← LSE: Public lectures and events
LSE: Public lectures and events
Syria after Assad: a reporter’s view on a nation in transition
01:07:10
Loading summary
Transcript51 lines
- [00:02]
A
Welcome to the LSE Events Podcast by the London School of Economics and Political Science. Get ready to hear from some of the most influential international figures in the social sciences.
- [00:17]
B
Welcome everyone in the room and online. My name is Katerina Dallacoura. I'm Associate professor in International Relations at the LSE and also Director of the Middle East Center. As of the 1st of September this year, I'm going to run through some housekeeping points before introducing the event and our speaker. I'd like you first of all to put your mobile phones on silent to avoid disrupting the event and to make a note that in the event of a fire, the assembly point is opposite this building next to Lincoln's Inn Fields. The event is being recorded and we will aim to make a podcast available in due course. You can tweet about the event with a hashtags. As with all public events at LSE, this event is being held in accordance with LSE's Code of Practice on Free Speech, which protects and promotes freedom of speech and academic freedom. We intend this to be an engaging and critical discussion of current developments in the region and there will be ample time during the Q and A for further discussion. After the lecture, there will be a chance for you to put your questions to our speaker. For our online audience, you can submit your questions via the Q and A feature at the top left of your screen. Questions will be submitted to myself and then I will direct them to the speaker. Before you put your questions, please let us know your name and affiliation and we are particularly keen to hear from our students and alumni, so please let us know who you are. For those of you in the theatre, if you can, raise your hand and wait for the microphone. When the time comes, I will ask you to provide your name and affiliation, as I said, and I will try to ensure a range of questions from both online and the audience here. So, preliminaries now done. Let me move to the substance of the talk. This lecture, as you know, is the second of our series as part of the Ian Black Memorial Lecture Series, organized in coordination with Ian's family. Ian Black was a veteran Middle east journalist who held a PhD in government from this institution, our LSE. After many years as a journalist, he returned to the LSE as a Visiting Senior Fellow in the Middle east center and made a significant contribution to the work of the center. For 36 years, Ian was based at the Guardian as Middle East Editor, Diplomatic Editor, and European Editor. He reported and commented extensively on the Arab uprisings and their aftermath in Syria, Libya and Egypt. He wrote a number of books, the most recent of which was Enemies and Neighbors, Arabs and Jews in Palestine and Israel, 1917-2017. That was published in 2017. Raja will talk about 30, 40 minutes, followed by a Q and A. Then we will move to a reception outside side to which you're all warmly invited. So let me now introduce our speaker, Raya Jalapey. She is the Middle east correspondent for the Financial Times, covering Iraq, Syria and Lebanon from her base in Beirut. Most recently, Raya covered the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria and the rise of the country's new leaders. From Damascus until 2022, Raya was senior correspondent for Reuters, covering Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, focusing on politics, human rights, and the rapid pace of social transformation there. So I'm delighted to hand over to Raya for the 2025 Ian Black Memorial Lecture. Get you some water.
- [04:48]
A
Good evening, everyone. I first wanted to thank the team at LSE and Ian's family for inviting me to speak tonight. It's a great honor to be here with you, particularly to celebrate Ian Black's legacy, whose writing and moral clarity was such an inspiration to me when I was a young journalist at the Guardian. And is the case for many other journalists of my generation covering the Middle East. Just a few words about Ian for those of you who aren't lucky enough to have met him. Back in my salad days at the Guardian, I was lucky enough to land an internship with the Guardian when I was 23 and fresh out of graduate school. And while I was sitting in New York at my desk, I was always fantasizing about being a foreign correspondent in the Middle East. And so I reached out to Ian to pass to him relentlessly about helping him out with coverage or doing whatever I could to sort of get on the Middle east beat. And Ian was always very generous with his time and his advice and it meant a great deal. And I remember particularly when I came to London and I was sort of giving up on the idea of being a foreign correspondent because it just wasn't happening. And I was sitting at my desk in Brooklyn and so I came to London and I spoke to Ian. I cornered him for a coffee that turned into a three hour audience deal for him. And he told me he gave me advice because I was debating going back to graduate school. And he said, I think you should go out and do it, and that there's a dearth of Arab women, Arabs in particular, but Arab women covering the region, and that I really should give it a shot. So it's the words that I carried with me and I quit soon after to take a job at Reuters and move to Iraq. So it was really thanks to Ian at the that time and his advice. So I'd like to sort of move into the meat of the evening's lecture. So I've given it the sort of rather grandiose title of Syria after a reporter's view of a nation in transition. What that actually means is that this talk will be one rooted in my own observations and experiences of the past 11 months, some of which have found their way into the FTC's pages in one form or another. I want to stress that this is by no means a comprehensive history or overview of the extraordinary changes Syria has undergone over the past year. That would be an impossible task to do with only 30 minutes left on the clock. So rather, I want to convey some essential observations to help you understand the state of the country's transition as it stands. It's been 11 months since Ahmad al Shara led his Islamist rebels to topple five decades of brutal Assad family rule and seize power in Damascus in a military offensive that surprised most of us, even those of us who were covering Syria for 15 years. I was there on December 8th in Damascus, and I'll never forget the sort of bifurcated reality that emerged on that day, and it has continued to a certain extent. It was both the jubilation at the end of 50 years of Assad rule and it was also one of trepidation and fear that gripped people as they realized the country might now descend into an unknown that they had little idea how to navigate. Since then, Shadda has installed what in theory is supposed to be an interim government that will guide the country for five years until free and fair democratic elections can be held. That's what he's publicly committed to, even though there are many skeptics out there who fear his government will be another iteration of authoritarian rule in Syria. That government has moved at a rapid clip to get the house in order, from the lifting of sanctions to foreign investment commitments to ambitious plans for the country's renewal. And that includes everything from a complete economic overhaul to a national landmine clearing center to a Damascus metro. And he has galvanized support at home in the region and in the west, in a remarkable feat of nimble diplomacy that showcased both his pragmatism and his sharpness. It's important to remember the wreck of a country that Shadra inherited before we get further in. The Syrian economy was and remains bankrupt. Its currency was in freefall at the time, even though it stabilized to a certain degree, its industries were gutted by sanctions, smuggling, and years of rabid kleptocracy. The institutions that once gave the illusion of order have been hollowed out. Courts no longer functioned, state security forces were busy peddling captagon and taking bribes, ministries were paralyzed, and half the country's educated class had fled abroad. The infrastructure, from hospitals to power grids to oil pipelines was fractured beyond recognition. And more than a decade of conflict had left not only physical ruins, but psychological ones, sectarian suspicion, generational trauma, and a culture that prized survival over anything else. I say all this because, as I lay out the fundamental challenges that Shara's fledgling government faces, I want us all to remember the place in which he started, as it's very easy to criticize without taking into account the monumental obstacles standing in his way. But