A (0:02)

Welcome to the LSE Events podcast by the London School of Economics and Political Science. Get ready to hear from some of the most influential international figures in the social sciences.

B (0:16)

Good evening, everybody. My name is Francesco Gazelli. I'm a professor of economics here at the lse. I just realized I left my notes somewhere, but I don't think I need notes to introduce Danny, so it'll be fine. I think everybody knows here. Dani Rodrik is one of the most influential and famous economists in the world right now. He has written extremely important work on economic growth, globalization, development, political economy, and he's also been massively influential in the global debate about these problems. Danny teaches at Harvard and he has written a new book called Shared Prosperity in a Fractured World, which is a book about how we get out of the horrible mess we have created. So it's a very much needed book. A couple of logistical things. There is a hashtag for this event, which is, I believe, LAC events. There will be a Q and A after Danny's comments, and there will be a book signing after the talk and the books going to be available on sale outside, and then the signing will take place here. I think that's all I have. And now, with great pleasure and anticipation, I hand it over to Danny.

C (1:45)

Thank you. Thank you. Thank you very much, Francesco, for the introduction. It's always very nice to be at LSC and to see so much interest in this work. Can you hear me? Is the microphone working? Okay, wonderful. Thank you. So Francesco and I were discussing just now, before the event, how long it takes for publishers to put out books. In fact, this book, which do I have. Yes, this book was written actually when the first draft was written, when President Biden was in office, when it seemed pretty unimaginable that Trump would be coming back. Furthermore, it seemed at the time quite clear that there was, we were on a kind of a different path for economic policy which one could criticize and I've criticized from a number of different perspectives, but in some ways put us on a better path towards addressing the kinds of problems that this book deals with. And so it was. The tone in the book was and is a kind of a hopeful and optimistic one. And then, of course, Trump happened. And for a while I thought, you know, it was, you know, the book was now totally naive given how everything seems to be changing, even from the very first weeks. But eventually, maybe this was this. Maybe this is motivated reasoning. Eventually I convinced myself that actually we needed a book like this even more, because in my mind, it provides a kind of Approach, a set of policies, a kind of a way of thinking, a framework for addressing what I think are our most important economic problems. And that we need that this kind of guidelines to hold us hope that when and if we have some sane politicians and political administrations in the US and elsewhere, that there are things that we can do. So this is, if you ever look at the book or if you buy the book, you'll see that this is an optimistic book. This is a book that cheers me up. I hope it'll cheer you up a little bit in these very, very difficult times. But it is not, and this is an important point, it is not sort of an idealistic book. It's not like a utopian book. It says that we need to be doing things differently. And I'll say a little bit about that, obviously in this talk about what that means, but not so differently in the sense that the kernel, the germ of all the types of new practices that I think we need, the new approaches we need, are already embedded in existing institutions and experiments and practices that exist in the world. So it really builds on what we are already doing. So in that sense, the hopefulness, the optimism is based on the reality of actual practice. And why is it that that practice doesn't catch our attention or we don't see it? I think there's two broad reasons. One, one is in the case of Chinese industrial policies and green industrial strategy, which I'll talk about as one of the key dimensions of this, is that it's been caught up in geopolitical debates about competition with China. And I think sort of the enormous advances that we've had towards addressing climate change through renewables have somehow gotten lost in that. And the second reason is that I think that many of these experiments remain small scale and very local and that sort of national economic authorities or focuses on sort of national strategies on growth or middle class or jobs, typically don't see those hopes in these or those the existing practices at the local level that have actually worked. So that's my task, to convince you that my optimism is not necessarily misplaced, that there is a common framework that helps us think about these issues. And if I don't convince you in my talk this evening, do buy the book. And there are even more convincing arguments there. So why these three? Well, I don't need to make a case for these particular challenges, but obviously the climate change is probably the one that I need, to say the least in terms of why it's important. It's obviously the most significant threat to our Physical existence. Rebuilding the middle class, I would say, is sort of like the analog of climate change for a social and political life, not our physical environment. Because I think much of the erosion of our democratic norms and the rise of far right populist forces all over the North Atlantic and US and Europe, Britain is clearly linked. And I think there has been a fair amount of empirical work that shows this. It's been clearly linked to labor market dislocations, the disappearance of good jobs, which are the basis