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A
Hello.
B
Hello.
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Hello. Hello. Both say hello.
B
Hello.
C
Hello. There we go.
A
Hello, and welcome to the Ballpark, a podcast from the US center here at the London School of Economics. I'm Denise Barron. Today were diving into a piece of research that started out as one thing, but ended up as another.
C
I wasn't setting out to look for rural attitudes towards cities.
A
That's Professor Kathy Kramer, and we'll introduce her in more detail in a little bit. But at this point, what you need to know is that this research that we're talking about today, this work, which Kathy has been working on for nearly a decade, picks up on one of the deepest and most politically significant divides in contemporary society. The gulf and resentment between rural and urban communities. And this idea of resentment, it's a.
C
Term that I think carries a lot of negative connotation, but I don't. I don't necessarily start with that.
A
I sat down with Kathy when she was in London, and today I'm very happy to have a fellow Midwesterner. I'm Denise. And I heard how an unconventional method of listening helped her dive deep into the rural urban divide. So Kathy Kramer is a professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and she's also the director of the Morgridge center for Public Service Mortgage.
C
Morgridge. So it's like lots of Rs in there. Morgridge, yeah, Morgridge, yeah.
A
And on top of that, Kathy is also the author of a number of books.
C
So today we're focusing on the politics of resentment. Colon, Social science. Colon, I should say.
B
Right.
C
Rural Consciousness and the Rise of Scott Walker.
A
Right. And Scott Walker, for those people who.
C
Don'T know, is currently the governor of Wisconsin. He was elected governor in 2010.
A
If that name, Scott Walker, sounds familiar, it might be because of the considerable conflict between Governor Walker and. And the labor unions in Wisconsin in recent years.
C
That's right, right, yes. And led to a recall election, which he survived and was the first governor in the US to do so. And he's been reelected once, too. And then he ran for president, started to run for President of the United States, but dropped out of the Republican primary.
A
Right, right. Okay, so let's jump into your. To the research that went into this book. What's the context for it? Where did you begin? And we'll get into your methods, I.
C
Guess, as we talk about that. Well, I started back in 2007, and I was looking for how people politics with their social class identity. You know, social class has been much more meaningful here in the UK than the Us, or at least we tell ourselves in the US but in fact, it's pretty important to people's political opinions. So I was really interested in how people use their social class identity to make sense of politics. And I just decided over the course of my career that a really good way for me to. To study political understanding is to listen to people talk to one another. And so what I did was to sample a variety of communities across the state of Wisconsin, which led me to realize that there's a big rural versus urban split in Wisconsin and around the nation. But it wasn't what I started looking for. So that's my way. I give the long answer to explain it. I wasn't setting out to look for rural attitudes towards cities.
A
And so you went out into the rural communities in particular.
C
Yeah, so, yeah, so that. That's right. That Madison and Milwaukee are definitely the two big cities in the state. But I had sampled communities, 27 communities across the state, which meant that I was in a lot of smaller communities too. And again, not intending to focus on how attitudes are different there or how people make sense of politics differently in those types of places, but, yeah, it just meant that I was well outside the Madison and Milwaukee. Yeah, Madison and Milwaukee metro areas a lot of the time.
A
Right. Outside of the urban bubble, for sure.
C
Yeah.
A
And you. Did you do interviews with voters? Is that. Or did you do.
C
I didn't. Yeah. I honestly, there's no label for what I did.
A
Sure.
C
What I did was to ask people, either local newspaper editors or people affiliated with the university who are actually housed in each of the 72 counties in the state, our extension university extension offices. And I asked them, where do people gather on a regular basis that I could get access to? Just groups of regulars. I'm not sure what the equivalent term would be here, but, you know, people who get together usually every day, usually over coffee, to just visit and share the news and then move on with their day. And so the term, sometimes a common term that's used in Wisconsin, Wisconsin has quite a German heritage, is coffee clutches. People say coffee clutch, you know, so I. I wasn't assembling these groups of people and it was more than one person, except on one occasion, I think. So they're not really focus groups.
A
Right, right.
C
But I was. I was nevertheless leading the conversation at points, but trying to step back and just listen as much as possible too.
