Kuwait Programme Seminar: Political Change in the Gulf

LSE: Public Lectures and Events
Date: June 6, 2011

Episode Overview

This seminar, part of the LSE Kuwait Programme’s ongoing series, brings together regional diplomats and seasoned experts to dissect the causes, implications, and prospects for political change in the Gulf states during the tumultuous period of the Arab Spring. The discussion focuses on why Gulf monarchies—Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, UAE, and Bahrain—have, with notable exceptions, remained relatively stable compared to other Arab nations, and considers the challenges ahead.

Main Speakers:

• Ambassador Khalid Al Tuassan (Ambassador of Kuwait to the UK)
• Sir Harold Walker (Former British Ambassador to Bahrain, UAE, Iraq, amongst other roles)

Seminar Breakdown

1. Introduction and Programme Context (A)

[00:00–04:20]

• The host marks the 10th LSE Gulf Breakfast Briefing, in association with CAFAS (Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Sciences).
• LSE Kuwait Programme highlighted: 4 years of research, over 30 academic seminars, 10 breakfast briefings, and more than 15 published research papers, soon to be compiled into a book.
• The Programme is cited as an authoritative source on Gulf studies, attracting substantial international attention.
• Speakers for the session are warmly introduced, focusing on their impressive careers and regional expertise.

2. Ambassador Khalid Al Tuassan: The Gulf’s Resilience and Challenges

[04:20–18:24]

Key Discussion Points:

• Differing Impacts of the Arab Spring

  • Arab Spring, or “Arab Awakening/Tsunami,” has swept the Middle East since January, with major changes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, but the Gulf states (except Oman and Bahrain) have remained largely unaffected.

    “It’s noticeable that since last January many Arab countries have gone through changes... the Gulf states have managed to stay immune to this unrest except for Oman and Bahrain.” — Ambassador Khalid [05:21]

• Unique Gulf Political Structures

  • Gulf monarchies ruled by tribal families for centuries; governance is described as consultative within the ruling family, not dictatorial.

    “These countries were never ruled by dictators and history is my witness. Governance... based upon consultation among the member of the ruling family... introduced to the people in the form of forum.” — Ambassador Khalid [06:40]

  • Example: If the ruler’s position is threatened, the family acts internally to replace them—recent history in Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, UAE cited by name.

• Oil wealth and Social Development

  • Gulf states used oil revenue for rapid social and infrastructure development, attracting migrants and investment, contrasted with Iraq and Libya where oil did not translate into development.

• Support Among Gulf States

  • Oman and Bahrain’s turmoil prompted collective response:

    “Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Qatar allocated US$20 billion for these two countries to help them overcome their problems.” — Ambassador Khalid [09:49]

• Bahrain’s Uprising Seen Through a Sectarian Lens

  • Initially, protesters in Bahrain and the Gulf sought more freedoms, not regime change (unlike Libya/Syria), but in Bahrain, sectarian tensions are described as dominant.

    “Demands … were met by a quick response by the Bahraini regime ... However, few days after these protests, demands began to amount, especially those of the extremists who dare to claim an Islamic republic...” — Ambassador Khalid [11:13]

  • Portrays Bahrain’s government as responsive, with repeated invitations to opposition for dialogue, most recently after the lifting of emergency law.

• Vulnerabilities and Future Risks

  • Demographic Challenge: Highest population growth rates in the world; 65% under 25 years old. If not addressed with jobs and megaprojects, instability could follow.
  • Expatriate Labor: In some countries, up to 90% of the population are expatriates—posing a challenge for stability and social security.

    “The Gulf state needs to work in collective and organized manner in order to reduce these numbers and replace them with labor from the Gulf.” — Ambassador Khalid [14:25]

  • Water Scarcity: No rivers; reliant on desalination, which will need massive investment due to population growth.
  • Democratic Experimentation:
    • Kuwaiti democracy is unique but “not a proper democracy”—characterized by sectarian and tribal influences.
    • Argues that democratic models should develop gradually, not imposed hastily due to external pressure:

      “We should or you should not force us the style democracy in Arab countries in such a short time. We need time, you know, to learn the process… we need to learn about the rule of law first.” — Ambassador Khalid [17:54]

Notable Quote:

“Governance... based upon consultation among the member of the ruling family... these countries were never ruled by dictators and history is my witness.” — Ambassador Khalid [06:40]

3. Sir Harold Walker: Frameworks, Realities, and the Role of Legitimacy

[18:24–34:32]

Key Discussion Points:

• The Need for Analytical Frameworks

  • Cautions against over-generalizing about “the Gulf”—significant differences exist (e.g., Kuwait’s Bedoon issue is unique).
  • Recognition of powerful cross-cutting issues in all Arab states:
    • Arab-Israeli conflict
    • Sunni-Shia schism, heightened since Iraq War

      “[Vali Nasr] wrote… that the reality that would shape the future of the Middle East was ‘not the debates over democracy or globalization that the Iraq war was supposed to have just started, but the conflicts between Shias and Sunnis that it precipitated.’” — Sir Harold [21:48]

    • Perceived ambitions of Iran.