essentially of the middle class, which is really supports cohesive societies and functional, sustainable democracies. So if you want our social and political life to regain a certain degree of cohesiveness and democracy to become stronger, I think rebuilding the middle class is going to be critical. And of course, we can't lose sight of global poverty reduction as an important challenge as well. Now, this actually was one front on which we had made significant gains, at least until Covid struck, with significant reduction in the number of people who live in extreme poverty, largely, but not exclusively through China's economic growth. But we've had sort of serious reversals since COVID and developmental prospects look much more uncertain today. But one of the important points I think that I make in the book is that even there, we'll need different strategies than those that worked in the past. Okay, so when you look at these problems and you look at what we're doing today, that even in the relatively rosy world of Biden era economic policies, there were clear tensions among these things. So Biden was very much focused on the green transition and rebuilding the middle class at home, not so much on global poverty reduction. And one can argue that many of the trade and industrial policies that America pursued during that period was averse to the interest of the global poor. So we need a framework, we need a way of thinking that's going to take all of these on board and avoid some of the trade offs. Now, these seem very, very different kind of challenges, different tasks requiring a lot of expertise in different domains. What gives me the authority or confidence to take them on in the same book? I think there's a common element that ties these challenges together that allows me to talk about all of them as a kind of something that requires a strategy that's broadly similar because all of these are tasks that require structural transformation of our economies, that is moving economic activity from certain type of sectors and firms and activities to others. So in the case of rebuilding the middle class, it's really a question of creating good jobs, expanding the good jobs in the economy. Good Jobs, of course, being those that not only pay high wages, but also provide greater agency and autonomy, a sense of accomplishment, career ladders being treated well on the job, and so forth. So that's a problem of structural change because we need to foster those firms and activities and sectors that are, are the source of good jobs. In terms of climate change, of course, it's very definitely a problem of structural change because we want to move the direction, move the economy in the direction of green industries and sources of energy and poverty reduction. That's a structural change, structural change challenge as well, because historically that's how we've gotten poverty reduction. Not by simply transferring income to the poor or making them somewhat better at what it is that they're already doing, but moving them to other occupations or to qualitatively different types of jobs which are more productive. So all three therefore share this common element of structural change. And economists know that structural change is rife with market failures. There are externalities, there are coordination failures, there are missing public inputs, all of which mean that the markets left to their own are not going to provide the adequate levels of structural change at the speed that society needs. And therefore we need corrective policies. What are those corrective policies? Well, in the past, we really thought about the policies that address structural change as policies that are, loosely speaking, industrial policies. Because what does industrial policy do? Industrial policy promotes some activities over others. It is called industrial policy because typically those policies were trying to promote manufacturing industries and hence industrial policy. Okay, so that type of policy is what we required, except that the term industrial policy now is a bit of a misnomer because it's not manufacturing industries that we need to necessarily promote when we're talking about jobs. I'll come back to that in a second. The jobs are actually going to be mostly in services. So if you're going to want to promote good jobs, they'll have to be in services. By and large, that also happens to be true for developing countries. Developing countries. In developing countries, manufacturing is no longer, for the most part, labor absorbing sector in the way that it was traditionally under the East Asian industrialization driven model. So we need much more of a services driven model in the developing countries as well. So first is, we're talking about an industrial policy for services. Okay, so maybe we shouldn't talk about industrial policy at all instead of productive transformation policy or productive development policy or what I call in the book, you know, this ugly term, productivism really may be a little bit more appropriate, of course, in the direction of green sectors. So the Direction of these productive policies are very different than from traditional industrial policies. What are the new elements? The new elements are going to be that first, when we're talking about good jobs, you talk, talk to policymakers and politicians in the United States, I think, and in continental Europe as well. I get the sense that in Britain the manufacturing hope has basically gone. But talk in continental Europe and in the United States about good jobs, they'll talk about sort of how it's important to reshore manufacturing, get basic manufacturing up and running. This is not going to work. Just mathematically it doesn't work out, I'll say. So this