← LSE: Public lectures and events
LSE: Public lectures and events
Israel and the Palestinians: Domestic Developments and Prospects for Talks
01:26:18
Loading summary
Transcript41 lines
- [00:01]
Khalil Shikaki
For the kind introduction, let me say that I could not have picked a better day to assert the primacy of domestic politics in peacemaking as the situation in Gaza continues to deteriorate. Of course, everybody understands fully the importance of domestic forces and the impact they have on Israeli Palestinian relations. So my talk today essentially tries to do the following. Number one is to try and describe the basic characteristics in Palestinian domestic politics that are relevant to peacemaking. I then will try very quickly to go over the reasons why the domestic conditions in Palestine have deteriorated to where they are today. And thirdly, I'll say something about the implications of that, of course, to the peace process. And fourthly, I'll ask a question about how to change that. How can we change the domestic conditions? Is there a way that we can restructure Palestinian domestic conditions in such a way so that the environment, Palestine, Palestinian domestic environment would become more hospitable to peacemaking? So my basic thesis then is that the current Palestinian domestic political conditions are such that they constrain, to a large extent, constrain Israeli Palestinian relations and make it impossible to move forward with the peace process. My as you'll well, actually, if you turn on tv, you can see why I'm pessimistic about the current conditions. I don't, however, believe that it is inevitable that this situation will continue to deteriorate. I believe it is possible that the current conditions will continue to deteriorate. However, I do believe that it is possible for the domestic conditions to change and say how. And then with that, I will then say something about if things do change, then what can be done with regard to the peace process and how we can move forward with the peace process. So let me start with the first question that I wanted to raise, and that is the basic characteristics of the Palestinian political system. Today, after Arafat died, the Palestinian political system became more inclusive, but very soon it also became more deficive and more dysfunctional. It has already been highly dysfunctional during the last five the previous five years of the Intifada. But with the victory of electoral victory of Hamas, the things have deteriorated even further in terms of the ability of the government to assert itself and provide basic services, including paying salaries for 160,000 people in the public sector. The first characteristic then of the Palestinian political system is that it's now full of divisions. It is now more dysfunctional than ever. The implications of this even though, of course, as I already said, the system became more democratic by becoming more inclusive. The Oslo process 10 years earlier has already created a highly Exclusive political system that denied both the Islamist as well as the young guard nationalist room in that formal political system. The implications of that have been one, the threat to Palestinian national unity, peace and security, what we see today in terms of the threat of civil war. Secondly, it negatively affected the ability of the Palestinians to move forward with regard to state building institutions. Public institutions have weakened significantly since the victory of Hamas. Thirdly, it has constrained, significantly constrained, the ability of the nationalists to negotiate, to continue to negotiate. With the Israelis, there wasn't much of negotiations since 2000, but the hope was that Abu Mazen, after his victory in his own elections, that he would provide the Israelis with a credible negotiating partner, something the Israelis have been asking for for a long time. Of course, with Hamas in power, the Israelis said, we have no partner in Abu Mazen as well. It wasn't just in Hamas. The second basic characteristic of the current Palestinian political system is that the balance of power that brought Hamas to victory, electoral victory, and a majority in the parliament hasn't changed since that date in January 2006. If elections are held again today, Hamas would once again win essentially what it won back in January 2006. That is about 44% of the popular vote. In other words, conditions that led to Hamas victory haven't really changed much. What are these conditions? Essentially, three conditions led to Hamas victory. Number one is that many Palestinians believed that violence pays and that Hamas can deliver violence. Those who believed diplomacy works, diplomacy is viable, voted for Fatah. Those who believed violence pays voted for Hamas. On the day of the elections, a larger percentage of Palestinians believed violence pays than those who believed diplomacy works. The second reason people voted for Hamas is because they focused on issues of state building that are different from the issues that Fareh supporters wanted. Farah supporters wanted independence, a state, it didn't matter whether that state was democratic, corrupt, etc. Hamas voters wanted a clean government. So on the day of the elections, those who wanted clean government were much larger in size than those who wanted independence, period. Those who wanted democracy voted for third parties. Those who wanted clean government voted for Hamas. Those who wanted independence, period, voted for Fatah. The third reason for that structure, the balance of power, had to do with the value system. Those Palestinians on the day of election who believe that traditional values should be preserved, cherished, protected, voted for Hamas. Those who believe that, well, traditional values are important, but also we want liberal secular values to be introduced as well, voted for Fatah. Those who were anti traditions voted for the third parties. So on the day of the elections, there were a Larger number of people who believed traditional values are more important than liberal, secure values. None of these three conditions, then. Issues of peace and war, issues of traditions versus liberal values, issues of independence versus clean government and democracy. None of that has changed during the last year and a half. These things have been in the making since the start of the intifada back in 2000. This balance of power, therefore, is here to stay. It could change what is happening today in Gaza, could, for example, negatively affect Hamas's perception in the West Bank. It's still too clear, too early to tell how the current violence in Gaza is going to affect this balance of power. But for now, this balance of power will continue to constrain peacemaking. The third element in the domestic conditions is that the most important public institutions in the Palestinian political system are very weak. These institutions, particularly those in the security sector, are fragmented, led by Fatih leaders who have been there for a long time. They view these security services as their own fiefdoms. The command and control structures are very weak. The chain of command has been broken a long time ago. There are very strong constitutional and legal questions, disagreements over who controls what, the role of the presidency, the role of the parliament, the role of government. The Palestinian constitution system is a very new one, and there are a lot of disagreements over the nature of this constitutional system and the powers and responsibilities of the various major public institutions. The last element in the domestic structure, domestic political system is that with the election of Abu Mazen, with the death of Yasser Arafat, the charismatic, historic leader died. Abu Mazen wasn't able to fill the shoes of Arafat. He has been traditionally very weak, has not taken the initiative in the past. He has avoided taking bold steps. He tended to delegate authorities and responsibilities to other. Instead of leading with Abu Mazen not showing leadership and setting a direction and leading the Palestinian people in that direction. I would say also this is true of, of Prime Minister Haniyeh as well. He's certainly not the most important leader within Hamas, but as a person, his own character is one that also shies away from leadership. These four elements of the domestic political system have been created during the last several years by the following factors. Number one, the failure of state building. The Palestinian National Movement, which created, which signed