LSE Public Lecture (30 January 2013):

The Political Consequences of the Great Recession in Europe: Electoral Punishment and Popular Protest
Speaker: Professor Hanspeter Kriesi (European University Institute)
Host: LSE Film and Audio Team

Episode Overview

This episode is part of LSE’s Euro Crisis lecture series and features Professor Hanspeter Kriesi, one of Europe’s leading political sociologists, discussing the political consequences of the Great Recession in Europe. The lecture explores how European electorates and publics responded to the crisis through both conventional (electoral) and contentious (protest) means. Kriesi blends theoretical insights, quantitative electoral analysis, and case studies from Western, Central, and Eastern Europe to show patterns of government punishment, protest mobilization, and their interaction.

Key Themes & Structure

1. Theoretical Framework: Convention vs. Contention

([01:27]–[16:00])

• Kriesi seeks to integrate two academic literatures:
  • Electoral politics
  • Social movements/protest
• He proposes that groups with crisis-driven grievances may:
  • Voice discontent through elections (“raise one’s voice”)
  • Exit the political process (abstention, alternative channels, or protest)
• Outlines expected responses in representative democracies and alternative institutional channels (e.g., referenda, litigation, appeals to other government branches).

Notable quote:

“To raise one's voice in a democratic society is to vote... The first way to express discontent and to voice grievances is in the electoral arena.”
(Hanspeter Kriesi, [02:17])

2. Economic Voting and Its Limits

([04:12]–[16:00])

• Reviews the literature on economic voting: voters punish incumbents for bad economic circumstances.
• Context matters:
  • Electoral system type (majoritarian = clearer accountability; PR systems dilute responsibility)
  • Openness of the economy (more open = voters recognize government constraints)
• Details several post-crisis electoral scenarios:
  • Support shifting to established opposition parties (esp. in Western Europe)
  • Emergence of new parties (common in Central/Eastern Europe)
  • Rise of populist/anti-system parties
  • Abstention or move to protest/alternative channels

Notable quote:

“...governments can be better held accountable in majoritarian systems, that is, in systems like in Great Britain, whereas in PR systems, consensus democratic systems, responsibility is diluted and cannot be attributed as in majoritarian systems.”
(Hanspeter Kriesi, [06:19])

3. From Electoral Arena to Protest: Escalation and Dynamics

([16:00]–[24:00])

• Discusses the normalization of protest in Western Europe (“movement societies”).
• Protest now requires higher levels of mobilization or radicalism to capture attention.
• Lays out interactive scenarios:
  • Opportunity-increasing (protesters find allies in government/institutions)
  • Threat-increasing (protest met with repression—access channels close)
  • Two-step path:
    1. Electoral punishment
    2. If ineffectual, shift to protest/radical options

Notable quote:

“In a first step, in a crisis, you mobilize against the austerity measures... In a second step, the new government might just be forced to do what the old government has done... So the voters actually, in this no-choice situation, might turn to alternative options.”
(Hanspeter Kriesi, [24:16])

4. Quantitative Empirical Findings: Electoral Punishment after the Crisis

([27:00]–[32:52])

• Comparative analysis of 31 elections post-2008 crisis across Europe.
• Key findings:
  • In Western Europe: pre-crisis electoral strength predicts post-crisis results; punishment stronger in majoritarian systems.
  • Budget deficits are the strongest predictors of incumbent punishment.
  • Central/Eastern Europe: election outcomes highly volatile; new parties frequently emerge, making forecasts based on past results unreliable.
  • Unemployment triggers punishment in Western Europe; GDP growth triggers in Eastern Europe.

Notable quote:

“In Western Europe, the deficit plus the clarity of responsibility and the interaction between the two explain about 90% of the variance. So we don't do so badly with the deficit and the clarity of responsibility.”
(Hanspeter Kriesi, [31:45])

5. Case Studies: Iceland and Latvia

([32:52]–[46:00])

Iceland (“Success Story”)

• First European country hit by the crisis; banking collapse led to IMF intervention.
• “Pots and Pans Revolution”—small but intense protest brought down government.
• Electoral punishment: Conservative incumbent -12.9%, Social Democrats benefited.
• Mass petition and two referenda rejected IMF-mandated deals to bail out foreign depositors.
• Voters moved toward populist/anti-party strategies (comedian Jon Gnarr becomes Reykjavik mayor).
• Direct democracy used as a negotiation tool with foreign governments.

Latvia

• Corruption driven “Umbrella Revolution” even before the economic shock.
• Government strategically neutralized initial constitutional reform attempt with a low-turnout summer referendum.
• IMF intervention and draconian austerity (e.g., 25% pay cuts for public sector).
• Mass protests followed; President allied with public to force government and parliamentary changes.
• Early elections: PM party punished (-21.4%); but little substantive policy change.

