The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Where could Justice go wrong?

Summary

Podcast Summary: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon – Where Could Justice Go Wrong?

Podcast: LSE: Public Lectures and Events
Episode Date: January 27, 2010
Host: LSE Film and Audio Team
Speaker: Dr. Omar Nashabe
Main Theme: An exploration of the creation, mandate, and problematic justice of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) in the context of Rafik Hariri’s assassination, selective justice, constitutional controversy, and flawed processes.

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Overview

This lecture by Dr. Omar Nashabe provides a comprehensive critique of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), a court established by the UN to prosecute those responsible for the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Dr. Nashabe unpacks how the tribunal reflects selective justice, legal and constitutional irregularities, and broader concerns about the international community’s approach to justice and impunity in Lebanon.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Background of Rafik Hariri and Political Assassinations in Lebanon

[00:01–~10:00]

• Political Context: Hariri, twice Lebanese Prime Minister, was seen as a mediator and peacemaker, closely connected to Saudi Arabia, Syria (then Lebanon’s hegemonic force), and France.
• Dynasty of Assassinations: Lebanon’s history is marred by a long list of political assassinations – from Prime Ministers to journalists and diplomats.
  • “Political assassinations are not new to Lebanon... This long list of crime does not make the assassination of Hariri less deserving of proper prosecution and fair punishment, but there is no legal or moral basis for pursuing justice in the Hariri case while refraining from doing so in previous and later cases.” (A, 00:56–02:36)
• Culture of Impunity:
  • Detailing Lebanon’s repetitive use of amnesty to absolve even the gravest political crimes.
  • The controversial 2005 amnesty law pardoned Samir Jaja for the assassination of PM Rashid Karami and others.
  • Quote: “In Lebanon, most of the assassinations...either went unresolved or unpunished or were whitewashed by general amnesty laws.” (A, 02:37–03:10)

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2. International Reaction and Creation of the STL

[10:00–20:00]

• UN Involvement: Security Council's rapid response after Hariri’s assassination, dispatching investigators, and declaring the incident a terrorist act of international concern.
• Investigative Commissions:
  • Fitzgerald Mission concluded (hastily) that Lebanese and Syrian security apparatuses bore responsibility for the lack of order.
  • Detlev Mehlis (UN Commission head) initially suggested Syrian and Lebanese involvement but lacked indictable evidence. His recommendation led to the arrest of 8 Lebanese, 4 of whom spent nearly four years detained without being charged or indicted.
  • Successive commissioners (Brammertz, Belmar) became more cautious, avoiding politically loaded public commentary.
• Tribunal’s Mandate: Its uniquely narrow scope – only Hariri’s assassination (and potentially closely related cases) is within STL jurisdiction.
  • Quote: “What makes this tribunal even more special is its mandate, which is by far, by far the narrowest of any international tribunal.” (A, ~20:00)

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3. Failures and Flaws in Prosecution and Process

[20:00–31:00]

• No Results: Over a year after launch, no indictments or meaningful judicial progress.
• Lack of Continuity: One-year contracts for key investigators, delayed appointments, and resignations (registrar, chief investigators, spokespeople) caused instability.
  • “Employing a chief investigator in a terrorist crime case for just one year is questionable, especially considering the necessary continuity, the complexity of the case and time constraints.” (A, ~28:45)
• Arbitrary Detentions: The four Lebanese officers were held for nearly four years on insufficient, even “insufficiently credible,” evidence. Their release highlighted both willingness to detain without charge and inability to bring cases to trial.
  • Quote: “By ordering the release of the officers, the Tribunal clearly implied that their imprisonment...was arbitrary.” (A, ~32:30)
• Comparative Justice: Cites the Yugoslavia Tribunal’s first indictment only four months post-prosecutor appointment, contrasting this with STL’s inertia.

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4. Selective Justice and Political Selectivity

[31:00–36:00]

• Focus on Hariri Only: The tribunal provides access to justice only for Hariri and related cases, not for other victims of political killings (e.g., the 2006 war, earlier assassinations).
  • “...sympathy failed to pay any attention to any potential international justice mechanism mandated to prosecute those responsible for the slaughter of 1,191 Lebanese [in 2006].” (A, ~35:00)
• Budget Disparity: Lebanon pays 49% of STL’s $51.4 million first-year budget—greater than its entire judicial budget, for a tribunal with no indictments or detentions to show for it.

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5. Constitutional and Legal Controversies

[36:00–40:00]

• Bypassing Lebanese Sovereignty: STL was enacted by UN Security Council resolution without Lebanese parliamentary approval. The process is questionable under both Lebanese constitutional law and international law, according to various states (Qatar, Indonesia, South Africa, China, Russia).
  • “This Security Council infraction of a founding member of the United Nations’ sovereignty could only be passed under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.” (A, ~38:00)
• Selection of Staff: Judges and staff appointed without clear, public criteria or necessary experience—sometimes with political conflicts of interest (e.g., Hariri’s son as Prime Minister, advisor with prior anti-Syrian statements).
  • Quote: “The problem with the selection process...is that the statute of the Tribunal does not contain detailed criteria for appointments, such as the need for expertise and experience in international human rights and criminal law.” (A, ~40:00)

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6. Frequent Resignations and Internal Disarray

[40:00–43:00]

• Repeated resignations of key figures in the Tribunal, often with unclear explanations, deepened public suspicion about STL’s legitimacy and effectiveness.
• “Resignations for various reasons are not unusual in International Tribunal. However, in the case of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, resignations were numerous, fast, frequent and their reasons were not fully clarified.” (A, ~41:00)

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7. Proposed Remedies and Recommendations

[43:00–45:00]

• Expand STL Mandate: Broaden it to address all political killings since 2005, and reform Lebanese judiciary to prosecute historic crimes, including those pre-2005.
• Transparent Recruitment: Implement transparent, rigorous background checks for tribunal staff and publish biographies.
• Improved Outreach: The STL must better explain internal changes (e.g., resignations) to maintain public trust.

