same proposal now, we will reject it. So we came up with the idea that we need to have probably start thinking about what sort of sanctions that should be imposed on member states that refuse to comply with the agreement. Nobody talked about expelling members at the time, but we talk about probably that particular country should not be allowed to attend the senior official meeting, say for two years, you know, or, you know, if they goes on violating all the agreement, probably their foreign minister should be banned, you know, so that sort of, you know, ideas that we came up with. So, but you know, of course ASEAN at the time not convinced that we, you know, needed that sort of new mechanism to enforce compliance and also regime sanctions. So it was dropped because at the time Also I think we thought that if we the only one who agreed with that, if we use the ASEAN minus X as a principle, then probably ASEAN Indonesia will be punished all the time, while the other nine actually disagree with that. But probably the time will come when this idea will be relevant. Again. I didn't see this is actually contradictory to the principle of non interference. Non interference as a principle is there in the UN Charter. In fact, you can't go out and then say to everybody, no, we are going to intervene in our domestic affairs all the time. Nobody, not even the eu, they also still work on that basis. You remember during the debate on the Brexit, if there was a comment from other European countries, many in the UK is quite upset and then citing the principle of non interference. But in reality, even within asean, we intervene a lot in each other's affairs. That's actually happened. The only difference, ASEAN does not actually go into the open when we try to intervene in our own domestic affairs. This is still a very elitist grouping because of these very strong and good relations among the officials are still there. And then this still the most useful platform through which ASEAN actually intervene with each other. That's actually a reality. So I don't really think that ASEAN really, really close its eyes whenever we think that there are domestic problems in member states that can affect other member states or those problems that actually have the transnational implications on South China Sea. This quite tough. But I think the key is really patient. It's not easy to come up with the consensus or the agreement even among the ASEAN member states. For obvious reason, not all ASEAN member state has the same stake in South China Sea. So it would be difficult, I think to force Laos to think about maritime issues. Right. The landlocked. But you know, and also the status of, you know, ASEAN member states, you know, when it comes to South China Sea also, you know, differ one another. Malaysia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines and Brunei are climate states. Right. The rest is not, are not. So, you know, in that context, even though all the ASEAN member states agree that we should have some kind of common platform with China so that we can manage the problem is there. But how to get that I think is quite a long process. But there have been a number of progress, of course. For example, now we have agreed with China on the framework for the elements of the Code of Conduct. It's elements, but still framework. But before that we didn't have that was agreed I think recently. Framework of elements of the Code of Conduct. So next step, remove the framework. Then we can have elements of the code of conduct and then try to fill in what are those elements and so on. But I think my personal view is that I don't think that we can solve the South China Sea issue because this sovereignty issue, you know, it will take, you know, long time, you know, before you can resolve the overlapping, you know, claims, you know, over certain, you know, territory. But, you know, now we are aiming for managing it, you know, through this, you know, code of conduct. The ideas that, you know, we discussed with China is quite, I think, you know, quite real. I mean, rules, you know, and so on, for example, that, you know, we should notify each other, you know, in terms of preventing the collusions, you know, at sea among the vessels, you know, and so on. So, you know, I think China and ASEAN are now kind of like agreeing to use the cues, if you're familiar with that, the code of unplanned encounters at sea, you know, so for example, it's talk about, you know, if two ships actually passing each other don't, you know, use, you know, the light to beam at each other, don't, do not spray water at each other. So actually we're talking even on those technical issues within this broad framework of elements of the Code of Conduct. But at least there are three, I think, important elements that we are discussing with China. Number one, how you build the confidence between China and asean. And this is actually fit in very well with the Chinese proposals on, on the joint development. So because we do also agree that joint development can be a very important areas where China and ASEAN can build that confidence in South China Sea. Number two, on conflict preventions. So conflict prevention will be the very important elements of the CoC. Number three is actually conflict management if the conflict arise. So these are the three elements that actually we are talking and discussing with China. The failure to come up with the result should not be seen as a failure of ASEAN and China to deal with or to manage China Sea because it will take, I think, I don't know, even though I think ASEAN and China officials, they're quite optimistic that they can get, I think, these elements more elaborated by the end of this year. But I think the complete code of conduct will take some more negotiations and discussions between China and asean. The final one on Common Market of asean. What was this question again? So we are trying to create that ASEAN Economic Community and I think this is an area where a lot of implementation has been done by asean, but we're not aiming at this EU style economic integrations because ASEAN still cannot or do not see the value of say freedom of movement as an important part of creating this economic integration. Especially we learned from the experience of the eu. So the step by step approach by asean. But if you look at even the tariff among the ASEAN countries is very low already, right? Some even like zero. And then you know, some others is already like as low as like 5, I think 5%. But you know, in between the old members, I think it's almost non existent, right. In terms of the tariff and we by 2025, you know, we hope, you know, we can actually implement. I think no, this is research actually done in Singapore saying that the implementation rate of the ASEAN Economic Community blueprint is almost 79 or 80%. But of course the other 20% is the most difficult one. But we quite optimistic that they can achieve that by 2025 as well.