Oslo, created the Palestinian Authority, has been in control since 19, since 1993, particularly since 1996, when we had the first elections, has failed to deliver strong public institutions, has failed to deliver clean government, has failed to deliver democracy. So all those who want a democratic political system became disenchanted all those who wanted clean government became disenchanted with Farahan, with the nationalists. And of course, those who wanted strong public institutions believe the role of the government is to provide law and order, deliver services, et cetera, became sick and tired of of Fatah. So that seriously affected the domestic balance of power. The second factor that contributed to this state of affair is the failure in peacemaking. The most important elements of that, of course, is that the Palestinians expected Oslo to deliver into occupation and did not. And the Palestinians therefore started to look to raise questions about the utility of diplomacy. After Camp David. A majority of Palestinians started to particularly remember that Camp David came after the Israeli unilateral withdrawal from South Lebanon. People began to question, therefore, the utility of diplomacy. With the Israeli disengagement from Gaza. They started to put their trust in violence more than at any time before. The Israeli measures that are implemented today in the west bank and in Gaza create conditions where Palestinian threat perception, pain and suffering is tremendous, that people want revenge. People support factions that is willing therefore to bring about that revenge by resorting to violence. The third factor that contributed to this state of affairs is the regional environment. Of the regional environment, I would focus on four elements very quickly. The war in Iraq, I believe, has contributed significantly to the belief that violence pays. A small insurgency is able to defeat a superpower. So Hamas can easily defeat Palestinians, can easily defeat Israel. The rise of the Islamists in the region has contributed to emboldening Hamas to take a leading role in Palestinian politics. They can do it. The war in Lebanon has created impression that Hezbollah has won. Israel has been defeated. Israel's deterrence capacity is gone. Rockets can be very effective. No matter how primitive they are, they can have strategic impact. And the rise of Iran has provided Hamas with an alternative. An alternative? If Hamas decides to to turn away from Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia because of the sanctions, because of the pressure from the Americans, the Israelis, and because Fatah doesn't want to make a deal, it can make a strategic realignment, turn the pa, the Palestinian Authority towards Iran and create an alliance with the Iranians. Hamas hasn't yet done that, but it is not clear that it won't do that in the future. The Mecca agreement that was sponsored by the Saudis, of course, aimed at distancing Hamas from the Iranians so that the strategic realignment won't take place. Particularly at this time when the Iraqi situation and the Sunni Shiite divide in Iraq and in Lebanon is becoming an important element in the dynamics of war and peace. And the Saudis Certainly do not want. If this question becomes even more relevant with regard to Iran, the last thing they want is to see Hamas in bid with the Iranians at this time. Okay, so these regional peacemaking and state building factors again are not easy to change. They have created very depressive environment for the peace process by affecting the domestic environment. So what are the ramifications then for all of this for peacemaking? Well, specifically, I want to mention four things that have been affected. Number one has been the question of partnership. Is there a Palestinian partner? Israelis will look at the Palestinian domestic conditions and say, of course not. They said, of course, of course not, even when our conditions were greatly different, much better than we are in today. But of course, with Hamas unwilling to accept the rules of the game based recognition of Israel, acceptance of previous agreements, renunciation of violence, et cetera, the Israeli condition is there is no willing partner on the Palestinian side. But they also say there is no able partner on the Palestinian side able to implement agreements, able to have monopoly over coercive force. There is, of course, they are right about that. The Palestinian Authority lacks the capacity to enforce any agreement it might sign with Israel under the present conditions. Secondly, it affects the constituency. It affects the Palestinian constituency in significant ways. I'll mention four One, their belief in the utility of diplomacy versus role of violence. If you believe diplomacy doesn't work and violence does, then that certainly affects your willingness to engage the other side. It affects their optimism about the future. If diplomacy, if negotiations are to be resumed, are they likely to bring about progress, achievements, success? Overwhelming majority of Palestinians, of course today say no. There is no chance that this is going to happen anytime in the future. It affects your perception about the other side. Developments in Israel, which I'm sure we'll talk about perceived from the Palestinians, create impressions pretty much similar to the impressions Israelis are likely to conclude when looking at the Palestinian side that Olmert has been weakened, that he has no legitimacy, that any agreement that requires very painful concessions from the Israeli side as well as the Palestinian side will require very strong leadership that is able to sell these agreements to their constituency. With Barak and Kadima being so weak, lacking legitimacy and public support, Palestinians conclude the other side is not a partner. Now what this very depressive environment has not affected in a negative way, however, is the willingness to compromise. Palestinians as well as Israelis, in fact continue to support compromises along the lines, save the Clinton parameters, things that Palestinians were not willing to support seven years ago, the time of Camp David. They are willing to support today.
- [18:38]
Shai Feldman
Although.
- [18:38]
Khalil Shikaki
To some extent The Israeli unilateral withdrawal from Gaza has lessened the level of support, reduced the level of support for compromise among Palestinians. There is still a significant part of the Palestinian population, a majority in many cases, that is willing to accept the fundamental compromises that are required for peacemaking with Israel. Thirdly, the strategic this domestic environment affects the nature of any peace agreement that might be reached. It's likely to affect the ability of the leaders, Palestinians as well as Israelis, in terms of their willingness to address the fundamental questions in the peace process. Refugees, Jerusalem, holy places, for example, are likely to be extremely difficult, if not impossible to address given the nature of the domestic environment. So permanent status issues are simply out of the question. Even if we stabilize domestic conditions, this will remain out of the question for the time being. But similarly, any agreement that is going to be purely security, such as the security plan that has been recently presented by General Dayton to the parties, isn't going to go anywhere. Security only isn't going to work. Permanent status isn't going to work. It's not realistic. What might be realistic is somewhere in between, perhaps a solution to the territorial issue, the creation of a Palestinian state within the context of the Arab League initiative. Something along these lines, I believe, is doable. More than that, I believe is highly unrealistic. Less than that is not going to be sufficient to make, to make, to allow progress to be made in the peace process. The domestic conditions, because the leaders are weak, because domestic conditions are so depressive, requires a much greater role for international actors, third party actors. Here in particular, it requires a much greater role from Egypt and Jordan, the two neighbors of the Palestinians with a lot of influence. Their willingness to play such a role, of course, depends on their own domestic assessment of their own conditions. But they have in the past been willing to play a role, a supportive role. They cannot, I believe, replace the Palestinians or the Israelis, but they can play a supportive role. There would be a great deal of. It requires a great deal of.
- [21:10]
Shai Feldman
Leadership.
