B (4:15)
Thank you very much, Chetan, and thank you all for coming. So many of you. Well, listening to to what Chet and explain about the complexity of the problem, you understand that it's just an impossible endeavor to try to address all these questions in 30 minutes. Especially that, as he has also told you, I've been working under terrible stress, racing against the clock to finish my forthcoming book. And well, so I had to squeeze the preparation of this lecture, which will be a number of a set of reflections which I want to share with you and discuss with you since we have a discussion here on these complex topics and well, I'll start from the observation that Chetan made about what is okay, that's what's happening in the region, this tension that we can see, but which actually existed from the start between let's say, religious political forces, forces that include religion as part of their political programs, and secular forces in very broad sense of forces which do not refer to religion as at least a major component of their program. Even you can find it in the background, but not as a major component, not as a defining component of the program. So in other words, tension between politically religious forces, or to be more specific, forces of fundamentalist character, various shades of Islamic fundamentalism and liberal to left forces, a conglomerate of forces that were very active in this whole uprising and which actually in most cases have been initiating, and that's a major feature of what happened is the fact that this big uprising in most cases has been initiated by people belonging to the spectrum of liberal to left and joined later on at a later Stage depending on countries by putting political religious forces. So this tension has been there and is still there. But in countries where the struggle is still going on, like Syria or Yemen or Bahrain, the tension is just in the background. It's the main. The dominant aspect of the struggle is the whole opposition, including this whole range of forces, from religious to secular and governments. Whereas the tension is at its peak now in the countries where victories have been achieved. And I mean, these countries are Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. And the three countries, the tensions are very clear between the two set of forces. So this tension has been here and of course, was noticeable since the beginning of the uprising. And it even led some people from the start to, you know, act as a kind of exception or against the current of. Against the euphoria that existed at the beginning of what has been called the Arab Spring, this kind of name also, I mean, being part of the euphoria, of course. So some people, minority of people, try to go against this current and actually bend the stick in the other direction with a very pessimistic assessment of what is going on. You had very early on, a book that came out with a provocative title about the Islamist hijacking the Arab uprising, and basically where the author basically explains that, you know, after all, the best regimes in the region are these. I'm quoting here because it's a complete mischaracterization. What he called constitutional monarchies in Jordan and Morocco. I mean, they are not constitutional monarchies. They are absolute monarchies with conceded constitutions, but constitutions which depends on. On the will of the monarch anyway. So, I mean, these were like exceptions at the beginning, exceptions compared with the euphoria. But now, of course, nowadays what we see is rather the euphoria, the whole euphoria being turned into a kind of, you know, deep pessimism about the. The outcome or the future of all that. And when I say pessimism, of course, I'm speaking here of the view in the west generally. But I mean, leave geographic or geopolitic characterization is actually the view from those who chair the secular liberal to left kind of range of views, as opposed to the others who have no reason, of course, to be pessimistic or sad about what is going on. And so now we enter the stage where the same people who used to speak of Arab Spring are speaking of Arab winter or autumn or whatever, you know, to maintain the seasons. And you have even, you know, cases of deep melancholic depression that are now expressed. And a very recent, most recent instance of that is the Article by Hussein Agha and Robert Malay in the latest issue of the New York Review of Books. The title is Is this a Revolution? Oh, sorry, it's not even a question, it's an assertion. This is not a revolution. That's the title. And, well, this is the expression, you know, of a kind of big disappointment from people who, I would say, misjudged the event from the start. So I would say, I mean, we'll discuss that. But it's neither the kind of euphoria that existed at the start, which is warranted, nor this kind of melancholy area or depression that is warranted. Both of them are, I think, based on misjudging what is happening now? Let us get more into the direct topic that we are discussing. And indeed, at the beginning, there has been a lot of. Of comments on the way this whole uprising has swept away the very Orientalist, in the Saidian sense, assertion that existed about the incompatibility of Islam or between Islam and democracy. And this is a very common idea on which articles and even books have been written, more