- [87:24]
A
We are out of time, but do you want to collect one more? Okay, so this will be the final round. There were, I think a couple of hands up. I'll just take three more. But can you please be very, very short when asking the question, ladies? Sort of in the fourth row over there and then sort of one behind and then again the row behind. So those three.
- [87:52]
B
Okay.
- [87:56]
G
Good evening, your excellency. I'm Winnie, I'm a Malaysian, I work as a business consultant. Often my clients do not see ASEAN as a bloc or a region and they often ask for my advice on the lack of harmonizations on regulations. For example, when a business go into Indonesia and after a couple of years they are thinking that they can use the same model to invest in Malaysia and that's always not the case. So I appreciate your view on how do you see this aspect in terms of the lacking of harmonizations for regulations in many Asia across ASEAN countries. Thank you.
- [88:32]
A
Harmonization question. Yes. So if we move on to the next person.
- [88:38]
F
I'm Olivia from, I'm studying social policy and development at LSE now.
- [88:44]
A
Could you speak up please? We can hardly hear you here.
- [88:46]
F
I'm Olivia, I'm at the moment studying social policy and development at lse. Parizal, I would like to ask you about. It seems that under Jokowi, Indonesia is looking more towards China. There is a flood of investment actually coming in from China. But there is also this situation where Indonesia is really like trying to be defending its sovereignty. Especially in the naming of the North Natuna Sea. What does that mean? What is actually, what do you think is Indonesia's foreign policy on China and would that be that Indonesia won't budge?
- [89:31]
A
Okay, we only can Only allow one question at this point.
- [89:34]
F
Won't budge on.
- [89:37]
A
You've had your question.
- [89:38]
B
I know what it would be.
- [89:40]
A
And the next person, please.
- [89:44]
H
Good evening, Excellency. I'm Sarah. I'm studying international relations and politics at LSE and I'm from Singapore. My question is, you mentioned earlier that domestic determinants are really important to foreign policy in asean, especially for Indonesia. I also read your work earlier about how democratic values are quite important to how Indonesia interacts with asean, especially in the context of Burma. My question is with the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia since the 2014 election of Jokowi, who's seen as a common man and represents the people, as well as the outcry against the attempts to make elections indirect at the local level. Yeah. How do you feel like the consolidation of democracy? Democracy in Indonesia has affected its foreign policy in the last five years.
- [90:28]
B
Okay, thank you.
- [90:29]
A
Just very briefly.
