B (5:32)

Good evening everyone. Good to see so many of you here. The legislative election in Myanmar on the 8th of November is going to be a very big moment for Myanmar and it's also going to be a big moment for Southeast Asia, for the association of Southeast Asian nations asean. Myanmar has been, I think, one of the success stories of the last few years since the opening up, the dramatic opening up that took place with the release of Aung San Suu Kyi in late 2010, the election of President, the elevation to the presidency of President Thein Sein in March of 2011. We saw of course, the release of Do Aun San SUU Kyi. We saw the release of hundreds of political prisoners. We saw the unbanning of Aung San SUU Kyi's party, the National League for Democracy, and we saw it fight, for example, a by election in 2012 and we've seen an extraordinary freeing up of the media Myanmar during the Time I was there, I Left there in 2009 was one of the most closed and oppressive nations on earth, a disastrous economy and the most repressive form of government. So it's been a remarkable opening up. There's also been a concomitant opening up of the economy. We've seen the oil and gas sector opened up. We've seen liberalization in a number of areas. We've seen, for example, Internet penetration, which was the second lowest in the world back in 2009, again opened up. All of this is translated into jobs for tens of thousands of young Myanmar people. It's translated into the loosening of the sanctions that the eu, Australia and the US had in place against that country. Not all of them. The US has residual sanctions against certain individuals still in place. And it also saw the start of a peace process to try and achieve some sort of reconciliation with the many ethnic groups around the borders of Myanmar. Now, no one is pretending this is perfect. There were still many, many things that were wrong. We've seen the persecution of the Rohingya, the Muslim minority. We've seen the birth of a really virulent strain of Buddhist nationalism that I certainly never saw coming, which is exerting more and more influence on developments in the country. We've seen many aspects of the economy that have not developed as much as one would have liked to see. And finally, we have also seen clear limits to the willingness of the military to cede power, the unwillingness to amend the 2008 constitution under which Doran San Suu Kyi is banned from the presidency, and also the unwillingness to change the 25% of votes that the military has in the legislature. But all that aside, the balance, in my view, is overwhelmingly positive. So the question coming up to these elections is whether that momentum is going to be sustained, reverse, or stay somewhere in the middle. But this is also a big moment for Southeast Asia. I was reminded of this. I've just come back from a month in the region, and I was reminded of how different the outlook in Southeast Asia is compared to, say, 12 months ago. Not only do we see economic contagion as a result of the slowdown in China, spreading through all the economies of Southeast Asia, some more profoundly than others. But we see, for example, Thailand still under military rule with an ailing king and a very messy succession. We see Malaysia embroiled in corruption scandals and other political troubles, as well as its economic problems. And we see Indonesia somewhere in the middle one year into the presidency of President Widodo. But again, at A position that is neither going forwards nor reversing. So asean, as it's called, badly needs Myanmar to stay on track and for the positive progress we've seen to be sustained. So the stakes are very high, both for that country and for the region in which it's situated. So some of the questions we might dwell on tonight, for example, and I know my colleagues, will what will be the fortunes of Doan San SUU Kyi's party, the National League for Democracy? Will they be able to reprise the overwhelming victory they enjoyed in 1990 that was then seized away from them? How are they going to perform? I mean, my sense is they will be the largest party in the parliament, but they will not register as many votes as people perhaps expect them to. There is no polling, so that's very much a guess. But there are a number of factors which I see pulling back on the NLD vote. The first would be the extent to which Buddhist nationalists who are now emerging feel that the NLD represents them. Second will be where the ethnic minorities put their votes. Most of them, I think, will put their votes in ethnic based parties. You've got the 25% military vote in the Parliament. That of course is very hard to then win in your remaining 75%. And then you've got weaknesses within the NLD itself. The extent to which it is a party of brave, committed protesters, but is not a party that has got experience of government. So all of those things I think will serve to pull back the NLD vote. We'll see whether that's right. The next big question for me is the extent to which the military, which still calls the shots, is willing to loosen its grip. And we've seen indications in recent weeks of the limits of, of their willingness to cede power. We've seen the stripping of a guy called the chairman of their party. The USDP was stripped of the chairmanship. We've seen their unwillingness to amend the constitution. All of which suggests they are comfortable in loosening the grip up to a point, but only up to a point. So the question is, if the NLD does get a majority, which I think they will, how is that actually going to translate into the disposition of the Vice presidency, the presidency three months on? In conclusion, I mean, I would say that my gut feeling is Myanmar will muddle through in a sort of suboptimal way. It's very hard to see how the three months between the election and the inauguration of the new president and the new government, there are myriad opportunities in that period for trouble, confusion, and mischief making. But I do feel that, although I wouldn't say I was an optimist about this, neither am I a pessimist. But I feel that the forces which have opened up Myanmar over the last few years are forces which can be pushed back a little bit, but are very, very powerful. I think it is extraordinarily important for the military still that the economic success of the past few years is sustained. I think it's very hard to pull back the connectedness of the people through the Internet, through the media. It's very hard to sustain foreign direct investment coming in if you pull things back too far. My experience of working in Indonesia, in Zimbabwe, and a number of other places that have been under either are under or have been under military rule is that you cannot wish away vested interests. There are powerful vested interests in Myanmar and the NLD and Doran San SUU Kyi will have to be very pragmatic in terms of the pace at which they expect the military to pull back from political life. That process in Indonesia has taken many, many years. In fact, many people would argue it's still not complete. And I think the same will be true of Myanmar. And I think progress can be sustained provided those underlying realities are recognized. So I think I'll leave it there, Danny, if that's right. Thank you. Very.

A (14:34)

Well.