my job is to observe and to hold people in power accountable. So with this talk, I'd like to assess the transition as fairly as possible. When we speak of transition in Syria, it's tempting to imagine a straight line from war to peace and from tyranny to democracy. But Syria's transition has so far shown itself not to adhere to a linear path. Showing movement doesn't necessarily always mean progress. Transition in this case is the liminal space between what was and what might be, where communities rebuild not because they trust Shedda's vision of the future, but because they want to endure no matter what. In practical terms, transition has meant a reconfiguration of power institutions and social contracts. To give you a sense of what that looks like in Damascus, for example, long term HTS loyalties and Shedda's siblings dominate the government and circles of power. They're entrusted with key decision making positions that are shaping the future of the country. They work in tandem with a small handful of competent technocrats as Shadow has handpicked as his ministers. But then it's not without difficulty. In some ways, some people talk about a transition within the existing system, an evolution in a style of authoritarian governance that is trying to style itself as more of a managed pragmatism. In other in other parts of government you have Idlib technocrats. So Idlib is all obviously the rebel held the province. It used to be the rebel shadow's rebel held province territory in the north. And since then a lot of Idlib has moved down to Damascus. So they've taken up positions once held by Assad loyalists across ministries, border checkpoints and police forces. Obviously that's rankled Many in the old guard. And yet true pluralism or decentralization remains elusive. There's also been a very real shift from wartime predation to a controlled capitalism and free markets. Jeddah's government is trying to move away from the narco economy and war profiteering with regulated trade and foreign investment. But sanctions and institutional decay have slowed every step. There are obviously the business community and government insiders who talk about the return of corruption, with Shiraz making some attempts to rout. But 11 months in and we're still talking about a transition from survival economics to an attempt at normalization. Meanwhile, armed factions still dominate the security forces as the formation of the state's military has stalled. And on the social front, millions displaced inside and outside Syria, redefining what it means to be Syrian. So with all that in mind, I want to walk us through four threads that define this transition as I see them and are arguably Sharad's greatest challenges. First is a struggle for justice and accountability. The second is the country's lingering security challenges. The third is the wider geopolitical competition that's rampant in Syria today. And finally, the emerging networks of power in the political economy, which is something that I focus on in particular in my work. So to start with justice and accountability, I want to start with an anecdote from last December that for me encapsulates the difficulties of accountability in the Syrian context. I had got to Syria on December 8, driving across the border from Lebanon on that chaotic day. It was incredibly intense. And what I did from that moment on was to try and focus on the collapsing state security apparatus. So those of you who know anything about Syria know that under Assad, it was a completely. It was a paralyzing state security apparatus with a labyrinthine prison system where people were often disappeared and tortured and never heard from again. So what I did when I got there was spend the first few weeks trawling dungeons and prisons, the places that I had heard so much about from sources that I'd spoken to for more than a decade of covering the Syrian war. And at one point I got given a list of sites of unexplored or unknown mass graves. And these are mass graves where political prisoners had been dumped from the various prison system that they had landed themselves in. And so I went to a mass grave site with a colleague, and we wound up finding this man, Mahmoud. And Mahmoud was busy digging up a mass grave at one of the graves, and I went to him to try and stop him because I was thinking about the preservation of evidence. And instead we Sort of got into this conversation where he explained that he, the night before had seen a news crew at the site and they had dug up the mass graves themselves because at that time, this was about a week into after Assad fell and there was no security forces around, there weren't enough people to guard these sites. And as they started to emerge, there was just no one to protect them. And so we went to Mahmoud and he said that he saw in this news report that there was a bag of bones that had been shown on camera and it had his brother's name on it, or what he thinks was his brother's name. And under it it said prisoner. And that was the first time that he had any kind of acknowledgement that his brother had been detained because his brother had disappeared in 2012 and had never been heard from again. So Mahmoud had this bag of bones and he dug it out in front of me and he said, said to me, what do I do with this? And it haunts me to this day because I think about how he had nowhere to turn, he didn't know what to do. So over the next couple of weeks, I was trying to find someone in the Syrian state apparatus or even in any kind of international organization who could help him figure out if these remains, his bag of bones were in fact his brothers. He couldn't find anyone to help him in the first few weeks. And we've touched base all year and he still has his bag of bones sitting in his house because he doesn't know where to turn. And that is, that tells you a lot about the mammoth, the sort of mountain of obstacles that face anyone who want to try, who wants to try and hold any of the previous regime members accountable for these decades of atrocities. I mean, for me, one of the defining features of Syria's so called transition is the absence of any transitional justice framework. There's been no national reckoning, no formal mechanism for truth telling or religious address. The government has not prioritized accountability. Instead it has absorbed some of those once complicit and ecdera abuses into the apparatus of state. A handful of former loyalists occupy advisory roles. When I say loyalists, I mean I said loyalists. They occupy advisory roles, broker business deals, or have been allowed to go about their lives as normal after negotiating opaque financial settlements with the new administration. This is all in the name of short to medium term stability. As an example, there are people like Fadi Saqr who broke a deals with the new government to help them secure the Alawite community in exchange for some kind of immunity from retribution. For context, Sakur ran one of the most notorious pro Assad militias accused of perpetrating some horrific crimes, including the 2013 Tadalman massacre. So the fact that the new government was seen as cozying up to him left many Syrians angry and confused. The cronies, they're also cronies who've made deals with the regime, with the current, with the new government, and all in the name of stability. They've signed over many of their assets to unknown state authorities, and it's unclear where those assets are going. For ordinary Syrians, that absence of transitional justice has bred a corrosive frustration. With no courts to turn to yet, the justice system is still in flux. That has left many taking justice into their own hands. Every week for months, we've been reading reports of intercommunal violence, sometimes referred to euphemistically as individual incidents. Revenge related crimes have been been rampant across the country, from property being expropriated for people's perceived affiliation with Assad, to revenge killings daily. Former members of Syria's notorious and feared security apparatus are getting shot to death in the streets of major cities on a weekly basis, and this is barely getting reported as an example of this. In Damascus, we know of properties of people who are perceived to have been close to the regime that are getting expropriated and giving away to hts. So hate Tahrir Sham, which is Shadow's former rebel group, being given to loyalists of his group. We have the eruption of sectarian clashes and massacres throughout this past year, famously along the coast in March, where clashes between government security forces and Alawite Assad loyalists left more than 1, 400 people dead. And again, we saw this pattern repeat in Sweden, where at least hundreds were killed. We still don't know the final number. Fueled by misinformation, but