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- [00:00]
A
Good morning and welcome to another LSE Kuwait Breakfast. We're delighted to have you here and I'm delighted to welcome our speakers. Just a few points before I introduce our speakers. Just to say the discussion today, as always, is under Chatham House rules. This is the 10th LSC Gulf Breakfast Briefing. The topic is political change in the Gulf, of course a pressing issue, and we have two outstanding speakers. I would like to take this opportunity Before I start, however, welcoming the Director General and the Board of CAFAS here. That's the Kuwait foundation for the Advancement of Sciences whose generous funding and scrupulous oversight has made possible the work of the LSE Kuwait Program and the standards it's achieved. I would just like to take the opportunity to highlight a few aspects of the LSE Kuwait Program as it approaches the end of its fourth year of operation. I will do this because we very rarely summarize what it is that we're doing, but I think I'll take this opportunity just to say something briefly about it. The program started in 2007. We have held during this time a series of 10 breakfast briefings on key topics affecting the Gulf. At the LSE, we've organized over 30 academic seminars which have covered a diversity of topics that impinge on the Gulf and the Gulf's relationship to the rest of the world. We've commissioned a series of research papers, some of which are on display and all of which are available download on our website. We published over 15 so far and these plus other writings will form the basis of a book we're about to publish. Christian Kurtzorgson and I called the Transformation of the Gulf Politics, Economics and the Global Order, which will be available from September onwards. All the work we've done and several other research programs we've initiated are among the most cited work on Gulf studies in the world. All the research papers and the publications are virtually mentioned in every publication on the Gulf, whether it's a book or journal article. Reflecting the extent to which this program has now international standing, I would just want to add one other feature which is our website. If you haven't been there, you perhaps might find it interesting. It's hit over 18,000 times now a month. That's over 700 times a day, which is not bad for an academic program focused on the Gulf. It's become an authoritative place to visit. None of this would be possible without the staff of the Kuwait Program. And since it's our fourth year, our fourth birthday as it were, I would like to acknowledge particularly the work of its Deputy director directly at Dr. Christian Kurtzorrisen and Ian Sinclair, the administrator of the program, all of which have made this impressive level of activity possible. Now to introduce our speakers on political change in the Gulf. First, His Excellency, Mr. Khalid Al Tuassan is the Ambassador, as most of you will know, the Ambassador of Kuwait to the United Kingdom. The position he has held since 1993, a record. Since 2003 he's been the doyen of the diplomatic cause at the Court of St. James. And in 2009 he received two prestigious awards. One for services to Anglo Kuwaiti relations and the other for lifetime contribution to diplomacy in London. Sir Harold Walker spent 35 years in the diplomatic services during all but two of his postings overseas were in the Arab world. Between 1979 and 1991, he was the Ambassador successively to Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia and Iraq. After leaving the diplomatic service, he held numerous positions including Chairman of CARE International UK and then President of CARE International itself, Chairman of the Royal Society for Asian affairs between 2001 and 2008 and President of the British Institute of Middle Eastern studies. But between 2006 and 2010, our speakers will speak for about 15 minutes each. Then the floor is of course open for discussion.