C (14:34)

Good evening. First of all, thank you very much, Danny, for inviting me to this event. It's a great pleasure to be here. I agree with Mark Kenning when he says that the 2015 elections will form a very significant event for the future of Myanmar. And I say so for at least four reasons. First of all, these are the first free elections since 1990. Secondly, the electoral process will be assessed in terms of Myanmar's political reforms and transition. Thirdly, the outcome of the elections will decide on how Myanmar moves forward from here, or indeed whether it will move forward. And fourthly, the elections may also influence Myanmar's foreign relations with some countries. And what I want to do over the next couple of minutes really, is to offer a few thoughts on what impact, if any, the elections are likely to have for Naypydaw's relations with Washington and Beijing. In order to do that, allow me to rewind just a little the tape to offer some points about where we are and have been in terms of those two relationships. Speaking first about US Myanmar relations, I think these have surely come a very, very long way since President Obama in 2009 decided that his administration would adopt what was called pragmatic engagement, an approach which was to Take dialogue as one tool to engage the military. It constituted a major break, if you like, with the previous policy pursued under his predecessor, President Bush, who is often said to have pursued a policy of regime change vis a mi mi ama. Now, obviously, since the political accommodation that the government of Hussein Sene reached with the leader of the political opposition, DOROS, In 2011, the United States has been able to ease most of the sanctions that it had imposed over a period of two decades, except the military embargo, the importation of gemstones, and of course also the so called SDN list, which is that list which identifies certain people that you not supposed to be doing business with. The US has actually heavily invested in the democratization of Myanmar. It offered the country a partnership if it pursued reforms. And I think in many ways the Myanmar government currently in power has taken up this offer. In fact, it has made quite a number of what you might say constitute political concessions that were unthinkable before 2000. However, we should also know that the two countries, of course, do have differences in relation to a number of core issues. There's, for example, the continued debate about how to change civil military relations in the country, how to, in that context, also to change the constitution. There are differences over the role of the military in the economy. And there are various other concerns that the United States has, be it in relation to the situation in Rakhine State, be it in relation to Buddhist extremism or nationalism more generally, or indeed the fighting that is still going on in places such as Kachin State and elsewhere within the United States. Given these various concerns, there has obviously been a debate about whether the relationship has any scope to proceed further or whether indeed it has already gone too far. And I think that question that will be answered after the election, at least, we think, by some. Again now, how might the relationship change? I think that would obviously depend on two things. First of all, as to whether the elections themselves get a clean bill of health. What I mean by that is whether they satisfy the international yardsticks that we commonly use. The United States itself has said that it wants to see free and fair elections, that they should be inclusive, credible and transparent. And many observers believe that perhaps this is possible. Myanmar and the relevant authorities will oversee such elections. But at the same time, there have also already been a number of concerns extending expressed. Some of these may concern an old issue, advanced voting that we saw in the previous 2010 elections. The issue is to do with voter registration and of course, also the disenfranchisement of large segments of the population, particularly Muslims. Secondly, the United States, I think also more or less would hope that at the end of the day DOSU will be offered or is able to take up some kind of position of political authority without necessarily specifying as to what that might be. Of course, some members of Congress would wish her to claim the presidency itself, but constitutionally she doesn't appear to be eligible for the highest office. Dawsu, of course, herself seems to be saying in recent weeks that she's interested in a smooth transition, and there are signs, if one interprets this, that she is nevertheless, where everyone says, preparing for some kind of role in the month and years ahead now, and as to how that will play out will obviously be seen after the election up to March. Now, in terms of the questions, the factors that influence the outcome of or the impact of the elections on the relationship, some of these have already been mentioned by Mark Some of this will have to do with the distribution of votes for the nld. Will the NLD get the landslide it may be hoping for? Will there be more than 2/3 of votes coming the NLD's way in relation to the lower house? How will the NLD fare in the ethnic areas and in the elections? Therefore, as regards the upper house, who will ultimately be able to claim the presidency and what kinds of coalitions are possible potentially in the period up to March now, depending on which scenario plays out, Washington may of course respond in quite different ways. If the nod should win, and if, for example, it is possible for the NLD to form a government, be it as a coalition, be it with the understanding of the military, then one would think that this opens the door to deeper cooperation, arguably also to military engagement of the United States vis a vis Myanmar, including security assistance. If, on the other hand, the USDP is able to to carry the day, then of course the relationship may not move forward in precisely those terms, although it should not necessarily be expected to suffer either. The worst case scenario is of course some kind of 1998 type. In that context, if that was to happen, then of course the United States would surely reassess its role in Myanmar and there should be a lot of congressional pressure from for the administration to do so, but I consider that perhaps be a scenario that is not that likely. Now, the Impact on China Myanmar Relations at the Moment China Myanmar relations are arguably at their lowest point, at least since the end of the Cold War. At a time, therefore, when China was about ending material support to the Communist Party of Burma. There's been a massive deterioration in the bilateral relationship since 2011. Why is this? One could of course, go into a lot of detail here, but I just want to mention three points. First of all, I think there was growing unease among the political military elite and leadership about Myanmar's economic dependence on China, particularly in the 2000s, and China's approach to economic cooperation. Secondly, there was growing anti China sentiments among the population. The PRC is obviously post 2011 in particular seen as having been instrumental in supporting the unloved military regime of the past, which was led by Senior General Sun Shui. And thirdly, the events in the Kokang Special Region this year where the Myanmar National Democratic alliance army tried to retake militarily ground that they lost in 2009. Although they don't say so officially very clearly, there are numerous people who have suspicions about the role of China as regards this particular conflict. And this is actually a conflict that is very important, not only because of what's going on there specifically, but also because it is linked, I would argue, to the failure by the government to secure a broader platform among the ethnic armed organizations in favor of signing the nationwide ceasefire arrangement. Myanmar's government has been opposed to including in this kind of arrangement the MNDAA as well as other groups that are fighting alongside this ethnic army. Most of the ethnic armies organizations in Myanmar have wanted the Kokang group to be included in the nationwide ceasefire code, but the government refused. This doesn't recognize this as a possible outcome, as a possible political outcome. It's striving for military solution and as a result we have seen a split among the ethnic groups and arguably what we will see on the 15th of October this month is that there will be a signing ceremony of the nationwide ceasefire accord, but it will probably only include half of those that were originally involved in the negotiations to sign it in the first place. So in terms of how can the elections impact on the relationship with China, I think from a Chinese point of view, they will be looking at the following four indicators. First of all, they may be looking at this question as to whether or not, having just spoken about the conflict in the ethnic areas, foreigners will be playing a more substantial role in the peace process in the future. We can assume that China would be opposed to this. Secondly, Chinese will probably wonder as to whether or not Myanmar will lift the suspension of the construction of the Mizone Dam, which was suspended in 2011, or whether they will not. Thirdly, they will wonder to what extent Myanmar will cooperate on strategic projects which the Chinese are pursuing, not just in Southeast Asia, but beyond under the so called one belt, one road concept. And fourthly, of course, there's this big question, particularly if there was an NLD victory, as to whether or not Myanmar might in the future move closer to the United States. States and the West. If it was, then of course we can think as to what the implications might be. But arguably there is room here both for improvement of bilateral relations. If the answer to these questions is yes. Yes, no. Yeah. But also the reverse. Thank you very much.

A (27:19)

Thank you. Yogi.