- [21:11]
Khalil Shikaki
Particularly from the Americans. It requires doesn't make it happen, of course. It requires it, as I said, because the parties, again, are weak and they need someone to push them. And is that someone the Americans in this case, are they ready and willing to do it? In my view, if their assessment of account situation, if it is similar to my assessment, what I've just presented, they are not likely to take up that challenge. The Bush administration's, I believe, guiding principle in engaging the Israelis and the Palestinians in peacemaking efforts has been will it work, in other words, unless they have assurances that it will succeed. They're not going to engage based on what happened with Clinton in the Camp David. Their conclusion, I believe, is the risk of failure means we won't do it. There will also be, but as I said, given the domestic conditions, that's precisely what is needed, a much greater leadership from the international community, particularly the Americans. Thirdly, in addition to the role of Egypt and Jordan, in addition to the American leadership, any implementation of any agreement that can be reached, assuming we are able to stabilize the domestic conditions in both Israel and Palestine, would require a third party role in the implementation, not only in the monitoring, but in the actual implementation. Europeans in particular would be required to play a significant role in implementing agreements, particularly in the security realm, not to replace Palestinians, but in addition to Palestinians, where Israel would require assurances because of the lack of complete lack of trust, there would be a need similar to what the Europeans are doing today at, well, they used to do. I'm not sure that they will continue to do it if the conditions in Gaza continue to deteriorate anymore. That is their monitoring and their implementation of aspects of the agreement on the Rafah terminal in the Gaza Strip. So these are the ramifications, if you wish, for the peace process. Let me say something about this stabilization that I've been mentioning. The domestic conditions are terribly bad. You would all recognize that this is what I started with. So the primacy of domestic conditions, as I said earlier, I believe must be recognized. So question to me would be, how can we change the parameters of the domestic conditions? Is there a way that we can change it? There are actually four ways in which we can change the current conditions. One has already been implemented, and that is to isolate Hamas. Hamas won the elections, but isolating Hamas has been the policy that the international community and to some extent Fatah has adopted a year and a half ago, with the hope that by isolating Hamas, enough pressure will be made so that Hamas would change or will fall. Hamas didn't fall and Hamas didn't change, not in a significant way at least to convince the international community that they should engage it. So this has not been effective. A second alternative is to eliminate Hamas altogether via military means. There are two ways of doing that. Fatah can fight Hamas, say, in Gaza, and eliminate it. As you probably discover if you turn on television today, Hamas is doing that to Fatah in Gaza. So there is no chance that Fatah is going to be able to do it. But Fatih can do it in the West Bank. If Farah does it in the West Bank. And they're in fact in Nablus Fareh and Nablus has decided to do it. At least in Nablus, we'll see whether they will actually implement it.
- [25:24]
Shai Feldman
But.
- [25:26]
Khalil Shikaki
That is certainly one alternative. If isolation doesn't work, just eliminate them completely militarily. We'd have, in this case, two states, one in Gaza, one in the West Bank. Israelis won't negotiate with the one in Gaza, but they can negotiate with the one in the West Bank. Is this going to work? I doubt it. I doubt very much that the idea of creating a base for extremism, perhaps all types of Al Qaeda groups in Gaza, is going to be acceptable to anyone in the region or to the Israelis and the international communities. In my view, this would be disastrous if indeed someone thinks that a military solution in the west bank, as Hamas has already done, or could be doing in Gaza. Third alternative is to go to new elections. Can't isolate them, can't defeat them, perhaps go to new elections and change the balance of power in the parliament, in the cabinet. But as I have already stated, this is not likely to work because the three conditions I described earlier that led to Hamas victory are still here. And they're not going to disappear tomorrow unless we work very hard to change them. But to work very hard to change them would require that we ignore them. We ignore the current domestic conditions first, which, as I said, isn't going to happen because nothing is going because of the primacy of domestic conditions. In my view, this is not going to happen. So you have to change domestic conditions in order to change the balance of power, which. The last means of changing the domestic conditions is by actually working with Hamas, that is to create a broad Palestinian coalition of Islamists and nationalists with a genuine power sharing arrangement, a national unity government, in fact, like the one that has already been created through the Mecca Agreement, but hasn't worked so far. This, I believe, is what needs to be made to work. This broad coalition with power sharing, not only in the political realm, not only in terms of divisions of what ministers go where, but also in terms of power sharing arrangement in the security sector where Hamas feels most vulnerable, or felt most vulnerable, at least in the West Bank. Now, probably things are changing in Gaza. The this last way of changing things is the one that I believe has a much better chance of success than any other means. Why do I think so? I think so because Hamas is capable of moderating its views and I believe that Hamas has in fact done so since it has been elected. I don't believe this change has occurred in response to international isolation, international pressure. I think it has changed for other reasons. These are the reasons that I believe Hamas has changed. One is because Hamas is part of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, Egypt, and this is not a very extremist group. It's highly pragmatic, it has some liberal interpretations of Islam and it has been willing to play according to the political rules. It has been willing to integrate into the political process as such, I believe Hamas is not a radical Islamic group. I think one can view it as a mainstream Islamist group with a great deal of potential for, for change. Five years down the road, well, maybe 10, maybe even 15. Who knows? It could be another AKP. Haniyeh, I was told by his political advisor, could very well be the next Erdogan. That I believe very much because of the legacy of the Brotherhood. Second reason why Hamas is moderated because its political elite has been socialized during the last 20 years within the Palestinian context and has in fact during the last 20 years been moderating its views compared to where it was 20 years before. That is when the first intifada erupted. This political elite has been socialized in the context that has encouraged them to moderate because that was the price for the inclusion into the informal political structures of the Palestinian, of Palestinian politics. Third reason is that hamas constituency, the 44% who voted for Hamas on the day of elections are highly moderate. There is a core of Hamas supporters, 20, 25% who, who are hardliners. And if Hamas is to listen to this 20 to 25% of its constituency, it will not moderate its views. If this is what it got on the day of elections, it's highly unlikely in my view, that Hamas would have done what it had done since it has been elected. And in a minute I'll say what it had done. The constituency, a majority of this constituency. You're giving me two minutes. Two minutes. All right, so I'm about to finish, actually. I thought I had more time. All right. I was misled. More than 50. Now, in our latest survey, which we we did in March, a majority of Hamas supporters, 51% or 50% in fact, supported a two state solution. Not only two state solution, in fact, but two state solution. A two state solution in which Palestinians recognize Israel as a state for the Jewish people. This was three years ago. Only a minority of Palestinians, of all the Palestinians, supported this formula. In March of this year, 52% of Hamas supporters said they would support this formula. And this is just one example. More than 40% of Hamas supporters identify themselves as highly supportive of the peace process. Another 20% consider themselves as either supportive or somewhere between support and opposition. That only leaves about 40% of Hamas supporters who identify themselves as untimed peace process. Finally, pressure. Pressure does work. I'm not convinced that external pressure works, but pressure does work, particularly if it is internal. The internal pressure, I believe, has been very effective in moving Hamas. Any internally driven pressure, in my view, works. And what is this internally driven pressure? The pressure coming from Farah, the pressure coming from moderate elements within Hamas, I believe has been effective in moving the movement. The movement. Well, I don't have time to get into that, but I would add, of course there are limits to this moderation and the limits are because of the 20 to 25% of the constituency of hardliners. Hamas isn't going to make a strategic shift. There is no way that Hamas will wake up tomorrow and say we accept the three conditions of the Quartet isn't going to happen. But I believe Hamas will and has been making small stops day after day, month after month, in which they have indicated their moderation and their willingness to move forward. Given time, engaging them would encourage the more moderates within Hamas to move even further than they have gone so far without engaging them. It will take them much longer period of time before they are able to moderate. So this is limit number one, and it's not a long list. Number two is their value system. There hasn't really been a change in the value system. Hamas interpretation of Islam and how Islam relates to Israel and Israel, Palestine issues, how it relates to democracy hasn't changed and it's not going to change. And I don't think we should be looking at their value system for moderation. They will moderate through their behavior. The value system will remain as an impediment. It will limit this moderation, but it will not prevent it completely. There will be moderation, but it. But it. Okay, I tell you what, I. I'll stop here.
