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The Role of Inter-governmental, State and Non-governmental Players in Conflict Resolution
01:19:40
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- [00:00]
A
Well, welcome everybody. I'm Mary Kaldor, the director of the center for the Study of Global Governance. And I'm really, really pleased that we have the chance to welcome President Artisari to the lse. I actually, and I was just reminding him now, I first met him in Geneva when he was on the. What was it called? The Yugoslavia Conference Conference. The Yugoslavia Conference with David Owen. And I brought a delegation of civil society people from Yugoslavia to try to persuade them that there should be an international protectorate in Bosnia Herzegovina, which in the end we got, but only after four years of war. Anyway, most of you know who he is. He was President of Finland and was very important in Finland joining the European Union. And he's played an extraordinary role in a variety of peacemaking roles in Namibia at the end of the NATO intervention in Kosovo, in Aceh, in Kosovo. He was just telling me as we came in about Iraq. And he's won all kinds of prizes for his work, the Oliver Tambo Award, which I think would be a fantastic award to win, and others. And he seems to be everywhere, that's my feeling, the East West Institute, the Helsinki Process for globalization and democracy. He's involved in an enormous amount of activities. So I think it's going to be really, really interesting to hear from him on this topic. Topic the role of intergovernmental state and non governmental players in conflict resolution. So I'm very happy to welcome you, President Artisan.
- [02:09]
B
First of all, dear friends, I would like to thank Professor Mericaldo for the kind words and invitation by the London School of Economics for me to come and lecture here tonight. Before I start my lecture, I feel that I have to draw your attention to the fact that I'm not atypical peace mediator. So you have to take with care what I say because it doesn't necessarily mean that everyone else can get away with what I have been able to do. I'm a former, as you heard, I'm a former head of state and I have so far served five under five Secretaries General of the United nations over the period of 30 years. And whatever I do, I can count on the cooperation of the un, individual governments and regional organizations like European Union. I think this was particularly the case when we negotiated the peace in Ace. And I have to be honest and say that without that sort of cooperation and support it would not have been possible to get results which we achieved. Referring to the title of my lecture today, I first wish to emphasize the importance and usefulness of academic research in improving the quality of conflict resolution. It is my sincere opinion that research is too little utilized in peacemaking and peace building. Academic institutions and think tanks can generate high quality and policy relevant analyses on the root causes of crisis and develop innovative frameworks and methodologies for crisis resolution and for overcoming broader instability. I recently joined an advisory board of an initiative called ASEM Education Hub. This is a network of European and Asian scholars and practitioners of conflict resolution who have come together to learn from one another and discuss the areas of work where we could seek more intense collaboration together in it is my firm belief that initiatives like this create added value to peace building efforts in Europe. The initiative was taken by the Nordic Asia Institute in Copenhagen. This lecture is based on my experiences as a mediator. I want to focus on two different processes that I have led during the recent years the ATSI peace process, which is a good example of private diplomacy, and Kosovo status process conducted under the auspices of the un. First of all, I would like to make a very brave declaration. It is my firm belief that there does not exist such a conflict in this world that cannot be solved. The current trend in indicating lowering of a number of conflict is in large part due to increased number of peacekeeping and conflict resolution efforts around the world. Mediation is increasingly used in conflict resolution. I saw the figure of 58% of today's conflicts. However, despite of the successful efforts made, half of all countries emerging from civil war fall back into it within five years. While their peace agreements are often the cause for conflict intensification, most mediation efforts are unsuccessful and over half of them fail. In my view this is due to the lack of multi track cooperation in conflict resolution as well as an inability to really tackle the root causes of conflicts. Conflict resolution is hardly successful unless linked to peace building and conflict prevention activities. In order for any conflict resolution to be effective and to break the cycle of violence, it needs to address the root causes of conflict and support local groups to find their own long term solutions. The coarse challenge of conflict resolution resolution is to generate trust and facilitate new relationships among local peoples, groups and institutions. Conflict resolution does not only need to be linked to national peace building efforts, but it also requires a multidimensional approach. As we all know, a huge majority of conflicts in the current world are internal conflicts with ethnic, religious, economic and many other dimensions. This fact has also had dramatic consequences on the approaches and practices for conflict resolving and peace building. When talking about peace mediation of internal conflicts, it is evident that the very principle of sovereignty is at stake. Governments of war torn society are often reluctant to internationalize their internal disputes and conflicts. This means, for example, that involvement of the United nations in conflict resolution or crisis management in the case of this internal conflict is being considered cautiously and critically by the governments. This was also the case in ace. I was told in no uncertain terms by the Indonesian government that they would not allow the UN to become involved. It didn't prevent me nevertheless to have the support of Secretary General Kofi Annan in the negotiation process. States and intergovernmental organizations have traditionally been the major engines on conflict resolution. This is gradually changing, mainly due to the changing nature of disputes and conflicts. States are pivotal actors in peace building, but in order to respond to the changing challenges of the conflict resolution, we need to get beyond firmly governmental approaches. Traditional diplomatic instruments for negotiation have not always proved to be successful. The informal negotiators and mediators of the so called Track two diplomacy actors have the benefit of being independent and in the best cases, impartial. They can successfully complement or replace governments and international organization when these, because of restrictive mandates or bureaucracy, are prevented from taking an active part in conflict resolution. Some actors in need of mediation are more inclined to trust a private diplomacy rather than a state actor, especially when flexible. Flexible and rapid intervention is needed. Non governmental actors can play a significant role as facilitators or mediators of peace process, as the ACE case clearly indicates. Sometimes we have to question our conventional modus operandi. The comprehensive approach to conflict resolution will be