D (27:23)

Yes. Hi, everybody. Good evening. It's really great here to be back at the LSE where I completed my undergraduate degree. So it's always nice to come back. As Danny mentioned, I live in Yangon where I report for the Wall Street Journal on Myanmar. I've been there, living there for about a year now, but been covering the country for almost three years. And you know, when I first came to Myanmar, I think I arrived there at a period of time of sort of just unbridled optimism. It was 2012. President Obama just visited. People were extremely, extremely optimistic on what was going to happen within the country. You could sort of feel it in the streets, especially around the Obama visit. There were people putting up NLD signs everywhere, which is Aung San SUU Kyi's party. And to them being embraced by the west was a really huge vote of legitimacy. And, you know, I think what has really changed over the past two or three years is that optimism has sort of sunk into a realism about how far this transition has actually gone and how far, you know, the nominally civilian government that now runs Myanmar is willing to make concessions. So I think I'm just going to start by talking about the elections and, you know, what structural deficiencies there are leading up to the vote. As Danny mentioned, 25% of seats within Myanmar's parliament are still reserved for military generals, and those are appointed by the senior general. So within this democratic election, only 75% of seats will actually be voted in. And that's going to make it extremely difficult for any party to have an overwhelming majority within the government. Even despite the NLD's popularity, to win two thirds of the available seats, which is what they would need to then form the government will be a challenge. And, you know, constitutional change to allow for the military to kind of step back and to allow for the 25% of seats to be reduced, has failed repeatedly. That process has been debated for the past three years, but nothing's really come off it. So, you know, when we're talking about the election, we're only talking about the 75% of seats. And that parliament will then choose the President. And the president and his cabinet will ultimately have a say of how this transition is taken forward. As Denny has also mentioned, Aung San SUU Kyi is barred from the presidency, which is another serious deficiency because she is by far the most popular politician in Myanmar. Rallies are much like rock concerts packed, thousands of people pushing forth. And I think the biggest problem with that is that most people in Myanmar don't actually understand the constitution. And they don't actually understand that a quarter of seats are still reserved for the military. They don't actually understand that Aung San SUU Kyi cannot be president. And I think that's going to set up the country for significant period of instability after the November 8 vote. Another huge structural deficiency leading up to these elections is that the Rohingya, that is a very discriminated against population, Muslim minority population in Myanmar are disenfranchised actually for the first time in Myanmar's history. So when we're talking about an election that's, that's more inclusive and there's the Most Democratic in 50 years, we have to keep in mind that that's inclusive for the Buddhist majority population, but not so much the populations that Myanmar's opening has sort of really targeted. And the Rohingya who live in camps in the western Rakhine State which borders Bangladesh, they've been leaving the country, much like Syrian migrants to Europe is very similar kind of story there. And they've seen their rights kind of steadily decline over the past the past few years. First with violent riots in 2012 that attacked them and then, you know, then they were pushed into the camps and then now they have their voting rights taken away for them and their temporary ID cards cancelled. And again, this is something that the government hasn't actually been very good at kind of explaining to the Rohingya minority population. So like in my trips to Rakhine State, you know, you talk to the population then and they really do believe that they can still vote and they don't understand why this right has been taken away from them, which again is going to lead to some, I think, instability around the vote. Leading from that is this sort of, kind of surprising as the other panelists have touched on hard line Buddhist nationalism that has taken hold in the country. And you know, it's very notable that no major political party is fielding any Muslim candidates in their life election. Even though, you know, officially they're about 4% of the population. Reality would be closer to 10%, I think. And, you know, that is a big sign, I think, for the Muslim minority population in Myanmar that, you know, whether it's the ruling Union Solidarity Development Party that's formed from the military or whether it's the nld, which is, you know, party associated with human rights and democracy, no one's actually fighting their corner, essentially. And in interviews with people in the nld, they've actually said the rise of Buddhist nationalism has stopped them from actually fielding any Muslim candidates. And they have sort of explained that to Muslim leaders within their party that they're unable to do this because of the current tensions in Myanmar currently. And, yeah, so, even with all these caveats, I mean, there is still, you know, a lot can change with the November 8 vote. The government, which will be the first democratically elected government in Myanmar's troubled history of military rule, will be able to then pick the president and sort of see then how the transition will continue. And if I can just touch on a few major issues that I would think that would influence the elections, I guess to me, the biggest spoiler will be what I touched on, which is the rise of Buddhist nationalism. You know, in this past weekend, the group, the association for the Protection of Race and Religion, or mabata, which is the ultra nationalist group of hard light monks in Myanmar, they've actually, like, they held a celebration, basically celebrating the fact that they helped to pass laws through parliament that would effectively legalize disposition discrimination against minority populations. They include a population control bill, a bill that stops Buddhist women from kind of marrying outside their faith and so on. And these laws were passed ostensibly to protect the sort of Buddhist kind of purity of Myanmar. But I think more concerning for the opposition NLD is that the parties sort of now being targeted by these hotline monks for speaking up against those laws. And the very prominent Buddhist monks are actually saying that the NLD is not Buddhist enough, and they're using all sorts of propaganda to sort of slam Ong San SUU Kyi and her party and say that they're not actually fighting for the protection of Buddhism. This rally over the past weekend was attended by tens of thousands of people. It is very clear that they have sort of mass support. And within Myanmar, I think the one thing I've noticed is that people really have a lot of reverence in their villages for their respective abbot and their village head. And there is a huge chance that if an abbot tells you, oh, you have to vote for X party over Y party. Despite Aung San SUU Kyi's overwhelming popularity, there is A chance that people would listen. So I think that is one thing that would dent the NLD's vote share in this coming vote. The other thing that my panelists briefly touched on is ethnic politics and how that's going to play a part in this election. I think that over the past few years, the ethnic parties have definitely sort of come into their own. There are a lot more of them, they're a lot more vocal, a lot more organized. And you know, Aung San SUU Kyi, her one sort of failing people say as a politician, is that she's failed to like form alliances with them and, you know, strategically decide which areas they're going to contest and sort of carve out Myanmar based on, you know, on a kind of strategic way of fighting the military dominance. And so Aung San SUU Kyi's party is contesting in every single ethnic area. And that has really isolated some of the ethnic parties who thought that, you know, similar to the 1990 vote, there would be clearer alliances formed which would be strategic against the ruling USDP and to fight off military rule. And I think that, you know, even though President Thein Sein has not really managed to achieve, you know, this nationwide peace process that people hoped would be achieved, you know, that there's going to be a signing on October 14th, 15th. Sorry, but it's going to be with half the number of parties that were involved in the process. There are still some ethnic parties that do think that their lot might be better with this current government. There are parties that are quite upset with Aung San SUU Kyi and the nld. And I think that that kind of dynamic might change, sort of the overwhelming popularity you saw of the NLD back in 1990. The other thing I've also noticed is that the USDP, while clearly a military linked party which is made up of former generals, they've actually tried very hard over the past few years to learn democratic ways. And the generals have been going around and sort of having their rallies in areas where they think that they can get significant votes. And they've become a much sort of well oiled, slick kind of machine rather than a party of military generals who don't actually know how to fight in a democratic system. And in some areas they're involved in vote buying. They're giving generators to people and they're giving satellite dishes and they're helping wire villages to the electrical grid. And in a country where most people really don't have basic necessities, this really could impact the election because people do think, oh, you know, if we vote for the USDP again, maybe we'll get more loans, maybe we'll get another buffalo or another pig, and it will help a lot because, you know, as Myanmar is mostly a rural agricultural society, this kind of thing really does matter. And vote buying could have an impact in the election. Even Aung San SUU Kyi's party has addressed this on their rallies and they've said, oh, you know, take whatever you want from the ruling party, but in the end, vote for us. I mean, I mean, it sort of remains to be seen, you know, how this will play. But I do think that especially in rural areas where people are not particularly following politics and they're more concerned with their harvest and how they're going to get by, which is a vast majority of the population, that could impact things very different from what's going on in the urban areas where people are far more educated, where they have access to newspapers, where they know the kind of election dynamics and, and that's something that they're aware of. I think the other thing that's been really interesting to observe has been Aung San SUU Kyi's kind of fading glory a little bit, especially within urban areas of Myanmar and intellectual circles. Obviously she is still by far the most popular politician in the country. Superstar kind of glory everywhere she goes. She's widely revered because she's the daughter of Aung San, which is the nationalist human, and his portrait still hangs on people's walls and homes. But she has definitely isolated big parts of the student movement that actually helped her rise to prominence by not fielding candidates of the 88th Generation Student Group with this coming election. And so they're prominent activists like Koko G and others who feel very sidelined and who had helped helped the NLD campaign for constitutional change and who had agreed with them not to form a political party because they thought that there would be this alliance and they would all sort of contest together under the NLD's banner. And that has definitely isolated some who've gone out then to contest as independents or, you know, not aligned themselves with the NLD and who are now openly criticizing Dawsu in a way that I think you would have never seen four years ago. And who are questioning this notion that she should be the rightful leader of Myanmar. And I think that has kind of spread into the diplomatic community as well. And, you know, even the sort of US and to a lesser extent the UK are also kind of questioning whether it really was that wise to formulate policy around Myanmar based on a single individual, which they used to do. So I think you're going to see that kind of dynamic change as well with the geopolitical relations of Myanmar depending on how the election goes. You know, if Aung San SUU Kyi cannot become president or even if the NLD does not win a majority, what will she then say and then how will the international community then respond? I think that's going to be really interesting to watch over the next three to four months. And I think that, you know, in conclusion, there's definitely going to be a lot of political uncertainty over the next few months. I think a lot of people underestimate how long the process of holding trading is going to go on for in Myanmar because the vote is on November 8th. But that's not conclusive in any way because it will only form the parliament and then the parliament will then have to decide on the president. And that process doesn't have to happen until March. So there's going to be a very long period of political uncertainty and just touching on the economy for a second. I think a lot of foreign businesses have been and continue to be very concerned about this because, you know, throughout the reform process, decision making has been concentrated in the hands of very few. So if you were a business trying to get a license approved or trying to get something passed, you would go to a couple of key ministers. All these ministers right now have stepped down from the ministerial roles to run and to contest these elections. So, you know, that has happened. That process has happened since June. And with the election uncertainty going to last till March, I think that things in Yangon are quite still in terms of like the business community and what they're doing. Things are definitely a lot quieter than they were a year ago. And I think a lot of people are waiting to see how things will turn out. Thank you.