is going to be, you know, it's going to be really about services and mostly about non traded services. So a lot of our focus when we talk about the middle class, about trade imbalances, protectionism, the global trade rules, the kinds of stuff that was my bread and butter when I was writing about globalization, this really becomes much less important now because really talking about sectors that are largely sheltered from international competition, whether it is for advanced countries or for the lower income countries. With regard to climate change, I think the big change, and this is important, is that economists have traditionally focused on taxing carbon emissions and there's a very good logic for that. In practice, what has worked a lot more effectively is actually subsidizing green activities. Now it's a second best way of dealing with the climate transition, subsidizing R and D and innovation. But it's been extremely effective. And there are political economy reasons for that, the most basic of which is that it's a lot easier to give people a carrot, an incentive, a subsidy than it is to actually tax actively. So the carrot versus the stick, the carrot approach, even though it's second best, has been much more effective. But this is also something that can be done at the national level, in fact at the sub national level, because you can combine a lot of the motivations for pursuing green industrial policies with other objectives, whether it's geopolitical, political, whether it's jobs, whether it's fostering new technological competencies and therefore you get over the global free riding problem. Right. So we thought that solving the climate problem was going to be subject to this incredible problem of how do you get people to agree and to invest in a global public good. Well, China has been doing it through its green industrial policies in a remarkable way. You know, the decline in the cost of renewables that Chinese industrial policies has produced is an incredibly significant global public good. But they're doing it for their own essential sense of who they are, you know, they're, you know, gaining competitiveness, their sort of vision of, of their national project and so forth. So variety of political economy reasons that, that, so, so these are, you know, the, that some of the common elements in the way that I discuss how we're approaching these is general preference over second best approach over first best. I just gave an example of that. In the area of climate change, carbon taxation might be first best, or cap and trade might be first best, but second best policies have evidently been much more effective. My doctoral advisor used to say the world is second best at best. And it's a kind of a very vivid reminder of that experimentation over fixed remedies. So another common feature of the type of policies, whether it is local policies that affect good jobs and productive transformation or the green transformation, a common theme running through is that they tend to be experimental in nature, that involve a different kind of nature between governments and business economists. Traditional model of government regulation or industrial policy is a top down kind of a model that you can think of in terms of a principal agent model that works very well if the dimensionality of uncertainty is small, but when there is huge uncertainty, a kind of iterative collaborative approach that has a large degree of experimentation, try something, monitor results. If it doesn't work, try something else. That approach works a lot better than the principal agent model. So experimental governance takes over. And another important feature, especially in a world where global cooperation is, you know, we can rely even less on global cooperation going forward than we could until now, is that if you can show that many of these things can be addressed without a whole lot of global governance, that this can be done through local incentives, local experimentation, international level countries doing it on their own for their own good reasons, then that's another big plus, that it can actually be done without necessarily relying on those ex machina of global governance. Okay, so those are some of the large teams. The question, of course, is that this all sounds good, but are there in fact such policies, in what form do they take in practice? Okay, so the book is largely about trying to illustrate what these general principles actually mean concretely. So let me start with the one, let me enter this sort of directly with what might have seemed to be the most intractable of these problems, both because of how serious the nature of the challenge is, climate change, global warming, and how much apparently it relied on the one thing that we lacked the most, which is global cooperation. This is the archetypal global public good addressing global climate change. Here, the big story, the big, big really Huge, really amazingly big story of the last 10, 15 years is how much progress has happened primarily through the collapse in the price of renewables. So now, in terms of the price of solar, wind, electric vehicles, electric batteries has collapsed to the point that now they become viable substitute for fossil fuels. All over Africa now, new sort of installation, new power sources are being essentially driven by imports from China, solar cells and solar power and so forth. And what's important to understand is that no one actually had predicted this. No one thought that there would be such a huge increase in, for example, in installation of solar capacity. This was way outside the kinds of projections, the range of projections that international agencies were making, even in their most optimistic scenarios. And