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Audience Q&A: Notable Issues and Quotes

Selectivity and Legitimacy of Justice (46:08–47:32)

• Dr. Nashabe underscores that the same judge who sentenced Samir Jaja for PM Karami's assassination is now vice president of the STL:
  • “Why would you not consider the decisions to come in the tribunal...since the same judge who was sitting on that tribunal back then is the vice president of the current tribunal?” (A, 46:08)

Political Selectivity and Deadlocks (49:27–50:38)

• Question on whether no tribunal is better than a flawed tribunal, and whether Nashabe’s argument serves one political faction.
• Nashabe: “The objective...is constructive, not a destructive one. Some work needs to be done on the tribunal to make it more...legitimate.” (A, 54:32)

Media Freedom Concerns and Unique STL Provisions (51:10–53:08)

• John Silverman highlights STL’s unique provision allowing defamation suits against journalists:
  • “...this is the only international tribunal which has introduced that. And I think that's an appalling attack on freedom of expression...” (F, 51:10)

Constitutional Process and Parliamentary Legitimacy (57:48–60:48)

• Debate about whether the government’s process for adopting STL and the resignation of ministers was deliberate obstruction. Nashabe says intent is unclear but calls the legal process problematic.

Possible Political Pressure and Tribunal’s Motivation (61:27–62:03)

• Nashabe acknowledges that the STL was created by “political will and therefore political interests,” not purely legal justifications.

Expansion vs. Investment in National Justice (70:11–71:10)

• Nashabe admits expanding STL would cost more, but alternatives are weak; “...you’re going to be spending [the money] on local tribunals and improving the system.”

On Access to Justice and Comparison with 2006 War (71:24–71:59)

• Nashabe argues all victims deserve access to justice, not only high-profile cases:
  • “Would the victim of a crime have access to a judicial mechanism in 2006? Why is there a difference among people who have lost loved ones? Isn't everyone entitled to access to justice?” (A, 71:24)

On STL’s Future and Potential Indictment (73:17–end)

• Nashabe is pessimistic but hopeful:
  • “I think that the prosecutor will come up with an indictment...but...the very legitimacy of this tribunal will be questioned and raised in the tribunal...and this will cost even more money and will make people feel more unsure about the whole judicial process. And that should not be the case.” (A, 73:17)

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Memorable Quotes

• “Imperfect justice may be better than no justice at all... However, imperfect justice may contribute to impunity and make ex-warlords who expressed unprecedented enthusiasm for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon immune from prosecution for heinous crimes they allegedly committed or were involved in during the 70s and 80s.” (A, 42:29)
• “...imperfect justice may contribute to impunity and make ex-warlords...immune from prosecution for heinous crimes...” (A, 42:40)
• “The tribunal, in its first sessions, perhaps the very legitimacy of this tribunal will be questioned and raised in the tribunal. And that will take a long time...and this will cost even more money and will make people feel more unsure about the whole judicial process. And that should not be the case.” (A, 73:17)

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Timestamps for Key Segments

• Background and History of Impunity: 00:01–10:00
• UN & International Involvement: 10:01–20:00
• Failures in Tribunal Process: 20:01–31:00
• Selective Justice & Legal Criticisms: 31:01–40:00
• Constitutional/Legal Controversies: 40:01–44:00
• Remedies and Recommendations: 44:01–45:00
• Audience Q&A: 45:00–80:00

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Conclusion

Dr. Nashabe delivers an unflinching critical analysis of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. He asserts that without a broader scope, better transparency, and real judicial reform (both locally and internationally), the STL risks undermining Lebanon’s struggles for truth and justice and deepening societal divides. The lecture ends on a cautious note—indications that, despite impending indictments, legitimacy issues and the burdens of selective justice threaten to turn the STL into a costly, divisive, and ultimately unsatisfying exercise in international law.

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Transcript

[A]