A (41:32)

Thank you very much, Shobhani. So now you've got three perspectives on this upcoming event, but not just on the upcoming event, on more general, longer term and in fact, geopolitical issues having to do with Myanmar's relations with the United States and China. Among other things, we heard, I think, some good news about how this could this is the freest election that Myanmar will have seen in decades. On the other hand, also some nuance in how what many of us might have original, many outside observers, not many of us, but many outside observers might have originally thought would be a walkover because of the extreme personal popularity of one of the protagonists in this actually sees a diminution and a Diminution, not just in the different things surrounding institutional barriers, like the different articles in the constitution that still prevent Aung San SUU Kyi from becoming president, but also in some of her own actions, the things that she said about ethnic and religious president practice in the country, her exclusion of the Generation 88 student leaders, as well as the rejection of the United Nationalities Alliance, a coalition of ethnic based parties. And so for me, maybe just to get the discussion going, given the institutional obstacles, given these nuances, that seems to me the possibility that neither Aung San SUU Kyi's party nor the current ruling USDP will emerge as the strongest single government making entity. And if that's the case, because of these institutional barriers, are we going to be needing to look at coalitions and alliances that will form? And if so, who's going to go with whom? Who's actually already got natural friends at work? That's the question I throw out for the panelists up here. If they wish, they can respond to that or other things that might have come up in the conversation. Perhaps we can begin with Jurgen.

C (43:38)

Well, I think this is very difficult to speculate on. I mean, there was at a time the assumption that there might be an alliance between Dorsu and who was heading the lower house parliament. But as Mark already said, that potential alliance came unstuck when, I think he was removed earlier in the summer and it became clear that he might actually not be the first candidate of choice, even from within his own party, let alone, you know, be able perhaps to get the backing of those people who sit in parliament who are from the military. So there is a question mark, therefore, as to what other people might be waiting in the wings to potentially attract the votes that they would require in order to emerge successfully as president, or if they make it not to the very top, but at least to the vice presidents.

B (44:47)

I think it's a bit of a cop out, but it's very hard to see how it's going to come together because Duan Sun SUU Kyi hitched her wagon, as it were, to Thoresh Weiman, who's now unceremoniously been dumped. So it's not quite sure what the Plan B is. My gut feeling is there will be a coalition of sorts. It will still be one that the military dominates. I think a bigger issue for Myanmar is the issue of capacity, because as Shobhani said, when you go there, it's the same two or three names that come up in connection with any reform, whether it's the tender process for the oil and gas blocks or telecoms, it's the same amazing two or three individuals who are not young, many of them are in their 70s, who are carrying this thing forward. So the issue for me in a way is not whether it's NLD or usdp, it's who is, where is the talent, where are the technocrats that are going to carry on and carry this process of change to the next level.

A (45:52)

Thank you, Shibani.