- [34:56]
Moderator
I just want. I only want to leave some time for discussion.
- [34:59]
Khalil Shikaki
I agree with.
- [35:01]
Moderator
To make sure you don't miss your plane.
- [35:03]
Khalil Shikaki
That's a good point. I also wanted to give Shai time to prepare himself.
- [35:15]
Shai Feldman
What won't we do? Not to miss a place anyway, I hope. I can't promise, but I hope to be concise so that we can have enough time for discussion. I'm not sure that I counted correctly, but I think today I'll do seven points about the subject matter from the Israeli side of domestic development and how domestic developments affect the prospects for peace and we will focus, I mean, as Khalil already done, we're focusing on the situation between Israelis and Palestinians, in a sense, coming from the region and sharing with you what our perception is of the domestic scenes and how they affect the peace, the prospects for peace. Of course, if you look at it not necessarily from the standpoint of the Middle east, but rather from the standpoint of something we used to do in earlier years, which is called IR theory. This, of course, is also a fascinating case study in IR theory, because we are in this panel today retaking what Ken Waltz called the second image, right, the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy. But to get a real sense of the full dynamics of the region, it is actually interesting to apply this kind of conceptual framework of the first image that focuses on man, in this case, person, and within that, the role of leaders and how leaders individually affect and their character affect domestic affect outcomes. And the third image, which is, of course, the international system and how changes in the international system affect outcome. And the reason this is important is because one has to also get a sense not only of the manner in which domestic politics affect, for example, the prospects for peace, but what's the relative role of domestic politics compared to the other two levels that Ken Walz used in his conceptual framework, compared to the role of leaders on one side and compared to changes in the strategic environment on the other side. So I hope that when I talk about again back to the Middle east, you'll also think about what this really means as a case study in the general theoretical sense, and maybe I'll make one or two remarks that are sort of relevant to that. So let me make those six or seven points that I wanted to make in terms of the domestic developments and how they impact on the peace process from the Israeli perspective. The first point that I want to make is that in my view, the Israeli imperative to end Israel's control over Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem is as strong as ever, which is to say it has not been weakened, that basic sense has not been weakened by even by the last six years, over six years of violence. And that in my view, that change, which is to say the conclusion of a majority of Israelis, that Israel needs to end this story called control, or to use the Palestinian narrative, which even Prime Minister Sharon adopted in his last year and a half, which is the term occupation, which he adopted from the Palestinian narrative in his last year and a half, that that occupation needs to end.
- [39:35]
Khalil Shikaki
And.
- [39:37]
Shai Feldman
That, of course, is a big change in comparison to where Israelis were in the 70s and 80s. And the biggest and the most important locomotive that has pushed this change in the Israeli domestic discourse is in one word called demography is the notion that given the demographic changes in the area between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan river, that given the demographic trend, the net result of which Jews are about to lose, if they have not already lost their majority status in those areas, in that area. This has led an increasing number of Israelis to conclude that given those demographic trends, Israel will not be able to maintain its character as a Jewish and democratic state at the same time unless it ends its control over the vast majority of Palestinians in the west bank and Gaza and East Jerusalem. And that is really a revolution. If you remember, the primary Israeli reflex in the 60s and late 60s, 70s and 80s was to regard a Palestinian state primarily as a strategic threat. Now more and more Israelis regard a Palestinian state as an imperative, as something without which it would be impossible to have a Jewish state. And the Palestinian state has almost become now a prerequisite to having a Jewish state now in parentheses. Again, if I go back to this issue of international relations theory, it's a very interesting question. What exactly is again the relative role of different factors in bringing about this change on Israeli side, in my view, and what I would argue is that to a large extent, Israelis could have adopted the luxury of focusing on the demographic issue because the regional environment changed. Because as long as Israel perceived a threat to its existence from the east when Iraq presented a major threat to Israel, or at least Israelis perceived Iraq as playing a major threat to Israel. And if you recall, after the peace treaty with Egypt in 1979, the Israeli Defense Discourse in the 1980s talked about the Eastern front. Well, as a result of lots of changes in the areas in the parts of the region to the east of Israel, culminating in the Iraq War with all its negative implications. One positive implication as far as Israeli defense thinking is Israel no longer faces an Eastern Front threat. And the notion that Israel needs to retain the west bank for security reasons was all tied to Israeli perceptions of the strategic threats that Israel faces from the East. Those strategic threats in Israeli perception are no longer there or at least have become lesser. And those strategic threats from the east that remain, for example, the possibility that Iran would obtain nuclear weapons. For those kinds of threats, the issue of whether Israel retains the west bank or not are completely irrelevant. A nuclear bomb dropped on Israel. Israel cannot reduce the threat of a nuclear bomb dropped on it by Iran by having control of the West Bank. So the role of demography in changing Israeli perceptions is actually partly the result of the changing strategic environment, which is to say, the third image made the ability to concentrate on the second image possible. And in that sense, because of the demographic locomotive, I would say the demographic locomotive has also essentially ended the ideological debate in Israel. In the 70s and 80s, there was a very strong body of opinion in Israel that advocated infinite or indefinite control over the West Bank. For those who were focusing on this ideologically, the term was Judea and Samaria. The fact of the matter is that that ideological debate that characterized 70s and 80s is essentially as a result of many developments over. And now the debate remains again focused on security, which is to say now the debate is not about whether Israel should end its control over the West Bank. As I said, I think there is a solid majority supporting that. The debate has turned into the issue of how and under what conditions can Israel afford to end its control over the West Bank. So that's the first point I wanted to make. The big change on one hand and now the fact that a vast majority of Israelis support the idea of ending Israel's control over the west bank and Gaza and East Jerusalem and support the concept of creating a Palestinian state, which is to say resolving the conflict on the basis of a two state solution. So that's point number one. Point number two is that there is equally now, and that's a change from the last year and a half. In contrast to the other changes that took a few decades to take place. The change that happened in the last year and a half is that there is also an equally solid majority among Israelis today that reject the notion that Israel can end its control over the Palestinians unilaterally. The