Rafi Hariri served as Lebanese prime minister from 1992-98 and then again from 2000 to 2004. He was a self made billionaire and a tycoon who made his fortune in Saudi Arabia where he also lived most of his adult life. Early in his career, he appeared in public wearing traditional Saudi headgear and was identified as the Saudi chief mediator in the Lebanese crisis. In 1984, Hariri participated in the Geneva and Lausanne conferences to bring about political reconciliation in Lebanon and he helped broker initiatives to put an end to the Civil War. The 1989 Ta'if Accords held in Saudi Arabia marked the end of the civil war and the start of a new era in Lebanese politics under Syrian hegemony. Hariri was appointed prime minister in 1992 by President Elias Harawi two successive cabinets after Taif. In Lebanon and abroad, great hopes were expressed on his ability to lead the country into an era of peace and prosperity. Despite having no political experience from his time in Saudi Arabia, Hariri became the Syrian choice. Partly due to his Saudi credentials and wealth. Hariri built close associations with powerful Syrian figures such as Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam, Army Chief of Staff Hekmet Shahabi and General Ghazi Kin? Aan, who enjoyed the confidence of President Hafez Al Assad and had substantial influence on Lebanese politics. He also became a supporter and confidant of Jacques Chirac, who was later elected President of France. In 1996, Chirag granted Hariri the prestigious medal La Grande Croix de la Legion d' Honneur and later compared him to Charles de Gaulle. Several months after the assassination of Hariri in 2005, General Ghazi Kanan reportedly committed suicide in his office at the Interior Ministry in Damascus. Soon thereafter, Abdel Halim Khadam was stripped of his office as Vice President, defected to France and Jacques Chirac put forward the idea of setting up an international tribunal and has been campaigning for it ever since. Political assassinations are not new to Lebanon. In fact, Riyadh Saleh, the first post independence Prime Minister, was assassinated in 1951. This was followed by a series of assassinations targeting politicians, journalists and religious leaders. President Elect Bashir Jamail was assassinated in 1982 and President Renee Mawad was assassinated on Independence Day in 1989, whereas an attempt was made on the life of former President Kamil Shamoun back in 1980. Prime Minister Rashid Karami was assassinated in 1987 and an attempt was made on the life of Prime Minister Saleeman Al HUSS Back in 1984 several religious leaders were assassinated and foreign diplomats, including an American ambassador and French, Iraqi and Jordanian diplomats were murdered. In 1984, Malcolm Kerr, President of the American University of Beirut, was gunned down. The assassination of Hariri was also followed by a long list of assassinations, including Member of Parliament Gibran Twaney, politician George Howey and journalist and friend Samir Kassir in 2005, Minister Pierre and activist Mohammed and Nidal Maszoub in 2006, Member of Parliament Walid Aido and Antoine ranim and Army General Francois Hajj in 2007 and police investigator and officer Wisam Ayid in 2008. This long list of crime does not make the assassination of Hariri less deserving proper prosecution and fair punishment, but there is no legal or moral basis for pursuing justice in the Hariri case while refraining from doing so in previous and later cases. Impunity In Lebanon, most of the assassinations listed above either went unresolved or unpunished or were whitewashed by general amnesty laws. The Lebanese Constitution, Article 53, paragraph 9 allows the President to grant particular pardons and empowers the government and the Parliament to vote general amnesty laws. Since independence in 1943, every single Lebanese president and almost every cabinet and parliament granted amnesty to hundreds and perhaps thousands of presumed criminals. The amnesty law passed on July 18, 2005 is, however, most relevant to this lecture because it was passed just five months after the assassination of Hariri. It amnestied ex warlord Samir Jaja for five specific sentences against him. In one of those cases, Zsaja was convicted and sentenced for the assassination of Prime Minister Rashid Karame in 1987. This amnesty law was passed just three months after the UN Fact Finding Mission to Lebanon presented a report to the Security Council stating that Lebanese officials, quote, contributed to the propagation of a culture of intimidation and impunity. Just five months after this amnesty law was passed by around 100 votes in the recently elected parliament dominated by Hariri's political allies, Prime Minister Fouad Sanura's government requested the United Nations Security Council to establish a tribunal of an international character to try all those who are found responsible for the terrorist crime perpetrated against Prime Minister Hariri and to investigate the assassination attempts and assassinations and explosions that took place in Lebanon, starting with the attempt on the life of Minister Marwan Hamadi On October 1, 2004, the same majority in the Lebanese Parliament that passed an amnesty law for the murder of one prime minister strongly supported the request to the United nations to investigate and sentence in the case of the assassination of another prime minister. To say the least, this selective approach to access to justice conflicts with initiatives aimed at ending impunity in Lebanon. Yet the Special Tribunal for Lebanon was established based on a document which specifically recalls the above request. And Secretary General Ban Ki Moon declared on the day the Tribunal was launched that it, quote, marks a decisive milestone in the tireless efforts by all Lebanese and the international community to uncover the truth, bring those responsible for this assassination and related crimes to justice, and end impunity. Unquote. From Fitzgerald to Belmar. On February 15, 2005, just one day after the assassination of Hariri, the Security Council showed extraordinary concern and requested the Secretary General, quote, to follow closely the situation in Lebanon and to report urgently on the circumstances, causes and consequences of this terrorist act. Unquote. Pursuant to this statement, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan dispatched a fact finding mission to Beirut. The mission, headed by Peter Fitzgerald, an Irish deputy police commissioner, arrived to the Lebanese capital on February 25 during a period stretching less than one month. Less than one month, the mission met Lebanese officials and politicians from both government and opposition, studied the Lebanese investigation and legal proceedings, examined the crime scene and collected the evidence and interviewed witnesses. Despite the fact that the mission's report stated that accusations and counter accusations are rife and aggravate the ongoing political polarization, it concluded after less than one month of investigations with a team of three foreigners with limited knowledge of Lebanon that, quote, the Lebanese security services and the Syrian military intelligence bear primary responsibility for the lack of security, protection and law and order in Lebanon. On April 7, 2005, the Security Council passed Resolution 1595 ordering the establishment of an international independent commission to assist the Lebanese authorities in their investigations of the terrorist act of February 14, 2005, and help identify its, quote, perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and accomplices, unquote. Security Council Resolution 1757 reads, quote, the Special Tribunal shall commence functioning taking into account the progress of the work of the International Independent Investigation Commission. Evidence collected by the UN Triple IC shall be received by the Tribunal. Its admissibility shall be decided by the Chambers pursuant to the International Standards on Collection of Evidence. The weight to be given to any such evidence shall be determined by the Chambers. Unquote. Berlin's prosecutor, Detlev Melis, nicknamed the German Fox by Lebanese media, was appointed as head of the Commission. And on October 20, 2005, the Security Council received his first report in which the Commission