D (45:56)

Yeah. My other two panelists have already talked about the alliance or the alliance that was forming between Aung San SUU Kyi and Tura Schwiemann. I'm not convinced that the Reshui man is politically dead. I do think that if the NLD still manages to win a majority of votes, they will have a say in who they can nominate for president. And the way it works, you don't actually even have to be an elected member of parliament to become president in Myanmar. So really, even if he does not win a seat, he does actually still have a chance at maybe eventually becoming president. But yeah, I do think that this issue of alliances and what's going to happen post November is actually one of the most uncertain things in Myanmar right now because it's also very hard to see how the ethnics will sort of play their card. I mean, who they'll throw their weight behind. I think if the NLD does win a majority of seats and a clear enough majority, then they don't really have to seek formal alliances. But at the end of the day, the military still has a quarter of seats in place. Parliament, they still will call the shots to an extent, and they will still have a pick of who they can field as president because it's three candidates, one that the lower house and the upper house, and one that the military puts forward. So they will still have a say in either who the vice president or the president will be. And I think that will be interesting.

A (47:17)

To observe with the removal of Xue man from the usdp. Why isn't Aung San SUU Kyi trying to reach out to, to form better friends with the other groupings, ethnic minorities or otherwise?

D (47:31)

Sheikh? Yeah, so I think, I think with Aung San SUU Kyi, I think she's still, you know, she always refers to her plan A, B, C and D. You know, I really do think that she believes that there is a way for her to eventually become president, for her to change the constitution. If the NLD wins a majority. I'm not sure that will actually be doable because obviously to change the Constitution, you do need at least one general. You do need one military linked person to vote, along with 75% of the parliament. So it's an overwhelming majority that you need. And I think that she has not sought those alliances because she still believes that, you know, she will get this. And I think that that might not be completely connected with reality, but. But yeah, I do think that she does still hold on very much to that mission.

A (48:24)

Interesting.

C (48:25)

Very good.

A (48:26)

Do you two want to come back on that?

B (48:27)

No, not on that.

A (48:28)

I would like to open. I'm not touching that one. Not yet. I would like to open up the discussion to the audience. So if it's okay, I would like to collect questions in groups of three or four and then I will ask the panel as a whole to respond. As you know, this event is being recorded for subsequent podcasts. So I would like to. When you ask your question, please identify yourself briefly and then ask your question again. I will collect three or four questions, make your questions short and punchy and we can get as many questions in as possible. So, sir, if you could begin. If you wait for the microphone, are there microphones to come around? There's one coming out behind you. So we'll do you. And then the woman in green. To everyone.

B (49:24)

I'd like to take the panel up on something that Mark Canning said just a minute or two ago about capacity. If the process that follows the election going to be messy, complicated, if there's going to be some sort of transition process, just as there has been a peace process, then the fact that capacity is so thinly spread is tremendously important. And my impression is that, you know, people, apart from political complexion, people are floundering, really. You know, the isolation of Myanmar has had a deep impact. And I would really like to ask the panel, you know, who's helping with this, particularly Mark Canning, as a former ambassador, may be able to deal with this, but also, you know, where are the political technocrats, if I can use that phrase, getting support from, on how they not being steered in a particular direction, but in pure process terms, how they manage that process.

A (50:51)

Thank you very much. Woman in green with a green jumper in the middle behind you. There's a microphone coming your way.

D (51:00)

Thanks. Hi, my name is Sarah. I work here at the igc. I just wanted to talk about, like ask a question about Aung San SUU Kyi and her failed attempt to build this coalition with Xue man, but also her failure to actually raise up an alternative leader within the nld. She knew that there was a very real possibility that she would not be president or be legible for it. And yet she didn't make any effort to really raise up much of a leader within her own party. And so my question is really how much is her kind of like blind entitlement to presidency really going to be an obstacle for Myanmar?

A (51:43)

Thank you very much. Now there were some questions from the back of the room. So sir, hello, my name is Jo Sol. Actually I'm from Myanmar. So I want to ask a question as Shiba Ni has asked. NLD is likely to win the election. So what kind of action or policy would NLD perform as priority? Okay, thank you very much. Excellent question. So the okay, behind you, there's one. If you could just stand up so the microphone can get to you. Here we go. I know who you are, but the ushers don't. So go ahead.

D (52:22)

Thank you so much. My name is Kimmaji. I'm from Oxford University. Aung San SUU Kyi Gender research Fellow. And thank you so much for very timely panel and particularly thank you for Shivani for particularly focusing on Mabata. And we must remember that the rise of Mabata cannot be underestimated because they are equal number with military and they have equal influence and power with the military. And also they have been greatly supported by the USDP. As you all know, yesterday there are more than 1 million people attended for like I know this and it's really interesting to see that they force NLD to announce that there is no single Muslim candidates in their body. So actually these things are actually very dangerous for Burma Democratic movement. But my question is that there are also problem with fundamental issue of voting things. And even despite the fact that there are a lot of millions of support from eu, there are a lot of complaints on voting list. And I myself went to the voting poll and I saw 16 people have seen date off but in one page and at the same time also there are many people including celebrities. Famous Burmese are not included in the list. So how much do you confident in this election? Thank you.

A (54:01)

Thank you very much. I'm going to come back. I know there are lots more questions. I'll come back and I'll try and pick up people from upstairs as well. But perhaps I could turn first to Mark. You want to kick off on this?

B (54:12)

Shall I start with the issue of capacity? Because it's really important and when I was there under the. I was there from 05 to 09 which was the most closed period and that really was what we were trying to do was to build the seeds of an opposition to try as we could to foster what was left of a democratic opposition. But now the country's opened up. The demand for the few people of talent has increased and exponentially. There are loads of people trying to help, from George Soros, osi, to the World Bank. Everyone and their mother is trying to help, which is actually part of the problem. I mean, there's huge dysfunctionality now, but there's no easy answer to this. This is a country that's been completely cut off from the outside world, whose education system, which was once the finest in Southeast Asia, was totally destroyed. And it's going to take a generation or more to build them up. And I've been impressed at the number of young Myanmar that I've encountered who've gone back, including some people I never thought the military would let back. And I hope our Myanmar friends at LSE and elsewhere in the UK go back and help their country, because it's really what's needed. And they need to work in the government rather than in the private sector for a couple of years. But you're right, it's going to hold that nation back for many, many years.

A (55:39)

Thank you. Jurgen, recently you wrote about Aung San SUU Kyi's visit to China, and I wonder if you might reflect a little bit on the policy priorities should her party come to power.

C (55:53)

Should her.

