LSE: Public Lectures and Events

Episode: The Future of the Liberal World Order
Date: January 23, 2014
Host: Peter Trubowitz (A), LSE Film and Audio Team
Panelists:

• John Ikenberry (B) – Princeton and Oxford
• Barry Buzan (C) – LSE, University of Copenhagen, Jilin University
• Trine Flockhart (D) – Danish Institute of International Studies, Transatlantic Academy
• Charles Kupchan (E) – Georgetown, Council on Foreign Relations, Transatlantic Academy

Episode Overview

This episode convenes a distinguished panel to debate the prospects, challenges, and transformations confronting the "liberal world order"—the global system characterized by open markets, multilateral institutions, collective security, democratic norms, and U.S.-led leadership since WWII. Central themes include whether Western hegemony is ending, the implications for international order, and if or how existing institutions can adapt. Each panellist addresses three framing questions:

1. What is the biggest challenge to the liberal world order?
2. Can it be met within current institutions, or are new structures needed?
3. If new structures are needed, what might they look like?

The discussions are intellectually lively, sometimes contentious, but deeply informed—offering plural perspectives on a topic of enduring importance.

Key Discussion Points

1. Is the Liberal World Order in Crisis, Transformation, or Transition?

John Ikenberry: Optimistic on Liberal Order’s Durability

• Argument: Challenges are "crises and transitions of success," not existential threats to liberalism.
• "We're witnessing a global power transition... unipolarity is ending" (06:48) – recognizes the diffusion of global power.
• The main contest is about authority and voice, not over the rejection of core liberal principles ("openness and rule of law").
• Rising states (China, India, Brazil, Korea, Mexico, Turkey, et al.) generally operate within established institutions (IMF, World Bank, UN).
• “What is most striking... is that China and other rising states... are rising up within rather than outside of the rules and institutions that have been built over the last 60 years...” (11:38).
• He identifies four features of the current order:
  1. Integration Capacity – new states can join and thrive.
  2. Expansiveness (G7 to G20, “sharing the spoils of modernity”)
  3. Accommodation of Development Models – laissez-faire, social democratic, and developmental-statist paths all included.
  4. Rise of a Global Middle Class of States – not just a ‘rest vs. West’ scenario.
• The tension is over “who sits at the table” (authority/voice), not over laws, norms, or capitalism itself.
• Concluding View: “We are in a period of transition and…a crisis of liberal international order. But it’s not an E.H. Carr crisis…It’s a Polanyi crisis—one of success and adjustment, not breakdown.” (18:55)

Barry Buzan: Not a Liberal, More Sceptical of Order’s Health

• Stresses multiplicity of simultaneous challenges, not one overriding threat, e.g., end of Western dominance, governance succession, institutional credibility, global inequalities.
• “The only way I could obey the rule [to name the single biggest challenge] is to say that the biggest challenge is that there are several challenges all happening at the same time.” (21:04)
• Main critiques:
  • The liberal order is too closely identified with U.S. interests, especially after recent U.S. failures (Middle East, war on terror, human rights hypocrisy).
  • The world has universalized capitalism, not liberal democracy—political forms (democratic, authoritarian, bureaucratic) remain highly contested.
  • “Economic liberalism can do fine under a variety of political regimes…” (26:10)
  • Institutional architecture (UN, Security Council, etc.) is outdated and largely unreformable.
• Proposes building a “concert of capitalist powers” rather than “concert of democracies,” emulating the 19th-century European model, to pragmatically manage coexistence and geoeconomics.
• Highlights common primary institutions (sovereignty, market, human equality) as a basis for coexistence.