- [04:20]
B
Ambassador, thank you. Thank you, Professor. Thank you. And thank LSE Kuwait Research Program for giving me this opportunity. First of all, thank you. You know that you mentioned it is Chatham House rule, so because I will speak a little bit frankly and openly despite, you know, that we have so many Kuwaitis here, you know, it was a nice surprise for me and I hope they will correct me if I did say something, you know, but this is my personal view. Firstly, you know that I'll talk about discuss a subject that is a great concern for entire world. Well, some of them they call it the Arab Spring or what some others like call it the Arab Tsunami or the Arab Awakening, I don't know. But mainly I will speak its effect on the Gulf state. It's noticeable that since last January many Arab countries have gone through changes and turbulences which started in Tunisia and Egypt and spread to Syria, Yemen, Libya, passing through some countries like Jordan and Morocco. Throughout the process, you know that the Gulf states have managed to stay immune to this unrest except for Oman and Bahrain, which we are going to talk about it later. For Oman, you know, as you know that it might all now know, it has gone through a short stage of protest which soon settled. Now it's also evident that turbulences that countries like Libya, Yemen and Syria are so severe that protesters are calling for Regime changes whilst protesters in some of the Gulf states only demanded more freedom, not regiment change. Except for Bahrain. I know that our ambassador of Bahrain is here and he can explain. But I will say my point of view where it later became clear that these claims were motivated by sectarian tensions, not popular, you know, and did not represent the majority of the Bahraini people. The question that arises here, why have those countries remained immune to these threats, turbulences? There are many reasons for that. I will say a few of them. The six Gulf states have been ruled and for hundreds of years by tribal families with tribal extensions and popularity which rule according to the desert tribal mentality. And I will explain more the mentality which does not recognize the hierarchy as it stems from within the community. Well, therefore we see rulers that are stuck by their people. They first feel their concern, then after they make their decisions. These countries, if you notice that at ANA I see that most or all of you here are experts on our part of the world. These countries were never ruled by dictators and history is my witness. Governance on the contrary, based upon consultation among the member of the ruling family itself then introduced to the people in the form of forum within the government officers or the ruler residents or as we call it in Kuwait. Duane, if it happens that any of the ruling families feels that the ruler poses a threat to its sovereignty, the family, the ruling family swiftly changes the ruler himself. It happens. As you follow in our modern history in four countries, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar and United Arab Emirates. I can say them as a chatham house rule. Where is King Faisal, King Saud, Sheikh Sheikh Mood Sheikh Zayed, Sheikh Khalifa, Sheikh Hamid and Saeed Bin Taymour and Sultan Qaboos. I don't need, you know, to elaborate more these stories. It's also noticeable that after World War II and following the discovery of oil, these countries had dedicated their oil revenues to building their infrastructure and improving their health care and education system are visible, you know, as you see it, all over the Gulf state which indeed made the Gulf region an attraction for job seekers, for companies. And we can see it, you know, in Dubai, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates. While other countries have had the same oil revenues or more as the Gulf state, however, they did not achieve what the Gulf states had managed to achieve. And I will give example to Iraq and Libya. Even when the Gulf states sensed that two of their six countries like Oman and Bahrain were affected by the Arab uprising and when they realized that the concern of their people were regarding better job opportunities, housing and health care, the other four Gulf countries, our Gulf States, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Qatar allocated US$20 billion for these two countries to help them overcome their problems. Well, I can say back to Bahrain, this is my personal view also. The demands of the Bahraini protesters since the beginning were required by different parties, were met by a quick response by the Bahraini regime where Crown Prince Salman Bin Hamid Al Khalifa took the initiative and rushed into inviting the opposition leaders to dialogue without any previous conditions in an attempt to reach an agreement which could maintain the stability of Bahrain. However, few days after these protests, demand began to amount, especially those of the extremists who dare to claim an Islamic republic and that it is, you know, red line in our part of the.
- [11:41]
C
World.
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B
And were encouraged by the other neighboring countries. Obnoxious, sectarian, you know, began to float which affected Bahrain security and stability. And this is when the regime took firm stand on the matter. Other GCC countries stepped in for help. Not to restore security because this is Bahraini's affair, but to protect the Bahraini institutions from destructions. And as a confirmation, only yesterday, Bahrain, the day before yesterday, sorry, Bahrain lifted the emergency law enacted three months ago and once again the king invited the opposition leaders to dialogue without preconditions next month. I think Ambassador Bahrain can correct me if I am wrong. Well, however, of course you know that some of you will say that well, this is rosy pictures about the Gulf and you are immune. You are. But will the Gulf states stay immune to turbulences in the near future? I said no. I said, you know that there are great challenges facing the six Gulf states. And if these challenges were not dealt with on both individual and collective level, they might lead to political and social tensions. These challenges are. Population growth rate within the Gulf state is one of the highest in the world, reaching more than 3.8 in some Gulf countries. The rate of youth, you know that under 25 years of age is more than 65% of the total population of the Gulf state. And if these countries were not to have a proper planning by providing job opportunity for these growing numbers and creating mega projects, there is a great risk that these countries could be heading towards social political instability. Second one, searching for alternative to oil in the near future through creating entire industries among the Gulf states and widely utilizing their ports and taking advantage of their geopolitical location and developing the tourism industry. And we are giving Dubai as an example where they have no oil. They have no oil. And look what Dubai. Despite their economic problems these days.
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There.