B (55:54)

What policy priorities should they come to power?

C (56:03)

I think if we look at the program that the NLD has put out there, I mean, we can see that the priorities are clearly all to do with domestic politics, with governance and economic concerns of various kinds in order to lift up, I guess, the people of the country. And they're all, I mean, this is basically a continuation, I think, of what she has stood for for many, many years. And so to that extent, it's understandable. There's almost nothing, if you were looking on foreign policy, for example, it's all about domestic priorities. I think the visit to China was interesting. She undertook that visit in early June of this year because it constituted the first time that she'd actually gone to China. It was a visit that was arranged on party party lines rather than she going as an mp. She was invited in her party capacity, and she was, I think, made aware of the kind of positions that the People's Republic of China has on the need for the two countries to continue to pursue a cooperative relationship. And of course, to some extent, the Chinese have held out hope that she may also be an important figure when it comes to deciding very soon, as to what will happen with this enormous Misson Dam, which was suspended shortly after the whole rapprochement between President Hussein Sen and Aung San Suu Kyi happened in August of 2011. So the question mark really for the Chinese has been to what extent can they continue to do business in Myanmar, to what extent can they invest? How safe are these investments? And I think they are hoping obviously for any government to revisit that major decision because the Chinese have already invested 1.5 billion or something like that in this particular project. So it's a massive sum of money, but yet it's a very, I mean, it's a very complex, if you like, situation in which any government would find itself. I think most people that I've spoken to on the ground do not actually believe that this project will be resumed, at least not soon. The Chinese will also have made her aware of the delicate situation which the countries face along the border. Again, we didn't go into any detail here, but you have to recognize that we're not just talking Kokang region here, we're talking about the northern part of Myanmar in which, you know, be it in Kachin state, you have conflict or no state, you have an ethnic army which, you know, may total 15 or 20,000. Nobody really knows, a sort of force which is able to hold off anyone from entering without authorization into that particular part. And if you think about any comparison with other countries, then I think it strikes us as being almost a unique case because there are not surely very many countries where you have ethnic armies who are able to deny the authority is the kind of state building process which the government, particularly the military, has been pursuing arguably since the dawn of independence. So there are connections across the border which involve locals and provincial authorities and individuals, you know, that are very difficult to capture and that give rise to suspicion. So it's these kinds of issues that she will have discussed when she was in China. And I think she has taken so far, of course, the attitude that it is, it is important to have good relations with China. But what we also know is that historically she has always veered towards or leaned towards the west. Right. All of her initial visits were to the west, be to the uk, to the United States. She hasn't even visited many of the ASEAN states, which is kind of surprising perhaps for some of us. So, so there is a real question mark about how she will think about these issues. And I think much of the if she was to score a major victory in the election, if she has to think about how to move forward, then she would probably have to face this question, not only what training do we get long term, but also what do we do in the interim? And then, of course, I think she is very much bound to address this question in terms of who can we trust to help us out. It's very, I think it's a very common theme that she doesn't trust a lot of people perhaps to help her cause along the way. And this, of course, means that it's all about personal relations she may have. And some of these personal relations undoubtedly are again with people here in the uk. So watch this space.

A (61:36)

Okay, thank you very much. Yogin Shibani.

D (61:40)

So on the question about Aung San SUU Kyi in coalition building, you know, I think it's really interesting because when Xi was first released from house arrest, she had a number of paths she could have taken. The one is, the one that she's taken was to be a politician to contest the presidency, or to make it really obvious that she wanted to contest the presidency despite the constitutional ban. But, but there were other paths she could have taken. One of them was to groom a successor within the NLD and to groom the party so that they will be able to then fulfill that role even if she cannot. Or she could have kind of stepped back from politics and sort of remained Burma's sort of moral voice. Right. And sort of played the role that she played when she was under house arrest, you know, speaking up against dictatorship or speaking up against discrimination against the Rohingya, for example, or any other issue. And yeah, you know, if you speak to some people within Myanmar, sort of intellectual circles, I do think they would think that she took the wrong path, that she took the path that would have the most resistance and would sort of cause this reassessment of her legacy and sort of open her up to the day to day sort of like political fighting rather than have her be kind of above politics and able to lead the country and take the country forward by being its moral voice. And I do think that, you know, for capacity within the NLD and the question also about their policies and how they will be in government, you know, it really does seem like the party is run as a sort of one woman show her sort of her committees, the economic committee, for example, any of the other committees report to her directly. And, you know, even in interviews with NLD members, they will always defer and say, oh, Dosu said this or Dorsu said that. You know, it's very, very hard for them to express their own opinion on something. And I do think that that, you know, for governments and for the future of the country is going to be quite concerning. It's concerning for a lot of people, I think.

A (63:42)

Yeah, certainly. Please.

B (63:44)

I mean, I just wanted to put an alternative view on that because there has been a lot of criticism. But also you've got to imagine what the situation would be if there was no Dorsu and if there had been no Dorsu before the opening up and after. And people would often say to me when I was there, well, she's no longer relevant. To which I would say, well, if that was true, she wouldn't be under house arrest or in prison, you know, she clearly was. And the same is true now that it's a bit like when Donald Rumsfeld said, if I want to speak to Europe, who do I telephone? And it's a bit like that with the opposition in Myanmar. If there wasn't a Dorsu to pull them together and to command the respect of different ethnic groups and elements within the military, you think, well, actually how would this process work? It wouldn't even get off first base. So there are other factors in it as well.

C (64:47)

Excellent.

A (64:49)

Okay, I'm going to take another round of questions now. So as people get ready, I just wanted to remark that the question from our Myanmar colleague in the back of the room was quite generally about policy and it could have been a reference to what kind of economic policy NLD might follow, how it relates to what's happening with the opening up of the ASEAN Economic Community, what's its attitude on tariffs, foreign investment, exploiting of natural resources, all of which are, you know, from my own perspective as an economist, I'm also greatly interested in. But it's quite instructive for me to hear how the narrative here that we're building around this political competition does not yet hugely emphasize that conversation. But maybe it's something that I hope that we will be able to grow more of. Let me take another round of questions now. Can I take Judith's question here? Judith, if you could. I know who you are, but the ushers might not. If you could just stand up quickly so that we can get the microphone to you.

D (65:55)

Hi. So anti Muslim riots haven't reached the.

A (66:00)

Same levels as they did in 2012 and 2013. And I was wondering, even though small.

D (66:07)

Scale pogroms do continue, I was wondering.

A (66:10)

If you would comment on what sort of triggers you'd see as inflaming these in the next few months in the.

D (66:16)

Lead up to the election.