concluded that, quote, there is converging evidence pointing at both Lebanese and Syrian involvement in this terrorist act. However, evidence gathered by the commission he headed was insufficient to support indictments of Syrian officials or anyone else for Hariri's murder. Melis expressed otherwise. He had recommended the arrest of eight Lebanese. Four among them remained behind bars for almost four years and were later released by the tribunal. As will be further explained in the second part of this lecture, on December 15, 2005, Melis resigned and on January 11, 2006, he was replaced by Serge Brahmerz. Unlike Melis, the new commissioner refrained from making public the details of his work. The Belgian commissioner or investigator maintained a high level of professionalism. No mention was made of witness testimonies implicating the Lebanese or Syrian officials or any other evidence of their complicity. Nor was Mellis conclusion on Syrian involvement in the assassination of Hariri repeated. The commission's mandate on the grammar was widened and it submitted six reports to the Security Council. The commissioner underlined the fact that the inquiry only made sense if it leads to judicial process and that it is committed to a special tribunal. However, after two years of criminal investigations, the gathered evidence remained insufficient for issuing indictments. A rare, substantial sign of progress in this investigation appeared in his third report in which he confirmed the theory of a suicide bombing to assassinate Hariri. Brahmad stepped down on January 1, 2008 and was replaced by Daniel Belmar. UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon naped Belmar as commissioner to be metamorphosed into the prosecutor of the Special Tribunal. Upon its launch, Belmar as commissioner of the UN Triple ic, made it clear that the investigation is not nearing completion. Quote, I cannot tell you next year at this time or in six months, or in the three years, I will have results, unquote, Belmar told the news conference in April 2008. This remains his position today as prosecutor to be. During a recent visit to Beirut, he repeated verbatim that he, quote, cannot give a timeline for the filing of an indictment. The banal fact is that a prosecutor is supposed to prosecute and if he's still doing the job of the Investigative Commission, whose mandate ended in February 28, 2009, then launching the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in March, seems insignificant. The very Special Tribunal For Lebanon on March 29, 2006, the Security Council had unanimously passed Resolution 1664 creating an international tribunal. It requested Secretary General Kofi Annan to to negotiate an agreement with the Lebanese government aimed at establishing a tribunal of an international character based on the highest international standards of criminal justice. On February 6, 2007, the United nations and Prime Minister Fouad Seniora's government, qualified by Speaker Nabih Biri of being unconstitutional, signed an agreement establishing a Special Tribunal. However, after four months of internal political tensions, no agreement was reached within Lebanon's parliamentary forces over the agreement signed on February 6 and the parliament failed to convene. Thereafter, Western powers decided to bypass the Lebanese constitution by considering the agreement between Lebanon and the UN on establishing the Tribunal without the vote of the local parliament. This Security Council infraction of a founding member of the United nations sovereignty could only be passed under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. What makes this tribunal even more special is its mandate, which is by far, by far the narrowest of any international tribunal. It has no jurisdiction to address serious human rights violations committed in Lebanon in recent years or decades, implicating that the justice being promoted is so severely and obviously politically selective that it may contribute to further disagreements among Lebanese. The mandate of the Special Tribunal is limited to investigate and then prosecute the alleged perpetrators of the terrorist assassination of Hariri and 22 others. It has jurisdiction over the assassinations and assassination attempts committed between October 1 and 12 December only if the Special Tribunal finds them to be connected to the assassination of Hariri and of a similar nature and gravity. Where could justice go wrong? The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, according to Security Council Resolution 1757, quote, shall commence functioning on a date, as I mentioned earlier, shall commence functioning on a date to be determined by the Secretary General in consultation with the Government of Lebanon, taking into account. Taking into account the progress of the work of the International Independent Investigation Commission. That date was determined and set for March 1, 2009. Considering the significance of this code, the investigations filed in possession of the Office of the Prosecutor are supposed to be complete enough to allow for indictments or at least, or at least pre indictment measures. Such measures may include pre trial arrest for a maximum of 90 days prior to issuing indictments according to the rules of procedures and evidence of the Tribunal. But today, almost one year after the launch of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in the Hague, the Office of the Prosecutor Daniel Belmar not only failed to submit indictments to the pre trial judge Daniel Francine, substantiated with credible evidence capable of surviving the competent defense of Francois Roux's team. But it is now in a partial phase of orientation and induction for a new Chief Investigator after the departure of Najib Caldas back to his Australian homeland. Prosecutor Belmar had, quote, expressed regret that Caldas would not be able to extend his contract for a further period, unquote. Yet Caldas himself. Caldas reminded on January 6, 2010 that, quote, when the Prosecutor hired him for the position of Chief of Investigation, he had accepted the offer with the understanding that he would serve only for one year up to the end of February 2010. Employing a chief investigator in a terrorist crime case for just one year is questionable, especially considering the necessary continuity, the complexity of the case and time constraints. On January 6, 2010, Belmar pointed to further delays in employing a new chief investigator when he said, quote, I soon will start the process of identifying a new chief of the Investigation division to replace Mr. Caldas, unquote. The immediate start of the lengthy and tedious process of identifying the replacement would seem necessary. Review of the failure of the Office of the Prosecutor to submit indictments after more than a full year of investigations, preceded by four years of investigations by un, IIC and the Lebanese Judicial what may also point to inadequate and delayed processes is the fact that Lebanese Judge Joyce Stabbett did not assume her functions as deputy prosecutor until November 1, 2009, eight months after the official launch of the Tribunal. Thus, her working relation with the Chief investigator barely lasted three months. Tabith's role as Deputy Prosecutor is supposed to have been central according to the agreement attached to Resolution 1757, and one would expect that her role would be crucial during the absence of Belmar in July and August for medical reasons. However, she had not yet assumed her functions for unknown reasons. Belmar, apparently realizing emerging concern over what seemed to be a stalemate of the investigation, declared on July 8 that, quote, the pace of the investigation is not only maintained, but it is also increased during his absence, unquote, which is highly unlikely. The only sign of life of the Special Tribunal, other than the bureaucratic reports and the frequent visits of its officials to Beirut, was the pre trial judge's hearing declaring his order for the release of four officers who were arrested and held for almost four years by the Lebanese judicial authorities following a recommendation issued by UNIC's former commissioner Detlev Melis back in August 2005. By ordering the release of the officers, the Tribunal clearly implied that their imprisonment, along