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Is yet another challenge represented by a large number of waters flooding into the Gulf State every year, which varies between, you know that in some of the countries, 60 to 90% of the population are expatriates. Their impact on stability and Social Security is immense. The Gulf state needs to work in collective and organized manner in order to reduce these numbers and replace them with labor from the Gulf. The problem is, you know, some of them, they stay for two decades and they are different from the culture of the Gulf states. And they are asking for nationalities, they are asking for citizenship. And with the conservative society like the Gulf, I think unless the Gulf states solve this problem promptly, they will face another turbulence in this region. Well, we have another problem and the Gulf state will face that. The water, as you know that we have no rivers in the Gulf that they can depend on. They mainly depend on desalination plants and they need to work together to build huge ones if they wish to avoid having this problem in the future. Because we have, as I said, increasing populations. The last point, I mean today is about democracy. Well, as you know that Kuwait, we have a democracy, but it's not proper democracy, unfortunately. We have sectarian, we have tribal, you know that democracy. And yet, you know that trying to correct this democracy. I think you know that there are some countries like Bahrain, they will have all also election. Saudi Arabia, they have, you know, council, as they call it, election, also Qatar and there will be a municipal election, sorry, in Saudi Arabia next autumn, as they say. I think these countries need to patiently advance to political reform forward wisely for them to avoid chaos resulting from misuse of democracy that some of the Arab countries had to face up to ask Kuwait, unfortunately, our democracy is not proper democracy. The other Gulf states by years, you know, ahead of us and we started, you know, in the early 50s. But unfortunately, the way of the democracy, you know, that's running Kuwait wasn't or isn't proper. It took you as a West, you know, more than 300 years to come to. Whether it is today to wherever you are today. We should or you should not force us the style democracy in Arab countries in such a short time. We need time, you know, to learn the process. I think, you know, that is what we need. We need to learn about the rule of law first. I think we should be taught, you know, in the Gulf, in the Arab countries for the role of law. Why? Before embarking on democracy, for many reasons, because I was giving time too short to mention them all. So I will stop here, you know, professor, and I'm ready, you know, that to answer any question. Thank you very much for listening.
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C
First of All. I don't know what the audio facilities are like from the other end of the room. So if anybody can't hear, will they please scream or something? Is it okay? Yeah. Okay. Without. I mean, David Held spent a little bit of time really patting himself on the back or his institution on the back. But I'd like to do that more. I think it's a public service that the Kuwait program holds this kind of event. And I'm privileged as an outsider to be invited in. Extremely valuable to people like me and I'm sure many others. Pretty daring of you to ask an outsider to be one of the two people leading the discussion. And it's a great honor to be on the platform with Ambassador Khalid, who is quite one of the hardest working ambassadors I've ever come across. Now, of course, there was no collusion between him and me, so I've set out a framework for my talk which will overlap with his. And then in discussion we can perhaps judge whether he was too rosy or not. And I suppose when I started writing some notes that what we're looking for today is a framework within which we can evaluate the fast changing developments in the Gulf. I mean, you could argue, of course, that there's been change ever since 1971 or even earlier. But I take it that this morning we're interested in the political changes taking place this minute which have been shaken up by the Arab Spring, or should we call it hot Arab Summer or turmoil or what? I don't know, some very trite, obvious remarks. To help set this framework to make sense of the world, we have to use phrases like the Arab world, the Gulf states, and indeed they do make real sense. I mean, the Arab world has a cultural unity arising mainly from religion and language. And within that cultural space, the Gulf states share very broadly similar social structures. But these broad terms can of course be misleading in giving a false sense of homogeneity. And the Arab states, and within them the Gulf states, have plenty of problems specific to each country. I won't enumerate any, except in present company, to say that the problem of the Bedoon in Kuwait is not shared by most other Gulf states. But there are also what might be called cross cutting problems. A no Arab state, and in fact no state in the world really is unaffected by the Arab Israel problem. B, unfortunately, since the American British invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Sunni Shiite split has been brought to the fore, as it has sometimes in history, sometimes not to the extent that the American historian Vali Nasser wrote in 2006 that the reality that would shape the future of the Middle east was, quote, not the debates over democracy or globalization that the Iraq war was supposed to have just started, but the conflicts