A
So the word resentment really jumped out to me from your research. Can you tell me a little bit about how you define resentment?
C
Sure. In my mind. And I should acknowledge it's a term that I think carries a lot of negative connotation, but I don't, I don't necessarily. I don't start with that. What I start with is that it's a term that captures a feeling of not getting your fair share, a sense of injustice or a sense that you've been wronged somehow.
A
Right.
C
And I think it's a really politically important sentiment because when you, when you, when you notice injustice, it's kind of a first step towards it being politically relevant. If you just think something is a personality conflict or about you as an individual, you have a different reaction to it, typically. Right. But when it's a sense that, like, something systematic is going wrong here, that means I'm on the. Just not getting my fair share, then. Then you're likely to. It's more likely to have some type of policy implication.
A
And it seems to me from, from that understanding of resentment that it inherently has someone at the other end of it. Right. And that, that, that's a natural. You know, if someone's resentful, it's towards something, towards another group of people or.
C
Yeah, yeah. It's just. Yeah. Like you've been wronged by some force.
A
Right.
C
And not. So it's not just a twist of fate or something happening by chance. Yeah. And I think that's really important politically, too, because when people have a target, blame in mind, that can be mobilized.
A
Right, right. So tell me a little bit about what role you've seen resentment play in recent elections in particular.
C
Sure. Well, I'll talk briefly about Scott Walker, just because it's so instructive for how this works. But then it mattered a lot in the 2016 presidential election, too. So with Scott Walker, one thing that happened in his initial election and then throughout his term as governor is that he told people that one of the reasons that they were struggling to make ends meet was that so much money was going to public employees. And that he characterized and in his terms called the public employees the haves and private employees the have nots. And that was a way for him to say, you're right, you are not getting your fair share. And you know what? Here's a group of people that's getting more than their fair share. And for him, as a very small government Republican, it was an effective way for him to both mobilize people's resentment and then once in office, justify policies like the Act 10 policy that you referred to, in which he basically undercut collective bargaining among almost all public employee unions, eliminated it and also required public employees to pay in so much more to their health care and pension benefits. So in Madison, where there's a lot of state workers, it was hugely unpopular. But the way resentment worked in that election and in his recall election and subsequent reelection was by him mobile, using that resentment to focus people's anger at a particular target. Right, right. Yeah. And then in the presidential election, I mean, Donald Trump is a very different candidate from Scott Walker, and even their platforms are quite different. That seems to have changed a little bit since Donald Trump's been in office. But anyhow, Donald Trump mobilized on resentment, too, because. And obviously not just to folks in Wisconsin, but across the country. He also said, you're right to be so upset and you are getting the short end of the stick or you're not getting your fair share. And you know what? It's the fault of these people. And his targets of blame were different. He wasn't talking so much about public employees on the campaign trail, but immigrants, Muslims, kind of veiled references to people of color, people that he portrayed as getting more attention, more resources than they should be. And that in the, in both in that message and in the way he spoke to people, it was a. It was a way of kind of saying, I. I hear what you're saying.
A
And I'm on your side. Yeah, yeah. Really putting that group dynamic at the forefront and mobilizing off of that.
C
Right. Like drawing very clear us versus them lines.
A
Right. So if we're. I mean, it's clear to any observer of American politics, a participant or someone who's studying, it's pretty clear that this is a strong, potent thing in the zeitgeist of American politics at the moment. How did this arise, especially in rural society? And I mean, where. Where did this idea of the liberal elites come from?
C
Yeah, well, that's a. That's a fascinating question. And I think the way I explain it to myself is, I think, as with any aspect of culture, there's probably a lot of different sources. Right. And so it's not. It wasn't one politician getting this ball rolling, but I think it has something to do with political rhetoric and people picking up on the lines of us versus them, battle lines that have been drawn in campaigns over time. And I'm thinking, especially since the 70s, and I say the 70s because I think part of this resentment, it's a really important source of it, is growing economic inequality and is the reality of people having a really hard time making ends meet. And in rural areas in particular, I mean, that is True for people across the board in the United States. Right. Except for the very wealthiest, that wages just are, you know, worth less than they were in the 70s. And the gap has been growing because those on the upper end of the income scale have just been making so much more income than everyone else.