conclusion of Israelis from the experience of unilaterally withdrawing from Lebanon is that that resulted in Hezbollah becoming Israel's northern neighbor. And the experience or the conclusion of Israelis is that Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in the summer two years ago resulted in unending Qassam rocket attacks on Israel's southern towns and settlements. And so the strategic reality and the security environment created by these unilateral moves, the negative security environment, have led many Israelis to conclude that they cannot afford to continue this process to the west bank unilaterally. Because the results would be even worse and more ominous for Israel than the unilateral withdrawals from Lebanon and Gaza. Because if the same outcome will be experienced with the west bank, the threat will not be on a southern town called Shterot that has a population of 25,000. The threat would be on Tel Aviv and large metropolitan areas in the main Valley, and no single airplane will be able to take off or land in Ben Gurion International Airport. That's the realities on the ground as a consequence of adopting unilateral measures. But there is another element or dimension of this which Khalil mentioned in a different context, which is that what Israelis have also concluded as a result of these experiences or experiments with unilateral moves is that one problem, an additional problem to the problems I already mentioned is that there is no that it is impossible to control. What kind of narrative will the other side adopt about the unilateral moves that you've taken? So while my understanding is that the main push to begin to disengage, to end the control, is the issue of demography, the Palestinians and especially Hamas pushed a different narrative, the same narrative that Nasrallah of Hezbollah pushed, which is, no, it's not demography, it's violence. We were able to chase the Israelis out through violence. And therefore this notion that, quote, unquote, violence pays, and if the other side adopts, the other domestic structure adopts a notion that violence pays, that has huge strategic consequences, right? Because then the notion is, well, it already paid twice. Let's, let's continue, let's try more. And Israelis have become, as I said, very aware that all of these are negative consequences of a unilateral approach. So the second point is that, yes, there is continued conviction that Israel has to engage in a process of ending its control over Palestinians. But the second point is it can't do this unilaterally. The third point is that if it can't do it unilaterally, the implication is you have to do it through a negotiation process. And the problem is that for negotiations, just like for deterrence, another aspect of national policy, in both cases, both for deterrence and for negotiations, you need to have an address. And the problem that Israel faces is exactly the problem that Khalil mentioned, which is that Israel perceives itself as facing an increasingly fragmented Palestinian body politic, Palestinian political system, fragmented between all of these things that Khalil mentioned, between Hamas and Fatah and within Hamas and within Fatah and all sorts of other cleavages, especially in Gaza, that are not even related to the main political. And if you couple with that, what Khalil mentioned earlier, which is the weakness of leadership on the Palestinian side, the fact that somebody like Abu Mazen is considered unable to, not necessarily to sign an agreement, but much more so to be able to deliver, to implement, to execute an agreement, that has of course, led Israelis to figure that although the only feasible way is through a negotiation process, for the moment, Israel doesn't see a partner for such a process. And related to that is the fact that while I think it is the case again that most Israelis would like to see a process that would end Israel's control over the Palestinians, and most intelligent or knowledgeable Israelis accept the other dimension of Khalil's description of the Palestinian polypolitik, which is to say that there remains a majority on the other side that is willing to have an agreement with Israel, a two state solution, something along the Clinton parameters that Khalil mentioned. But the Israeli perception is that the problem is that yes, there is this majority, even among Hamas voters, as possibly as Khalil mentioned. But the problem is that the militants control the agenda. The majority that wants an agreement is unable to prevail over the minority of militants, whether they're Hamas militants, Fatah militants, whatever militants you're talking about, and that essentially the militants now control the agenda. There is an equal understanding on the Israeli side that the militants interest is to provoke Israel, not only to not continue the process of disengaging, but in fact to entice them back to the Gaza. Because once back in Gaza, Israel presents itself once again as a huge target. And number two, you can go back to the very comfortable traditional narrative, which is Israelis are occupiers. So you have this constant effort to entice Israel to reverse the process that began two years ago and go back to Gaza. The thing is that Israelis are not completely stupid and they understand that this is what is expected of them. And therefore the great reluctance and the Israeli government and the defense forces are exercising unbelievable restraint because after all, the Qassam rocket attacks continue and the town of a sovereign state has practically been abandoned as a result of these attacks. And yet there is great constraint, there is great restraint against going back into Gaza because they understand that that's exactly what the other side, the militants on the other side want to see. So it's almost the classical sort of dialogue between the masochist and in this case Israel is the sadist, right? The masochist says hit me, hit me. And the sadist says no. So this is the problem that Israel faces, which is the result of all these cleavages and the fact that the militants rule the street. What Israel faces today is. That's the fourth point. The fifth point is that in the situation in which Israel faces, perceives that it faces chaos on the other side, there are increasing voices or voices with increasing volume in Israeli political and military elite that have kind of given up on the prospect of a negotiation process with the Palestinians. As I said, they've long since abandoned the idea of unilateral moves, and they argue that instead Israel should explore the possibility of reaching a negotiated agreement with Syria. No one in Israel, I think, has an illusion of how costly that agreement will be as far as Israel is concerned. Nobody has an illusion in Israel that you can reach an agreement with Syria for anything less than a total withdrawal from the Golan Heights. But in a situation where you face this chaotic reality on the Palestinian side, the Syrian option has one great appeal. And the great appeal is the Syrians present you with a clear address. The address has just been re elected by a margin of 97.7%. And that, of course, is a great temptation. So that's the fifth point about how these domestic scenes affect the prospects for peace. The sixth point is simply to say, and I don't think that any fair and balanced assessment of the scene can ignore the fact that you, you also have weakness on the Israeli side, that the Israeli government and political system emerged from the last summer's war with Hezbollah. Very, very weak. And this continues to be the case with these continuous investigation commissions, the most important of which, the Winograd Commission issued its report a few weeks ago. Olmert's popularity as very difficult to conceive, how it can get lower. But even more worrisome, there is some trust, some loss of trust also in institutions. The only. And that, and therefore you have what Khalil mentioned earlier, which is Palestinians perceiving that they don't have an Israeli address. The difference, although I would say