or less sophisticated, from the very, very crude to the. To the sophisticated, trying to explain or sustain this kind of perspective. And of course, the basic flow in such a perspective is that it is dealing with a whole part of the world, as if this part of the world, or assuming that this part of the world is determined primarily, if not only by religion. That's one point. And the second is that there is anything like Islam which you could, you know, label in one way or another and define in modern political terms. I think, I believe that this kind of view is basically flawed because, I mean, Islam in modern times, not to mention even throughout its history, is of course the object of many, many, many different interpretations. And so is the case of all religions. Actually. Is Christianity compatible with democracy? Which Christianity, the Opus dei, theology of liberation, the papacy, Protestantism, with this or that branch of Protestantism, etc. So why would Islam be different? Which Islam? Just give you an example. The Islam of Hassan Al Banna or the Islam of his brother? Here are two brothers, two Muslim scholars with completely different views of Islam, completely different interpretations of Islam. And therefore the very question of is Islam compatible with democracy? Is quite, quite flawed. Or else the answer should be any religion is compatible with democracy, of course, because it's a matter of interpretation. There's no religion that stood unchanged since its early inception until now. This doesn't exist. And the fact is that actually, beyond the question, what is meant is not really is Islam incompatible or compatible with democracy, but Are Muslims as human beings, as a set of people able to work through democracy? And that's where I think ultimately these kind of culturalist views, this kind of essentialist perspectives, defining whole peoples by culture or by some purported essence of their religion or whatever, are at the bottom of them are really brands of racism, variations of racism. Now, what the uprising has shown, and I mean, I think for anyone familiar with the region, this is certainly no surprise at all. What the uprising has shown is that the peoples of the region, there are peoples, like any peoples on earth, aspire to democracy. And they not only aspire to democracy, but they are showing us, actually, I would say, a higher standard of democracy than the one we are used to. We are used to parliamentary democracy. And this is, of course, what they achieved, what the uprisings have achieved everywhere where they triumph, be it Tunisia or Egypt or Libya, you have had parliamentary democracy put in place or parliamentary democratic forms, still discussing constitutions. But the peculiarity of what's going on is that is you have parliamentary democracy corrected by street politics, by the will, the direct will of the people, which is expressed on the streets through demonstrations. And this very central slogan of the whole uprising, the people want, which is the title of my forthcoming book, a little ad, is very expressive of that. So, I mean, this core idea of democracy, the real sense of the term, the etymological sense of the term people's power, is very much what people are fighting for and by the millions in this part of the world. But again, this is, I mean, absolutely no surprise. The surprise or not the surprise, the big question. I keep repeating that the big question is not why or how come it has exploded now. The big question is why did it take so long to explode? That was a big question. And this is actually why you had all these theories, completely misleading theories, trying to explain that actually the peoples of the region, I mean, are accustomed to despotism. That's part of their culture, that's part of their, you know, political genes. And therefore, that's why you have these. All these despotic regimes in the region. Well, all this has been completely smashed, I would say, by the uprising. And yet what do we see now? Of course, we see in at least two of the three countries, or not at least actually only two of the three countries where victories have been won. We see the hegemony or the. Let's say we see religious forces or Islamic forces or forces of political nature, mixing religion with political perspectives, predominating. And that's what I started with, which leads to this kind of pessimistic or gloomy kind of reaction among some people in the West. Now, is this, ultimately, is this a vindication of the culturalist thesis in the sense that, well, okay, I mean, you had this big euphoria and a lot of you said this smashes, as I just said myself, the very idea of the incompatibility or the purported incompatibility between Islam and democracy. And yet what do you see? You have these religious forces coming to the foreign, seizing power, and the outcome will be even worse than what you have now during this transitional period. And that's it. So that means that actually this whole uprising was basically for the majority of those who were part of it, a way to replace governments which were despotic, but more or less secular. And then you would think of Tunisia, which had this reputation, the Tunisian government in particular, with, with Muslim forces, Islamic forces. And, and that's what it is about. And it's not. And it wasn't a democratic uprising, or even it was not or