A
Exponentially more.
C
Absolutely. Yeah. And everybody's feeling the stretch, so I think that's one of the sources too. But then I think the changes in the economy and the way jobs have changed and disappeared in a lot of rural communities has also contributed to people feeling like something is wrong here.
A
Right.
C
That I am working really hard and I'm doing the jobs that people in this very community used to be able to do and live a good life. And so something, something is off. Right. I should be having a better life. And so it's changes in jobs and the nature of jobs and the economy and also I think in the nature of technology in that people have, have the ability to recognize that there is wealth in society. And oftentimes it appears like urban, like its sources, like the people with a lot of money, the good paying jobs are all in the cities. And I think all these different streams, and there's others as well, are contributing to people's perception that people like me in places like this are getting a raw deal.
A
Right, Right.
C
So it's come from a lot of different angles, I think.
A
Yeah. That it makes a lot of sense. I, I'm reminded of a piece of pop culture insight from my brother, actually, and he was pointing out how people from small towns, like where we grew up, see the urban rural divide from the same perspective that is best illustrated in a movie like the Hunger Games where you have the urban elites that are obsessed with these strange topics and these strange fads and strange fashions and not focused on the same things that are just difficult in daily life outside of the capital. And so that when, when he pointed that out a couple years ago, it really made me look at things a little bit differently. I'm interested if you see this resentment from the other side because you said you didn't set out to study just rural politics. So you talked to some urban dwellers as well, for sure. And did you see the same type of resentment on that end of the spectrum?
C
Yes and no. So yes. And that it's definitely, definitely the case that people in our cities are feeling like something is really off here. Right. That I'm struggling really hard to make ends meet and it seems like no one's listening to me and my community is not getting a whole Lot of respect. But it's different in that.
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The way.
C
People were interpreting public policy and just their own situation in life wasn't through the lens of because I am a city dweller. You know, it's almost as if, as with a lot of kind of marginalized identities, it's when you're of the kind of the dominant identity, it's less prevalent. But that's not to say that there aren't, I think in the cities, the neighborhood is more meaningful than like that I'm an urban person as opposed to rural folks. Do you know what I mean? So that particular lens wasn't there, but certainly a sense of injustice and a sense that the political system is off and not responding to people like me was there for sure. Yeah.
A
What are the key findings, like what are the implications that need to be out there to inform discussions on rural politics in particular?
C
I would say one, the one that's at the top of my mind isn't necessarily related to rural politics, but just the way we think about public opinion in the US in general, and that's that people's social identities are so important. And that's obvious, and many people have been saying that for years. But yet in the study of public opinion, especially when we get to elections, we're often so attuned to people's partisanship that we forget that so many other aspects of who people are matter a lot for the votes. And partisanship, as I understand it, is very much a social identity too. But people's sense of who they are in terms of their rootedness to particular places is way more meaningful than we normally get at through national sample public opinion polls, just because it's harder to do with that type of data. Right. But I think a lot of times when people are thinking about whether a candidate resonates with someone like them, the someone like them has a lot to do with where they're from. Right. And we know that in casual interactions, like we ask each other moments after meeting each other, where are you from? It's very meaningful. Right. It's meaningful both for figuring out who people are, but it's also very meaningful for people to understand themselves and who is going to get people like them.
A
Right.
B
Yeah.
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It's such a reoccurring frame that you see pollsters use of do you think that this candidate cares about people like you, or do you think that this party represents values for people like you? And yet. And while they're measuring that attitude, they're not measuring all that contributes to a sense of people like you. What that even means.
C
Yeah. And I think it's kind of hard to do through polls.
A
Sure.
C
Which is, I think another implication of my work is that I think we all too often equate public opinion with what polls are measuring. You know, and polls are super important and super useful, but they, I think the best illustration is to say, the people that I spend time with in these coffee clutches, if they say one thing in that group context and then a pollster calls them up that evening at home and they say something different with, like, they, they give a slightly different policy preference on a, on a particular policy area, what's more real? You know, and I mean, both are a snapshot, a particular take on how they feel about politics. But the poll that, you know, responding to a stranger over the phone in, In a format that's totally unfamiliar is not necessarily more real than what they say with the group of people that they hang out with every morning, you know.