just to give you a sense of how big that is, some of you may know Bill McKibben. So Bill McKibben became very well known in the United States as a climate activist and was one of the first authors to ring the alarm bells about climate change and how we're all getting, you know, sort of getting, essentially getting fried under our existing policies. And his most recent book, which came out last year, is called Here Comes the Sun and is actually a kind of a relatively upbeat account of how this transformation in the power, in the cost of renewable energy, is really now, for the first time, making it look possible, as if we must be on a path where we won't get the one and a half degree, we still will exceed that, but we now conceivably on a path where we actually won't get extinct. It's hard to understate what a momentous transformation this is and what a good news this is at a time when you mention solar cells, solar power, renewables. The focus of most American and European policymakers is on the competitive threat of Chinese producers, because this has been essentially the result of what China has done. Now, it's interesting that it was the Europeans and Americans who were the original pioneers in renewables, but starting 10, 15 years ago, China went into this in a very big way. And essentially this transformation, this renewables miracle, has been the result of China's green industrial policies. What are these industrial policies? Sort of how did we get this variety of supports for renewables that leads to an increase in capacity, that leads to learning. By doing so, costs go down and that allows these firms to charge lower prices, the market expands, that leads to sort of more capacity expansion. And so this virtuous cycle of industrial policies that support expansion of renewables capacity, joined together with the miracle of learning by doing, is really what has gotten this now when our image in the west of Chinese industrial policies is still very much kind of a top down process of state planners telling what producers what to do implemented through subsidies to kind of a traditional model of industrial policy. You set targets, you give firms subsidies to meet them, and then you harshly punish firms that don't meet their targets. This is actually not what Chinese industrial policy was. And I think this is where the entire sort of, this new understanding of how productive transformation can happen, how industrial policy does work in practice, how it's much more iterative, collaborative, experimental, really comes into its own. Because as you look at China's practices, yes, it was a strategy that was developed at the top in Beijing. It was developed as a kind of a national project. So that's where prioritization comes in. It's helpful when the national government says we're going to move into renewables in a big way because we think that's going to be new competitive frontier, the new, and the world eventually will move into renewable energy and we want to be pioneers there and therefore we're going to make this a national objective. But there was a huge amount of experimentation with policies, as been generally the case with Chinese economic policies, with demonstration zones set up, localities given national resources to pursue their own experimental approaches with local, lots of variation across different kind of regions. So with lots of autonomy at the individual level, especially at the municipality level, for different cities to do different kinds of things. There were subsidies, but there was a lot more than simply subsidies. Subsidies are generally easier to quantify. And that's why when you see descriptions of Chinese industrial policies, mostly in terms of subsidies, but there was a lot more. It was public investment in R and D, specific infrastructure, government procurement, this demonstration program, regulatory changes at the national and local levels to incentivize renewables. It's not in the list, but it should be. Public venture capital was a very important form where a lot of localities, municipalities set up public venture capital firms to invest in renewables and then electric vehicles and so forth. This was not simply a top down process. There was very close collaboration with the government, between the government and business, as well as between the national government and localities. So iteration on both counts and lots of feedback loops of monitoring and a process of iteration and revision. Okay, so these are all sort of, in some sense they were features of China's green industrial policies, but they are general features of successful industrial or productive transformation policies elsewhere. If you look at history of what South Korean or Taiwanese or even in fact US industrial policies, whether it's the DARPA model or other local economic development initiatives, they tend to have these features rather than the sort of the economist caricature of top down command control, hard conditionality and so forth. Now, I said earlier that China was a relative late comer to renewables. And in fact, you know, the United States and Europe started on this earlier. And some of that early experience in the United States in particular helps us also qualify perhaps some of the optimism about, you know, and understand better the conditions under which actually industrial policy work and when they can fail. Because the Obama administration instituted a fairly extensive industrial policy program for renewables and green technologies in 2011. And there was largely implemented through loan guarantees of the Department of Energy. And those programs were essentially shuttered after a very public failure. How many people here have heard of Solyndra? Okay, good. So Solyndra