with four other civilians for periods exceeding three years, was arbitrary. Yet the Tribunal statute does not allow it to prosecute those responsible for arbitrarily detaining people based on false testimonies. And it is especially critical here to note that, quote, the information available to the un, Triple IC and to the Lebanese judicial in the case of persons incarcerated for more than three years was insufficiently credible. Or rather, in the original words of Judge Daniel Francine in the pretrial Les information etaisamen not that they were insufficient, that they were insufficiently credible. There's a big difference. There are therefore clear shortages in the justice system in question. However, it is not these shortages that generate suspicion, but the failure of the Office of the Prosecutor to show any sign of progress. Although this lecture does not present a comparative approach, it is useful to point here that the first indictment of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia was issued just four months after the prosecutor was appointed. Richard Goldstone was appointed on July 8, 1994, and he issued an indictment on November 7 of that same year against Dragan Nikolic. SELECTIVE JUSTICE Friends and family members of Prime Minister Rashid Karami, who was assassinated in 1987, continue to be deprived of justice, although they had access to the Lebanese Judicial Council Tribunal, in which Judge Ralph Rieshi, who recently assumed the position of Deputy President of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, was among its judges and the killer was convicted but was soon amnestied. Lebanese majority parliamentarians and politicians who opted for an international judicial process to convict the killer of a former prime minister passed an amnesty law for the murder of another prime minister. As was mentioned earlier in this lecture, the agreement between the United nations and the Lebanese Republic on the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon includes a Lebanese commitment, quote, not to grant amnesty to any person for any crime falling within the STL's jurisdiction. This implies that persons found guilty of assassinating or attempting to assassinate any of the politicians and journalists prior to February 14, 2005, as is the case for Karami, are eligible for amnesty if the crime they committed is not proven to be connected to the assassination of Haril. From July 12 until July 14, 2006, extreme violence erupted in Lebanon. Bombs exploded in people's homes and hospitals and hundreds were buried under the rubble of buildings. The Lebanon Higher Relief Council put the Lebanese death toll at 1,191 and estimated the number of Lebanese injured to be 4,409, 15% of whom were permanently disabled. Some may argue that the bombing of Hariri's motorcade cannot be compared to armed forces bombardment of civilian infrastructure in Lebanon and the slaughter of hundreds. However, it is access to justice for the victims that is being evoked here. Unlike its immediate reaction to the February 14th murder of Hariri and 22 others in 2005, the Security Council, after 15 days of silence over the continuous killings in 2006, expressed, quote, its deep concern for Lebanese and Israeli civilian casualties, unquote. There was, however, no request from the Secretary General to follow closely the situation in Lebanon and to report urgently on the circumstances, causes and consequences, unquote, as was the case on February 15, 2005. Just one year earlier, the Security Council, which unequivocally condemned the 14 February 2005 bombing that took the life of Hariri and 22 others, failed to express similar condemnation of the 2006 bombings that took the life of 1,191 persons. Its quote, deepest sympathy and condolences to the people and Government of Lebanon, unquote, led to launching the Special Tribunal with a mandate limited to the Hariri assassination. But such sympathy failed to pay any attention to any potential international justice mechanism mandated to prosecute those responsible for the slaughter of 1,191 Lebanese. After more than three years, the families of these victims remain deprived from access to justice and there are no signs that this is going to change anytime soon. The Tribunal's Disproportionate Cost. The contribution of the Lebanese treasury to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon was set by Resolution 1757 at 49% of the tribunal's budget. Over one year ago, the UN Secretary General report on the Security Council to the Security Council stated that, quote, the budget of the special tribunal is $51.4 million for its first year of operation. The total budget for the Ministry of Justice in Lebanon for 2009, which represents less than 1% of the government budget, is the equivalent of $55.8 million million US dollars. The national budget for the same year allocated US$72 million, an equivalent of 108 billion Lebanese pounds as Lebanon's contribution to the special tribunal over two years. The security Council compels Lebanon to contribute to the Special Tribunal that has a limited mandate, so some $30 million more than it spends on thousands of judicial cases in hundreds of local courts. Yet the chambers of the STL have not yet been convened, no arrests were made, no indictments were filed, and there are no persons detained, to say the least. Lebanese investment in prosecuting the assassination of Hariri and related attacks is disproportionate to the local justice system given the enormous number of other killings and grave human rights abuses that are not being prosecuted. Denied Sovereignty the draft agreement between the United nations and Lebanon on the establishment of the Tribunal was approved by the Lebanese cabinet on November 13, 2006. However, the cabinet's decision was made in the absence of six ministers, five of whom represented the total number of Muslim Shiite ministers. Paragraph J of the Constitution's preamble Lebanese Constitution's preamble cites quote There is no constitutional legitimacy for any authority which contradicts the Pact of Communal Coexistence, which implies that the Cabinet and its endorsement of the draft of the international agreement to establish the Tribunal are both unconstitutional. Thus, the agreement was neither ratified by the Lebanese Parliament nor by the President of the Republic. On May 30, 2007, the Security Council overrode the Lebanese Constitution by passing Resolution 1757 to bring into force the agreement to set up the Tribunal the application of enforcement measures stipulated under Chapter 7, Article 2, Paragraph 7, allowing an exception to the principle of national sovereignty underlined in United Nations Charter Article 2, paragraph 1 presupposes the existence of an international dispute threatening international peace and security. No such dispute was mentioned in Resolution 1757. Even if there was a dispute, the Security Council was supposed to adopt a resolution under Chapter 7 of the Charter after failure to settle the conflict under Chapter 6. A third of Security Council members, including two verdant members, did not vote in favor of Resolution 1757. Nasser Abdul Aziz al Nasser, representing Qatar, then the only Arab state in the Council, expressed his country's support of the internal Lebanese constitutional process and stressed that the resolution, which includes the Statute of the Tribunal, quote, entailed legal encroachments. Hassan Kleb, representing Indonesia, reminded the Council that, quote, Article 2, paragraph 7 of the UN Charter stressed that nothing contained in it would authorize the United nations to intervene in matters that were essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. Unquote. Dumisani Khumalo of South Africa considered it was not appropriate for the Council to bypass national procedures by imposing a tribunal. China's Wang Wangya objected to interference in the Lebanese internal affairs, and Russia's Vitali Shurkin considered the whole arrangement, quote, dubious under international law, unquote. The selection of Judges and staff the tribunal includes 11 judges, four from Lebanon and seven from other countries who have been recruited using a selection panel appointed by the Secretary General of the United Nations. International candidates were interviewed by a panel