also by assumptions and perceptions of years of pent up intercommunal anger. Each act of retribution deepens the wounds and sows more mistrust. Across the country, there's been a complete breakdown in trust between minority communities and the government. And this is important not just because of the social fabric that we're talking about, but it also matters for Damascus's ability to continue centralized rule. When Kurds in SDF held territories see how the government is dealing with other minority communities, it breaks down the incentive they have to deal and broker a deal with them. So what does it mean to rebuild a of state state without reckoning with the previous regime's crimes? Can a society imagine a future While its dead remain unnamed. It's a question the government doesn't yet know how to answer. While there is an official government bodies tasked with dealing with the difficult task of transitional justice, it's wary of further inflaming tensions across the country, already beset by increasing rhetorics of sectarianism and retribution, so much so that it has retained a coterie of former Baathist bureaucrats across ministries, although that has recently begun to change. As one senior government official put it to me recently, he said, if we were to start prosecuting Assad loyalists, half the country would be imprisoned by now, and we can't afford that. Shahra himself was also keen to emphasize that he's learned from the lessons around the region, both throughout the Arab Spring and also in Iraq. So he treads cautiously for a reason. He says now there are recent moves that have given clues as to a shift in direction, that the government is starting to understand the implications of what transitional justice and accountability mean. So Syria's justice minister last week announced that prosecutions would commence soon for those accused of perpetrating massacres in Sweden and along the coast. But with the legal system in flux, we still don't really know under what laws they will be prosecuted. There have also been arrests of Assad relatives involved in the captagon trade and former kleptocracy. But the wheels of justice are moving incredibly slowly. And Syrians are getting frustrated, Syrians like Mahmoud who sit around their homes with bags of bones and no answers. I'd like to move into security challenges next. So if justice is Syria's missing pillar, then security is its cracking foundation. And it may be Shella's greatest test yet. His patchwork of rebel militias that fought together to oust Assad aren't necessarily united. They've largely operated in an uneasy truce, bound less by ideology than by shared victory. And they've resisted unification to a national military force. And the cracks are beginning to show. So when I was in Syria earlier this year, so in January, February, I took a road trip from southern Syria all the way to the north. So I started in Sweda and drove all the way up to the north, stopping in nearly every province. And I did that to basically stop and talk to every single rebel faction that I could, because I was curious about what it is that they were seeing and how they felt about this moment. Many of them had been in the fsa, so the Free Syrian army, or had joined other groups as they sort of progress and metastasize in the complex context of Syria's civil war. And they all had different responses. And I remember at the time the jubilation and the euphoria of toppling Assad, which is a goal that they had been working towards for 14 years, was still very dominant. But they started to talk about cracks in the alliance. So not all of them were incredibly, you know, were comfortable with Shadow's, what they called his pivot. So what we in the west have seen as his transformation from Islamist and HTS to the suit wearing, democracy talking sort of Western style politician, other people were just displeased with the, what they sort of had past grievances with Shadow's rule. And so they weren't, you know, in the interim they said we place nation over our personal grievances and we want to rebuild the state. And it's important to us to have to be unified at this point particular moment because at the end of the day we're patriots. But in my conversation since then, it started to splinter. So some commanders have started to whisper that Shadow is too liberal and too willing to appease the west and just. And they dislike this new iteration of him as a character and as a leader. And others complain about their poultry salaries, which is an increasing problem. They've taken on this sort of lack of financial incentive to stay unified as proving to be a bigger problem than unified ideology. So they, some of these factions have taken the same corruption and repression that they once rose up against, extracting ties in their local communities and rankling the goodwill they had built up when toppling Assad. This fragmentation or this increasing fragmentation has left the government struggling to impose coherent control in an environment where you still have lingering challenges like ISIS or the Iran backed militia groups that are still activating smuggling networks along the border border with Jordan and Iraq and Lebanon. Another major security challenge has been the issue of foreign fighters. So in my conversations with officials, they say that these foreign jihadis number between 2 and 3,000. Although there aren't any official, there aren't any confirmed figures out there. They're very difficult to come by as this is one of the thorniest issues in Syria today. And that's because many of these fighters came to Syria at a different time. They joined up with HGS or the previous iterations of hts and they pledge their loyalty to both Sharia and Syria. And so many of these guys are now integrated into Syrian society. They've married Syrian women and they have Syrian children, even though they're originally they're Uyghurs or they're Tajiks or They've come from other parts of the world. So some now occupy senior positions in shadow security forces, while others help him advise, help advise him on the economy. So this is proving to be a problem with foreign capital who are pressing Shira to expel the remnants of these foreign fighters because. But that's a lot easier said than done. Many of these fighters were crucial allies for Shadow, and he feels like he owes them loyalty. And yet he's sort of torn between these foreign capitals who are pressing him for, to expel these guys. So the recent clash, there were recent clashes between army units, government security forces and French speaking foreign fighters in northern Syria. And that underscores how combustible this can actually be because those foreign fighters weren't happy with the way things were going in Damascus. Another enduring security threat is that of Islamic State. So it's a group that Shadows, which is a previous iteration of Haytir Hashem, was allied to for about a year, and they broke with them in 2013 and have since had a very, very bitter enmity. Even now, though, ISIS cells haunt desert corridors ready to exploit a perceived vacuum. So Sharia is you in Washington next week actually, and he's expected to fall formally signed Syria up to the global anti ISIS coalition. It's a remarkable pivot which many Syrians note the symbolism is dizzying. So at one time, jihad is commander seeking legitimacy by joining a coalition that was once sworn to to kill him. So for all this talk of reconciliation, violence still blooms in the darkest corners of this new Syria. The massacres of minorities from the coastal caches to Sweder in the summer to the church bombing in Damascus earlier this year, their brutal reminders at the fore fault lines of sect and revenge remain alive. And each eruption underscores the fragility of the piece that Shadow is trying to hold together. It's a piece built on. On bargains, on exhaustion and the hope that the center can still hold. But obviously key to that center holding is the geopolitical competition. Syria today is not just a nation in transition. It's also the stage on which nearly every regional and global power is competing for resources and influence. From Turkey, which still has its official affiliated factions and on payroll and controls a corridor along its border to Saudi Arabia, whose leader mbs has back shed adversiferously but isn't funding much of the transition. From Qatar to Israel, which has also occupied swathes of southern Syria and the west, which is exerting exponential influence on Charles government today, each is vying for influence in what has become The Middle East's most contested crossroads. Since his first days in power, Shira has had to navigate this minefield of patronage and pressure. Western governments, initially wary of his Islamist roots, have since lined up to support him, not