Trine Flockhart: The Pragmatist and Theorist

• Sees merit in all arguments, but sketches a framework for analyzing ‘international order’:
  • Leading state’s capabilities and "magnetism" (soft power).
  • Primary institutions (shared practices, norms—drawing on Buzan’s English School).
  • Institutional architecture (dense/thin, formal/informal).
  • Domestic political structures.
• SWOT analysis: Notes resilience, legitimacy, and innovation as underappreciated strengths.
• Liberal order is relatively strong, but “its magnetism especially appears to be fading” due to economic crisis and political debacles (40:14).
• Critiques the idea that crisis is new—liberal orders have always been “in some sort of crisis.” Their adaptability is their strength.
• Existing institutions are workable but need updating; supports TTIP and TPP as examples of adaptive reform.
• Rejects “league/concert of democracies”—calls instead for open institutions signalling cosmopolitan aspiration, in line with liberalism’s universal inclusiveness.

Charles Kupchan: Pessimistic about Universalization, Predicts Normative Decentralization

• Argues we are “moving to a world that will… be interdependent, be globalized… [but] with no captain at the helm.” (46:34)
• Key challenge is maintaining international order without a dominant Western, especially U.S., hand.
• Rising powers (China, India, Brazil, etc.) do not share fundamental Western perspectives (“I see a country [China] that… does not buy into the Western liberal order on most critical dimensions”—53:03).
• “To reduce international order to trade…and therefore [expect] they will buy into our views about governance, about democracy, about human rights, about sovereignty, about legitimacy, strikes me as not looking at China with eyes wide open.” (52:49)
• Predicts emerging powers want global influence but want to rewrite rules/norms for their interests.
• Points out that growing stratification in the West undermines its capacity to provide a compelling model and manage transition: “If the European Union is falling apart and the United States is closed for business, we will definitely get this transition wrong.” (59:06)
• Prescriptive turn: Focus first on fixing Western domestic politics and economics.

Timestamps and Memorable Moments

[05:54] – Ikenberry opens with a spirited defense:

“I’m going to praise rather than bury liberal world order today.” – John Ikenberry

[19:58] – Barry Buzan’s critical framing:

“I think probably most of us here will agree about the decentered world order... But the practice of the liberal global order, it seems to me, has discredited it in a variety of ways.” – Barry Buzan

[32:07] – Trine Flockhart on internal and external challenges:

“There are two ways of looking at that question. One is how to sustain liberal order into the future... The other is about how to ensure global order in a more pluralistic world.” – Trine Flockhart

[46:15] – Kupchan, on the historical perspective:

“Imagine that we gathered here in the year 1700... Power was very broadly diffused around the globe… The question that we are debating today... didn't come up.” – Charles Kupchan

[53:02] – Kupchan on rising powers:

“When I look at China, I see a country that on most critical dimensions of order, does not buy into the Western liberal order...” – Charles Kupchan

[59:06] – Kupchan’s conclusion:

“Our first, second, third and fourth priorities has to be to get our own house in order...” – Charles Kupchan

[70:34] – Buzan on the (im)probability of great power war:

“Great power war is not impossible, but it is more or less completely irrational... The old Charles Tilly line—'war makes the state and the state makes war'—was a pretty good line up until about 50 or 60 years ago. And now it’s not.” – Barry Buzan

Audience Questions and Panel Responses

[60:50] – War and the Liberal Order

• Question: Can we really be confident that great power war is off the table?
• Buzan: “Great power war is not impossible, but it is more or less completely irrational… If you want to worry about violence,… the point of violence to worry about is the conjunction between rather large powers of destruction… and relatively small groups of people...” (70:34)

[61:22] – Soft Power and U.S. Leadership

• Question: Where does soft power fit into this debate?
• Flockhart: Soft power is closely linked to “magnetism,” a vital element for spreading liberal values, facilitating cooperation, and potentially shaping new international norms. (67:55)

[61:43] – Institutional Reform

• Question: Which global governance architectures most need reform?
• Flockhart: Not all global architecture needs overhaul, but the UN Security Council and broader power-sharing mechanisms are deeply in need; reform is tough but essential.