the guiding principle of my lecture today. Dear friends, I have often been asked how to pursue effective conflict resolution. I am not able to give you a fully satisfactory answer to that question. However, I fish to illustrate the complexity of conflict resolution by first shortly describing two unique processes from ACE and Kosovo. Based on these two efforts, I will highlight some issues I consider to be prerequisite for successful conflict resolution. There has been many analyses and explanations on the success of ACE peace process. One of the most common explanation has been that a tsunami that hit Aceh with its tragic consequences was a key factor behind the peace. As we know, around 200,000 people were killed by Sunan. And of course the effects of this traumatic incident cannot be underestimated. But at the same time, it is good to acknowledge that the fact that the contact between the parties and myself was actually established already before Sunan, the Finnish businessman who had the vision and inspiration about peace in Adse, had started his personal subtle diplomacy discussion between the parties already earlier. I was first contacted by Indonesian side by the Deputy Minister of Health Farid Hussain and Mr. Gustafsson in February 2004. But Gustafsson came to see me with the offer for mediation two days before Christmas in 2004. It is also important to notice that the crisis management initiative that's CMI led process was not the first contact between the parties. The government of the Indonesia and Free Ate movement Khan. Between 99 and 2003, a cessation of hostilities agreement was negotiated under the auspices of Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. I think its center is perhaps even now known as Andre Duna Center. Even if the agreement failed after half a year, the importance of that process should not be underestimated. And naturally, the role and fresh attitude from the side of a new government of Indonesia that came to power in November 2004 was crucial for the constructive negotiations. In January 2005, the Government of Indonesia and Free ATSI Movement met in Helsinki to talk about the conflict that had lasted for almost 30 years. The tsunami had devastated Atsi just a month earlier. From the beginning of the talks, I had a feeling that I was surrounded by people who realized that they had in their hands the power to stop further suffering of the Athenist people. During the negotiations, trust and confidence was gained gradually. The starting point of the negotiations was a peaceful solution with dignity for all. This wording was used by the leader of the Indonesian delegation, the Minister, Hamid Avalodi. And we used that in all our press. That was the title of our press releases throughout the process. From the point of view of successful outcome, a key element was the principle that nothing is agreed before everything is agreed. This meant that neither party could claim any victories during the process and use media to communicate their constituencies how successful they had been in the negotiations. All the agreements were included in the memorandum of understanding and published only in the end of our process. This gave peace for the negotiators to work. And I must say I admire the discipline of both parties in this regard. And if we didn't do this and say that nothing is agreed before everything is agreed, it would not have been possible to open the really difficult issues for negotiations. We slowly managed to open them and get some understanding how they might be solved. It is essential to understand that trust can only be created if one party sees the other keeping its promises and to do as was agreed. I made it clear to both parties that if genuine peace is the call, both sides had also to be prepared to make concessions. And I think that now when we look at the situation, it is evident that both sides actually gained much more than they had to give up. I had to make one trip to Jakarta during this negotiating process. It was Very short. And that was in May, because I received information that things were happening in Ate that should not have been happening. So I had a serious talk with the President, vice President, leaders of the military, and I told the government that if things were not improving, I couldn't guarantee that we would have a successful outcome of these negotiations. And I had the cooperation of the Indonesian government and they intervened. The negotiation process lasted seven months altogether and included five rounds of talks. All the meetings took place in Helsinki, Finland, most during a very cold winter time. The first round of talks took place in January and a common understanding on the content of the agreement was reached at the end of the fifth round in July that year. After that we were able to proceed relatively rapidly and the final agreement, Memorandum of Understanding, MO, as it had been called, was signed on 15 August 2005 in Helsinki. For anyone interested in more detailed description, I would recommend a well written book by my countrywoman, Katri Mericalia, Making Peace. This is available in English and in Finnish if somebody wants to study it in Finnish and published by the publishers called wsoy, a Finnish publishing house. I would now like to turn to Kosovo. As many of you know, the immediate EU concerns in the western Balkans are provoked by continued uncertainty over status and hence the future of Kosovo. The unsettled status of Kosovo is posing a threat to the otherwise improved stability of Balkans, arguably the last remaining piece of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. In November 2005, the UN Secretary General, acting on basis of the conclusions of the Security Council that situation in Kosovo is no longer sustainable, asked me to lead the political process to determine the Kosovo's future status. In the terms of reference that the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, came to me on the 14th of November 2005, I was told that the Special Envoy will report directly to the Secretary General. As a Special Envoy, I was given maximum leeway in order to undertake my task and I was expected to revert to the Secretary General at all stages of the process. I established my office in Vienna in the beginning of 2006 thanks to the courtesy of the Austrian government who gave us the facilities which we are still utilizing. Some of my colleagues are still utilizing in Vienna. Our work was carried out in close consultations with the Contact Group that includes France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States. In November 2005, actually before I was appointed the US Under Secretary of State Nicholas Perns expressed the hope on behalf of the Contact Group that the guiding principles would provide a political framework for parties as they entered the Status talks this document that the contract group had worked was called Guiding Principles for Settlement of Kosovo status and included 10 principles. It's a public document and available for anybody who is interested today. I wish to share with you especially the sixth principle which says, and I quote, the settlement of Kosovo status should strengthen regional security and stability. Thus it will ensure that Kosovo does not return to pre March 99 situation. Any solution that is unilateral or results from the use of force would be unacceptable. There will be no changes in the current territory of Kosovo. In other words, no partition of Kosovo and no union of Kosovo with any country or part of any country. The territorial integrity and internal