so much out of conviction, but convenience. For European capitals in particular, backing Shara offers a path to something they want even more urgently, the repatriation of millions of Syrian refugees. And I initially thought this was. This seemed too on the nose. But in my conversations with embassies over the last few months, it's become patently clear that that's one of their priorities. They go to Damascus to sort of lobby them on how safe is it really to return our refugees? Because it's a problem that we don't really want to be dealing with anymore. Stability is the new moral currency. Turkey remains perhaps Damascus's most complicated ally. Ankara was once a crucial patron of Shahra's rise, supplying logistics, weapons and political cover in the early years of the rebellion. But now the relationship is one of uneasy dependency. Sherram has balanced gratitude with sovereignty, trying to place Turkey placate Turkish demands on border control and the Kurdish SDF and trade routes without appearing subservient. The same balancing act plays out with. Well, I'll just give you a recent example because it comes to mind, but a few weeks ago, I was talking to a Turkish, sorry, a Syrian business delegation in Aleppo, and they were telling me about how the economy Minister met with the Aleppo Chamber of Commerce, and they had a very tense meeting because in ever since Assad was toppled, Turkish imports have flooded the market inside Syria, and it's caused exponential issues for Syrian businessmen because it's a flood of cheap imports have made their own production largely irrelevant. So many factories have closed, many industries are under strain. And so they were appealing to the economy Minister to try and impose tariffs on Turkish imports. And his answer, according to some of the attendees in the meeting, was that, well, we can't do that because we can't annoy the Turks right now. So it's something that we might be able to revisit down the line, but not right now. So that sort of anecdote epitomizes to me that that sort of uncomfortable relationship, the similar sort of dynamic, similar balancing act plays out with Khattaj, whose money had previously been flowing towards rebel factions that were allied with Shadow and now has begun flowing into reconstruction projects and development funds. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf have been slower to commit. There are memorandum of understandings, whispered promises of infrastructure deals, and plenty of photo opportunities. I mean, Shahra was in Riyadh last week for fii, but there's been little actually money pouring into the country. For Saudi Arabia, that has much to do with its own cash crunch and a new philosophy on patronage which has resulted in tighter purse strings. Abu Dhabi is more wary, waiting to see whether this new Syria is worth the risk. But for now, share our team is left courting investors and managing expectations. With Washington, frustration is growing. Shah's relationship with Tom Barack, the US envoy and longtime intermediary, well, not long time actually just intermediary remains close, but he's beginning to chafe at Washington's pressure regarding brokering a security pact with Israel. So Washington has been a key ally in helping shut our development at this legitimacy sort of piling on very early on and encouraging his rule. But his recent trip to Moscow, which was officially billed as a reset with an Assad ally that causing tremendous destruction and pain to many Syrians was read by many as a quiet rebuke to Washington or at least an attempt to diversify shadows alliances ahead of any potential Israel deal. Washington has been very, very hell bent on this Israel Syria pact and it would be a new kind of what they're calling a security arrangement. But unfortunately it's sort of, it's stalled, much to the Israelis and Washington's discontent because Israel itself is a player whose presence is keenly felt in Syria. Today Israeli forces began seizing and fortifying positions on the Syrian side of the UN disengagement. It's called the UN DoFL line before, even before Assad fell. So when the war in Gaza broke out, the Syrians, sort of about a year in, the Israelis started to encroach onto Syrian territory and built up fortifications. And since Shada came to power, and in fact within 24 hours of him doing so, the Israelis bombarded all remaining Syrian military installations across the country. So there were two weeks of just aggressive bombardment across the country, destroying any kind of military installation, including including planes and air bases. And since then there have been repeated bouts of Israeli shelling and they have also occupied the Israeli military forces have also occupied swathes of villages in the south. So after much stop and start, there have been renewed talks again about a Syrian Israeli security arrangement. And it's loosely modeled on an existing agreement that was brokered in 1974. But the Syrians are being asked to capitulate in full to Israeli demands, which Shadow seems to think is unreasonable. So this agreement, in the meantime, Israel keeps threatening Syrian sovereignty. Every foreign handshake is buying Shadow some breathing space but it also tightens the web of obligations that he must navigate. And observers say that he's doing this very deftly. But there's a pressure that's mounting on him as an individual ruler. The last section I'd like to focus on is the networks of power and the emerging networks of power, power under SHARA and HTS and something that I focus a lot on during this transition. I'm sort of curious about what power looks like now in this interim moment, but also what power is being set up to look like going forward. The epicenter of power now lies in the presidential palace, much as it did under Assad. Around Sharia is a tight, concentric ring of loyalists drawn from Harid Hashem and his own family. So two of Shadow's brothers hold key portfolios. His brother Mahoud runs the general secretary at the presidency, which is a very sort of obscure position that we don't really understand what it does, but it's sort of akin to a senior minister or a prime ministerial position, someone with a sort of wide overview over many government portfolios. His brother Hazim runs the Economic Council, and they, more than other members of cabinet, are helping shape the direction of the emerging states. And officials inside the government tell me this arrangement isn't so much about nepotism, at least not yet. It's about trust, which is one of Chadow's key quirks. They say that he's still learning to believe in institutions and individuals beyond his immediate circle. In a country without functioning courts or a clear legal framework, it's perhaps inevitable that things are being done ad hoc, at least in the short term. But his advisors insist that this is a temporary arrangement, that professionalism will come and that Syrian transition will mature once stability takes root. But as an example of this, because there are complaints increasingly that corruption is coming back in and that the old assetist model is sort of more is tougher to crack down than one would think. So if you look at the work of Hasim Shadow's Economic Council. So it's run by Shadow's brother Hazm, and another HTS loyalist who's a little a Lebanese Australian associate from the President's time leading HTs back in Idlib all year, they've been screening prospective investors and business opportunities for the President's consideration. But they've also been in charge of organizing financial settlements with Assad's cochery of cronies. So these are senior. These are sort of influential men who used to operate under Assad and led much of the kleptocracy that that regime became known for. These are all very key decisions on economic files, public assets and investment contracts taken by this opaque council. Now, the government says it's not opaque, it's well known, these characters are known. But people who've been dealing with them say that it's just the structures of the institutions in place, the individuals that we have to deal with. We just don't understand who we're supposed to be dealing with on a formal level, who's in charge of these things. And also once, you know, people that I've spoken to who are former Assad businessmen, they say, well, we're happy to sign over our assets, Assets, you know, as, as a sort of, as payment. But where are these assets going to? Who are they being signed off to? Is it going to a Caesarean state sovereign fund or are they going to, into someone's pocket and will never be heard from again? We're talking about enormous sums. I mean, in some instances we're talking about, you know, one individual was in negotiation to hand over $1 billion in assets. So these are considerable amounts that there