The Grand Strategy of Detente

LSE Public Lectures and Events | Professor Niall Ferguson | 18 January 2011

Episode Overview

This lecture, the third in Professor Niall Ferguson’s Cold War series at the LSE, interrogates the strategy of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union—focusing especially on the Nixon and Kissinger years. Ferguson examines competing historical interpretations of détente, critiques the charged moral judgments levied against Henry Kissinger, and contextualizes the choices made under Nixon in terms of five interconnected crises facing the US in the late 1960s and 1970s. The lecture also explores whether American foreign policy today suffers from the absence of a true grand strategy.

Key Points & Discussion Themes

1. The Divisions of Détente in Cold War History

• Introduced by Professor Arne Westad (00:00):
  • Détente is seen by many as preserving peace long enough for change within the Soviet bloc and China.
  • A counter-view (the “Reagan view”) asserts détente gave authoritarian regimes extra time and legitimacy.
  • Historical interpretation impacts current policy, as leaders still look to détente-era choices for guidance.

2. Kissinger as Person & Problem (04:02 - 18:45)

• Ferguson positions this lecture as a “preliminary report” from research for his upcoming Henry Kissinger biography.
• Kissinger is a uniquely polarizing and scrutinized figure—“millions and millions of [Google] hits, nearly all...in anything but scholarly language” (07:10).
• Critique of public/journalistic judgment (esp. by Christopher Hitchens and Seymour Hersh) for focusing on Kissinger’s methods rather than strategic aims or context.
• “We need to assess grand strategy, the overarching objective of a foreign policy, as far as possible in context.” (15:15)
• Raises the question: Why is only Kissinger so intensely reviled, compared to other US secretaries of state with equally bloody records?

Notable quote:

"Was it something he said? Was it things that he did? One way or another, it is very hard to think of any figure in modern public life in the United States who has been the object of quite so much violent criticism."
— Niall Ferguson (09:47)

3. The Five Strategic Problems Facing Nixon & Kissinger (18:55 - 36:12)

• Ferguson identifies five interconnected crises confronting US leadership in 1968-69:
  1. Vietnam War:
     • US involvement already “doomed to fail” by 1965, but maintaining US status as a global power was at stake.
     • Nixon’s administration dramatically reduced US casualties—“by the time [Nixon] was re-elected American casualties in Vietnam had essentially ended.” (27:05)
  2. The Soviet Threat:
     • The USSR attained true nuclear superiority in the 1970s.
     • The era’s “missile gap” was real, not just a Cold War myth.
  3. Economic Crisis:
     • Severe economic woes: stagflation, declining trend growth, rivals (Europe, Japan) closing the gap, and doubts about Bretton Woods.
  4. Domestic Political Weakness:
     • US more violent and polarized than today; Nixon’s Republican Party was weak in Congress, constraining policy options.
  5. Instability in the Third World:
     • The emergence of a multipolar, interconnected world, with new opportunities and threats arising out of global change.

Notable quote:

"You can't make judgments, particularly moral judgments, about a foreign policy strategy if you do not take account of the circumstances of the context."
— Niall Ferguson (15:50)

4. The Grand Strategy Unpacked (36:16 - 50:00)

• Key Elements of Nixon/Kissinger’s Strategy:
  • Vietnamization: Withdraw US troops, “linkage” with negotiations elsewhere to gain leverage despite US weakness on the ground.
  • Arms Control: SALT I and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as efforts to contain nuclear risk.
  • Hardball on Economics: Aggressive stances on currency and trade.
  • Curtailing Domestic Interference: By limiting media and Congressional influence—I“I think that was a legitimate concern.” (41:15)
  • Opportunism in the Third World: Engaged in opportunities to weaken the Soviets, most notably in China and Egypt.
• Linkage Concept: American priorities were ordered—Chile’s fate mattered for its implications; moral criteria were subordinated to strategic logic.

Notable moment:

“We set up this whole intricate web. When we talked about linkage, everyone was sneering.”
— Henry Kissinger (as quoted by Ferguson), on the success of China opening (48:38)

5. Moral Critiques—Ends vs. Means (50:00 - 54:13)

• Liberals criticize Kissinger/Nixon for prioritizing realpolitik over human rights.
• Reaganites claim détente failed and harder confrontation ended the Cold War.
• Ferguson stresses context: it’s not clear more “liberal” or more "hardline” policies would have brought better results—potential for even greater violence.