stability of regional neighbors will be fully respected. Belgrade, End of quote I made my first trip to the region at the end of November 2005 and told the leadership in Belgrade that I interpreted the just mentioned kidding principle so that the Kosovo will not return to pre 99 situation, meaning that Kosovo will not return back to Serbia. My hosts, particularly the Prime Minister, did not share this interpretation. Furthermore, during these initial visits to Belgrade and Pristina, it became apparent that the positions and perceptions on the status were entrenched and so widely contradictory that any immediate attempt to narrow these differences would leave nowhere. On 31st of January 2006, the contact group had a meeting here in London which I attended. In this meeting it was suggested that the Contact Group members would individually deliver following private messages to the Kosovo Status Process parties and I go through these eight points. First, the unconstitutional abolition of Kosovo's autonomy in 1989 and the ensuing tragic events resulting in the international administration of Kosovo have led to a situation in which a return of Kosovo to Belgrade's rule is not a viable option. 2. While today's democratic leadership in Serbia cannot be held accountable for the policies of Milosevic's regime, leaders in Belgrade and Pristina must come to terms with its legacy and have important responsibilities. 3. The leaders of Serbia and Kosovo have a responsibility to participate constructively in the status negotiations and prepare their publics for the inevitable and necessary compromises. The status process must result in a secure multi ethnic Kosovo that meets the high standards of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. It should result in a better living conditions for all citizens and communities in Kosovo. 4. The leadership of Serbia's priority must be to help secure the ethnic Serb community's future in Kosovo. It must focus on sustainable multi ethnicity in Kosovo with effective constitutional guarantees and appropriate mechanisms to protect the human rights of all citizens of Kosovo. The Kosovo Serb community has an essential role to play in shaping Kosovo's future and should participate actively in the status process and in the Kosovo government, assembly and working groups. 5. The leadership of Kosovo's priority must be to accelerate standards implementation and focus on confirming with democratic values and meeting European standards. In this context, we attach particular importance to the issues of decentralization, minority rights, establishment of conditions facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons, mechanisms to allow the participation of all Kosovo communities in government, both on the central and local level, and specific safeguards for the protection of the cultural and religious heritage of Kosovo. 6. The international community will establish post settlement international civilian and military presence that will exercise appropriate supervision and control of compliance of the provisions of the settlement. 7. In this context, the international community reiterates its commitment to the people of Serbia and Kosovo to support their goal of living in prosperity, freedom and security and of realizing their Euro Atlantic aspirations. We reiterate the importance of full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia icti in particular bringing to justice all those indicted by the Tribunal. And the last point we look forward to concluding the final status process in the course of 2006. All but the Russian Federation delivered these private messages in the course of February and March to Belgrade, Pristina and Kosovo Serbs. As you know, there was later in 2006 agreement reach that the status process should be postponed because of the Serbian elections and that that happened. I wanted to give you this background in order for you to understand what were the basis for for my work and that of my team and our recommendations and the reasons why we approached the issues as we did. My team and I therefore commenced work in early 2006 with an understanding that we should try to at least close the gap between Belgian and Pristina on so called technical aspects of status, rights of communities and their members, decentralization, religious and cultural heritage, economic provision and property. Technical agreements, or at least rub rochements were thought to then serve as building blocks for the resolution of status. As positions of Belgrade and Pristina on technical aspects became clearer, my office elaborated its own papers in an attempt to accommodate the concerns and aspirations of the two sides and offer possible compromise solutions. These rough elements of agreement were distributed to the parties before the negotiating rounds and formed the basis for discussions. On the 10th of March this year I shared in Vienna a high level meeting concluding the negotiations on the future status process for coso, during which my team, with strong support from the international community, has engaged both parties in 17 rounds of direct talks and 26 expert missions to Belgrade and pristine, I regret to say that in the end of the day there was no will from the parties to move away from their previously stated positions. While in the technical talks and agreement was within reach in a number of areas, including protection of cultural heritage, community rights, decentralization parties remained intransigent on the status issue. Belgrade insisted that Kosovo should remain an autonomous province within Serbia, while Pristina insisted on independence. I had hoped and very much preferred that this process would lead to negotiated agreement, but it has left me with no doubt that the party's respective positions on Kosovo status do not contain any common ground to achieve such an agreement. I felt that no amount of additional negotiation would change that. It was my firm conclusion that the potential of negotiations was exhausted when it comes to the work that I was leading. Therefore, I sent my settlement proposal, which is the best compromise as I see it, to the UN Secretary General in March this year. I envisage that the supervisory role of the international community will come to an end only once Kosovo has implemented the measures set forth in our proposal. The UN Secretary General endorsed my settlement proposal and forwarded it to the UN Security Council. The suggested solution has enjoyed wide international support, not least within the European Union, but this was not enough to produce a resolution that could be adopted by the Security Council. As we all know, Etroika, established by the Contract Group, is now leading an additional attempt to negotiate a settlement. With my office in Vienna, continuing to be involved in the process and providing support as necessary. I maintain that it is high time to resolve Kosovo's future status. Neither return of Kosovo under Serbian's rule, which the overwhelming majority of the Kosovo people would upset, nor a continuation of Kosovo's current political and legal limbo under international administration are viable options. I hope that the international community will end this conflict by closing a chapter where history was manipulated and used to fuel violence and hatred. It is high time to move from the conflict management phase to the end game. I firmly believe that Kosovo is primarily a European issue and the EU cannot afford Kosovo to become just another frozen conflict. We need a solution to be implemented as soon as the UN Secretary