was the signal failure of this program, was actually what made it a failure in part, and why it marked the entire renewables green industrial policies of the Obama administration was that the Obama administration made one critical mistake of even though these loan guarantees were supporting potentially hundreds of different firms, of which one, by the way, was Tesla, which was saved through these loan guarantees of the Department of Energy because it was on the verge of bankruptcy at the time, the Obama administration picked on Solyndra as sort of its flagship. And essentially President Obama went to California to highlight Solyndra as sort of as an example of this fantastic problem. So you can imagine the political difficulty when six months later or eight months later, it turns out that the kind of technology that Solyndra had invested in was not going to be viable, given, you know, this very sharp decline in the cost of PV cells. And there was a very public failure and this marked because precisely because, you know, rather than treating this program as a kind of in this traditional public venture capital form, which is to say, well, some of them will fail for sure, but those that are successful will pay for all the failures, plus more. Which in this case was by the way true, because Tesla alone, given what a successful company does end up being, Tesla alone paid for all the failures of Solyndra multiplied a thousand times. But because the way that was, you know, the way that the approach of the administration was simply not to present this as a kind of as a portfolio of programs, but to sort of put plant the flag on the one company that was going to going to fail in a very public way, essentially this became politically unsustainable. So Congress actually, in 2012, I believe, even passed a law that was called no more Solyndras Act. Okay, so in other words, no green industrial policy. So I think so. This failure obviously illustrates a number of things. One is obviously the point about industrial policy is not that you're going to make a success of every firm that you support. That's the wrong way to think about industrial policy. You simply want to make sure that the portfolio itself pays off and that the losers, you don't keep supporting them after it became. So it's not the real test for industrial policy is, is not whether you can pick winners, but whether you're able to let the losers go. Right, which may still be demanding, but it's a lot less demanding than requiring governments to be omniscient and knowing exactly what will be successful. The private sector doesn't know that either. Okay, but it's also not simply the case that Chinese industrial policy has been successful because China is a hard state, it's authoritarian, and countries like the US can't do industrial policy because they are democracies. US has been traditionally very good at carrying out industrial policy. Look at darpa, which has been singularly successful in promoting frontier technologies, everything from GPS to Internet, which is essentially run as a kind of a semi autonomous agency through public funds and is a kind of precisely the kind of a model of thinking about industrial policy renovation policy, kind of a portfolio of different activities that certain things will be eventually successful. So I think China's green industrial policies are important both in their own right, because they are a direct example of how one of our three fundamental challenges can be addressed through these second best measures. Green industrial policies that directly incentivize new green technologies. But they're also useful as an example to lead us to pose the question. Is a similar transformation also possible in those other areas where we need transformation when we need structural change, namely in terms of restoring the middle class and achieving poverty reduction and economic growth in the developing countries? This, the China's green industrial policies are good for the green transition, but they're not going to be the solution either to the growth challenge or to the jobs challenge. Okay, so those need their own policies. They need policies that are going to directly promote good jobs, to sustain democracy and to promote economic growth. And, and the question is, are there sort of the analog of these in green industrial policies for these labor absorbing sectors, the services in the middle income countries and in the advanced countries as well? Is there an equivalent of these kinds of policies? I'm going to suggest that there is, although the evidence is scattered and much less direct than in the case of the green industrial policies. But first, let me say a few words about the importance of good jobs. We're in the London School of Economics and I know the LSE is not just about economics, but I assume many of you are economists or have been in the process of being indoctrinated or being inducted. But I want to make an important point about how, you know, sort of where this emphasis on good jobs is coming from because it's not something that you'll be focusing on in mainstream economics. And that I think, because, you know, conventional economic theory, going all the way back to Adam Smith, which put the focus on the consumption side of the economy to draw a sharp distinction from the or cantalists, has had this blind spot on jobs because in the traditional conceptualization of what we as individuals maximize our preferences, right, our utility functions, jobs don't enter directly. In fact, they enter indirectly through the budget constraint. That jobs are important only to the extent that they allow us to earn an income, which in turn relaxes our budget constraints, which in turn allows us to pursue the main