and its recommendations were endorsed by the UN Secretary General on December 4, 2008. As for the Lebanese candidates, they were selected by the Lebanese Supreme Council of the Judiciary and sent by the Cabinet to the Secretary General. The problem with the selection process for both Lebanese and international judges is that the statute of the Tribunal does not contain detailed criteria for appointments, such as the need for expertise and experience in international human rights and criminal law. The UN appointed selection panel did not review the professional record of the candidates prior to submitting recommendations the son of the main victim of the February 14 assassination, Saad Hariri was named Prime Minister on November 9, 2009. He now leads the cabinet that is supposed to, According to Resolution 1757, be consulted on the reappointment of the Special Tribunal's judges after their three year contract expires in March 2011. In other words, the victim of the crime will be consulted on the reappointment of the judges, which represents a conflict of interest that may weaken the credibility of the Special Tribunal's chambers. Soon after the launch of the tribunal in 2009, Duret Psharawi was appointed advisor to the Special Tribunal's Office of the Prosecutor was known to have publicly accused Syrian officials of assassinating Hariri. In an article published in an Nahar newspaper on December 27, 2007, he expressed quote and I translated it myself because it's in Arabic. Fears of the possibility of failure in reaching the truth about Hariri's assassination if some security members strike a political deal with the Syrian regime at the expense of the International Tribunal for Lebanon. This implies that Sharawi was convinced of Syrian involvement in the assassination. Such expressions of prejudice would usually disqualify the candidacy of its author to the legal Advisor to the Office of the Prosecutor position. That was apparently not the case. The Special Tribunal had also employed Najib Caldas as Chief Investigator of the Office of the Prosecutor. This was declared in mid December 2008. However, at that time Caldas was being investigated back in his homeland, Australia, in a case brought forward to Chief Justice Jim Spiegelman on allegations of of withholding information from the Court in the investigation of the murder of Labor Member of Parliament John Newman back in 1994. Caldas was found innocent on April 16, 2009, more than two months after he assumed his duties as Chief Investigator for the Tribunal. Resignation Resignations Internal disputes unanswered questions on January 12, 2010, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon announced that its registrar, David Tolbert, resigned in order to take on his duties as president of the International center for Transitional Justice. The Chief Investigator at the Office of the Prosecutor had also declared himself not willing to renew his one year contract earlier on that same month and will be leaving The Hague on February 28, 2010. Four months earlier Four months earlier, Judge Howard Morrison resigned for unknown reasons and a few days earlier the spokesperson of the Tribunal, Suzanne Khan, had also resigned. Resignations for various reasons are not unusual in International Tribunal. However, in the case of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, resignations were numerous, fast, frequent and their reasons were not fully clarified. Tolbert, who was appointed by UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon on July 10, 2009 and who took office in August 26, 2009, had replaced Robin Vincent, who resigned on April 21, 2009. President Kasese told me in a recorded interview on April 22, 2009 that the reasons for Vincent's resignations were personal, whereas Vincent explained that disagreements between him and Prosecutor Daniel Belmar led to his departure. Suggested Remedies 1. Expanding the special Tribunal Mandate and launching local judicial Reform in an effort that may contribute to resolving the problem of selective justice, the Lebanese government may have to request the Security Council to issue a follow up Resolution to 1757 expanding the mandate of the STL. This may be facilitated by the fact that Lebanon has been voted member of the Security Council and its representative has been attending its sessions since January 1, 2010. In conformity with the principle of equal access to justice, the mandate of the Special Tribunal will have to include all killings since 2005. Victims of crimes that were committed in Lebanon should have access to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. As for the killings that took place prior to 2005, the Lebanese Judicial will have to be reformed and strengthened to prosecute. This may require constitutional amendments, including the elimination of amnesties. Although the application of these recommendations may seem politically problematic in Lebanon and perhaps in the Security Council, the current position and expected outcomes of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon do not just represent serious challenges to justice, but may threaten peace and security in Lebanon. Number two Review of the STL Employment Process the Special Tribunal is supposed to be based on the highest international standards of criminal justice, as was cited in Resolution 1757. This presupposes a rigorous process of selecting candidates for employment in the Tribunal. Such process requires a careful review of the professional and personal background of candidates and the publication of detailed biographies of employees and judges. Focus on the professional background and experience of candidates should also be done on their political background. This is vital in view of the fragile and weak consensus among various local conflicting political groups and the fact that the establishment of the Tribunal was not formally approved by the Parliament regarding the appointment of Lebanese and international judges. The transparency of the process is recommended and publishing detailed biographies may also be useful. Number three Effective outreach and responding to public and media concerns. During a recent visit to Beirut, the Special Tribunal Prosecutor Daniel Belmar quote stressed the importance of the confidential the confidence of the Lebanese public and the Lebanese institutions in the integrity of the Special Tribunal as a judicial body, unquote. Multiple resignations and departures from the Tribunal during its first year may not affect public confidence, especially since this occurs in other tribunals. Yet the absence of clear official explanations for the reasons for such resignations induces doubt and even suspicion. The resignation of two registrars consecutively fueled a number of questions that were not clearly answered by the Tribunal's public information and press office. No explanation whatsoever was given to the resignation of Judge Howard Morrison and chief investigator, and the chief investigation departed just one year after his appointment. Taxpayers in Lebanon, who cover 49% of the tribunal's cost, do not exactly know how the money is being spent. President Cassesi's six month report on the work of the Tribunal since its launch on March 1, 2009 does not include information about cost and spending. Concluding remark it was argued that, quote, imperfect justice may be better than no justice at all, especially in a country whose parliament, in its very first act after the end of the civil war, passed a general amnesty law granting immunity from prosecution to all the country's warlords, many of whom had become parliamentarians and ministers in the post war governments. However, imperfect justice may contribute to impunity and make ex warlords who expressed unprecedented enthusiasm for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon immune from prosecution for heinous crimes they allegedly committed or were involved in during the 70s and 80s. As for the hundreds of families who lost their loved ones in 2006 bombing, who have no access to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon or any other judicial mechanisms, they take justice into their own hands by supporting violent resistance. In that sense, the question where could justice go wrong? Is tragically answered. Thank you.