between Shias and Sunnis that it precipitated, unquote and C the ambitions of Iran, real or perceived, is also a cross cutting problem, particularly of course for the Gulf states. Against this background, it's hardly surprising that Western commentary in recent years has focused on political and security problems. But as we know, the origin of the Arab Spring was nothing to do with Israel or Iran or Sunni Shi it was oppressive rule or to put it more delicately, the failure of Arab governments to engage the energies of their people. A fault that has been pointed out in successive Arab Human Development reports written by Arabs under the undp. Now those complaints underlying the originally Tunisian revolution, repression, corruption, poverty, unemployment, were and are widespread throughout the Arab world, including to some extent and in varying degrees the Gulf. And thanks to the IT revolution, primarily Al Jazeera, the complaints and reactions in one part of the Arab world are instantly known elsewhere in the Arab world. So without going into precise timetables, as the Ambassador mentioned, there have been effects, obvious effects, in the Gulf from about February when demonstrations started in Bahrain. On 18 February, about 1,000 Kuwaiti bidoon demonstrated in Jahra. The same day there were people demonstrating in front of ministerial offices in Muscat calling for an end to corruption. On 9 March, a petition was submitted in the UAE urging that there should be direct elections to the Federal National Council. Even In Saudi Arabia, 120 academics and businessmen posted a call for a constitutional monarchy on the Internet on the 27th of February. I haven't heard anything, but Graham Boyce can perhaps tell us about gutter. Now, from the start of the Arab Spring it was obvious that although there was commonality of cause, the way things were going to develop in each country would depend on a number of considerations peculiar to each country. I think we can distinguish some of these considerations, how they work out in each country. First of all, most important is the attitude of the security forces. And one can see contrasting outcomes in Egypt, in Syria and Libya. Another consideration of course, is the financial capacity of the authorities, the extent to which, crudely speaking, you can buy off protest. And within the Gulf, as has already been alluded to, it's pretty obvious that we have three rich state and two that aren't so rich. Now another consideration, which I'm glad the Ambassador touched on because I think it's much underrated in this country, is what I would call legitimacy. We are hooked of course on our brand of parliamentary democracy or kind of democracy we have in the us. But the roots of shapely form of government are very strong and largely accepted by the peoples. Were of course much reinforced by the British period in the Gulf when we supported the rulers as against the people. The rulers are in a very strong position and they're broadly accepted and I think it was actually rather better put by the Ambassador than by me. Then most important there's the matter of.
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B
How.
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C
The Arab Spring in each of these countries will interact with the cross cutting issues I've mentioned, which obviously brings us to Bahrain or will bring us to Bahrain Now. I think that events in Bahrain have been reported in a very one sided way in the West. For example, the demonstrations at Lutla roundabout were extensively reported, while the I think bigger demonstrations outside Al Fattah Mosque, which were more sort of national, less oppositional, were largely ignored. And the opposition's accounts of events at the Salmaniya Medical center have been largely accepted in the Western media, while there is considerable evidence that the hospital was indeed taken over by sectarian interests. That said, it does seem undeniable as seen from here and with apologies to Ambassador Khalifa, that the authorities in Bahrain made a catastrophic mistake on 17 February when Lutlo Roundabout was cleared with one would have thought quite unnecessary violence. Of course we can debate, or perhaps it would be a waste of time to debate, whether there were divisions in Al Khalifa about what to do. It was absolutely predictable that clearing the roundabout in that way would only harden the opposition's demands, moving from demands for reform and the end of corruption to, as the Ambassador hinted more strongly, the removal of the regime. And that event caused unhappily the decision of Al Wafaq, the main Shia political society. We can't have political parties, political society to say they were going to resign now. On 14 March, although demonstrations continued, the Crown Prince made a significant concession to the opposition in publicly announcing that some such subjects as a parliament with full authority would be up for discussion in dialogue. Yet before the opposition had time to respond, a state of national safety, a state of national emergency was declared the very next day. And the same day, Saudi troops and UAE policemen arrived in the guise of the GCC's Peninsular Shield Force. And again we can debate whether actually the Bahrain government really invited them or whether it was rather a question of the Saudis saying well, we're coming. What is clear is that the Saudis saw a risk that there could be a Shia takeover in Bahrain and they were simply not prepared to tolerate the risk. We can again debate whether the Saudis.
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B
See.