this, the difference between I would say only make two points about this, number one is that yes, there is at the moment serious weaknesses on the Israeli side as well. The difference is, though, is that right now, what you experience in the Israeli case is weakness of leadership. That's very different from the kind of endemic fragmentation that you have in this Palestinian body politics that Khalil described earlier. And the second thing is that the results of yesterday's election primaries in labor, which of course would mean that a defense that the bottom line of the impact of that domestic development is that Olmert for the first time would have a real partner inside this coalition, which is to say, until now, Olmert had two problems. He did not have a Palestinian partner, but he also didn't have a Labor partner because the labor leadership was so weak, especially weak on the kind of Issues that we're dealing with, peace and security and so on. Now a defense minister that didn't know the first thing about defense is at least replaced by someone who spent all of his life on defense, former prime minister, former minister of defense, former chief of staff of the armed forces. I'm not a big fan, but there is, but at least no one can take from him the credentials of being an authority on defense issues. And in any move that we're talking about, where you need to take, make concessions, take risks, you need to have with you a partner that can face the public and say, I'm telling you now as a professional, my professional judgment is we can take the risks involved. Yes, it involves serious risks, but we can take those risks involved. Until now, Olmert did not have such a partner. As of yesterday, for the first time, he has one. Finally, I'll go back to an issue that Khalil mentioned, and with that I will end, which is if the process that I mentioned that has begun on Israeli side of the domestic scene, possibly beginning to sort itself out in one way or another, if it is coupled with positive changes on the Palestinian side, it's very difficult at the moment to see, but not impossible if Palestinians reach the conclusion or enough Palestinians reach the conclusion that sliding further would bring them to the kind of civil war that we experience, experienced in Lebanon in the 70s and 80s, and walk back or step back from the abyss and stabilize their scene and somehow produce an address so that each side has an address on the other side. I just end with a point that Khalil mentioned, which is then it boils down to the question of, okay, if we go back to the negotiation table, what would these negotiations be about? So Khalil already mentioned that the first option of just trying to stabilize the situation probably isn't going to work because all previous stabilization plans that were not connected to a larger political horizon have failed. I also completely agree with you that any attempt with Khalil, that any attempt to go back to permanent status negotiations would also fail because the conditions today are worse than they were in the year 2000. We can get into greater detail. So the only thing that's possible is somewhere, something in between. And when you think about something in between, I'll just mention a few building blocks. I think Khalil mentioned some of them. I'll just mention them. And with that, I will end. Number one is to remind everyone that before the summer's war with Hezbollah, when Prime Minister Olmert, before he became prime minister, ran his election campaign he ran it on the program called or a platform called Conver. He didn't give numbers, but most people attributed to him the idea that Israel would withdraw from 90% of the West Bank. He thought that at the time, to do this unilaterally, the unilateral dimension of this is dead. But the idea that Israel can withdraw from 90% of the west bank, which of course means also relocating a large number of small settlements, is of course, it's there because Olmert believed in this and it's hard to believe that he's abandoned this. So this is the first building block. The second building block is an attempt to create some kind of an armistice. An armistice is more than a ceasefire. It's a more permanent attempt to stop the fighting. That is an international term. It's been adopted by some Israelis. Hamas corollary to this is what Khalil mentioned earlier, is the concept of a hudna. A hudna basically is in Islamic history, a long term, maybe comprehensive armistice. So that's the third building block. The fourth building block is the second phase of the roadmap. If any one of you is masochistic enough to go back to read the roadmap, you'll discover that the second phase in this three phase approach or proposal is something called a Palestinian state with provisional borders. So that's number four. And number five, which Khalil usually mentions, is the Arab Initiative. The Arab Initiative goes back to the relationship between domestic and strategic. Because what is the Arab initiative? Telegraphically, the Arab Initiative offers Israel in exchange for far reaching Israeli concessions, the most difficult of which is to withdraw to the 1967 lines in exchange of that, that the Arab world offers Israel to embrace it in the region. And now you go back to the domestic. This is strategic, but it has domestic implications because Israelis, while they've become more and more pessimistic about the ability to coexist peacefully with the Palestinians, primarily as a result of the experience of the last five or six years of the second Intifada. The Israeli dream is to be embraced, integrated, accepted by the Arab world at large. Israelis would like to do business with the Gulf, right? With Saudi Arabia, with Qatar, with Bahrain, with Oman, with Kuwait, and so on and so forth. And it's no wonder that that Arab initiative originated from Saudi Arabia, because the Saudis understood that this is what the Israelis would like to hear. And the original intention was to appeal above the Israeli government to the American people, to the Israeli people. And so that is another building block. And since the Arab states have decided to revive their initiative. Now, I think that's another fifth building block in a future attempt again, once, miraculously, you could almost say this is fantasy land. The domestic scenes that we focused on would stabilize and people would have to then figure out, okay, now that we can negotiate, what would we negotiate about? These are the building blocks for this in between option. That is probably the only feasible one.
- [63:34]
Moderator
Thank you very much indeed. I'm very sorry to hold you both down, but I was anxious to allow the audience some time for quick comments and questions. Do we have some groving mics? Good. What I would like to do is to take three or maybe even four questions in groups and to allow that as a full expansion. I saw Katarina first, who will start by assuring us that everyone who took Got Delacoura's course has read the Quartet roadmap.
- [64:12]
Katarina
No, I haven't. It's a question about the Quartet's conditions on Hamas. And it's a question to both of you, if you may. There are three conditions. Renouncing violence, recognizing Israel, and recognizing past agreements. But my question is, is there a way of differentiating between them? Using international law, for example, it is clear that terrorist violence is illegal in international law, indeed in domestic law. But can we differentiate that condition from, say, the condition of recognizing past agreements, which seems to me, to me to be a more political condition?
- [64:59]
Costanza Muzo
Thank you.
- [65:03]
Moderator
Can I see others who want to ask questions? That gives me a sense. Right. Kazan's first.
- [65:13]
Costanza Muzo
It's a question for Professor Feldman. If you could just briefly sketch the. What the public opinion position is or how it's articulated around the question of settlements in the west bank and whether there is a difference now, what your.
- [65:26]
Khalil Shikaki
Opinion is about what the settlements.