are many questions to be asked about how these settlement processes are going. The paradox is that even as power remains centralized and opaque, Shah is urging his technocratic ministers to think very big. So his government has been brokering major contracts in energy, infrastructure and finance, signing letters of intent with Gulf investors, courting Turkish and Qatari capital, and promising to open Syria to international markets once sanctions ease. Because an important thing to note is that while most sanctions have been lifted on Syria, there are Congress in the US still needs to give its stamp of approval to lift the Caesar sanctions. And until those sanctions are lifted, foreign investment and interest in Syria has, has definitely cooled. On paper, all of these things are ambitious, but on the ground, it often feels quite improvisational because of the ad hoc nature of how government government is run. Beyond the economy, though, progress does feel elusive, particularly on the political front. For many in civil society, these structural weaknesses and the lack of institutions aren't just growing pains. They're symptoms of, of a deeper problem. Two key moments that were key that were meant to mark Syria's transition were the national dialogue and the first parliamentary election that happened last, that happened in, last month. Yeah. They've instead become shorthand for government failings. Both were rushed, tightly managed by HTS networks and they were ultimately non democratic. Civil society groups that participated say they were never, they were consulted but ultimately never heard. And others are now complaining of an increasingly heavy hand. So restrictions on meetings, surveillance and bureaucratic interference, and even the most apolitical initiatives. The result is a political ecosystem that looks modern from afar, with ministries with brand new logos, investment conferences and televised debates. But inside still breathes the old air of control. The challenge for shadow and for Syria is whether these networks of power can evolve into something genuinely accountable before they ossify into a new authoritarianism. Now, Syria's transition is not from war to peace or dictatorship to democracy. It's from certainty to uncertainty, from imposed ability to negotiated survival. And within that uncertainty lies both the danger and the possibility of renewal. Now, I focused a lot on the challenges that this government has and will face going forward. But it has to be said that in all my conversations in Syria, while people are nervous and fearful about the changes that are coming, and not everyone certainly agrees with the Islamist nature of this government, they also express a hope, and a desperate hope, really, that this government works out. I think the overwhelming sentiment is that everyone wants this government to succeed because the what happens otherwise is too terrifying. But I will leave you with this one thought is that in all my conversations, people focus on the fact that they are freer to express themselves now. And even though they fear the instability that could come, they also feel that this is their first shot in a long time at renewal and hope for Syria. So I'll leave you with those thoughts. Thank you. Hi. I'm interrupting this event to tell you about another awesome LSE podcast that we think you'd enjoy. LSEIQ asks social scientists and other experts to answer one intelligent question like why do people believe in conspiracy theories? Or can we afford the super rich? Come check us out. Just search for lseiq wherever you get your podcasts. Now back to the event.
- [35:49]
B
Thank you, Raya, for this tour de force and also for ending on a positive note.
- [35:54]
A
I tried.
- [35:55]
B
Yes. So you talked us through the issues of trans transition, justice, security, economy, networks of power, and civil society. And I wanted perhaps to start the conversation before moving to the audience by asking you about security and the centralization of power. In military terms, how do you think the prospects are for that in terms of the Kurdish enclave and of course, many other minorities?
- [36:30]
A
Yeah. The military has been very, very slow to be formed, the national military. This is still a country run by a patchwork of rebel groups. And you see that as you drive across the country and see different rebel groups that control different areas. They have, in theory, the rhetoric coming out of the government is that they are trying to form this national military, but again, they are hamstrung with a lack of funds and, and support from overseas. So that's one line of thinking. I am concerned about the splintering of these factions and their allegiances to Shadow. I think it's a narrative that's growing, and I think some of them are because they ideologically differ, and some it's because of financial incentives, and some just want to retain their fief. I mean, I think, you know, the outgoing UN Special envoy, Gab Peterson recently told my colleague that he's worried about, you know, Syria turning into Libya if these factions are brought under control. I think there is. It's unclear if it's a, if it's an issue of intent, if the government is intentionally avoiding doing this, because it has to, of course, keep these individual commanders and these individual factions happy, because these are people that helped him get to where he is today. And so he owes them loyalty. But at the same time, a lot of them differ ideologically to what he wants to do. So that's, that's, that, that, that's concerning on that front. Now, when it comes to Sweder and it comes to the Kurds, there was, in theory, this agreement brokered in March between the Kurds and Damascus. And the idea was that the Kurds would eventually reunite or at least have some kind of arrangement where they would have at least their security forces become part of a new national military. And there would also be other arrangements made, for example, for oil resources and for physical control of territory. That hasn't happened. The. It hasn't happened yet, I should say. There are ongoing negotiations and I think there are positive signs coming out of that camp. But fundamentally, the, the government security forces, clashes in, in, on the coast, but really in Sweden have disincentivized the Kurds from wanting to broker a deal because to them, it's like, why should we, you know, first of all, we can't trust that they're going to, this government is going to treat minorities with the respect that they deserve. But also, they know that the Damascus can't afford to be seen as engaging in another massacre. So they're not going to do another military incursion to sort of force the Kurds to adhere to Damascus rule. So there's this kind of stalemate that's uncomfortable right now where they're not fully. They haven't found a resolution yet. And when it comes to this, the Druze, after the massacres in Sweden, which involved, it must be said, security forces, Druze militias and Arab Bedouin, all of which committed atrocities, it's complicated. I mean, at this point in time, the Druze feel very, very mistrustful of the government. They don't want to really open that conversation at all. And they don't really know what their future looks like. And of course, you do have Israeli interference happening in Sweden. You have a sort of geopolitical game that's being played there. So very complicated on the security front.
- [39:33]
B
Okay, thank you so much. I'm going to open the floor for the Q and A so you can type your questions, if you're online in the Q and A box. And I'll try to answer as many as possible, passing them on to Raya. And it's very important for all of us, please, to include your name and affig before you ask your question. Please keep them short and please make sure they're questions as opposed to general statements. So I'll start with the floor here in the room. I'll take two, and then I'll take one from online. So the person there with the glasses. No, no, sorry. Yes.
- [40:21]
A
Hi, my name is Will. I'm from Islamic Relief uk. I wanted to ask you, in your view, what do you think is the main humanitarian crises that are affecting Syria at the moment or you think will be affecting them on the horizon soon?
- [40:37]
B
Thank you. I'll take one from the back there. The person there on the right. Yes, you. Yes.
- [40:58]
A
No.
- [40:59]
B
Yes.
- [40:59]
A
Thank you. Thank you, Raya, for the, for the amazing talk. And as Halabi, no affiliation. I have a question. Have you. Have you heard anything on the ground about, like, forming a new political party? I think some rumors are coming out of a new political party. And aside from that, any political life whatsoever? From the political, you know, from anyone who was politically active from before December 8th?