A
Yeah, yeah. And it. And also, I mean, when one of the difficulties of polls trying to measure something like this is that the pollsters, the people writing it, don't necessarily know all the options of how that answer could be expressed. And so sometimes you get answers to a poll to say, oh, clearly people believe this over this. Well, if those are the two options they're given, they'll pick one. But the truth might be more nuanced or farther over to the left or right, farther away from the answers, given that, provided that just doesn't get measured in a quantitative approach. Basically, given your understanding of resentment and how that functions in political attitudes right now and in rural societies in particular, what does this mean for American politics moving forward? Is there, is resentment going to continue to play a big role? I mean, I hate to ask you to predict something, but, you know, is this an element of our political dynamic right now that's not going away anytime soon?
C
Yeah, that's a great question. I think that's right. I think, because it's been shown to be very effective at mobilizing support, in other words, winning votes. Right. But there's sort, I think, along the lines of just what is going to happen in American politics, and also just kind of worrying about the broader implications for democracy, you know, because partly, I think one thing that's happening is both parties are trying to. And maybe the Democratic Party even more is trying to figure out where do we focus our attention? Does this, does the outcome of 2016 mean that now we have to focus more attention on rural areas in the US and there's A huge struggle, I think, within the Democratic Party about whether or not they do that. Because it's not as if all of our issues in our cities have been solved. You know, there's plenty of people who are saying, are you kidding me?
A
Like.
C
This election happens. And now the answer is we're gonna focus more on white folks in rural areas. You know, so there's this tension, and I just find it. It's very understandable, but I find it also very troubling because why can't the answer be how do we figure out a way to not sell people on policy by demonizing subgroups of the population? Right. It's just so, so negative and cannot be sustainable. Right. Because what it. What it results in is significant portions of the population having no faith in the system. It's. I don't see an end to it anytime soon.
A
Sure. All right, well. Well, thank you very much, Professor Kathy Kramer, for joining us here at the Ballpark. Come back anytime.
C
Oh, thanks. I'm really honored to be on your show. So thanks.
A
I'm joined now by my co host, Chris Gilson. Hi, Chris.
D
Hi.
A
And I'm also joined by Tori Mallett, a PhD candidate here at the London School of Economics, and specifically she's in the sociology department. So thanks for joining us, Tori.
B
Thanks so much.
A
So you do research specifically on political elites and sort of like, their role or their influence in local elections, is that right?
B
Yeah, kind of. I look at how the dynamics of power flow in political elections, and I find that political elites are very interesting and useful lens to view that shift of power.
A
Okay, cool. So given that work on local elections, how have you seen this rural and urban divide manifest itself?
B
Yeah, I think that that divide is definitely felt, but I wouldn't say that there's an urban conscious. The way Dr. Kramer talks about rural consciousness, I think that that probably has to do with the fact that there's a threshold point for identity, and cities tend to be identified with cities. You know, people. People think of themselves as Seattleites or San Antonians, whereas when you're in a rural community, you're rural. Any kind of animosity that is felt from the urban perspective is directed more at the state level as a whole. You know, they feel that they're. They're being undermined from a state level. And so. So their feelings about rural communities tend to be filtered through that.
A
Sure.
B
A good example might be in San Antonio, which is one of the places that I was studying. They passed an LGBTQ non discrimination ordinance, and that ruffled the Feathers of people kind of in the suburbs a bit. And so they went to their state level legislatures and then the state passed a law that superseded the city ordinance.
C
Oh, wow.
B
Okay.
A
So. So sort of like the state level government was a way to. To exercise or express that frustration then. Right. Sort of to go above the city level.
B
Yeah. And that happens in states, I think, that have large rural populations like Texas. You're not going to see that in states like New York probably. You're not going to see that in states like Washington where the cities really do dominate the state level power as well.
A
Have you seen this sense of real resentment that Dr. Kramer talked about? I mean, have you, have you observed that and you said that you specifically have been studying San Antonio and Seattle, is that right?