[74:00] – Norm Contestation and Social Identity

• Question from Leslie: Are disputes over liberal order more about group vs. individual rights as material power shifts?
• Panel: The debate acknowledges that as standards rise (especially for rights), the distance between liberal and non-liberal norms becomes more apparent—and less easy to bridge.

[75:13] – Is the World Really Multipolar? (Brazilian Student)

• Question: Is a multipolar world really emerging, or is the West still dominant?
• Buzan/Flockhart: Multipolarity doesn’t quite capture the emerging complexity; instead, we're entering a decentered, “layer cake” system—regional powers' importance rising, but no clear multipolar contest for global dominance.

[76:47] – Iran and the Liberal Order

• Question: What is Iran’s role in the (liberal) world order?
• Kupchan: Iran is at a crossroads. If the nuclear deal proceeds, rapprochement and greater integration are possible; failure would greatly increase risks of conflict. (77:51)

Concluding Reflections

Panel Final Remarks

• Kupchan: Predicts increasing regionalization of governance and higher standards within Western frameworks, which may exclude non-Western powers.
• Buzan: Calls for new terminology and frameworks—not "multipolarity," but decentered, pluralist regional and functional governance.
• Flockhart: Sees change as undeniable, if not always measurable by growth rates or military metrics. Suggests institutions should enable self-selection of liberal identity.
• Ikenberry: The future will not be a Western liberal clone, but a more inclusive, authority-sharing, and functionally adaptive liberal internationalism:

  “The vision of an open, rule-based order is not a Western idea… when you look at what states are doing… you see them… embracing open, rule-based order.” (87:11)

Takeaways

• All agree Western hegemony is fading, but not whether the liberal order will persist, adapt, or fragment.
• The shift is toward a more pluralistic, regionally organized (yet still functionally interconnected) system, with authority and legitimacy emerging as the core battlegrounds.
• Liberal order’s adaptability, resilience, and procedural openness are strengths, but growing contestation of norms, legitimacy, and institutional efficacy cannot be ignored.
• The universalization of capitalism is not matched by the universalization of liberal democracy or western norms.
• The policy consensus: The West must focus on internal renewal; projecting liberal order externally is less effective if the Western model is weakened at home.

Notable Quotes

• Ikenberry (05:54): “Crises and transitions that we can watch today are… crises and transitions of success… the kinds of transitions that you would want if you are trying to build an open, highly interdependent world order…”
• Buzan (21:04): “The biggest challenge is that there are several challenges all happening at the same time.”
• Flockhart (32:07): “There are two ways of looking at that question. One is how to sustain liberal order into the future… The other is about how to ensure global order in a more pluralistic world.”
• Kupchan (46:34): “The key question before us is, can we move to a world that is decentered materially without also moving to a world that is decentered normatively?”
• Buzan (70:34): “Great power war is not impossible, but it is more or less completely irrational…”

Summary Table of Panelist Perspectives

| Panelist | Main Thesis | Crisis Type | Role of Rising Powers | Institutional Outlook | Policy Prescription | |------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------| | Ikenberry | Liberal order in a successful transition crisis | Polanyi | Join & strengthen | Adaptive reform | Share authority, openness | | Buzan | Capitalism universalized, political liberalism contested | Mixed | Not anti-liberal | Build pluralist, capitalist concert | Pragmatic coexistence | | Flockhart | Decentered, pluralist future; flexible, resilient liberalism | Mixed | Potential joiners; self-selected liberal union possible | Adapt institutions, open membership | Foster cooperation, inclusivity | | Kupchan | Liberal order’s wheels “about to come off”; deep transformation | E.H. Carr & Polanyi | Want new rules, not our rules | Regionalization, new rules | Fix Western core first |

This rich, multi-voice discussion underscores that the liberal world order is neither dying nor secure, but evolving—and that the coming decades will be defined not by the death of liberal norms, but by how they can adapt, be shared, and legitimated in a world of plural actors and contested authority.