- [41:29]
B
Okay, I'll take a third from online. So this is from Yusuf Abbas. Based on your observations, Raya, how do you think the US Administration would respond to the Kurdish autonomous administration if it fails to reach an agreement with the central government? So follow up from what we were talking about before.
- [41:50]
A
I'll start with that one, actually, since it's fresh. I think the US Is exerting pressure on the Kurds to come to an agreement, but I don't think it's. We're not anywhere near them being unhappy with them. I think they understand the difficulties at hand, but they're very involved in negotiating between Damascus and the Kurds at the moment. So they're hopeful to see a resolution. I don't know. There are, of course, rumblings of, you know, will Washington withdraw its support? Will it withdraw its military installations. I mean, now in Iraq, certainly the Americans are pulling back their installation relations from the rest of the country and moving them to Kurdistan, to Iraqi Kurdistan to focus on the anti ISIS fight. And so they, there are. It's a sort of. Some people are perceiving it as an implicit threat that they will move their sort of physical assets from Syria, from the Kurdish enclave in Syria to Iraqi Kurdistan and focus their operations from there. So there is a mix of things happening, but it's very unclear to see what happens next on the humanitarian stuff. Thank you for that question, because I was remiss to not mention enough on the humanitarian crisis in Syria because it is, it's a country still riven with. I mean, it's just a pile of rubble still. In many of the, many of the parts of the country that I go to. I mean, even outside of Damascus, you have this concentric circle of rubble. It's where, you know, a lot of the sort of rebel sort of where a lot of the protests started. And it's where I said was his most ferocious. So you leave the city and within 20 minutes you're in piles of rubble. So I think it's still a country with tremendous, tremendous needs and very little funding. I would say the biggest humanitarian issue, there's two things. One is rubble and reconstruction, and we're very, very far away from having any kind of structured reconstruction. And two is unexploded ordnance and landmines. I mean, it is just littered with. Everywhere you go, you just encounter unexploded ordnance. And it's killing several people a week, I think, since they started keeping count, since humanitarian organizations started keeping count in December, since the fall, you've had more than almost 600 people killed by unexploded ordnance. And it's a lot of children, I should note. So that's something that I think needs a massive upscale in funding from the international community. The question on political parties and political life is an excellent one. It's something that we're all keenly waiting to see how that evolves Very quickly. After taking power in December, all political parties were dissolved, and that has remained in place. There are no political parties that are formally been created. Created. There are, as you say, rumblings that political parties are trying to form themselves, but there really hasn't been any kind of attempt formally to do so yet. And I think, I think it's unclear how this government is going to react to that when it happens, which it eventually will. I mean, if this is to be a free and fair democracy, as you know, the stated intents have been. Although Shadow is very wary. I don't think he's ever used the word democracy himself, but, you know, some kind of pluralistic system, then you're going to need to have political parties, and we're not at the stage. And I think a lot of people that I speak to are skeptical that, you know, that they're at a. That the government is at a point where it's comfortable enough with the threat of opposition to allow that to happen. Now you have some influential Syrians in the diaspora who've tried to sort of ferment a bit of political movement that hasn't really gotten anywhere yet. The interesting thing is to look at the recent elections. They were not elections as we would see them here. They're elections in the sense that there was a committee that was appointed by the government that hand picked electors that would then hand pick candidates who would then become MPs and who go into parliament. So those people will be tasked with. And that's, I should say, that's two thirds of Parliament. The other third is handpicked by Shahra himself itself. So it's a very, very tightly orchestrated political body that's emerged. And so with that, there were no political parties that emerged. There was no. There weren't really any manifestos. The candidates were given a very, very short amount of time to get themselves together and present themselves as candidates. So really, it's political life is still, I think, very tightly regulated. I think people on that level, I think in terms of terms of political culture and political life, there isn't what we're seeing as the beginnings of one. I mean, during the elections, you had people, because Syrians live on Facebook, as many of you all know. So during the elections, the people who were running for these elections in the comments on Facebook, there was a lot of debate back and forth about qualifications, about policies, about things. So we were seeing a lot of that. Now, I say on Facebook, because. Because people are still afraid to talk publicly about politics. It's shifting. It's still. But we're still not there yet. So I think people are having these debates and we're starting to learn. And, you know, a lot of civil society, they've been organizing these sort of underground meetings to sort of start teaching Syrians about, you know, I mean, this sounds very condescending, but teaching Syrians about political life, it's more about just like reengaging them in that process after 50 years of totalitarianism. So, you know, it's Happening. We're not there yet. And I don't know about political parties ever being allowed to take form during this interim period.
- [47:22]
B
Thank you, Frania. I'll take two more questions from the floor. So one person there. Yeah. Yes, you. Thank you. Hi.
- [47:37]
A
No affiliation.
- [47:38]
B
Sorry. Okay, go ahead, Go ahead.
- [47:41]
A
It's fine.
- [47:43]
B
Go ahead, go ahead. Hi, my name is Sham. No fellowship.
- [47:47]
A
I'm just a Syrian student. I was just wondering, as a Syrian, I think our biggest concern right now.
- [47:53]
B
Or one of our biggest concerns is.
- [47:55]
A
Ahmed Al Shara kind of entrenching himself in power with the parliamentary, the parliamentary elections and post the election. So I was just wondering what your.
- [48:06]
B
View on that was, whether you think.
- [48:08]
A
That after the five year transitioning period is over, if he's going to just kind of continue entrenching himself in power, entrenching his colleagues. A lot of his families are holding senior positions. So this is just like a very big concern for us. Thank you.
- [48:24]
B
Thanks. And three people down, please. The person I was originally. Not you, the lady in the front. Thank you. Sorry.
- [48:32]
A
Hi. I just wanted to say thank you.
- [48:34]
B
So much for the talk. It's really informative.
- [48:36]
A
I just kind of wanted to ask.
- [48:38]
B
What kind of things can more like.
- [48:40]
A
The international community do and maybe even individuals to help the situation in Syria.
- [48:46]
B
Thank you. And I'll take one from the iPad. This is from Francis Is Guy. Does freedom of speech extend to any nascent journalism? Can you reflect on the state of the Syrian media, including for women journalists?