- [65:29]
Costanza Muzo
The settlements in the west bank and whether you see there has been change in how the settlement issue is perceived in public opinion today. Thank you.
- [65:39]
Moderator
Sorry, that was Costanza Muzo. Can I ask you all to give your names as you start? Yes. Question at the back.
- [65:55]
Arnold Eber
Arnold Eber.
- [65:56]
Shai Feldman
Can you hear me?
- [65:58]
Moderator
That's better. Hold it close.
- [66:01]
Arnold Eber
Can you hear me now?
- [66:02]
Shai Feldman
Yes.
- [66:02]
Arnold Eber
Right. I think it's quite clear from your description of the situation that it's pretty hopeless to think of any sensible negotiations from the point at which we are now. But there have been many occasions in the past where particularly Israel has had the opportunity of initiating what we call confidence building measures, and in that extent would have helped the moderate Palestinian leadership, particularly Abu Ma', Zen, in such measures as releasing prisoners, alleviating the living conditions, and in that way, step by step, it would have perhaps strengthened the moderate camp on the Palestinian side in recognizing that there is some value in diplomacy. But it seems that Israel has set its face quite firmly against that. Could you suggest why that has been and if there is any prospect of any change?
- [67:12]
Moderator
One more question. There was one over there, the young man in the slightly pinkish shirt.
- [67:23]
Khalil Shikaki
That's an interesting description.
- [67:25]
Audience Member
Hi, this is a question for Professor Feldman. I was just wondering, you mentioned that there's a growing sort of agreement amongst Israelis, you weren't specific but amongst Israelis for a two state settlement. And I just really wondered on the spectrum of state running from the sort of severely curtailed sovereignty, delegated sovereignty which Oslo looked to be leading to, all the way up to full territorial sovereignty which obviously the Israelis have. Where is this proposed state that the Israelis you mention increasingly in favor of?
- [68:13]
Khalil Shikaki
Thank you. The Quartet conditions as stated are conditions that I believe Hamas cannot accept based on its own ideological beliefs, value system and because of its concern about losing its core constituency, it isn't likely to go that route. But I think Hamas has been and will continue to show moderation in all the three elements. It won't recognize Israel, but it says it recognizes Israel on de facto basis and wants to have normal relations, normal state to state relations with says it will not renounce violence, but it says it's willing to accept an immediate ceasefire if it is mutual and it is in the west bank and Gaza and is willing to agree to a long term Hudna. It could be 10 years to 20, 30, 40. We've heard a lot of Hamas people talking about various numbers. It says it won't, it will not accept the condition that talks about accepting existing agreements, but it says, and this is part of the Mecca agreement, it respects those agreements. So there has been an attempt to meet the international community halfway. It is not full agree, it is not fully endorsing these and I don't think this is going to happen soon. But there is willingness to move forward and I think given time we will continue to see that kind of moderation, small stops that gradually builds on pre previous ones. This is, they are capable of because of the pragmatic nature, I believe of the leadership and because of the moderate nature of its constituency, I believe because of that we will continue to see that happening. The problem is it will take a long time until somebody in Washington, the White House will say okay, so now they have met the conditions. It isn't going to happen that way. Unless Washington and people in the White House start engaging Hamas, it will indeed take A very long time, and we don't really have that kind of luxury. Engagement, in my view, helps to reduce. Helps to speed up the process of moderation within Hamas. Lack of engagement, in my view, will make it tougher for Hamas to move forward. I think that was the only question addressed to me.
- [71:00]
Shai Feldman
Okay, Chai, the artillery fire was in this direction.
- [71:07]
Khalil Shikaki
Need to take some of that.
- [71:08]
Shai Feldman
Let me. Yeah, well, if you. If I feel free to object on the first question. My own view about this is you asked about whether it was possible to differentiate between the three conditions. My own view, and I don't think that, you know, I don't think this is something where I can describe the Israeli view, because I don't think that the Israeli view or the Israeli public or even the Israeli elite looked at this issue with such resolution that allowed it to differentiate between these three, the three preconditions. My own view is that the only that the really important one among them, you'll be surprised to hear, is actually the third one which is operated, which is that the new government assumes the responsibilities and the commitments and the undertakings of the previous Palestinian government, which means that we don't start everything from scratch and we don't basically throw all the understandings and agreements and so on and so forth out the window. And the precedent, I think that the precedent that Israelis, if they didn't think about, should have been thinking about is the fact that when Netanyahu won the elections in July 1993 and Likud came to power in July 1996, having campaigned for three years, or almost three years since September 1993, when the Oslo Accords were signed against the Oslo Accords and against the process, Netanyahu, the day he became prime Minister, accepted, adopted all the commitments that the previous Israeli government undertook and said, this was our position as Likud. This was my position as a political leader. But now we are the government, and now I'm the prime minister, and I can't say, okay with that. I erased the commitments that the previous government has undertaken. And from the Hebron agreement to the White River Accords, Netanyahu entered into agreements with the Palestinians that were part of the Oslo process. Hebron agreement was part of the implementation of Oslo. And why simply continued Israel's disengagement. It, of course, got derailed at the end. But when you're talking about position in principle, Netanyahu adopted the Oslo process de facto and the juror, because he did it by announcing this. So in my view, this is really the important operative dimension of these three, from an Israeli standpoint, I have to say I am somewhat in a minority view on this as an Israeli, to say for me, you'll be surprised to hear the least important of the three is the issue of recognizing Israel. Frankly, as an Israeli, I feel that I don't need them to recognize Israel. Israel is a permanent fact. After 60 years in a situation in which, look at the Arab initiative. What's the Arab initiative? The entire Arab world has come to terms with the fact that Israel is a fact in the Middle east that you have to come to terms with. So Israel needs Hamas to recognize it. I mean, it's almost demeaning or humiliating to think that Israel, with a GDP larger than all of its neighbors, combined with a GDP per capita 20 times that of Egypt, needs Hamas to recognize it. It's almost preposterous to me personally. But of course other people have their opinions. Second, where is the Israeli view on settlements? See, I am of the view that the only reasons the settlements still exist, I'm not talking about the large blocks, but I'm talking the majority of the settlements in the Arab populated parts of the West Bank. I would say almost all the Israeli settlements on the other side of the security barrier, the only reason they exist until now is that there has not been an alternative, a negotiated option to disengage. But from Rabino on to Sharon, and Sharon was of quintessential importance here because he was the father of the Israeli settlement project. But look at what he said about the settlements and settlers during the last six, during the disengagement, the debate about disengagement. The thing that drove the settlers nuts was not that he all of a sudden said changed his mind, it's that in changing his mind and trying to bring the country with him, he basically delegitimized a large part of the settlers community. And so