• Arab Spring’s True Roots

  • Dismisses the Arab Spring as fundamentally about Israel/Iran or sectarianism; at core, it was about oppressive governments failing to engage their people’s energies, as identified in repeated Arab Human Development reports.

• Impact and Reactions in the Gulf

  • Bahrain’s protests since February, mirrored by protests/demands in Kuwait, Oman, UAE, and even some calls for constitutional monarchy in Saudi Arabia.
  • The specific trajectory in each state depends on:
    • Attitude and loyalty of security forces (contrast to Egypt, Syria, Libya)
    • Financial capacity of rulers to “buy off” protestors (rich/poor Gulf states)
    • Legitimacy of ruling systems, emphasizing deep-rooted acceptance of monarchical, consultative governance—strengthened during the British colonial period.

• Case Study: Bahrain

  • Western media has been one-sided; underreports pro-government demonstrations, overemphasizes opposition.
  • Serious error by Bahraini authorities: violent clearance of Lulu Roundabout (Feb 17, 2011) escalated opposition’s demands into calls for regime change.

    “It was absolutely predictable that clearing the roundabout in that way would only harden the opposition’s demands, moving from demands for reform and the end of corruption to... the removal of the regime.” — Sir Harold [26:45]

  • After brief dialogue overtures, the government declared a state of emergency and accepted Saudi and UAE security assistance—possibly at Saudi insistence.
  • Saudi priorities: preventing a Shia takeover in Bahrain, with fears both of Iran’s influence and of contagion within Saudi’s Shia Eastern Province.

• Limits and Prospects for Reform

  • Dialogue and some concessions likely in Bahrain and Oman (Oman’s Sultan pledged more powers to consultative bodies).
  • Troubles in Bahrain will persist; reforms will have strict limits, especially with Saudi influence and strong Sunni support for the monarchy.
  • The Bahrain crisis is now entangled in regional Sunni concerns over Iran and intra-Muslim sectarian splits.

    “I suggest that… against the background of this question of legitimacy, which I’m glad to see we both regard as important, and against the background of finance, the problems of the other Gulf states are containable. But I think in Bahrain, there’s going to continue to be trouble.” — Sir Harold [33:17]

Notable Quotes:

“Western commentary in recent years has focused on political and security problems… the origin of the Arab Spring was nothing to do with Israel or Iran or Sunni-Shi’ite split‐it was oppressive rule… failure of Arab governments to engage the energies of their people.” — Sir Harold [22:57]

“The rulers are in a very strong position and they're broadly accepted and I think it was actually rather better put by the Ambassador than by me.” — Sir Harold [24:10]

“The troubles within Bahrain have become part of the Sunni Arab world’s concerns about Iran and part of the Sunni-Shia split within Islam. It will be a hot summer and beyond.” — Sir Harold [34:25]

4. Discussion and Closing Remarks

[34:32–End]

• Brief transition to discussion, invitation for questions, and comments from the audience and Dr. Christian Kurtzorrisen.
• No additional speaker content is captured in the provided transcript.

Timeline of Key Segments

| Timestamp | Section/Speaker | Key Topic | |-------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------| | 00:00-04:20 | Host (A) | Introduction, LSE Kuwait Programme achievements, speakers’ bios | | 04:20-18:24 | Amb. Khalid Al Tuassan (B) | Arab Spring’s effect on Gulf, governance traditions, vulnerability analysis | | 18:24-34:32 | Sir Harold Walker (C) | Regional framework, legitimacy, Bahrain focus, reform prospects | | 34:32-End | Host/Panel | Open floor for questions/discussion |

Memorable Moments & Quotes

• On Gulf tribal governance:

  “These countries were never ruled by dictators... Governance... based upon consultation among the member of the ruling family...” — Amb. Khalid [06:40]

• On democracy and external influence:

  “We should or you should not force us the style democracy in Arab countries in such a short time. We need time… to learn the process.” — Amb. Khalid [17:54]

• On the roots of discontent:

  “It was oppressive rule… failure of Arab governments to engage the energies of their people.” — Sir Harold [22:57]

• On Bahrain’s spiral:

  “It was absolutely predictable that clearing the roundabout in that way would only harden the opposition’s demands, moving from demands for reform and the end of corruption to... the removal of the regime.” — Sir Harold [26:45]

Takeaway Themes

• Relative Gulf Stability: Explained by traditional legitimacy, oil wealth, tribal consultation, and rapid response to unrest (especially “buying off” economic discontent).
• Fragility Is Growing: Demographics, expatriate labor, and youth unemployment create latent pressures.
• Bahrain as Focal Point: Illustrates how domestic discontent, regional sectarianism, and fears of Iranian influence intertwine, creating a “hot summer and beyond.”
• Skepticism about Western Prescriptions: Speakers urge patience, context-awareness, and caution against hasty democratization.

This rich and nuanced seminar unpacks both the internal resilience and vulnerabilities of Gulf states in the face of regional upheaval, offering both frank insider and seasoned outsider perspectives on the prospects for real political change.