LSE Public Lecture: "The Nature of Existence"

Speaker: Professor Tim Crane
Date: October 8, 2013
Host: Danielle Sands (Forum for European Philosophy, LSE)
Podcast: LSE Public Lectures and Events
Episode Theme: Exploring the philosophical question: What is it to exist?

Overview

This lecture by Tim Crane tackles the foundational philosophical question, “What is existence?” Moving beyond common approaches—such as “What is our being?” or “Which things exist?”—Crane focuses on the more abstract issue of what it is to exist. He distinguishes this inquiry from related questions about our own existence, the existence of particular entities (like God or numbers), or the epistemological problem of how we know what exists.

Crane explores the contrast between existence and non-existence, investigates whether it’s meaningful to talk about things that don’t exist, and proposes a nuanced position between two classic philosophical extremes. He analyzes how properties (or attributes) relate to existence and non-existence, introducing distinctions among types of properties and laying out how they apply to both real and fictional or hypothetical entities.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

Framing the Question

• Distinguishing Types of Questions about Existence

  • The question “What is existence?” is not the same as “What is our being (Heidegger)?” or “What exists?”
  • Crane won’t address the existence of numbers, God, or the nature of our specific being, but rather focuses on what it is to exist in general.

• Reflections on Existing Approaches

  • Some say to exist is to occupy space and time, to be physical, or “to be the value of a variable” (Quine).
  • Others claim the question is meaningless or based on confusion.
  • Crane’s approach is to resist these “standard” answers and look at how we contrast existence with non-existence through our language and concepts.

“I’m going to contrast the existing with the non-existing and see what we can say in the most general or abstract terms about that distinction.” – Tim Crane (10:25)

The Pervasiveness of Non-Existence in Thought and Language

• Everyday and Philosophical Talk About Non-Existence

  • We routinely speak meaningfully about non-existent things: unicorns, Sherlock Holmes, Santa Claus, planet Vulcan, etc.
  • Fictional characters and hypothetical objects are referenced as if they have properties, despite not existing.

• Error vs. Fiction

  • A distinction is made between:
    • Fiction: Entities we know are not real (e.g., Sherlock Holmes).
    • Error: Entities people once believed to exist but later found do not (e.g., the planet Vulcan, hypothesized by Le Verrier).

“Talk about things that don’t exist is a pervasive feature of our talk and thought about the world.” (15:46)

The Challenge: Can Non-Existent Things Have Properties?

Two Classic Positions

1. Descartes/Malebranche View:

   • Nothingness has no properties — non-existent things have no properties whatsoever.

   “If non-existence... is nothing, then nothing can be true of it. It can't have any properties, it's just nothing.” (28:20)

2. Meinong’s View:

   • Non-existent objects can have all the properties attributed to them (e.g., the ‘round square’ is both round and square; Sherlock Holmes is a detective).

   “Meinong just thinks all of these things have properties and that's because he had what he called... the independence of being from being.” (33:28)

Crane’s Middle Way

• Non-existent objects have some properties, but not all those attributed to them—and certainly not none.
• Mistaken or fictional attribution is possible for non-existent entities, akin to misattributing properties to existing things.

“My view is that non-existent objects have some of the properties attributed to them, but not all.” (37:10)

Understanding Properties: Two Kinds

1. Non-Substantial Properties

• Properties that are representation-dependent—they exist because we attribute them to something in thought or language.
• Examples: being postulated by Le Verrier (Vulcan), being represented as having a horn (unicorns), being famous (Sherlock Holmes).
• These are “abundant” (after David Lewis): there are as many as our ways of talking allow.

2. Substantial Properties

• Reflect the nature of an object—what it is independent of representation.
• Examples: being gold (atomic number 79), having a determinate number of hairs (humans), being a real planet with mass and orbital properties.
• “Sparse”: these correspond to genuine discoveries about the world.
• Only existing things can have substantial properties; non-existents never do.

“The nature of something is its substantial properties, things that tell you what kind of thing it is. But... Vulcan doesn’t have any substantial properties.” (47:10)

Representation and Non-Existence

• Representation-Dependent Properties
  • Non-existent objects can possess only those properties derived from being represented in thought or language.
  • There are no "free-floating" non-existent objects; they "exist" only as conceptual or representational constructs.
  • Using Bertrand Russell’s insight: for Hamlet (a fictional character), all there is to him is what is represented in literature and thought; for Napoleon (real), there is more than just the representation.

“Non-existent objects have only those non-substantial properties which result from those objects being represented in some way.” (53:40)

Why Does This Matter?