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This kind of threat primarily in religious terms or in terms of the infection of the Shi' I population of the Eastern Province or as I tend to think in terms of the straight political possibility of an Iranian takeover of Bahrain which would put Iran within causeway drive of Rastanoura and the Saudi oil installation. Well, it's probably a combination of these things.
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A
Anyway.
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C
We can also debate whether there has been, as it can be argued, an absolute sea change in Saudi regional policy based in part on their disappointment with the United States over their reaction to regime change in Egypt and the Arab Spring generally. And the Arab Israel problem, of course, the arrival of the GCC forces in Bahrain immediately. Well, not of course, but it did prompt immediate condemnation from the Iranian authorities and then adverse media and other comment from Iraq and Hezbollah, with the problem rising to the seriousness that the Bahrainis suspended their air flights to all of Iran, Iraq and Lebanon. So sad to say, the internal dispute within Bahrain has become inextricably linked with the cross cutting issues I mentioned of the Sunni Shi Split and Iran. Happily, some normality has returned to Bahrain thanks to the state of national safety. And that was lifted on 1 June, as Ambassador Khalid mentioned. And even better news, perhaps because it's a real signal of normality, is that Awufaq welcomed, or rather said it was in favor of the rescheduling of Formula One motor race on employment as well as other grounds, and it has said that it will be prepared to enter into dialogue with the authorities. So where are we with where is this framework now? A it seems that there will be dialogue in Bahrain and concessions no doubt will be made. Quite astonishing concessions have already been made in Oman where the Sultan has pledged that greater powers will be given to the State Council and Consultative Council. B Secondly, the Gulf governments will continue processes already begun of tackling economic discontents. Well, it's arguable how much economic, how much economy and politics go together, but at least you could take the hard edges off the opposition with economic advance. And as Ambassador Khalid said, Bahrain and Oman have been promised $20 billion by their richer neighbors. A key question of course will be how this money is spent in job creation and so forth. Thirdly, C there will, however of course be severe limits to the willingness of the Bahrain government to respond to the more far reaching of the opposition's demands. It's quite unreasonable to ask the turkeys to organize a Christmas dinner and D moreover, the Saudis will be exerting their powerful influence to restrain the weakening of Shekhli authority. They will resist the infection of their own slow reform process. And very interestingly, furthermore, it's not just the Saudis now. The GCC held an emergency meeting with foreign ministers in Bahrain on the 18th of February. And since then, I think the GCC have uncharacteristically been rather firm and forthcoming in supporting the Bahrain authorities. The GCC has all of a sudden shown resolution as a Sunni monarchs club and f. And most importantly within Bahrain, the Sunnis, who after all are not a small minority and there's some argument about the figures in Bahrain, the Sunnis, while many of them are at one with the Shia over many of the reforms, are actually very keen to preserve the current system of government. Rightly or wrongly, it's another subject for debate. They fear that the Shia of Bahrain today, which is probably different from in the past, look to Iran for their Marja'. Iya. And the Sunnis are seriously afraid that the Shia of Bahrain now are in favor of the system of Vilayat Al Fagi as in Iran, and they see the ruling family, Al Khalifa as their defense against any such awful prospect. Well, in summing up, of course, I've hardly touched on the Gulf states other than Bahrain. Of course Ambassador Khalid can tell us all we need to know about Kuwait. But anyway, I suggest that as I think the Ambassador also suggested against the background of this question of legitimacy, which I'm glad to see we both regard as important, and against the background of finance, the problems of the other Gulf states are containable. But I think in Bahrain there's going to continue to be trouble. The ruling family, reinforced by the Saudis and backed to some extent by their own Sunni population, will set limits to what can be conceded in the way of reforms. The opposition, for their part, will not give up. Money will need to be used very skillfully to take the edge off grievances. And meanwhile, another huge subject, the trouble within Bahrain has become part of the Sunni Arab world's concerns about Iran and part of the Sunni Shia split within Islam. It will be a hot summer and beyond.
- [34:33]
A
Thank you very much. Well, since this is such a pressing set of issues and a controversial set of issues, no doubt there will be many contributions from the floor. I think rather than simply take question and answers, we'll take immediately, we'll take a series of questions from the floor and a series of brief, very brief statements that people want to make and then give you a chance to pick up some of those points. I thought I would just ask Dr. Christian Kurtzorrisen for just first to see from the LSE to ask him if he wanted to comment on these contributions before opening the floor further.