Notable quote:

"Before you can criticize any policy and condemn it as a failure, you have to be absolutely explicit about what the alternative outcomes might have been."
— Niall Ferguson (53:10)

6. Kissinger’s Philosophy of Tragedy and Conjecture (54:14 - 63:53)

• Kissinger’s dilemma: statesmen make choices between "least effort" or harder courses—if they act and avert disaster, it’s invisible; if not, disaster may ensue.
• Real tragedy is not choosing wrong over right, it's “difficulties of the soul…which you in your world of black and white can't even begin to comprehend.” (62:26)
• Ferguson’s conclusion: understanding Kissinger (and détente strategy) requires grappling with these tragic moral dilemmas.

Notable quote:

"Real tragedy comes in a dilemma of evaluating what is right. Real dilemmas are difficulties of the soul provoking agonies which you in your world of black and white can't even begin to comprehend."
— Henry Kissinger, letter to his parents, 1948 (as quoted by Ferguson) (62:41)

Q&A Highlights

1. On Kissinger’s Distrust and American “Elites” (64:00 - 69:34)

• Westad asks if Kissinger's (and Nixon's) grand strategy reflected mistrust in the American people.
• Ferguson: Both Nixon and Kissinger were suspicious of groups (elites, academics, bureaucrats), not necessarily "the people" writ large.

Quote:

“While they had very different views...what they agree on is that there are these different groups conspiring against them. And like so many paranoid fantasies...just because they're paranoid doesn't mean it wasn't true.”
— Niall Ferguson (68:21)

2. Counterfactuals & Alternative Outcomes (69:34 - 74:48)

• Audience & Westad press on whether a different, “happier” outcome was possible.
• Ferguson: It’s much easier to envisage credible worse outcomes than better ones. “Just imagine a hot war.” (71:51)
• The 1970s would have been violent even had the US not intervened; “the counterfactual of America stays out of Chile and they all live happily ever after doesn't work for me.” (73:23)

3. What was the Endgame? (75:03 - 76:13)

• Ferguson: “The game of power...is unstopping, unceasing...if everything had gone according to plan for Kissinger and Nixon, then clearly South Vietnam would have survived...the success in the Middle East was real and enduring...but the game never ends.” (76:20)

4. Europe and the Grand Game (82:05 - 89:25)

• Ferguson laments Europe’s military passivity versus Kissinger’s hopes for a multipolar world.
• US could “enter a new era of isolationism”—budgetary constraints already point that way.
• Criticisms of Kissinger are as much about him being an intellectual conservative as about his Jewishness, but this wasn’t central.
• Opposition came from both left and right, including neoconservatives who thought him too “soft.”

Notable quote:

“Europe has been as disappointing in that regard as China has exceeded his expectations...”
— Niall Ferguson (83:30)

Notable Quotes and Memorable Moments

• On public judgment:
  “The headwind of journalistic judgment that has been passed and continues to be passed on this individual.” (08:55)

• On nuclear fears:
  “By the 1970s, the superpowers had enough explosive capability to unleash 400,000 explosions of the size of Hiroshima...the capacity to destroy the human race 15 times over.” (34:00)

• On detente’s geopolitical payoff:
  “The opening to China...fundamentally altered the geometry of geopolitics to the advantage of the United States and to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union. In my view, that was the single most important thing that Nixon and Kissinger did.” (44:19)

• On the tragedy of power:
  “Only the most callous of persons choose what they know to be wrong. Real tragedy comes in a dilemma of evaluating what is right.” (62:46)

Important Timestamps

• 00:00: Introduction and defining debates over détente
• 04:02: Ferguson’s research approach and Kissinger’s reputation
• 18:55: The five crises confronting Nixon and Kissinger
• 36:16: Interconnectedness of foreign, domestic, and economic policy
• 44:19: Opening to China and “linkage” strategy
• 54:14: Kissinger’s philosophy of choice and conjecture
• 63:53: Q&A begins—distrust, counterfactuals, and strategy “endgame”
• 82:05 – 89:25: Europe’s role, military power, and Kissinger’s legacy

Tone and Style

• Ferguson’s talk is candid, frequently witty, skeptical of polemicists, and insistent on rigorous historical context over moralizing.
• He emphasizes complexity and ambiguity—eschewing dogmatic interpretations for a realist, tragic understanding of power.

Summary Takeaway

Ferguson concludes that the Kissinger-Nixon strategy of détente was a necessarily complex, pragmatic, and often tragic effort to manage multiple existential US crises simultaneously. Judgments about its morality or efficacy must reckon with plausible alternatives in context—not in hindsight or ideological purity. While the “game of power” never ends, the absence of such a grand strategy haunts current policy.

[End of Summary]