Notable quote (Iceland):

“About a quarter of the Icelandic voters signed the petition against the IceSave deal. And the president heeded the call...Twice the voters rejected the deal.”
(Hanspeter Kriesi, [38:55])

Notable quote (Latvia):

“Again, the IMF intervened and imposed a rescue package, restructuring of the banking system and severe austerity measures. For example, 25% cut in public sector salaries. And that unleashed massive protest.”
(Hanspeter Kriesi, [43:51])

6. Conclusions: Protest and Electoral Politics Interact—but with Few Substantive Wins

([46:20]–[48:57])

• Popular protest often triggers leadership changes, reshuffles, and procedural effects.
• Substantive (policy) gains are rare: Iceland is the outlier.
• In Western Europe, crisis triggers protest; in Central/Eastern Europe, crisis amplifies pre-existing protest.
• IMF/EU interventions and austerity serve as crucial triggers for both protest and electoral punishment.

Notable quote:

“In the countries which are most severely hit by the crisis, it's actually the intervention from the outside...the reaction against these austerity measures leads to electoral punishment in the final event.”
(Hanspeter Kriesi, [47:54])

Audience Q&A Highlights

Perspectives on IMF, Protest Legitimacy, and Case Selection

([49:24]–[59:05])

• ECB’s Johannes Lindner questions if IMF is too simplistically cast as the "bad guy"; Kriesi clarifies he is “agnostic” on protest legitimacy, focusing on empirical analysis.

  • Cites Fritz Scharpf’s input/output legitimacy—if voters have neither choice nor results, democracy itself can erode.
  • “Normative point of view on protest is agnostic. I might not have been clear about this here. I'm a political scientist analyzing what is the interaction between political protest and electoral behavior.”
    (Hanspeter Kriesi, [53:29])

• Audience notes governments can sometimes leverage protest instrumentally in negotiations (e.g., Iceland, Swiss referenda).

On Central/Eastern European Volatility & Special Cases

([60:49]–[70:57])

• Question on volatility in Central/Eastern Europe: reflects non-institutionalized, fluid party systems.
• France not affecting regression analysis—Sarkozy punished in line with others.
• Merkel’s 2009 re-election despite crisis discussed: possibly due to lack of credible alternatives and grand coalition context.
• Spain: Notable decline in mainstream party dominance from 85% (2008) to 65% (recent polls)—possible move toward populist or regional alternatives, but Kriesi doubts full party-system collapse as seen in Latin America.

Digital Mobilization and New Media

([63:20]–[75:24])

• Social media cited as a mobilization tool in Iceland and Portugal’s protests; Kriesi is cautiously skeptical over claims of transformative impact (“I think they might be overrated.”).
• Observes role of social media in Arab Spring but suggests firm empirical evidence is lacking.

Memorable Moments & Quotes with Timestamps

• “Today, protest is not so newsworthy as it was before. Some demonstrations go unnoticed...voters have to step up their protest. They have to radicalize in order to have an impact.”
  (Hanspeter Kriesi, [13:40])

• “Electoral punishment might be a first step. In a second step, if electoral punishment does not lead to any alternative policy...voters might be fed up with electoral politics altogether and turn away and mobilize in the streets.”
  (Hanspeter Kriesi, [25:54])

• “The direct democratic institutions were used to put additional pressure on the government...voters in Iceland had some success in the process. The constitution was revised and...referenda in fact had substantive success.”
  (Hanspeter Kriesi, [39:44])

• “Why is it impossible to predict post crisis election results on the basis of pre crisis election results in Central and Eastern Europe? ...The party systems are new and the parties are reshuffling and reconfigurating all the time.”
  (Hanspeter Kriesi, [66:00])

Suggested Further Listening/Study

• Explore the subsequent lecture in this series:
  "A Law of Crisis or A Crisis of the EU Legal Order Under Stress" by Neil Walker (6 February).

Summary

Professor Kriesi offers a deeply informed, empirically rich account of how the Great Recession’s political aftermath is shaped by both institutional constraints and popular agency. His findings underscore that, across Europe, voters punish governments for economic pain—especially budget deficits and where responsibility is clear—but the channel and impact of protest and electoral punishment diverge considerably between Western and Central/Eastern European settings. Substantive policy change driven by protest remains rare, though procedural and leadership changes are frequent. The talk and ensuing discussion cast light on the stresses facing democratic legitimacy and the continued evolution of party systems in post-crisis Europe.