Podcast Summary

Podcast: LSE: Public lectures and events
Episode: Managed Nationalism under Putin: an experiment gone wrong
Date: April 25, 2016
Host: Edward Lucas
Guest: Charles Clover (journalist, author of "Black Wind, White Snow")

Overview

This episode features Charles Clover discussing the rise and transformation of Russian nationalism under Putin, with a focus on how the Kremlin attempted to "manage" nationalist movements for its own ends—a policy that, Clover argues, eventually spun out of control. Using investigative storytelling, case studies, and references to his book, Clover delves deep into the ways fringe groups became mainstream players and ultimately influenced both Kremlin policy and Russian political culture.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Rise of Russian Nationalism (02:00–09:00)

• Fringe to Mainstream: Clover explains that the Russian nationalist movement, long on the political fringes, was mainstreamed over the past decade, with figures once considered outsiders becoming influential pundits, academics, and political actors.

  “I’ve written … a history of Russian coffee-house fringe nationalists with beards and how they have become mainstream pundits… how nationalism has become a mainstream phenomenon in Russia…” (03:05, Clover)

• Nationalism Across Political Spectrum: Not solely Putin but even opposition figures became more overtly nationalist, shifting the "center of gravity" in Russian politics towards nationalism.
• Complex Drivers: The shift is not just top-down or bottom-up; it’s a complex cultural process involving both state policy and societal changes.

2. Managed Nationalism: Policy, Execution, and Consequences (09:00–27:00)

• Kremlin’s Calculated Use: Early in his tenure, Putin authorized a policy of empowering various nationalist groups, hoping to both contain and harness nationalism for state consolidation, mobilization, and even imperial expansion (e.g., in Georgia and Ukraine).

  “...the Kremlin’s decision…to empower nationalists of all types in Russia in an effort to both limit nationalism and neutralize it as a threat to the state … and also to expand in an imperial way.” (06:40, Clover)

• Case Study: The Murder of Stanislav Markelov (10:30–25:00)
  • Clover uses the 2009 assassination of human rights lawyer Stanislav Markelov and journalist Anastasia Baburova to illustrate how “managed nationalism” backfired.
  • The killer, Nikita Tikhonov, was linked to Russky Obraz ("Russian Image"), a nationalist group with suspected Kremlin patronage.

  “...Russky Obraz was a Kremlin organization... able to hold marches in the middle of Moscow... a Kremlin project.” (19:00, Clover)

• Double Organizations: The Kremlin’s tactic of creating simulacra—controlled opposition parties and movements—worked with some ideologies but failed with nationalists, who often went rogue.

3. Court Testimony & Exposure of Kremlin Support (25:00–32:00)

• Trial Revelations: Transcripts from the murder trial revealed Russky Obraz was the legal political wing, while its underground militant arm continued violent activities; both had links to a “Kremlin minder.”
• Admissions & Ambiguity: Official denials notwithstanding, testimonies indicate the Kremlin was aware of, and even supported, nationalist groups—even when they became violent.

  “...the Kremlin knew that a political legal organization that enjoyed its patronage continued to have links to an illegal terrorist organization...” (28:10, Clover)

4. Why Nationalism is so Dangerous and Tempting (32:00–39:00)

• Reference to Ernest Gellner:

  “Wherever nationalism has taken root, it has tended to prevail with ease over other modern ideologies.” (34:52, Clover quoting Gellner)

• Post-Soviet Experience: Russian elites were deeply wary of nationalism due to its destructive role in the Soviet collapse, yet its emotional power proved irresistibly useful for political mobilization.
• Kremlin’s Dilemma: Limit nationalism to avoid break-up, but also exploit it for political strength—a contradiction that led to loss of control.

5. Mutation and Aftermath: From Managed Nationalism to Opposition (32:00–43:00)

• Crackdown but Not Defeat: By the late 2000s, radical groups like Russky Obraz were repressed, but the movement went both underground and mainstream, becoming a visible force in opposition protests and boosting figures like Alexei Navalny.
• Eurasianism as Official Ideology: Putin adopted aspects of Eurasianism, advocating for a “civilizational state” and integrating it into state rhetoric (notably in speeches and projects like the Eurasian Union).

  “It’s a kind of supranational imperial nationalism... Eurasia is a concept ... that has become kind of an official nationalism...” (36:46, Clover)

• Correlation with Kremlin Policy: Many of the regime’s policies—reviving the Orthodox Church, confrontation with Western values, limiting Western influence—correlate with Eurasianist and nationalist philosophies.

6. Discussion and Audience Q&A Highlights

Paranoia and Nationalism (44:30–50:00)

• The Role of Paranoia: Paranoia, particularly among leaders with security backgrounds, feeds nationalist rhetoric and policy.

  “...the most paranoid people I have ever met have all, without exception, been employees of the intelligence services.” (45:46, Clover)

• Nationalist Mindset: Fear of external threats is intrinsic to nationalism, present in Russia and elsewhere.