it is not a revolution, as the title that I mentioned said. Well, as I said, this is. This whole thing is based on a misjudgment. I mean, for decades we have been those who are familiar with the region expecting that in any explosion which most observers thought would be or is inevitable actually, and there were a lot of prognosis of explosion in the region, the common assumption was or expectation was that in case of explosion, Islamic fundamentalist forces like the Muslim Brotherhood, which is the most important of such forces in the region, will prevail or actually will lead. That was absolutely the expectation. And why so? For a simple reason, which is that for three decades at the very least, these forces have been the hegemonic forces in the expression of popular discontent in the region. But they have been like that, not forever, not as part of the cultural essence of the region, but since a certain period in time, when I say three decades, it means that before that they were not the hegemonic forces. And the region in the 50s and 60s was definitely not dominated by such forces. And the kind of forces that were the most important forces in the expression of popular discontent were of brands that belong to this broad range of secular left wing forces, from the nationalist to the communist. I mean, people forget that in the same countries where some of the same countries where we see now total domination of fundamentalist forces, take Iraq as an example. People forget that in this country in the late 50s, if you take the Iraqi south, the dominant force were not the likes of Mokhtad Al Sadr. Or whoever, but the communists. So it's just showing that we are dealing with historical phenomena. Of course, everything is historical, but not anything essential. So nevertheless, the fact that you had this big failure of the nationalists of the left and the rest left or created a vacuum which was filled by the Islamic fundamentalist forces. And I mean, it was all the more filled by them or all the easier for them to do so that this coincided with the rising cloud of the Saudi kingdom, which is the epicenter of fundamentalism, of Islamic fundamentalism and huge financial support to these developments and also the use made by various governments of these same forces in order to defeat the remnants of the left and nationalism. And so this produced the situation that we have had for the last few decades. And therefore we were expecting that this situation would lead, in case of explosion, therefore to the domination of these fundamentalist, Islamic fundamentalist forces. And as I started by saying, I mean, actually the real novelty of what happened or the surprise was that they did not initiate and new forces emerged, especially among the youth, using the technologies of communication and the rest, new forces emerged that played the key decisive role in unleashing this whole process. And that was the real novelty. But as long as the central demand, politically speaking, is democracy, it was quite obvious that any elections organized, you know, just after a few months of the uprising would lead to the victory of those who had a much larger political organization and much more financial and communication means not only money, but also television, which all of us know how much television is central to the modern political and electoral processes. And therefore it was absolutely clear that they would be winning. And it's only wishful thinking that led many people to, to doubt of that in the start, you know, just because there wasn't any mechanism to be, to be sure about what these forces represent. But whatever they represent, people didn't take enough into consideration that even if you are not, you are a minority, but if you are an organized minority with money and television and the rest of the facing people who are unorganized basically, or scattered into small groups, then you, I mean, it is quite normal that you triumph in elections or the rest. Now the question, I mean, the issue is that this itself has to be relativized. When you look, and I don't have time to go into that, but when you look at the actual processes in Egypt or Tunisia, not to mention Libya, where actually the Muslim, the local Muslim Brotherhood was defeated, I mean, beaten by another so called secular liberal force. But if you take even Tunisia and Egypt, the victory achieved by the Muslim Brotherhood then or the, the likes in Tunis, but it's practically the same organization, is not, you know, not a landslide as it is projected. It had more or less disappearance in the, in the parliamentary election in Egypt, but already this had faded away in the presidential election where the score was much, much less significant than, I mean, the score of Muslim Brotherhood than whatever they achieved in the parliamentary election. And therefore this is a situation, I mean, in process, it's moving. And again, what happened is not surprising. It's definitely not surprising. And despite all the gloomy depiction of things, I still think that actually what is mostly amazing is how quickly these forces are or have lost ground and how there are, I mean, increasing resistances by other forces and especially forces on the left, whether in Tunisia or in Egypt. Now the question, whatever is the outcome is why would we assume that the forces that have been prevailing until now.