[B]

Thank you, Dr. Nishabe, for that very detailed social, political, legal overview of the background, the context for the tribunal and its various shortcomings, I think might be the word that comes to mind. I certainly learned a lot about a tribunal that doesn't really get very much attention. I think in certainly the international legal literature, which is the literature I'm most familiar with. Dr. Sharvi has agreed to take questions.

[A]

Yes, of course.

[B]

I think we have about half an hour, perhaps slightly under to do so. I imagine there's going to be a lot of questions, so can people please keep them brief, to the point, try to avoid commentary, but rather direct particular questions and please introduce themselves to the audience as well. So hands are going up, up at the back first and then behind you, up at the back. We'll take three or four at a time and then come back to you. Rather than one on one, I think. So we'll take three or four. There, there and there, and then come back to Dr. Shelby.

[C]

Okay. I know you said no comments, but I do have some. I have a lot of like.

[B]

Could you introduce yourself, please?

[A]

Yes.

[C]

My name is Zia Chabulsi. I'm an LSE student in social and public communication. I used to live in Lebanon and witnessed the whole Hadi assassination. As I guess everyone here is an LSE student. I mean, most of your LSE students witnessed manifestations, everything. I mean, I went to quite a bit. Just keep it brief. Yes, I'll keep it brief. Dr. Nashabe clearly designed the timeline of what happened during the last years. But of course the bias is obvious and because we're, I mean, I can't see, Dr. Shab is failing to show that the fact that some people announced back in 2007, 2008, 2009, that yeah, maybe the Syrians might be behind it. It's because the Syrians only withdrew from Lebanon in 2005. As you said, there was the hegemony of the Syrian regiment. And I'm sure you will agree that the Syrian regime actually controlled the judicial system. So back to my question is, of course you mentioned Dr. Samir Jaja three times in your lectures. Although it's about the special treatment for Lebanon, my concern is, I guess we both agree, and everyone agrees that when the Syrians were in Lebanon, the judicial system went clearly wrong because it couldn't function well, of course. So, I mean, notwithstanding the body language and the aggressive tone and.

[A]

Yeah.

[C]

So what are your thoughts on how did justice go wrong before 2005 and if it's not going better, probably after 2005, with more freedom and more capabilities to express oneself.

[A]

Thank you. Okay, I'm sorry, I'm going to make an exception. Answer this now. I just took the. Just allowed to do that because there's a very important point here to mention. I mentioned, yes, Samir Zhaja and you know, there is a case law for the tribunal and it's published on its website, and there are four cases considered the background for this tribunal, and you can check it on the website, and three of those indict and prosecute Samir Jaja. And these are on the website of the tribunal as background. And Judge Riyashi who was in the tribunal, I'm not saying that the decision that was made against Samir Jaja was fair, but I'm saying that the same judge who was on the tribunal for the Higher Judicial Council is vice president for the tribunal now. So therefore, if you consider that the decision by the court is dubious back then in the 80s. Why would you not consider the decisions to come in the tribunal? Since the same judge who was sitting on that tribunal back then is the vice president of the current tribunal, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Same man.

[B]

Okay. The person behind you, I believe, had a question.

[D]

Yes. Hello, my name is Rita and I come from Lebanon too. I'm a student at King's College in the Department of War Studies. First I had some comments, but I will skip them. To keep it short, I just want to ask about the results of the several missions you said that they all led to the thing that Lebanese and Syrian intelligence were involved, which means this is a breach in security and no explosive can go in the country without this breach. And we know the powerful people to leak these kinds of things. I mean, who possesses weapons in Lebanon except Hezbollah, other than the. Other than the government? Okay. And second, the four imprisoned officers that were released. Well, I think regardless of the case, they deserved this. I mean, Because of what they did previous to 2005 with the student. I was a student and I was hit by them. Anyways, have you an actual question? Yeah, yeah. So you said the international tribunal was politically selective. Can you tell us exactly how and why do you think that Belmar failed?

[B]

Okay, I believe there's one down here. Sorry, one moment. You can wait for the microphone.

[E]

Nasser khalawun. Thank you, Dr. Nashabi, for this meticulous lecture. And I followed your own writings on Al Khbari newspaper over the years. You follow the subject quite well. And I liked your own interview to Judge Cassisi in the Hay. My question is, I wouldn't argue with what you said about follow on and the faults of the court or the process itself from day one to now, but would it one lead a person to say that in this case the logical conclusion is no court is better than court. That's one would see. So how can justice be served in this case if we go towards this conclusion? Number one, in political terms, your argument, no matter. Is quite fair in legal terms, but it does serve the views of one half of Lebanon against the other. And it's been used as such. Can you. Can you deny this? Thank you.

[B]

Take one more in this round at this point, and then we'll go to another round afterwards.

[F]

Yeah. My name is John Silverman. I'm a journalist and academic. And although I'm no expert on Lebanon, I do have some illuminating insights into the processes of the stl. Because course, last year I've covered and written quite a lot about a number of international tribunals and the STL approached me last year to run a forum in Beirut for the media. And Omar knows that he was going to be one of the people that contributed. And I have to say that his assessment of the tribunal and the flaws in the tribunal. Tribunal, I think, underestimates the shambles that this tribunal is. I mean, my experience of international tribunals is quite wide. I've never come across a tribunal that is in such disarray as this tribunal. And for various reasons, the forum that they'd invited me to run didn't happen. Although. Although journalists and various other people were invited from all over the world, visas were obtained and large amounts of money was spent. Well, I think it's quite an important point because it shows you that in my view, I don't think this tribunal will ever get anywhere. I think it'll probably be abandoned before it ever indicts anyone. But just one other point which Omar didn't mention, relating to the media, which. Which I'm very interested in. As I understand it, one of the rules of procedure that the judges introduced last year was to allow journalists to be sued for defamation if they made mistakes or they produced reports that were flawed in some way. Now, there is no other international tribunal anywhere that has ever introduced a law like that. A number of international tribunals have laws on contempt. That's understood. But this is the only international tribunal which has introduced that. And I think that's an appalling attack on freedom of expression and is hardly going to endear the tribunal to the media community in Lebanon.

[A]

Respond to yes, thank you. Let's start with the young lady from King's College. It's not a political perspective that I'm presenting. What I said at the beginning, I said, we are trying to understand where could justice go wrong with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. It is not a political analysis of the situation in Lebanon in the 90s. And. And so therefore, I said it in a couple of sentences and I talked about Syrian hegemony. It's a very clear sentence. As for the officers, I'm not sure this is your personal opinion and you are entitled to it. However, there is a judicial process that should be respected. And I think incarcerating people for four years without indictment is arbitrary detention. And in fact, in 2007, on the issue of the four officers, the Special group in the Human Rights Commission in Geneva issued a report that confirms that the detention of the four officers was considered arbitrary. And therefore, if you consider it arbitrary, it's unconstitutional because paragraph B of the Lebanese Constitution abides by The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

[D]

Okay.