A (66:18)

Thank you. Okay, I think the gentleman in the back of the room and then I'll come to you. Hi, I am, and I'm the Myanmar management student. My question is to direct to the economics point of view. So if NLD didn't win in favor in this election, what do you expect the foreign investment landscape in the country to be in the future? Because there's already a substantial amount of foreign investment in the country at this moment. Will it sustain in the future or how will it turn out? Thank you. Thank you. Now there was a gentleman in the corner. Yeah, if you could just.

C (67:08)

Hi, my name is Voi Lee. I'm from Exeter University, recent LSE graduate. Well, I come from China, so I want to come back to the question about the influence or the attitudes that comes from the Chinese government. So kind of have two questions, but I think it's connected. The question is to what extent do you believe the sudden progress of democratic progress or change in Myanmar is driven by a strong belief in ideology or it's more like influenced by more practical kind of calculation of external influences? And the second question is how do you actually formulate the role of China in Myanmar as more like a threat of its recent progress or actually the country's foreign policy can be portrayed as a positive force? Because I think there is kind of a discourse on Chinese foreign policy in the sense that there are very less ideology driven and more kind of pragmatic, ideological driven. So I just wonder how you actually understand or interpret future influence of such government.

A (68:50)

Okay, thank you. Role of China now. Women's scarf with the green. Jessica, if you can wait for the microphone.

C (68:58)

Thanks.

D (68:59)

My name is Jessica Avalon. I'm from the Australian National University. I just wanted to pick up on Shibani's comment that there's really nobody fighting in the corner of the ethnic groups. And I'm slightly concerned that in addition to that, through perhaps incompetence or purposeful actions, the voting process is going to be weakest in, in those ethnic areas as well. So we'll see this buildup of hope and then there's likely to be a huge letdown when a lot of the ethnic minorities interests are not represented in a substantial way. To what extent do you think that that is likely to be the case? And do you see this leading to renewed and perhaps prolonged conflict coming out of a sort of fading of hopes and disillusionment with the idea of change? Thanks.

A (70:03)

Thank you, Jessica. Okay, if we can begin. Jurgen, you're free to pick up on any of these questions, but Certainly the question about China seems to be exactly directed at what you've recently been doing.

C (70:17)

Okay, if we go back a couple of years, then we can say that even though Myanmar in declaratory terms has a non aligned and active and independent foreign policy, the military government which preceded the current one did in practice actually have some form of limited alignment with China in order to deal with the perceived US threat in particular, and not in terms of military intervention, but primarily in my view anyway, in terms of a possible UN Security Council resolution that would have opened up the possibility of a future intervention of some sort. Now that obviously that form of alignment has gone and Myanmar's declaratory and substantive foreign policy thus have, if you like, at least in my view, converged once more. But the relationship is tricky that Myanmar now has with China. And I think it's all very well saying that in some ways, of course the relationship has been a positive one. There are examples over the years of much cooperation. Yeah, clearly they have. Also there are certain people who have benefited from that as well within Myanmar, we should say. But at the end of the day, the feeling is that China hasn't been as forthcoming in some matters as, you know, the Myanmar political elites, particularly perhaps the military would have liked. And this is again the point about how to deal with those areas in northern Myanmar that are not effectively under the control. If you look at the constitution, the constitution says there should be one army, but this is not the reality of Myanmar. When the government of senior General Sun Shui set forth a plan for the future democratization of the country, a so called roadmap issued in 2003, it was probably anticipated that by the time this process finishes, they would have achieved better success at actually this project of state building that they entered into many decades ago. But they haven't been able to really make much progress. And if you look at the situation now, it's arguably worse than it's ever been for the last couple of years anyway, because there's much more fighting going on in that region. And if you look at the Kokang, obviously these are for some people, ethnic Chinese who may or may not have enjoyed the support of other ethnic groups also on the border, be it the war or be it Mongola or whatever, and all of whom entertain some relationships with people across the border. Now, when the Myanmar government pursued a military solution to deal with the issue in Kokang, they of course accidentally killed some Chinese across the border and had to apologize for this in a spectacular fashion. But, well, not spectacular in the sense that it was spectacular, but in terms they had to apologize particular way. And this of course ultimately led to Chinese government undertaking military life exercises right on the border. That's why I said in my initial remarks, I mean, this hasn't happened for a long time. This is therefore one of the worst kind of periods in the bilateral relationship. And it's difficult to see either side really backing down. On the one hand, the Chinese side is saying you need to have stability on the border. The Myanmar side would say, well, you know, that's not really up to you. These people fought us and we have suffered many deaths and we are going to pursue the military solution for as long as we like. So in a way, there's a stalemate there. And it is ironic, of course, China, China officially says we follow a policy of non interference. We're dedicated to this principle. But at the end of the day, by pursuing this policy or principle in the way they do, they are of course interfering because they are preventing. This is a government perspective, I should say this is not perspective of those ethnic groups concerned. But they actually prevent to some extent things from happening that have been aimed for for a long time. So therefore the relationship is complicated, it is difficult, and it is also not so easy to say, okay, we will improve the relationship by pursuing other issues. You know, some of the issues that I refer to in my introductory remarks have to do with creating, if you like, a sort of a pathway through Myanmar so that China can access the Bay of Bengal, can access the Indian Ocean. You know, these, the projects that we can talk about here and that we're under discussion involve, you know, railway lines, roads, et cetera. But these are all, you know, strategically important projects that do not necessarily, either for economic or other reasons, appeal to the Myanmar government. So there is not necessarily much out there apart from good and big talk in how to move that relationship to much better ground. I'm sure they will all try. They all have a stake in each other's future. But at the moment I think it's still the case that the relationship is a bit of an impasse.

A (76:29)

Thank you. Now, Shibani, obviously your opening comments would have prompted people to start to reflect on the nature of the anti Muslim violence or the representation of ethnic interests. But also, you know, I know that you've recently written about how the gloss has come off US Investment in Myanmar, so feel free to pick up on any of these issues.