objective, the main arguments that go into the utility function, which is to consume. And to the extent that jobs enter into utility function, they enter with a negative sign because leisure goes into the utility function, which is jobs or work with a negative sign. Okay, now, you know, you look at sort of other social sciences and of course, you know, sociology. There's a lot of work in sociology on this and in social psychology, but also increasingly recent work in economics that's sort of asking what are the sources, real sources of, you know, well being and happiness and life satisfaction. When you ask people those questions, it turns out that jobs have a very direct effect on well being because jobs are not just a source of income. They're a source of personal esteem, they're person source of dignity, they're a source of social recognition. And what these studies of life satisfaction have shown is that in fact job losses are associated with losses in perceived well being, personal well being, that are multiple of the monetary costs, direct monetary costs. So that if your idea of good jobs of jobs is simply as a kind of source of income, is that you could, even if the government actually did, was actually to provide transfers to compensate people who lose their jobs. And even if they did it in full, which they never do, right. You know, you'd still not go nearly the whole distance required to, to make people whole again because the job loss goes much beyond the income loss, but that's at the level of individuals. Then jobs also have, I think, a very large big element of social externality. That once again, I mean, this is something that's not news for sociologists. But economists have increasingly found out, so that there's a recent wave of studies that job losses, whether due to globalization and trade, due to automation or to fiscal austerity, produce a significant social, economic and political externalities. So they may take the form of breakdown of families, rise in health, problems, in suicide, rise in addiction, all sort of whole bunch of social problems and ultimately political dysfunction as well. So there are studies that show that when communities lose jobs, also there is a tendency for authoritarian values to increase. Support for authoritarian and populist demagogues tend to rise. So it stands to reason that when people feel personally economically insecure, that there's a much greater tendency to want to identify culprits. And those culprits would be those from outside the community. They could be immigrants. They could be religious or ethnic minorities. They could be foreign nations. So there's a direct link between many of the syndromes of social and political malfunction that we've observed and that we associate with the rise of politics, populism that is directly linked to job losses. And finally, from the perspective of social justice, I think most economists tend to think about social justice in terms of redistributive justice. That is, who gets what I think at least as important, building on those sort of, you know, the first two ideas is the notion of contributive justice. And that term is from my college at Harvard, Michael Sandel. And he defines contributive justice as the opportunity to win the social recognition and esteem that go with producing what other needs and value what others need and value. So it's not just that we want to compensate people. We want to redistribute assets and income. It's also that we want to give people the chance to do the kind of jobs or the kind of work that gives them meaning as sense of contribution to society. Okay, so those are all reasons why, I think, you know, both the reasons why I think economics traditionally has underplayed the role of jobs sort of now there's kind of correction being built in, but also why, you know, sort of with, you know, it's important to bring it in to understand, you know, this new dimension of this new objective for public policy, which is the objective of creating good jobs now. So where will these jobs be? I've already said this one thing. We know for sure, these jobs are not going to be in manufacturing. Manufacturing jobs have been declining in all the advanced countries in the world. So this is for The United States. This fair picture goes all the way back to, I think it's 1980. You see the share of, of the share of all manufacturing employees as a share of total employees. And what I want to draw here is that if you look at sort of this last bit is blown up here. So this is really just from monthly figures from 2020 or something. I can't read this, so there's no way you will be able to read them. But take my word for it. What is the point I'm trying to make for this? The point I'm trying to make is that there's been an ongoing decline in manufacturing in the United States. Now it's about, you know, one job in 12 only in manufacturing. And it simply has not mattered what country, what governments have done, because ever since Biden, the objective has been to basically to re industrialize, to increase jobs in manufacturing. Biden did it through chips and Iraq. Okay? Trump has been doing it, okay, with, you know, tariffs, but they both pursue these objectives. You look at the numbers, it makes absolutely no difference. So, you know, up until the last time I could, I looked before, you know, BLS was shut down and therefore couldn't get the data, was that every month that Trump was in office, the manufacturing jobs, the share of total employment would continue to fall. The Biden administration touted these beautiful numbers about investment and construction in manufacturing that was due to chips. The investment, the construction numbers were really quite awesome, but didn't create any manufacturing jobs. So manufacturing jobs now you might say maybe Biden and clearly Trump haven't been going about it the right way that there is. If you pursue the right policies, you know, the right industrial policies and so forth, that you would be creating more jobs. But how much better can you get at supporting your manufacturing than China? Right? China has been losing employment in manufacturing by the millions. In fact, 31 million fewer workers in China's manufacturing since 2011. 