B
That's right.
A
So yeah. Have you seen this kind of manifestation of rural resentment?
B
I have. I'm a little bit hesitant to call it an urban, rural divide because I think that implies that there's two sides and that's it. I think it's much more of a spectrum. And when, you know, 80% of the country lives in an urban place. But that doesn't really represent the fact that more than half of Americans live in suburbia. And suburbia is really that kind of messy liminal space where politics really happens, because that's really who votes ultimately. And it's half, it's more than half of Americans and who moves to suburbs. It's people who want better schools and they want more space. They want all the advantages of being a part of an economic. But they also want that kind of simpler life that associates with the rural communities. But they have to drive a lot. They use a lot of emergency services to a degree. You know, they rely upon these things, but they don't maintain that kind of emotional connection with the city center. And so when it comes to it, they're not going to vote for expanded public transportation, they're not going to vote for more public housing and things like that. They're going to vote for lower property taxes for sure. And then they're going to really identify with this sort of nostalgia, romanticization of the rural community. So they're going to lean right when they vote.
D
Can I jump in with a sort of a geography question with one of my very old hats on? You talk about sort of suburbs reflecting more rural values. I think that's how I understand it. Does that hold across the states? I mean, would a suburb in sort of upstate New York or even a New York suburb, would that be the same as 1 as in California or as 1, as in the South. Are they all, I mean, you talk about them being liminal spaces. Are there differences across these?
B
Yeah, I think there's a lot of difference across them. And I'll just take San Antonio as an example. North San Antonio is predominantly white. South San Antonio is predominantly Latino. And the rural communities around northern San Antonio are also predominantly white. And the rural communities around south San Antonio are predominantly Latino. And you'll see them voting with each other. South San Antonio votes Democrat, and the rural communities there vote Democrat and vice versa. So I think that, yes, they lean towards who's outside the city more than in. Towards the city is probably a better way to put it.
A
So that, that kind of reminds me of one of the things we talked about when I, when I spoke with, with Kathy Kramer. She, she went into how she observed and came to define this sense of rural resentment. Her research methodology, basically. And you know, she went out to these coffee clutches. I'm just curious how you've set out to study these local elections, what sort of methods you use.
B
Yeah, so I interviewed political elites in these different cities and that really varied depending on the city. So in Seattle it was a little bit more straightforward. We're talking about political consultants, people who've worked on campaigns for a long time, elected officials themselves, union leaders, political directors, activist groups, grassroots activist groups, but also, you know, higher level groups like traditional ones, like environmentalists or Choice, and then also the business community in San Antonio, because they don't really have unions in the same way. It was mostly business community folks and zoning lobbyists.
A
And so you're saying that the landscape in Texas was quite different?
B
The landscape in Texas was very different, and I would venture to say much more like the rural communities that Dr. Kramer talks about in her book. San Antonio is the most unequal city in America. It's the most economically segregated. It's also the second sprawliest city in America. So on the south side, the communities there really do resemble rural Texas more than anything else. It has about the same level of poverty, it has about the same income. They have food deserts in a city. There's not as much of a rural urban divide there that can be clearly identified.
D
And do you see these patterns of sort of, you know, inequality and then sort of segregation of people continuing into the future? And is there any way that these things will change?
B
I hope so. The new city council that was elected this time around is adopting an equity based financial plan for the city, which is new, and it's a result of A much more progressive city council as a whole that was elected during this cycle.
A
Chris, I'm curious to hear your reaction to this. This idea that Tory brought up of more of a rural, urban spectrum. Honestly, I mean, that was something. I hadn't even been thinking about it in those terms. I've been thinking much more about that perspective from rural communities, looking at the big cities and seeing them as getting something unfair, basically getting their unfair advantage of either resources or just privilege in general over the rural communities. But I mean, like you said, that doesn't even take into account suburbia.
C
Really.