General makes public the Contact Group report on the current mediation efforts, which is due to take place on 10th December this year. Doing nothing is not an option, and my settlement proposal provides an organized methodology for a UN exit and EU takeover. This requires a strong and consistent united European position in the coming months, which will take intense diplomatic efforts at the highest level. Dear friends, after these two examples from Adsie and Kosovo, I shall try to summarize some of the key Issues in a mediation process, whether mediated by a non governmental organization like Crisis Management Initiative, a government or an international organization. When we look at each peace process, the issue of legitimate representation is crucial. It is not possible to reach peace without the groups or individuals who are considered as legitimate representatives of the parties. Naturally, participants at the peace table need to include those who have the power to settle and implement agreements. This is not, however, the whole picture. One important issue often passed unnoticed in the negotiation tables is the role of women in the peace process. I've been happy to follow the discussion around the UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which explicitly calls on member states and all parties to include women and civil society groups in peace processes and conflict resolutions. I sincerely hope that the good practices and models for strengthening the role of women in peace processes could be seriously created. I also think that the research could and should play a stronger role in advancing this. But I have to confess that I'm extremely disappointed. When I started, I had selected in my mind a lady lawyer who worked with me in Namibia to become my Chief of staff. But in the end it turned out that her department was not prepared to let her go. And my advice to her was that it was better for her because she had been on a leave of absence in uniform. And I advised her to stay put because otherwise her future, when the Secretary General was changing, would have become rather precarious. Every time we went to Kosovo, I met the representatives of the women's organization and it was very intriguing to see that whether they were Serbs or Albanians, they could all come to the same room. My feeling is that the only reason why the women are not actually well represented in the negotiations are because the men are afraid that if the women are there, we will make peace much faster. So keep on pushing, because that's the only way. How we get women in. There should be much more proposals to the Secretary General when he chooses the special envoys. They should not be only men and not only senior citizens like myself. The other point I want to make that justice is a necessary ingredient of lasting peace. When a mediator gets involved with the peace process, there are two main concerns. First, to prevent the reoccurrence of the problem that caused the conflict in the first place, and secondly, to lay the foundations for reconciliation. Role of a strong leadership of both parties to the conflict who could publicly admit wrongdoings of their communities is also a vital tool. The reconciliation process must be encouraged by someone other than the mediator. It might be best addressed through a criminal prosecution. However, recording past injustices and creating the conditions for national reconciliation are not always addressed through criminal law. Available evidence of even massive violations may not always reach the threshold of formal criminal accountability. Also, it needs to be asked whether a prosecution followed by incarceration genuinely serves the interest of reconciliation and accountability. I want to emphasize that this matter requires profound understanding of the complexities of the local context. I'm at the moment involved in Northern Ireland as an outside adviser with a South African lawyer, Brian Kurian. When there is a consultative process that tries to look within the year how they should deal with the past, and we will see in a year's time roughly how they have decided to deal with the past, which is extremely complicated and difficult, Then the commitment shown by the parties at negotiations and beyond is the key to the success of any negotiation process. An outside mediator can help to conduct the negotiations, but can cannot help if the parties do not have enough willingness to find a solution and be ready to compromise to achieve this. And what I tried in case of ace, for instance, is to get the parties to talk to each other without me. And that happened the first day when we met. Because that's the only way when we can make ourselves unnecessary. When people start slowly talking to each other and see each other as human beings coming from the same country, that will help. It's a long process, but I think one of the problems with the negotiations that lasted three years that there were lot of proximity talks, not direct talks, and that's why the ceasefire agreement was found in difficulties fairly soon. Internal political rivalries can seriously hamper the ability of the parties to compromise. And therefore no amount of mediators efforts would lead to a solution acceptable to both parties. The only strategy that could bear fruit in this context would be the involvement of regional powers or international community to extend pressure on the parties. In that case, it is essential that the international community speaks with one voice. I give you an example from Hatse. I could count on some of the governments to talk to Indonesian government. I could count on some of the governments and their expert to talk to come. I could count on some of the non governmental organizations to organize meetings for those parties who did not participate in the process in Helsinki to bring them in somehow because we couldn't do it. We had both Swiss and Swedish support in this process and the Netherlands government was also extremely helpful. So without actually looking outside your own organization. And I mentioned the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, because he was involved in the beginning. I asked him to make some phone calls for me. We are former colleagues, we used to work for years together when I was in the secretariat. And he gladly made those phone calls for me. And that was absolutely useful, important and even vital. Even if he knew that Indonesian government was not prepared to accept the UN as a mediator in this. I think they have had enough of UN in East Timor and they felt that this was an internal problem and they wanted to treat it like that. But it was also important that Indonesian government accepted that when monitoring was organized that we could count on the. They wanted to have five ASEAN countries to do the monitoring. And I suggested immediately that how about eu? I had no authority to do so. So I called quickly to Javier Solana. I caught him in Madrid and I said I'm dropping the EU's name here without any authority. He said, keep on dropping, but. But I need your help. You have to come and help me to get the EU to support us. Which I then later on did. Even when successful mediation and peace agreements are not tools to solve all the reasons for the conflict, but offer institutional and political frameworks for parties to live peacefully and continue working together on the issues which they have agreed upon, I think one of the things that the negotiator or mediator has to do is to limit the discussion. I had to tell GUM representative, for instance, that they were