that's point number one. Point number two, when I think about it from the point of view of the settlers. And that has to do with the second reason. Well, the same reason of why the settlements still exist, the settlers nightmare was that after Israel's disengagement from Gaza, there would be a Palestinian decision to stop all forms of violence from Gaza to Israel. Why was this the settlers nightmare, the settlers in the West Bank? Because the settlers feared, and rightly so, that if the Palestinians cease all forms of violence from Gaza following Israel's withdrawal, the conclusion of the vast majority of Israelis would be we can safely withdraw. So in that sense, what Hamas has done and the others have Done, which is to continue. The Qassam rocket attacks from Gaza played wonderfully into the settlers of the West Bank's hands. That's exactly what they wanted to see because that allowed them to make the argument which they continue and make effectively to this very day. You withdraw. This is what you will expect now. You want to withdraw from the west bank, from where we are, we, the settlers, reside every place where we will evacuate, Hamas will come and take our place. And what you will see in Shtagot, what you saw in Shtagot, which is an evacuation of a town, you will see in the, in Ben Gurion International Airport. Believe me, the first Qassam rocket attack that lands anywhere close to Ben Gurion International Airport, there'll be an immediate phone call from the insurance company that insures British Airways to say, you fly one more flight into Tel Aviv, we cancel your insurance. And they know that. So that, that makes their argument so strong. That's, I think, two points about where the settlers issue issue is. The third question was about confidence building measures. My own view about this is that Israel has been too stingy in, and not generous enough in trying the avenue of confidence building measures and including on one of the issues you mentioned, which is prisoner release. And I think there were definitely junctures along the way in which Israel could have, maybe, may have affected, may have been able to affect the internal debate on the Palestinian side by taking steps that might have empowered, for example, Abu Mazen. I think by the time he became president, it may have been too late. But when he was prime minister and challenged Arafat, if Israel was a little bit more generous at the time, if Israel also was wise when it did take some gestures to give Abu Mazen the gestures so that Abu Mazen will get the credit for these gestures. I think that yes, Israel should have done more in that respect. But at the same time, what also has to remember that, that to go back to the point that I already made, and it's also a point that's relevant to the fourth question, which is to keep in mind the fact that Israel faces a nightmare, right? The nightmare is that the reality that we now see in Gaza will be replicated in the West Bank. So the problem you see is that on one hand, here is the dilemma. The last, there is a request now by the Americans to significantly reduce the number of checkpoints in the West Bank. Now I can tell you, Israelis, even those at the top of the defense community, they're not total idiots. They actually happen to realize an astonishing fact that in fact Checkpoints create real hardships for the Palestinians. And that, in fact, in the end, the hardships and the humiliation that Palestinians experience in these checkpoints breed more violence and more propensity anger, which results in violence. But at the same time, again, I stress, the Israeli nightmare is that what Israel will see is a huge terrorist wave, something that you see in Gaza today. So the question is, and now you have to remember that when you're talking about that leadership, whether it's political leadership or defense leadership, they know that their whatever is on the line, right? They will be held accountable. If you will see a situation where, because of this free movement back and forth, that the free movement would not just be of, you know, good willing, normal citizens who just want to go about their lives, but that would also be exploited by people who've developed by now an expertise in moving people and weapons and ammunition and so on and so forth. And that movement of weapons and ammunition that you see in Gaza, that you see in Gaza, despite everything, despite the best efforts of the Egyptians until now, you see massive influx of weapons and ammunition into Gaza. Now imagine that Israel just one day said, okay, you know what, as a gesture, we lift all these checkpoints. That also has to do with the fourth question that was asked of me, which is, what kind of state does Israel envisage? The dilemma of Israel with respect to that future Palestinian state is almost the same because on one hand, Israel has an interest in that Palestinian state being viable, which means sovereign. But when we begin the discussion of what are what my friend Khalil Shikaki calls attributes of statehood, the first and one of the most important from their standpoint of attributes of statehood is control over exit and entry points. And the issue then is, given the fact that you are now after 100 years of conflict and after the last six or seven years of very heated conflict, can you just say, okay, you know what? I'm out of the business of trying to affect what goes in and out of that state. In other words, no presence, no controls over the travel of people and by, by implication weapons and ammunition into that Palestinian state now. So by definition, there is no way to find, to address Israel's real security concerns without some limitations on that Palestinian state's sovereignty. Now, does that mean that Israel has to be in those exit and entry points? No. It's quite possible, as Khalil mentioned earlier, that this is exactly where, for example, third parties can play a role. But I have to be fair to the Palestinians, even if it's a third party, even if it's you know, nice guys from the eu. That's still. It is still. There's. You have to be blind not to see this as a constraint on your sovereignty. So the idea that there would be. That that state would be completely and totally independent and sovereign and that you won't have, at least during a considerable interim period where people, which would allow the two parties to build trust in one another, you'd have to have third party. Now that it's possible, I'm convinced. Why am I convinced? Because there is a very good example on the ground between Israel and Jordan. You know that when a truck travels from Erbi, the northern Jordan, to Israel today, it crosses the checkpoint into Israel. The truck is not even checked. It's not even checked. It's not even scanned. And the reason is that there is an agreement between Israel and Jordan and also by implication with the Jordanian defense community that a truck leaving the factory in Irbid is being checked by the Jordanian security services. And the level of trust that exists between the Israeli security services and the Jordanian security services is such that allows Israelis the freedom of saying, we, we don't need to check it. We can rely on new Jordanians. This is a result of a process that took a number of years of building trust in one another. And that means that there is no reason why, by definition, this won't be possible in the future with the Palestinians. But for that, the Palestinians have to begin to behave like Jordanians. And for all the reasons that Khalil mentioned earlier, they're not exactly yet there.
- [85:48]
Moderator
There are a great many more questions that one would love to pose. But I'm conscious that we do have to let you go. And it is half past seven and some of you will have to go as well. So at this point, I would like to thank both of our speakers for their honesty about the situation. The attempted balance. We have to avoid saying fair and balanced because that's the Fox News slogan.
- [86:13]
Shai Feldman
The third word I always use is the key third word is dispassionate.
- [86:18]
Moderator
Dispassion. Very good. Yes.
- [86:20]
Khalil Shikaki
And.
- [86:22]
Moderator
Regret that we will have to return to this subject many times more in the future before we begin to see the resolution that we all hope for. Thank you very much indeed. Thank you.
- [86:42]
Shai Feldman
And.