D
Yeah, I mean, most of the research that's. That's come out even relatively recently focuses on the idea of polarization and the polarization of not only politics, but of inequality and the segregation of space. So really poor communities getting larger and clustering and really rich communities and being gated getting larger and clustering. So the suburb is a really interesting unit of measure. And I think, as you said, you know, it's liminal. They are. And they are different in amongst themselves and compared to other ones. So I think, if anything, they're in probably a new space for research, a new space to look at. But I think it goes back to the question, what counts as a suburb? Where is a suburb? A suburb on the east coast looks very different to a suburb on the west coast looks very different to a suburb on the south. Are they rich? Are they middle class? Are they working class? I mean, also now we are having the rise of more working class suburbs as well as sort of the economy gets hollowed out too. The inner cities are now becoming much more kind of an area for the creative classes, which is completely different to what it was 30, 40 years ago when you had sort of what used to be called white flight from the cities as well. So I think it's just. I mean, I don't know how you feel about the story, but we're sort of seeing a new era. And you kind of tell when we should be looking more closely at suburbs and how. How that maps are and where that spectrum is.
B
Yeah, I think that, you know, the elites that I spoke to in the city often see the suburbanites as the main hindrance to getting policy done, that they want that it is not necessarily the state level, it's not necessarily rural sentiments, but it is people in the suburbs.
D
Is that because, as you say, the sheer weight of population is with the suburbs?
B
Yeah, I think it is the sheer weight of population. It's also, again, that they are very mobilized to participate politically. They have more leisure time. They have the, you know, they're highly enfranchised and. And they want what they want.
D
And I would say just they're more conservative. They have kids, they bought a house. They're protecting this asset.
B
They're fully invested in the status quo in a way that rural communities are not and in a way that urban communities are not.
A
But I wonder if the suburban identity is as powerful and as motivating in terms of political attitudes as a rural identity or an urban identity is. And perhaps maybe that's because they're at two ends of the spectrum, and so they sort of see each other as, you know, as their opponents or whatever on each side. But, yeah, I'm just kind of. I'm just kind of skeptical that that suburban identity is as much of a motivator.
B
I agree. And I think that's kind of what I was getting at when I was saying that the reasons why they moved to the suburbs, it's not to be a part of a community. It's to very operational. It's very instrumentalist in its motivating factors. And of the people that I talked to, the ones who were most likely to talk about their identity as casually, the ones who really framed the conversation in terms of identity were the people who were most invested in the city centers. They would say things like, oh, that's just how we Seattleites are, or that's the San Antonio spirit. People who operated primarily in the suburbs did not talk like that.
A
Right. They didn't express that same identity that, like, clear formed?
B
No, it was much, much more instrumentalist, much more transactional in their approach to government.
D
I mean, this may be too specific a question, but the people you spoke to in the suburbs, had they been from how long have they lived there? Had they sort of been, you know, they've been there for years. Have they moved from a different part of the city or a rural area? Because that's interesting in terms of identity. Because I would expect someone who's been in the suburbs, if they've existed for sort of 30 or 40 years, to feel more like they were Seattleites or what have you. Whereas if someone who's just moved from another part of the country, of course, Americans are so very mobile, especially compared to Europeans and people in the uk they would have a much more, as you say, instrumental point of view in terms of bettering themselves rather than having a real innate sense of community.
B
Yeah, I mean, a lot of what I'm saying right now is filtered through, you know, political consultants and kind of what they told me about the nature of voting in the city. So I don't know all of the demographic details of the people, but generally that's kind of how they approach the different groups. Those are. That's how they write their mailers, is to appeal to those kind of things. The mayoral election just happened in San Antonio over the summer. And in the suburban communities, they were mailed information about the crime rate in San Antonio primarily skyrocketing. It was not affecting suburban communities in any way at all. But they used that language to motivate them to vote because you want to keep that crime in the city not coming out here.
A
So I'm glad you brought up elections. I wanted to get back to not just your focus on elections, but sort of like the impact that this, if it's not a divide the spectrum has on elections. So do you think that there are local, national elections coming up in the next few years that are going to be impacted by this, this dynamic?
B
I do. I think that cities really do see themselves right now as this vanguard of resistance against what they see as a national wave of injustice or lack of empathy. And so I don't know how it's going to actually affect the 2018 elections, for example, just because I think that gerrymandering, political gerrymandering, is at the point where you have to win your primary to win, and you have to be pretty purist in your convictions.