bringing to the negotiating table issues that were of vital importance. But I said in all candor that I didn't think that you had any authority to negotiate these issues. You have never won an election. I think you can come to these issues when we have established the framework in which you can carry out your political activities like any other political party. And these are worthwhile issues. But these are not issues that I would allow to be discussed in the negotiating table. And after some discussion they accept it. This I hope that many of those ideas will be implemented later on. Building mutual confidence between the parties is a process that takes time. As I said, the process can be initiated in the negotiations, but will only fully start with both parties sticking to their commitments and implementing them in a reliable manner. This creates trust in the ACE process. As I mentioned, the starting point for the negotiation was a peaceful solution with dignity for all. And this was pivotal. It is crucial that a peace agreement is followed by a credible international monitoring mission that ensures the parties implementation of their obligations. Monitoring of a peace treaty should not be about monitoring only. It should be about offering a hand giving a concrete support to peace process and the parties of any respective peace process. I don't believe that the NCOs necessarily are the best to engage in monitoring the implementation of these agreements. I told my colleagues when we started the negotiations on ADCEP that I will not allow the CMI to get involved. I said we have no role, we have no competence and we have no credibility either. You need the states, you need the regional organizations like European Union and ASEAN to be behind there. And that turned out to be the only right solution. And finally, a peace agreement is not an end, it is a beginning. I cannot underline enough the importance of this notion. The implementation of the treaty and democratic changes in a society are the true test of agreement, which only time can prove. I introduced in the signing ceremony the representatives of the Swiss organizations called Interpeace. You can look at the Internet from website its background. It's an interesting organization. I was asked in 2000 to be the chairman of the board for one year. I'm still the chairman of the Governing Committee Council for the simple reason that I think this organization does something which is absolutely vital. It does not do the reconciliation work. It facilitates the reconciliation by the locals. I give you an example. I met the Finnish students before this lecture. I told them that it took two years in Rwanda to find the people who were accepted by all major elements in the society to do this reconciliation work. But it was worthwhile to spend those two years because then the situation started moving. So this organization can facilitate the work, provide the facilities, if research is required. It has to be done by locals and not outsiders like us, because otherwise it will never be a lasting exercise. We are there to support, give the methodology what we have learned, how to do these things, but not do it for the people. They have to be facilitated. And that has led now to the involvement of Interpeace in Asia as well. In conclusion, so that we get to the most important part, your questions and comments. In conclusion, I would like to make two points that I have often emphasized. A peace process should be as clear cut as possible and concentrate on the essential issues that need to be clarified. My colleagues know it perfectly well that I am not a technically gifted person. I have often said that a peace agreement must be more clearly written than the instructions for home appliances, of which I'm never able to make any sense. And I have the ADS Memorandum of understanding. It's eight pages only. I think the cessation of hostilities agreement had hundred pages, but it was enough. Second point is that the mediator must know where he or she is taking the negotiations. It also helps if the mediator's future is not dependent on mediation process and that the person has other alternatives. In his or her life. Therefore, the retirees like myself are normally rather suited for the task. But that doesn't solve the problem, because younger people are required for the task, and I'm the first one. I work in cmi. I could be the father of all my colleagues, sometimes even grandfather. Some of them are so young because they are well trained. Some have studied in this institution as well, and theirs is the future. But my advice to them is that perhaps they can at least pretend that life is not depending on this negotiation process, so they can get away with murder. Thank you.
- [45:08]
A
Well, thank you very much for sharing your experience and giving us some of your wisdom about how conflict resolution actually happens. It's very nice to hear what you did step by step. And I was very struck by your general points at the end. The point about women in civil society and the point about reconciliation. One of the things that's always struck me as the big problem of peace agreement is that the people who have the power to make the peace are often the most extreme, the intransigent people. And that's why women in civil society are so important. And I was wondering, you mentioned talking to women's groups in Kosovo, but to what extent were you able in both of these negotiations to bring Women and Civil Society Party actually to the negotiating table?
- [46:11]
B
I have to be very candid that I have no authority to decide who sits on the other side of the table. And there were sometimes some token women there and sometimes also serious negotiators there. But it's a sad reflection in the sense that. But perhaps it tells something about the Balkans as well. I know there are people from Balkans here, so it's a man's world. And I come from the country where the majority of people studying in institutions like this are women. And I'm married to a very progressive lady. Sir.
- [47:00]
A
I'm going to now. Well, thank you. And I'm now going to open the floor to questions. So who would like to ask questions? I'm looking around. I think I'll take. I'll start with a group of three, and I always start with the principle of women first. And please say who you are. And just so that we know. Denisa Kostoviczeva, Government Department.
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B
Pardon?
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A
I'm Denisa Kostovicheva from Government Department. My question has to do with your interpretation of conflict. You talk about solving internal conflicts. It's lots of theory in the work that we do actually shows that these conflicts look internal, but are very much global. They are shaped by transnational forces like war, economies, Diasporas and et cetera. And I was wondering if you had any thoughts on how these forces are to be addressed in order to have effective conflict resolution in a global age. Okay, I'll take two more and then you done here. Thank you very much. My name is Ida Longquist. We met upstairs. But I am doing my PhD here in the human geography department. And as somebody who is writing about street families in Kenya, therefore very involved in gender, children's rights and civil society issues, I'm wondering how you could encourage us young women at this institution to get jobs in places like where you are chairman right now. Okay, now I'm going to take someone from the top floor, the lady there, on my principle of taking the women first.