D (76:51)

Yes. So in terms of foreign investment, I think that particular. I'm sure Mark can touch on this as well. But investors like stability. And I think for them because of the capacity issue, because approval process for the licenses has been concentrated in the hands of so few businesses would like to see those ministers continue in positions of power. One of them is so thin who is Thein Sein's economic minister. And there are a couple of others as well, Winston Salong in the Central bank and so on and so forth. And, and I think it would be prudent for an NLD government, if they do indeed win a majority of seats, to continue working together very closely with those ministers really shepherded the process. It really would be beneficial to businesses and beneficial for the continuity of the reform process. And yeah, it is true that US businesses in particular have issues with remaining sanctions, including the SDN list, which is a blacklist of individuals that are linked to the previous military government. I think that from the US perspective, there are definitely indications that if the elections go as planned or go as well as they can possibly go, given the structural deficiencies, then that might prompt a policy change on the SDN list and it might sort of normalize relations even more with the US and Myanmar and some of those sanctions would come off. And I think that that would be, you know, boost number two for businesses. The first would have been, you know, obviously Barack Obama's trip in 2012 and you know, the removal of sanctions in 2012 as well that, you know, basically the US was selling its businesses, you know, come here, invest, have, have good examples of US businesses in a country that, you know, has, has never really had Western investment for the past 50 years and then sort of do well. And there haven't been that many examples of that yet because they're not that big commitments coming from US companies. The oil and gas and telecom stuff is definitely significant, but a lot of that's kind of exploration as well, even with the oil and gas. And I do think that US companies do have a good opportunity to kind of show how it's done or how it can be done better in Myanmar than perhaps the Chinese business businesses, right. Which have had very bad reputation for being not particularly good in terms of their labor practices. On Judith's question on the anti Muslim riots and what might trigger that, I think it's really interesting to see how Mabatha has kind of moved now towards more influencing politics and legislation than on the ground violence. I think they've become a lot savvier and more mainstream as a political organization even. And you know, they're less concerned with sort of distributing pamphlets, you know, anti Muslim and sort of Encouraging violence on a kind of local level, but more interested in influencing legislation that would have, you know, that would allow discrimination on a wider level. So I think that's why you see kind of less outbursts of violence happening in Rakhine State. You know, the state has a new chief minister. He's been in the state for, for two years. And I think he's really controlled violence from erupting there. But I do think that ahead of the elections, because the Rohingya don't really understand that they can't vote. November 8th, there are going to be some people in that state who are able to vote. There are some areas where the Muslims are not fully isolated from the Buddhist population. And there are some Muslims who do actually have citizenship cards. The Muslims who are not like the Rohingya, they do have identification cards. And I think you're going to have a very confusing situation on that day itself. And you know, I know various organizations have a lot more election monitoring capacities within Rakhine State because they are quite concerned about the outbreak of violence around the election there.

A (80:44)

Interesting.

B (80:47)

I think there's clearly a huge amount of uncertainty in the months ahead, the weeks ahead. But I think the issue of foreign direct investment is actually a very important stabilizing factor because whoever ends up running the place or whatever the permutations are, they have got to maintain that foreign direct investment. It's underpinning thousands of jobs and that will I think act as a certain stabilizer in the whole thing. There was a question I just wanted to touch on. On was it an ideological change that led Myanmar to open up in 2011? And I think this is a really interesting question because there are basically two schools of thought. There are. One school says the sanctions were ratcheted up so tight the generals threw up their hands and said we can't take it anymore. Tell us what you want us to do. But it wasn't that. It certainly wasn't that in my view. But what it was was sanctions operating in a different way. It created huge distortions in the economy. It shut off Western capital from Myanmar. It forced the Myanmar economy really to become, to lean more and more towards China. And I think the generals understood. The generals who are proud men, whatever you say about them, they understood the choice was very clear. Did they become a second rate province of China or did they take back control of their lives and operate a more balanced relationship with China and the West? So sanctions didn't operate like a boot on their neck, but it definitely operated in a slightly different way in terms of forcing them to confront choices.

A (82:38)

Thank you. Now, I know I promised I would try and get as many questions in as possible, but we are running up against a strict time limit. So what I'm going to need to do now is I'm going to invite the panelists to provide a brief closing statement to reflect on both what they've heard from each other, but also from the questions and the conversation that we've had. I'm going to go in reverse order. So, Shibani, do you want to begin? Sure.

D (83:01)

So, yeah, I mean, obviously I think the, the theme of this panel really has been the amount of political uncertainty that Myanmar will face over the next couple of months. But you know, for me, the biggest issue, more than the NLD and the fate of Aung San SUU Kyi and the presidency and so on, is how Myanmar controls this really ugly and kind of scary rise of Buddhist nationalism that we've seen over the past few years. And I think because that is so sort of ground level and so visceral for so many people and it affects the day to day lives of so many people within the country, I think that if the government does what they have been doing over the past four years, which is continuing to sort of enable these, the most radical and the most hard line voices within the society to have a soapbox and to have an influence over political decisions and business decisions and laws that are enacted, I think that could be a very, very harmful thing for the transition. And you know, in the context of Southeast Asia, when you are surrounded by, you know, Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, you know, it is potentially very destabilizing. And I think that whichever government that's in power, be it the NLD or the usdp, one of the things that they will have to do is to kind of sort of fight back this surge of, of Buddhist nationalism that we've seen over the past few years.

A (84:26)

Thank you, Jurgen.

C (84:28)

Well, I think for me, obviously I worked in international Relations department, the key point is how will Myanmar's foreign policy evolve? How will the particular relationships it has with the Western states and China evolve? My point I would like to make sort of now is really about my belief that whatever really happens in the election, it's very difficult to see Myanmar move away from a position of non alignment even, you know, if we have a Dor Su victory. There has been so much interest among many to diversify foreign relationships. And I think we've all said it's very important for the, for the elites to have a balance given the kind of country that Myanmar is then I think that this is going to be a trade also in foreign policy in the future.

A (85:21)

Thanks, Mark.

B (85:23)

Just as it's going to require compromise and statesmanship and pragmatism from the players within Myanmar. My hope is that we see the same thing from the west, from the US from the EU I hope they don't look at these elections. Clearly these elections are going to be suboptimal. You know, one hopes that they're okay, but you can always pick faults with them in a hundred ways. And I think what is really required is a realism on the part of the west in particular, that this is a messy, slow process. I mean, I think the Arab Spring has been very instructive in demonstrating that you cannot move from black to white, bad to good. There are vested interests, and you wish those away at your peril. And if you want to make those changes too quickly, you can. But the whole thing will fall apart. And, you know, just as Indonesia has taken 15 years to do it, so Myanmar will take 15 years. Turkeys don't vote for Christmas. You need to lead people along out of politics. It's going to take a decade or more for the military to relinquish their grip, and people need to be realistic about this in giving it space to happen.

A (86:43)

Thank you. Okay, on that note, about being realistic in our expectations, I'm afraid we have come to the end of our evening. I want to just, first of all, thank all of you, the audience, for your interest, for your attention, for all the excellent questions you've asked. Then I would like to invite you to join me in thanking our panelists for truly scintillating evening. Thank you all very much.