Official vs. Fringe Nationalism (50:25–56:47)

• The Great Patriotic War: The state leverages WWII ("Great Patriotic War") history as core to official nationalism, creating an identity that blends pride and victimhood.
• Radicalization Risks: When the state turns nationalism into the core political narrative, it creates space for even more extreme versions to emerge.

Contradictory Nationalisms (56:47–59:24)

• Eurasianism vs. Russkiy Mir: The intellectual contradictions between a supra-ethnic Eurasianism and an ethnically Russian “Russkiy Mir” are ignored in practice—logic is often suspended for emotional or political expedience.

  “The interesting thing about nationalism… is that contradictions simply don’t bother them... belief in logic kind of gets suspended at the door.” (57:36, Clover)

The Russian Orthodox Church and Minorities (59:41–64:17)

• Orthodox Church’s Complex Role: The Kremlin uses the Church as a symbol of national identity when convenient but avoids alienating non-Orthodox minorities—another tightrope in managed nationalism.

  “...the problem with embracing Orthodoxy, this sort of Russia as the third Rome ideology, is that... the further you move towards the church, the more nervous everybody else gets.” (61:04, Clover)

Economic Causes and Elite Nationalism (64:33–68:35)

• Socioeconomic Factors: While economic insecurity is often linked to the rise of nationalism, Russia’s increasing prosperity in the 2000s complicates this narrative; elite circles, too, have become more nationalist.

Polls, Sanctions, and Putin’s Popularity (68:43–72:12)

• Popularity Amid Crisis: Despite economic struggles and international isolation, Putin’s popularity remains high—managed nationalism helps build the siege mentality that boosts such ratings.

  “That said, the reason that all political leaders play the nationalist card is for precisely this reason. It’s a kind of a desperate measure.” (70:01, Clover)

Deep State and Historical Roots (72:12–75:28)

• KGB Roots: There is suggestive evidence (but no “smoking gun”) that elements of the security services in the late Soviet/early post-Soviet era nurtured nationalist movements to fill the ideological void left by communism.

Intervention in Syria (75:39–78:00)

• Syrian Campaign: Clover sees Russia’s military involvement in Syria as primarily a demonstration of capacity and prestige, with only tangential links to the nationalist narrative.

Notable Quotes

• On Managed Nationalism:

  “The Kremlin has the following principle for dealing with any political organization. If they cannot destroy it, they will lead it, and they can’t destroy the nationalists.” (20:39, Clover quoting Alexander Belov)

• On Paranoia:

  “The most paranoid people I have ever met have all, without exception, been employees of the intelligence services.” (45:46, Clover)

• On Contradiction:

  “Contradictions simply don’t bother them… belief in logic kind of gets suspended at the door.” (57:36, Clover)

• On Eurasianism as Policy:

  “You see a kind of strikingly interesting correlation between the philosophy that I’ve described … and what the Eurasian Project describes.” (41:50, Clover)

• On Elite Nationalism:

  “Nationalistic attitudes… had become general and also had spread to the elite… that happened very early under Putin.” (68:26, Clover)

• On the Kremlin’s Approach:

  “The Kremlin is a bit arrogant in the sense that they don’t believe that the contradictions really apply to them. They can be Russian nationalists one day… Tatar nationalists another.” (62:35, Clover)

Important Timestamps

• 03:05 – Rise of Russian nationalism from fringe to mainstream
• 06:40 – Kremlin’s motives for managing nationalism
• 10:30–25:00 – Case study: Markelov murder and Russky Obraz
• 28:10 – Court testimony revealing state support for radicals
• 32:00–39:00 – Dangers and temptations of nationalism; Gellner quote
• 41:50 – Correlation between Eurasianist theory and Kremlin actions
• 45:46 – Paranoia in intelligence services and its political impacts
• 57:36 – Contradictions within nationalist ideology
• 61:04 – Russian Orthodoxy’s limits as a national idea
• 68:26 – Expansion of nationalism to elite circles
• 70:01 – Nationalism as a leader’s last resort
• 75:39 – Russian intervention in Syria’s link to nationalism

Memorable & Insightful Moments

• Clover’s detective-story account of Russky Obraz ties the book’s themes to a gripping real-world case.
• Discussion of official vs. fringe nationalisms, and how the logic-defying coexistence of supranational and ethnonational ideologies has shaped Russian political strategy.
• The frank admission: “I’m not sure how much belief actually plays a role [in nationalism]… it’s an emotional or a sociological phenomenon.” (57:36, Clover)
• The recognition that managed nationalism, once released, can create threats that the state cannot easily control—a “genie out of the bottle” moment.

Conclusion

Charles Clover’s talk, interspersed with engaging questions from Edward Lucas and the audience, paints a picture of nationalism in Russia as something at once engineered and uncontrollable. The Kremlin’s attempt to manage nationalist fervor to its advantage led to unintended radicalization and an ideological atmosphere that permeates all levels of Russian life. Nationalist ideology—whether mainstream or fringe, logical or contradictory—remains a potent and dangerous tool in Russia’s political landscape.