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B
Mine too.
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A
Mr. Atisar, you mentioned that Belgrade did not change his position and he said autonomy for Kosovo and Prishtina, sustained independence. What about your personal opinion? And the second question is, you also mentioned that Kosovo is an EU issue. Does it mean that EU country will recognize and expect it independence from Kosovo soon?
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B
Sorry, I didn't understand.
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A
Now the second question is, will countries of the EU recognize an expected independence of Kosovo? Thank you.
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B
So.
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A
So yeah, why don't we answer?
- [49:52]
B
Allow me to. I think there's external influences in all processes. There's one thing you didn't never mention and it's the foreign advisors to the parties. That's a very intriguing thing because if I look at the different peace processes that I have been involved over my 70 years, I started very young. Actually I wasn't mediator, but I became, when I was two years, I became internally eternally displaced person. And I had to live with my mother from Karelia, which when the Soviets attacked my, my part of Finland. So I became, as I say, eternally displaced. There's always an element of foreign advices and I have noticed this in case of Namibian negotiations, I have noticed that in Northern Ireland, even if they are very self contained, I have noticed this in the Balkans. I noticed that in Adseh. And that is something that I wish somebody should do more research because my experience generally is that sometimes the foreign advisers, and I must say that even the governments in Africa, for instance, when we were negotiating the Namibian settlement, I had to tell some of my friends from independent African countries, the ministers, that you are holier than the Pope. But I think if the local people are prepared to make a deal, why should you oppose it? On what right? Because it was a fair solution. Very often. The foreign advisers have a similar attitude, like immigrant communities. If you have lived long Time outside the country, you are stuck with the views that when you left the territory and very often in transit and you never actually face the reality which the people on the ground have to face. And that intrigues me tremendously. Because how can they be used? Well, because very often they are required. They have the academic background, they can produce papers, they work 26 hours a day to produce the documents which people are not prepared or not able to do with that speed. So you have that. And I think there's enough research, for instance that if there is a big immigrant community in the United States, I think that it was a World bank scholars who did this study that there was a 38% chance that peace would fail if there was a very big immigrant cohort. So all these elements have to be looked into. And I think it's also important and I see that in some of the African problems where people are actually addressing the immigrant communities, communities and their attempts, like Interpeace has invited people to go to some of the African countries where the problems have been so that they can actually be also drawn into that process one way or another. So I think you then economic interest, which obviously if you. I look at the. I couldn't close my eyes. What's happening in Angola, for instance. I mean mere fact that you have. There's a talk about curse of the natural resources. And when you have diamonds and oil, there are also people who are interested to exploit that sort of situation. And how do you get the transparency into these processes that would prevent. It is I think extremely important. So you are touching a very complex situation which makes it even more. The poorer the situation is, the better actually from a negotiator's point of view. But very often it's not the people would like to see. On the second issue was how to get involved. You have to convince my lady colleagues that you are excellent and knock on the door. I don't interfere anymore in selecting people. I try to help. I have to confess that sometimes at this age I should really retire. But sometimes when. I'll give you a very personal experience. There's somebody who is a graduate of London School of Economics and my excellent special assistant. His boyfriend is doing PhD work in Georgetown and she of course wanted to move to Washington. So I agreed to work with some friends on the employment issues in different parts. In Indonesia we have developed an employment program there, in China, hopefully in Iran, Middle East. And with my contribution, the young lady is being employed by the department organization. I don't know which comes first. My eagerness to work on these issues or my desire to help her as well. Sometimes it may be both, but I'm enormously encouraged that I see well educated young people who are devoted to these tasks and who can do an excellent work. They don't need me anymore. They can take minutes without me.
- [56:31]
A
They just need you to ring up Javier Solana and copy Ann.
- [56:35]
B
Perhaps a few phone calls here and there, that helps. But soon they will do the phone call. They can call the assistance of Javier. That works. I'm a former civil servant. I'm not really a politician. I just became president. And we have a marvelous word in Finnish language and I will ask my Finnish friends to explain it to you. But I once said an interview that being a president in Finland, in my life was a sidestep from my career because I have returned doing what I did before I became president. But there's a marvelous Finnish word called Syria hippe. You hear the ladies laughing because it means extramarital affair as well. Now there was a lady who asked me about Serbia and Kosovo. I think the most important thing when you look at this task that I got in November and Professor Calder was mentioning that we met when I was chairman of the Bosnia Herzegovina Working Group helping Cy Vance and David Owen in Geneva. You can't find a solution if you don't honestly analyze what went wrong in a conflict situation, how tough it is. And you have to be honest enough. My advice. When I had a brown pack lunch with colleagues in political department, when they asked to talk to me in New York, I said to them that you have to do what is right, not what the member states expect you to do. You have to be doing what is absolutely right. When you have analyzed the situation at the this is the right thing to do and whatever criticism you face, you have to stand for that because otherwise you are not worth your job. And we can't omit, unfortunately. And then you have like in Serbia. The sad thing is that there was another regime that caused the havoc in Kosovo and with the Albanians. But as I read the private messages, the message was very clear. This democratic regime has to deal with that past. There was a very interesting discussion once when Foreign Minister Vukdaskovich, whom I knew when he was in the other governments early on he talked to the EU foreign ministers and said that please, ministers and colleagues, don't punish us for what Milosevic did. I confronted Vuk, I said to him, look, we can't reward you either. That's what you are asking. But the sad thing in today's Europe is that the only country that has taken a hard look at its past is Germany. Nobody else in Europe has done it. So no wonder that we have still problems on our continent. But you can't solve. You can't find and make a new beginning. If you don't honestly accept that sometimes things go wrong, even if you were not responsible. And you have to try to sort out. And very often it doesn't mean that there's only one guilty party. Others have done also things that should never have happened. But still we have to find, keep the great picture in mind and try to find out that solution. If you don't, then accept that you are criticized like I have been in every task I have undertaken. Then you should pack your bags and go home and do something else.