• Relevance to Philosophy of Mind and Intentionality
  • The mind is essentially a representing thing, and understanding existence/non-existence clarifies how we can think about both real and imaginary things.
  • To explicate intentionality and mental representation, we need to grasp the nature of non-existent objects.

“Unless you understand the idea of things that don't exist and the representation of things that don't exist, then you won't understand the nature of the mind. That's why this subject is significant.” (54:30)

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Witty opening on the scope of the question:

  “This reminds me of... the Monty Python All England Summarize Proust competition, where people were invited to summarize Proust in five minutes. So I'm going to talk about the nature of existence for approximately 45 minutes.” (01:13)

• Dismissal of Quine’s Slogan:

  “To be is to be the value of a variable. And if you don't know what that means, then I recommend you keep it that way.” (08:47)

• Fame and Fiction:

  “Sherlock Holmes is more famous than any living detective, which I think is true actually.” (51:52)

• Audience laughter:

  “The essence of living on a street is that at some point you've lived in a house or something there, that's your address on the street. So I'm laboring the point. Sherlock Holmes didn’t live in Baker Street. Of course, in the books he lived in Baker Street. That's a different claim.” (50:04)

• On representation:

  “Non-existent objects can only have representation dependent properties. And that's my way of spelling out the insight from Russell's remark about Hamlet and Napoleon.” (53:50)

Audience Q&A: Selected Highlights

• On the Distinction between Error and Fiction

  • Crane: “It's not a sharp distinction. I think it's one with blurred boundaries. So things could and probably have begun as error and ended up as fiction. You could think of the Greek myths like that.” (56:17)

• Nothingness vs Non-existent Objects

  • On whether “nothingness” differs from non-existent things, Crane asserts even “nothingness” gets a property when represented:

    “I think that nothingness has the representation dependent property of being represented as metaphysically possible... Concern about nothingness is different from non-existent objects.” (58:41)

• Substantial vs Defining vs Incidental Properties

  • Crane agrees the distinction overlaps with essence/accident and defining/incidental properties, but prefers “nature” to “defining,” as essence implies constraints of language rather than reality. (61:07)

• On Realism and Essentialism

  • Crane allows as much realism is involved as saying things have properties independent of representation. Not committed to strong essentialism or a specific realism about properties. (63:11–65:28)

• Existence Through Fame or Definition

  • When challenged that Sherlock Holmes “exists” if he meets the definition of fame, Crane responds:

    “How does he get to exist? Because someone decides to write a story about him... I don't think you can define people into existence. Maybe you can define abstract entities into existence.” (74:23–75:14)

• Objects Moving In/Out of Existence; Block Universe

  • Addressing whether things can move between existence/non-existence, Crane notes the “block universe” (Einstein) would eliminate going out-of-existence, since everything that ever exists retains a place in spacetime. (81:31)

• Quantum Theory

  • Crane admits: “I don't understand quantum theory… That's a very controversial interpretation...” and dismisses the anti-realist reading that measurement entirely determines existence. (83:01)

Timeline of Major Segments

| Timestamp | Topic | |---------------|-----------| | 01:06 – 10:00 | Introduction & Framing the Main Question | | 10:01 – 18:00 | Everyday and Philosophical References to Non-Existence | | 18:01 – 28:00 | Fiction vs Error; Attributing Properties | | 28:01 – 37:00 | Descartes/Malebranche and Meinong on Non-Existence | | 37:01 – 50:00 | Crane’s Middle View; Substantial vs Non-Substantial Properties | | 50:01 – 54:30 | Representation-Dependent Properties and Russell’s Insight | | 54:31 – 55:50 | Why This Matters: Relevance to the Philosophy of Mind | | 56:17 – 83:51 | Audience Q&A (logic, realism, fiction/error, block universe, values, quantum theory) |

Conclusion

Crane’s lecture offers a lively, rigorous, and occasionally humorous exploration of ontology and the philosophy of language, advocating for a view that balances between traditional extremes. Non-existent things matter philosophically because our minds, in representing, must reckon with the real and the merely possible or imaginary. By restricting the “properties” of non-existent objects to those that are representation-dependent, Crane both accommodates our ordinary ways of speaking and avoids the metaphysical oddities of Meinong’s wild ontology or Descartes’ barren nothingness.

“Existing things can have substantial and non-substantial properties... non-existing things can only have representation dependent properties.” – Tim Crane (53:50)

Recommended reading:

• Tim Crane, The Objects of Thought (Oxford University Press)

For further discussions:

• The distinction between representation and nature in the context of metaphysics and philosophy of mind
• The ontological status of fictional and hypothetical entities
• The implications of these distinctions for intentionality, realism, and meaning

End of Summary