31 million, by the way, is more than the sum of total US And German employment in manufacturing. So over a decade, China has lost the equivalent of the total number of manufacturing jobs in the United States, Germany combined. Okay? Now the big amazing thing, of course is you don't see it in the output or export numbers for China keep increasing. That's just a miracle of labor productivity in manufacturing. So you can increase, you can reshore, maybe you'll increase product, maybe you'll increase production, maybe you'll decrease your imports from China, but there will be. The point is that there will be virtually no impact on manufacturing, given how Skilled and capital intensive and automated. Modern manufacturing today is okay, so that's. It's remarkable to me how mainstream politicians, whether it's the center right or center left, have still this fixation with manufacturing as a source of bringing the middle class back and creating good jobs. It's sort of like running history in reverse because that's manufacturing was a traditional route to creating good jobs of manufacturing. But that's not going to happen in the future. Where will the jobs be if not in manufacturing? Okay, I hope maybe you can read this. This is for the United States. Can you. No, I'll tell you what it is. Okay, so this is, you know, the Bureau of Labor Statistics makes projections for, you know, how many jobs there will be be in different occupations. This is for the next decade. So this is looking for the composition in 2034 in the United States. Okay. And I've ranked Here the top 10 occupations in the United States. Okay, the top occupation, home health and personal care aids. Second one, fast food and counter workers, retail salespersons, general and operations managers, registered nurses, laborers and freight stock and material movers, stalkers and order fillers, cashiers, customer service representatives, janitors and cleaners. Except maize and housekeeping cleaners. Okay? Of those, none of them, with the possible exception of the tiny bit here in labors in manufacturing. Not a big super surprise. But here's the other surprise. Of 10 of these, only two require college degrees or more general managers and registered nurses. None of the others requires college degree. So what does that mean? It means that again, the economist's standard knee jerk response to the problem of how do you increase productivity in these sectors? How are you going to increase earnings earnings and create more good jobs where these jobs will exist? The knee jerk response that you invest in education, you get more people into college, that's not going to work here. So neither reshoring nor investment in education in the traditional way that we think about it is going to do the job. That's why I think we need a strategy that focuses much more directly along the lines of industrial policies that focus on increasing productivity in these services through increasing the productive capacity of the workers and the firms that employ them. That's going to bear the hallmarks of more of an industrial policy than these general across the board types of approaches. Is rapid productivity growth in services possible? Now? Traditionally, the reason that there has been deindustrialization is precisely because labor productivity in manufacturing grows much more rapidly than in services. But there are lots of encouraging signs. Much more recently, look at the United States. Since 2005. In some of these large labor absorption absorbing services, productivity is actually increased much faster, not either at the same or at higher levels than in manufacturing. Wholesale trade, retail trade, accommodation and food services. These are all sectors where in fact productivity, labor productivity is increased more rapidly than manufacturing. How? Well, think about, you know, online ordering, Uber, the deployment of all these digital tools in Amazon warehouses. But these are all directly productivity increasing. Except that given the way that our current services are organized, the Amazon Uber model are organizational models that ensure that all the benefits are appropriated by the owners rather than the workers themselves. In part that's because of the type of technologies that are being employ. So if Amazon has a choice between investing in technologies that would allow managers to routinely monitor every single thing, every single movement that warehouse workers do versus investing in technology that is going to increase the autonomy agency and the range of tasks that warehouse workers can do. Essentially implementing sort of in services in warehouses the equivalent of a Toyota model of production as opposed to a Taylorist model of production. Amazon managers. Amazon is much more likely to invest in the first because it gets most of the profits, it has more control and therefore it finds it more beneficial. So that's going to tie importantly with a point that I'll come back to shortly about how part of this industrial strategy and services has to be in a public effort to direct innovation in a more labor friendly direction, which is not what we're going to get if we follow our current model. Okay, but let me run through now very quickly because what I've lost track of time.