- [60:42]
A
Shall we allow a few men to ask some questions?
- [60:46]
B
And what is my personal. It is that I want to see a solution to the Kosovo on the basis. Pardon, My proposal is very clear. And if you have studied the proposal and I recommend. EU has done some very positive things. It has produced this sort of pocket edition of my proposal. And this is the best contribution I have seen coming from my friends in commission. It's a marvellous thing. There are two things that I carry with me. UN Sartre and my proposal.
- [61:44]
A
Okay, I'll let you hear in the front.
- [61:57]
B
My name is Ludwig Duran, I'm in the European Institute. And my question is how do you see some kind of peaceful resolution to the Kosovo conflict coming when some of the preconditions that you listed as being necessary for peaceful resolution weren't present when you concluded your work, such as an intransience on both groups or a lack of coming together without the facilitation of a mediator.
- [62:24]
A
Okay, I'll let this gentleman just behind you.
- [62:32]
B
Hi, my name is Jonathan. I would like to ask to what extent do you think international organizations and non governmental organizations. Sorry, I lost you. I'm Jonathan. Yes, please. My question relates to the failure of international organizations and NGOs in conflict prevention. Do you think such organizations, and particularly the Secretary General, can be held formally accountable for any wrongdoing or any errors in judgment in conflict prevention and resolution? Thanks.
- [63:17]
A
And I'm going to. There's a lady in the back. Thank you. Kimber Tuchel Balkan JOURNALIST actually, so my question is of course to do with Kosovo. You said at the beginning that every.
- [63:33]
B
Conflict has a solution and has to be resolved.
- [63:37]
A
Yet, as you said in the Balkans.
- [63:39]
B
We still don't have one. But do you see the main reasons for that?
- [63:43]
A
Since you've been involved at length. And what are the chances that under the troika is reached such a solution or compromise as we hear it, since your proposal was described as compromise itself, what are the chances that we reach what the compromise could be that you.
- [64:00]
B
Did not predict in your proposal?
- [64:03]
A
And what are the chances that your proposal comes back to the table?
- [64:08]
B
Shall I start from your question? I still remember my handwriting is getting so poor that I can hardly. First of all, it has not disappeared anywhere. It's on the table of the Security Council. It's still there. There's nothing else. We will see what the troika comes up to. But when it was decided that further negotiations would be carried out in order to show that everything possible is going to be done, my advice also was that please don't ask me and my colleagues to do it. You have to do the contact group. Because I had invited contact group members to be observers on 10 March and in some other meetings. So they were sitting there, they saw how the parties behaved. I said, you have to go through this, you have to experience it yourself. If you can come up with something useful, good and well, perhaps it helps. And that was decided and it was agreed that one of my senior colleagues would be available there. And I think we have had. The head of our office in Vienna is a Russian diplomat, very good, professional, and he has been assisted by a Ukrainian colleague. So they have been sitting in the meetings and we are being briefed. What happens, we will see. They still have scheduled, at least, if I recall correctly, three meetings before they have to report to the Secretary General. And then we will see what comes out of this process. They have put some points for discussion. I don't want to go into those here, but we will see what the outcome of that is going to be. I don't know. I honestly can't tell you if I would. I think it's an uphill battle. Yes. What is your impression?
- [66:28]
A
That why parties could not agree and.
- [66:39]
B
Perhaps one of the reasons was. Is what I said is how one reads the history of the. If we only look at the history. In the Finnish group, I found that there was a Serbian student also who had become a Finn all of a sudden, and he asked very good questions. He was, I think, accompanying with his. There you are. Thank you for the questions because they helped me to answer them, answer some of the concerns as well. Much depends on how do you look at the history, what happened 89 onwards. We don't need to go to 1,300 years when I was chairman of the Bosnia Herzegovina Working Group. I remember Karadi showing me maps from 1300 and I said, come on, put it aside. So that is perhaps the most crucial issue. If people can't actually agree what went wrong and why and how we have to try to come out of this mess because that's what these negotiations are all about. We are trying to make the best out of the mess that happened in the 90s with all the sideshows associated with that. So let's have patience. I have plenty. So we'll see.
- [68:11]
A
No, I think.