A
Yeah. The low number of swing districts just makes it where things aren't going to move massively.
B
Yeah.
A
Especially in a midterm like this in Congress.
B
But the people that are being elected right now at the local level are very vocal and they're very ideological. They're very anti Trump, and they have that record now. And those are the people that they're going to be drawing from for the national and statewide elections in 2, 4, 5, 10 years. And so I know it sounds a bit sad, but I think that we may be looking at an even more polarized national set of elected. So yay.
A
That's a nice hopeful note to end on. I think that just about wraps everything up. So thank you, Tori, for joining us. Thanks, Chris, for being here as well.
B
Yeah, thank you.
A
And that's it for this episode of the Ballpark. A big, big thank you to Kathy Kramer and Tori Mallett. The Ballpark is produced by Denise Barron. That's me. With contributions from co hosts Sophie Donzelman and Chris Gilson, and also with help from the LSE's annual fund. Our theme tune is by Ranger and the Rhea Rangers, a Seattle based gypsy jazz band. Look them up@rangerswings.com they're wonderful. They're just so wonderful. The content and opinions expressed in this podcast not reflect those of the US center or the London School of Economics. Next month at the Ballpark, we're looking into the opioid epidemic that's gripping the country. Thanks for listening.
Podcast: LSE: Public lectures and events
Episode: Season 2, Episode 7 – The Rural-Urban Divide
Date: October 12, 2017
Host: Denise Barron (LSE Film and Audio Team)
Guests: Professor Kathy Cramer (University of Wisconsin–Madison), Chris Gilson (co-host), Tori Mallett (PhD candidate, LSE)
This episode of "The Ballpark" explores the deepening divide between rural and urban communities in the United States, focusing on the concept of "rural resentment." Political scientist Professor Kathy Cramer discusses her decade-long research into how social identity, economic shifts, and political rhetoric have fueled feelings of injustice and group resentment—critical factors in recent American political dynamics. The conversation expands to consider the role of suburbia, local power structures, and the broader implications for democracy and party politics.
Origin and Methods ([02:42], [04:18])
Resentment Defined ([05:29])
Resentment as Political Motivation ([06:45])
Role in Elections: Scott Walker and Donald Trump ([07:07])
Economic and Cultural Origins ([10:20])
Urban Resentment: A Distinct Flavor ([13:48])
Importance of Place-Based Social Identity
Limitations of Polling
Future of American Politics and the Persistence of Resentment ([18:48])
Tori Mallett’s Perspective
Suburbs as Political Battlegrounds
Suburb Identity
State vs. City Tensions
Inequality and Future Trends
Suburban Political Influence
On Defining Resentment
"It's a term that captures a feeling of not getting your fair share, a sense of injustice or a sense that you've been wronged somehow."
—Kathy Cramer [05:29]
On the Power of Resentment
"When people have a target, blame in mind, that can be mobilized."
—Kathy Cramer [06:45]
On Suburbia as a Political Space
"Suburbia is really that kind of messy liminal space where politics really happens... they're going to really identify with this sort of nostalgia, romanticization of the rural community."
—Tori Mallett [23:27]
On Identity in Political Dynamics
“People’s sense of who they are in terms of their rootedness to particular places is way more meaningful than we normally get at through national sample public opinion polls...”
—Kathy Cramer [15:03]
On the Future of US Politics
"I don't see an end to it anytime soon."
—Kathy Cramer [20:36]
I. Introduction and Main Guest (Kathy Cramer)
II. Political Examples and Context
III. Implications and Limitations of Current Political Research
IV. Roundtable with Tori Mallett and Chris Gilson
V. Looking Forward
Through in-depth research, Professor Kathy Kramer exposes how resentment—rooted in perceptions of injustice and identity—shapes American politics, particularly around the rural-urban divide. The episode widens the lens to include suburbia, demonstrating that contemporary political cleavages exist on a spectrum and suggesting new focal points for both research and policy-making. The conversation closes on a sobering note: These divisions are unlikely to diminish soon, so understanding them is ever more crucial.