- [49:14]
A
Hard to say. If in five years, well, four years, we're going to still see Ahmad Al Shada in the seat and continuing, I think it's likely based on what we've seen so far. I'm not. I think it's interesting. I've studied him very closely over the last year. I wrote a profile of him in March and I obsessively went through his entire history and spoke to people who've known him for decades. And I was really trying to get into the mind to sort of understand the trajectory of Syria as seen by him. And really it's something that everyone sort of agrees on, is that he's a control freak with good intent. But he is, he micromanages. He's very involved. And that's how he governed in Idlib and that's how he's governing now that we can see after a year. So, you know, I mentioned, and you of course pointed to the coterie of loyalists who are in his, who are controlling government today. And that includes people he's Known for, for many, many years and his family and, and people he's learned to trust recently. Does that circle get wider? We're not sure. We don't know yet. I think his, his entourage is very keen to stress that this is all about the transition and he can't trust anyone yet. And of course, you have to remember he's coming from this rebel background where you couldn't trust anyone. And so he really has this military sort of mentality where trust is, is, stays within the concentric circle and that's it. But I do think there are a lot of, you know, certainly the un, certainly civil society, they have a lot of concerns about whether or not that circle is ever going to widen. And I think, you know, this election was fine by international observer standards. I mean, no one was expecting you to be, you know, the reason you couldn't have had a proper election is because most of the Syrians don't have documents. So it would have been impossible to hold a sort of free and fair election at this stage. But what happens in four years? I don't, I don't know. I think there are definitely, there are reasons to be concerned about whether or not there is an effective political transition at the end of that time. Hopefully that answers your question. I rambled a bit. What can people do to help? I mean, I think caring is important. I think the international community, community needs to sort of hold Shara accountable to his pledges to reform, protection of minorities, protection of freedom of expression and rights that extend to all. I think they also need to pressure him about the, the military, about them needing to be a sort of international military. But I also think the international community needs to throw money at Syria. Syrian stability is not going to happen without money. You need, they need the funds, they need the help. And this government is very keen that it doesn't want to take out any debts, it doesn't want to be indebted to anyone, which is fine, but then figure out a way to sort of fund initiatives and reconstruction efforts and de mining and schools and, and so I think from that front, there's a lot the international community, community can do and not just focus on refugee returns. And on an individual level, I mean, you sound like a very good human being. So I think, sure, you figure out a way to care and help and then on freedom of speech and journalism and Syrian women, I mean, Syrian women are very strong, so they don't really need a lot of help in terms of, you know, support on that front. But I think freedom of expression, like I work for a Western paper. Yes, I'm an Arab woman, but like I'm a work for Western paper. I go in as under the guise of, you know, Western journalism. And they have let me do pretty much whatever I want. I've never really had any interference and most of my colleagues will agree we've had pushback when we've written stories that they don't like, but it doesn't extent. We've never been threatened or barred from entry. I mean, I think I speak quite confidently in saying that on behalf of most of my colleagues. Yeah, I don't really. There's only one incident really when some the government got annoyed for about 24 hours and then calmed down. So, you know, we feel like there is a pretty good freedom of expression for us. Does that extend to Syrians and Syrian journalists? Mixed reviews. My Syrian journalist friends are saying that there is a lot of self censorship happening because they're afraid of rankling the government and they're afraid, you know, Idlib was run extremely tight and like the intelligence apparatus does exist, it's obviously not Assads, but there are, there have been detentions, there have been people who've been rounded up from civil society, even if it is for a short period of time. So. So they are nervous, but they are also. There's a lot of excitement because you had a lot of Syrians in the diaspora or like living in Gaziantep who were working and helping covering their country from abroad, who are now back and want to sort of build up the Syrian journalism community. And so they're really working hard to sort of launch new news outlets and they're training their colleagues because under I said journalism wasn't really a thing. Well, independent journalism wasn't really a thing. So they're trying to sort of rebuild that culture. And Syrian women journalists in particular, I mean, honestly, like they're leading the pack as they always have. So I wouldn't be. I would be more concerned for the industry at large rather than for, you know, for the Syrian women journalists.
- [54:31]
B
There's a question from Maureen Gilbert online about the position of women in general. Maybe you can sort of briefly tie this to what you've just said.
- [54:40]
A
Yeah. So where Syrian women are incredibly strong, they're also being marginalized from the political apparatus. So you had, I believe, and please don't get this wrong, six women who are elected to parliament out of 120. So that's not great. And I think Sharia is expected to appoint more women to help fill the gap when he appoints the rest of the 70 MPs, that he will get to do in the next few weeks. But Syrian women, you know, I think it's, it's. I don't. I mean, there are obviously concerns about the Islamist nature of the people in power. You see that there are changes happening in the court system. They're bringing in judges that not necessarily secular. And so there are some people who are starting to complain about women's rights being eroded on that front. I think I'm not. I haven't seen that manifest yet. I think my main concern is just the marginalization from political life. Like, even in Cheddar's cabinet, you have one woman, and that woman also happens to be the Christian in government. So like she's, you know, two birds, one stone. So, like, that doesn't make you feel great about the position that women are in in this government. So, you know, I think it's definitely something to watch. And to go back to your comment, I think, you know, that's something that the international community can keep pressing them on.
- [55:59]
B
Thank you. I'll take a final round, people from that side, please. So the person with the yellow band in their hand and then the person behind them, please.
- [56:15]
A
Thank you very much. My name's Eve McQuillan, no affiliation, but I was at LSE about 10 years ago. So my question relates to you talked about a web of obligations upon him that's getting kind of stronger and stronger and the pressure on him as an individual. And I want to know what it looks like if that pressure kind of comes to a point, if those obligations can't be matched up together.
- [56:37]
B
Okay. The person two rows back. Yeah. Switch on, please.
- [56:46]
A
Better? Yeah. Hi. Thank you. My name is Jad Baghdadi and I'm a PhD candidate at the University of Oxford. So my question relates to just maybe more day to day issues maybe with regards to your work in Syria. And I'm wondering, where have you found it most difficult, difficult to get sources and, you know, be able to cover a story here speaking either geographically, regionally, however you want to put it. And I'm wondering if this relates at all with the situation in the border in the south. There's a lot of, you know, news coming out of occupation forces setting up fences in Syrian towns, between Syrian villages. And it's been very difficult to get, you know, the detailed news about this and what's happening there. And I'm wondering if that connects to this question. Thank you.
- [57:43]
B
Okay, I'll take one more from the center at the back there, please. The Person at the back. Yes, thank you. Wait for Micah.
- [57:56]
A
Do you hear me? Yeah. I would like to ask a question about Iran. Obviously, Iran had significant influence in Syria before the collapse of Assad. So to what extent does Iran retain any influence or sort of any groups? Because inside Iran it remains quite an issue of contention, especially how certain minority groups in Syria are treated by the new government. So. Yeah, because you touched upon Iranian smuggling group, so specifically Iran moving arms to Hezbollah, would be interesting to hear about how that's continuing. Yeah.
- [58:29]
B
And there's an online question from Hussein Alaini who's asking about the role of Saudi Arabia in supporting. Well, just generally.