- [68:12]
B
No, I think my plan is not disappearing anywhere. It's there, looming. So let's see. NGOs. My apologies that it took me such a long time to find you in the audience. It's an interesting question. I don't think that you can hold. I think one of the most miserable jobs is that of the Secretary General. I have worked for five and this is definitely my last one. One who is there now, I don't. I hope that he will serve his two terms. He has been very good to me and to the process in Kosovo. So I always sing praises for Secretary General Ban Ki Muno this one. And I can only judge him from the relationship on this issue because I don't know the others. It's easy to blame the Secretary General, but I have been 13 years serving in New York. I started in 77 and left in 91 when I became State Secretary in high school, civil servant in my foreign office in Finland and then quickly went to Yugoslavia conference. When I was asked by Saigons if the member states don't want to help to solve the problems. There's very little leeway that Secretary General has. So let's look at the member states and direct our attention to the member states and push them to act. Thank God no one can escape the issues become public. Thank God we have a media that if something goes wrong somewhere, it's known next day, if not the same day. And that puts much more pressure on the leaders who don't want to for one reason or another to get involved. I tell you an example about when the coalition willing that resolution was passed in UN that allowed the coalition to attack Iraq. I was stopped by young colleagues in the secretariat building and said, Mr. Altisar, we want to talk to you. He said, we joined the peace organization in and our Security Council has given an agreement for member states. This coalition are willing to go to war. What do you have to say? I said, let's sit down. He went to my office. I said, look I come from a small country and how would the world look like if UN would do nothing if a big neighbor attacks? In this case it was Iraq that attacked Kuwait and we would do nothing. He said, why is it that we don't do it in other areas of the world, in other conflict areas in Middle east and elsewhere? I said, unfortunately we haven't become yet so advanced that we. We follow the same principles all over. But let's at least try to do it where we have a coalition and agreement. Perhaps in the end of the day the principles become unilateral and we can actually treat every conflict in the world. I think we are far from that at the moment, but I think it would have been even more disastrous. Then I had to go. Then Secretary General Xavier Berestek asked me to go to see assess the need for humanitarian assistance in Iraq and Kuwait. I had nothing to do with the problem, but he said that could you please do that for me? And I did it. And I saw the devastation in Kuwait and I saw also the problems caused in Iraq by bombing of the coalition. I produced a report and I was blasted by New York Times. My friend, the UN correspondent really gave me hell about the wording I had chosen in describing how bad the situation was in Iraq at that time. For the simple reason that I told Secretary General that if I don't say this, we will never get the necessary assistance to help the Iraqis with humanitarian assistance. Because when the energy was out, the electricity was out, water was not running, sewage system in a society that was 70% urbanized was not running and we had all the diseases, everything produced. So we have to be candid and say whatever the reasons for intervention were, we have to help the people because whatever stupidity the leaders show that ordinary people should not suffer. And I said, let the report go on my name, I'm leaving anyway. And we agreed on that. On the NCOs. When I negotiated the ATSI agreement and asked facilities from my government so that we could use the state owned buildings for those, the agreement was very clear. If we succeed, we share the glory. If we fail, I take the play. It has to be that way if you are running an ngo because that gives more courage for the governments to use their NGOs like Swiss government is very often doing. I think it's an excellent way. I have followed the Swiss with great admiration. But it has to be these are the ground rules that we have to accept as an NGO leaders because otherwise no government will trust. Because if you have doubts that now Ahtisari will make the mess out of this and then we will be blamed when this is agreed. It's much easier to make governments to be more courageous, to get involved in some of the most difficult issues. And it may sound that I have lost my marbles when I said that every conflict can be solved. They can be. We should never accept that the conflicts can't be solved. Everyone knows, for instance how Middle east has to solved. Let's do it. I think we should not accept that there are conflicts. We talk about frozen conflicts, that they should be there. Why should we? And why can't Kosovo be another frozen conflict? When I hear some of the permanent members telling me we have already Cyprus and Middle east another one more. What's the problem? Problem? I get out of the room if that sort of nonsense is taught. So we have to force the government. We have to be active as a civil society to get the governments to move and try to solve the conflicts, because they can be.
- [75:54]
A
Well, I'm going to allow one last round because I'm very possible.
- [75:58]
B
No agreement. Who was the one who. Ah, you asked.
- [76:01]
A
Oh, sorry.
- [76:03]
B
Yes. I still believe that this is the best compromise we can. We can have. And when it's supported by most of the EU countries, great majority of the Security Council is behind the plan, if not all the permanent members yet. I hope that they will see the light one day as well. I can't just go home and say, sorry, I couldn't solve it. I have to fight for the plan and say that I feel that this is the only way we can actually solve it. And it guarantees that there will be international community monitoring that whatever government comes, it has to do the things that we have in our plan. It has to change that society because the standards are not yet all implemented as they should be. And we have to start hopefully in the Balkans generally to get ordinary people to get a better life and concentrate on economic issues. I leave you one thought with you, if you allow. I'm involved with an American friend of mine who has look at his website, it's called Imaginations. He was the founder of the Rick Little. He was the founder of the International Youth foundation in Baltimore. It has over 80 partners all over the world and I have cooperated with them. He argues on his website that that by 2015 there are going to be 1.2 billion youngsters between 15 and 25 looking for work in the world. And with traditional means we can offer work perhaps for 300 million. And he wants to challenge the world leaders and say we have to we can't get work for each and every one of them but we can we must do more because if there's a billion youngsters of that age without any hope for better life I mean where is the better ground for recruiting terrorists in this world? So we have to fight the poverty we have to keep a chance and I'm prepared to work with him on that I can't guarantee that we create by year 2015 billion jobs but we will start processes and now the World bank has already established a fund a special fund for the employment Inter American Development bank is funding through the International Youth foundation and when they give 10 million they expect the organization to get 20 from private sector and it's done but these are the real issues of the world that we have to deal with not play with the words but actually change the real life of individuals you know what it means to be able to study in this sort of institution there are many people who would love to do that thank you very much for your patience. It.