- [90:30]
B
Right. The. Well, now we get used to many voices, you know, in the foreign policy making. So as democracy began to consolidate, you know, actually it's not with the election of Jokowi, it's actually even before that, you know, after the election in 2009. So, you know, foreign policy is no longer, you know, the domain, you know, for the few, because we need to take into account all the voices out there in the country. But at the same time, as democratic foreign policy making become more democratic, the challenges are also more now because it's not always easy to really take into account all those views and then articulate it into the single or coherent foreign policy. So that's why sometimes you feel you will find this degree of contradictory in Indonesia's foreign policy because it's bound to reflect different views and position in Indonesia. But under authoritarian rule, there's only one man made foreign policy everybody else actually just followed and implemented. On the questions of China, like I mentioned earlier, it's actually again, you have to look at the numbers compared to other investors in Indonesia. So there is no like, you know, like dominant Chinese investment. Indonesia, 1.5 billion only is increasing, you know, double from 20, I think 15 now. You know, this 1.5 billion figure, that's just double from last year. Last year is around like US$700 million. That's what we really want, you know, so for China to actually become on par with other investors in the country and look at the infrastructure, for example. Right. Let me frank here. Indonesia need 500 billion for the next, I think five years in terms of the infrastructure investment, our budget can only come up with around 30 to 35 billion US dollars per year, you know, for the infrastructure. Then the whole regions actually require, I think 2,300 billion US dollars until 2030 if we want to really, you know, invest and build those infrastructure where the money, you know, come from. US don't think so. Japan, yes. Still very important players. Eu of course not. I don't think that EU is still interested in building roads, bridges and other infrastructure projects in the regions. In fact, somebody came up to me and said that Parisan, you can ask the Chinese to build the ports, but we can manage the port for you. So that's basically where Europe fit in because of the technology and also the ability to manage those port. But, but Europe and the US are no longer in the business of constructing roads, railways or ports because they provide the services. More so I don't really, I'm not really worried because we do need China. Having said that, the implication is there because, well, yesterday I spoke in one of the think tank here, we discussed about this, China's the bri, the Belt and Road Initiative. And then if you look at all the literature on this, you will be told that, look, be careful with China's Belt and Road Initiative because number one, you have to use Chinese technology, Chinese expertise, Chinese goods and so on. So my reply was, what's so different with the US or Japan? We also use Japanese technology or American technology. All the countries of course try to promote that. So how China is different in that regard? It's all the same with other, I think major powers. But the questions of workers, of course there's always sensitive in many countries. China begin to learn that as well. They have a problem in Sri Lanka. They have a problem, you know, in, I think this, you know, China Pakistan Economic Corridor. They did have a problem, you know, in Myanmar with this dam development, you know, and so on. So this is the issue that, you know, we begin to, you know, I think, you know, have more discussions and Indonesia, you know, actually must come up with a very clear guidance on that, you know, so in which I think level technical skills that we can allow, say Chinese workers to come in a certain project and also in which level that we should insist that only Indonesian should be used as the part of that project. So again the second criticism is as we receive more investment from China, then a lot of people think that, you know, these countries will not be able to stand up against China in the case of, you know, say South China Sea. That's not true. This is not true. If you look at, you know, the debate, you know, again, this Is, you know, related to the characteristic of asean. I think when it comes to the issues of sovereignty, none of the ASEAN countries, you know, I think would be easily, you know, coerced. So remember even you know, when we had that incident, it's not territorial issue, actually an incident in a fishing incident. Then suddenly he decided let's have the cabinet meeting, you know, in the warships, you know, in around in Natuna Island. That's, you know, I think is not going to affect how Indonesia and in that, you know, regard any, you know, President, you know, in dealing with, you know, China. So no one is going to, I think compromise when it comes to the questions of sovereignty. But I think people tend to forget that China never claim Natuna. So the dispute that we have with China is only on these definitions. The so called traditional fishing ground. Right. So it's a fishing dispute because, you know, their fishermen also came, you know, into the area of our EEZ sometime, then we try to resolve it accordingly as a fishing issue. Harmonization of regulations. I don't think that we have time with that. You can ask some of our economists here in the room to what extent that this harmonization of regulations in Assam. But there have been a number of, I think initiatives taken by ASEAN member state within that ASEAN Economic community in order to harmonize the regulation, especially in terms of like investment, you know, and so on. Thank you.
- [97:41]
A
Okay, I think we have gone over time by a few minutes. I hope that was okay for you. Nevertheless, I'd like to thank all of you as members of our audience for attending tonight's event. But please join me now in thanking Paco Rizal for a very illuminating talk and some very thoughtful and insightful answers to your many questions.