- [58:43]
A
Yeah. Okay, good questions. And it's making me realize I glossed over too much in this talk. But 30 minutes, guys. So web of obligations, I think, you know, like the example that I gave about Turkish imports is a big one. I mean, it's completely destroying the Syrian industrial. I mean, the entire manufacturing industry is going under because of these Turkish imports. And they don't feel like they can do anything against them because of this sort of obvious obligation that you have. So Syrians are suffering and Syrian industry is suffering as a result of this sort of like pressure from, from Turkey and this design not to upset them. But beyond that, I mean, I think it, you know, it's, it's Syria. You know, the country has been brokering all these big deals. Well, they've been brokering mouse a memorandum of understanding. They're not exactly deals yet, but they're promises of deals. And all of these deals are happening with international partners and they're all competing for the same sort of small pocket of resources that exist in Syria today. And the Syrians are struggling with who to award these contracts to. And like, you know, if they annoy a certain partner, then does that mean that they don't get funding to pay the rebel salaries that they still need to pay? Does it mean that they don't get the same investments in other parts that are desperately needed? I mean, one of the main problems you have in Syria today is the lack of electricity. They're very specific. You know, the Qataris are very, are involved in a sort of big project to, to regenerate power in Syria. But does that mean that they get. They, they have to be given other project? You know, that the Saudis, for instance, have to be given another project. So it's like this sort of constant negotiation between who gets what in the pie. And like, obviously it's all. There is a mutual benefit there because Assyrians will benefit ultimately from These investments. But it's a lot of pressure to manage these competing interests. So I think. I don't know what it looks like beyond that, but for now, it's certainly. You can feel that tension in government where they're sort of having to balance these things out. Sources where I found it difficult to build sources and to find stories. I mean, so you mentioned the south. So I went to NATO in March, and for those of you who don't know, this is where Israeli military outposts have popped up. And they've also. They've encroached, you know, 17 kilometers and beyond into Syrian territory, beyond the battle buffer zone, and they've taken over villages. So you have Israeli military patrols happening in all these villages. They regulate. There's curfews. They regulate where people can go. So this is all happening on Syrian sovereign territory. And so there is this discomfort. So I went there in March, basically, when this all started happening, when we first started seeing these Israeli military incursions into Syria. And we were able to get there, and it was fine, largely because, like, reporting in Syria today, like, there are so few, you feel the vacuum of the security presence because there aren't enough of these rebels to, well, sort of, I should say government security forces to police the entire state. So we're able to kind of go around and there aren't a lot of questions being asked at checkpoints. So we can go. It's just what happened, you know, so. So I went there in March, and we were able to get into certain communities where the Israelis were sort of down the road, and it was largely fine. But since then, it's been harder to get to for sure, and harder because the Israeli military patrols are deeper in land and are blocking access. But, you know, it's. It's not been. I hate to say that it. It's not that it hasn't been difficult to build sources and stories. I mean, everyone. The good thing is that everyone's annoyed about something. Like, it's a context where there are competing interests and people hate the government. People love the government. People want to tell you stuff that they're doing. People want to win, you know, contracts. People want it. So there's always someone gossiping about something. So, like, you'll. You'll pick up enough journalistically and even, you know, with Exodus, like, they love to talk. They love to talk to the foreign press. So, like, they've been sort of around trying to sort of recruit sympathy. So, like, we were even able to get to talk to them. That wasn't a very detailed answer, but hopefully we can talk later. Iran is the big. The big one. So we talked a bit about Russia because obviously Iran and Russia were the main backers of the Assad regime back then. With Russia, the Syrian government has broken a very sort of an easy relationship since the fall. So the Russians have been able to keep their bases on the coast, and they've sort of been negotiating various aspects. And so there was, you know, shut out, went to Moscow. There have been several delegations going back and forth. Iran, Absolutely not. There is barely a relationship. There isn't a relationship. In fact, they. There is deep mistrust. One of the first things I did when I went to Damascus on December 8 was to go to the Iranian embassy, and it had been torched immediately. Like, it was one of the first things to go. And it stayed that way. They haven't cleaned it up. It's still got broken windows. It's, you know, it's very much a message. So there is barely a relationship. There were some negotiations because the Iranians had certain assets and installations that the new government wanted to take control over, and the Iranians didn't help with that. So it's. It's an uncomfortable one. There's also a huge amount of debt that the Iranians would like to reclaim that the Syrians aren't even entertaining.
- [63:58]
B
So.
- [63:59]
A
So I don't think that relationship is going anywhere. I mean, I was just in Baghdad last week, and there you obviously have a lot of Iran back to militias. And to show you a bit of the narrative coming out of that camp, they still call him Jelani. They say he's isis. They say, we can't trust this guy. He's going to foment an incursion into Iraq and Iran, and we have to protect it at all costs. So it's one of deep, deep mistakes. Distrust. I will say, though, that in Iraq, they're being very pragmatic, and so the government has been like, entertaining conversations with Damascus, and they're much more inclined to sort of do business with them. But on Iran, I mean, there's really not much of a relationship. And you asked a question about smuggling roots of weapons to Hezbollah. I mean, like, yeah, it's happening still, clearly, because the Syrian government security forces have been intercepting weapons smuggling attempts. So, like, we've seen pictures come from, like, border interceptions of weapons and other assorted resistance paraphernalia, but they. Yeah, I mean, that's clearly still happening to an extent. I think there's been a massive crackdown and it's obviously a lot harder for it to happen. Like, the government is doing a pretty good job at intercepting these things, but if they've intercepted a handful, who knows how many more have continued along long. So Iran is still the bat noir and Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia, MBS is apparently a big fan of shadows. On a personal level, he, you know, they have a good relationship. Shadow was invited to Saudi. It's where he shook Trump's hand for the first time. So they're very much engaged in supporting, I would say, to a certain extent. The issue is that they don't have, they have a different politic when it comes to throwing cash now, like in the past. Whereas Saudi would have been very comfortable throwing money at a state in this, you know, country, in the state. Not anymore. It's got its own internal domestic needs for liquid. It's not willing to throw cash around in the same way. But it still wants to support. So it is, you know, there are projects being discussed and I think we'll see, like some of these promises materialize into tangible deals. But, you know, the Saudi is just a different place to what it was a decade ago. So the way it shows its support is going to look different. But yeah, it is a close relationship to a certain extent.
- [66:17]
B
Okay, thank you.
- [66:19]
A
Thank you.
- [66:37]
B
I'm not going to say anything. It's unnecessary. Thank you so much.
- [66:41]
A
Thank you.
- [66:41]
B
So please join us for the reception outside. Thank you.
- [66:46]
A
Thank you for listening. You can subscribe to the LSE Events podcast on your favorite podcast app and help other listeners discover us by leaving a review. Visit lse.ac.ukevents to find out what's on next. We hope you join us at another LSE event soon.