[A]

As for Mr. Kalamun, yes, we have. I think that the Lebanese treasury has paid an awful large amount of money over this judicial process. So I think it should get somewhere. That's why the remedies and the recommendations and at the end of this lecture were not to disregard the process. It was to improve it and make it more solid and more legitimate. And that's the objective. So therefore it's a constructive objective, not a destructive one. As for the political employment of this lecture, well, as any analysis it can be employed. Employed by politicians to serve their own interests. But that is absolutely not the objective of this lecture. Mr. John Silverman, thank you for mentioning this issue and for mentioning the rules of procedures and evidence that have not been addressed here because of the time shortage and because if I were to address the rules of procedures and evidence, and I. I'm sure Mr. Kalamun knows that since he has followed the monitoring in my writings, I have presented thorough analysis of the rules of procedures and evidence and the problems with these rules. The rules may be, however, amended. And for example, for the Yugoslavia tribunal, the tribunal for former Yugoslavia, I think the rules were amended 26 times. The rules for the procedures and evidence for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon have been amended twice. And therefore any Lebanese judge may, or any other judge may request amendment and the panel of judges could make these amendments. So I think that some work needs to be done on the tribunal to make it more. More legitimate, more accurate, and remove all the shortcomings that were mentioned in this paper so that it can proceed properly.

[B]

Take another round. There's one at the back. You were earlier. Yep, I had you on my list. And we're not going to be able to take the number of everybody who wants to do so. We'll take first at the back.

[D]

My name is Ruba Beitun. I'm an anthropologist. I was interested in the idea of extending the mandate of the tribunal, which sounds very correct or ethical, but the question is how to do that. I mean, it sounds very good and rosy and everything, but what are the steps that we can take to actually have this done? And do you think that the 2008 events should be included in this extension? And another question, one more quickly. Yeah. Don't you think that the. The Israeli invas Israel or whoever, the allies of Israel would prevent such extension?

[B]

Okay, thank you. Down here.

[A]

Thank you.

[G]

Nadim Shahadi, Chatham House. It's a pleasure to see Dr. Nashabi in London again. You've raised two important points that I want you to Clarify. One of them is the unconstitutionality of the approval of the approval process of the Tribunal. And you're right in saying that this is a unique thing that the Security Council has done by bypassing local legislation. But are you also saying that the withdrawal of the four ministers from the cabinet as well as the blocking of Parliament for over 18 months were meant to block that process? Because that was one of the justifications that was used in 1757, also based on a petition by over 70 members of parliament in Lebanon, that the blockage of the parliament and the withdrawal of the ministers were specifically for the purpose of stopping the decision on the Tribunal. The other thing which I'd like you to clarify is the. And I support your call for reform of the judiciary in Lebanon, of course. But the arrest of the four generals for four years was under a procedure and a law in Lebanon that was instigated by one of these four generals in 2001. So the reason why they were released after four years was because there was a change in jurisdiction. And the rules of the Tribunal do not allow for more than 90 days. But this law that allows indefinite arrest in Lebanon still exists on the statute. And one final clarification, if I may, very short one. Surely the media has a very important, important political role. And when there are resignations, sometimes the explanation is very simple. For example, you mentioned Suzanne Khan. Susan Khan is married to a British diplomat who was based in the Hague when she was there. She applied for a job. He was moved back to London. She quit her job. So it's nothing really. It's a very banal thing. And I'm sure there are equally banal explanations for. There's no need to find a delegitimizing reason for these resignations. And resignations from international tribunals are very common because there are so few judges.

[A]

Anyway, so. Thank you.

[D]

Thank you.

[B]

Up at the back.

[D]

Hi.

[E]

Yeah, my name is Julan. I'm also a student at lse. Now, from an international relations perspective and less from a legal perspective, I was just interested to know how much do you think the things you define as wrongdoings in the Special Tribunal, how much can they be attributed to outside in interpretations, meaning the interests of certain global powers, and how much can be attributed to inside out explanations, meaning to the immaturity or uneducated political rhetoric in Lebanon?

[H]

Thank you.

[B]

Take one more in this round.

[D]

Just very brief questions. First of all, I was interested to know what you thought motivated the Security Council to create this Tribunal in these circumstances, especially with their track record and regard to the ICTY and ICTR having such expansive mandate, and this one being so specific and as well, how do you think this affects this tribunal, affects the legitimacy of ad hoc tribunals generally? Those are my two questions.

[B]

Otherwise you're going to lose track.

[A]

I'm writing everything down so I don't lose track. But I didn't get your name. Okay. Yes. Let's start with Ruba, right? Yes. Ruba, you mentioned that you believe that extending the mandate could be faced with resistance. Yes, that is to be expected. And I did not say otherwise. However, the current situation of the tribunal is problematic and that's what I argue for in this lecture. And yes, it is expected that, and this is an informed comment that every move that has been done in the past or every request to the Security Council to take legal steps against Israelis or to actually even open an inquiry or imperial investigation against Israeli violations has been blocked in the Security Council. And I could list in details the initiatives and the American vetoes that are repeated over the years since 1948 to move to Dr. Shahadi. Thank you for the comments. Yes. On the unconstitutionality, I do not know if the intent of the ministers to resign was to block the tribunal. And I further do not know if the Speaker Nabih Birri, who blocked the Parliament for not voting on the agreement, has done so to block the tribunal. But what I do know is that Speaker Nabih Birri recently got 92 votes from the parliament out of 128 to be speaker of the Parliament. And the majority is the same majority that requested the establishment of that tribunal. So therefore, it is up to that majority parliamentarian who voted for nabih birri by 92 votes to be asked the question that you raised on the issue of, of the arrest of the four generals. Yes, it is true that General Jamil Said was the one who pushed for the law that would allow for arbitrary arrest. But yet that action by Jamil said in 2000 or in the year 2000 was unconstitutional and illegal and illegitimate and it continues to be. And that law that he pushed for and that he perhaps, as was allegedly said in the media, threatened members of Parliament to vote on it under Syrian request is unconstitutional and illegal and illegitimate and it continues to be, even if he is a victim of it. So it's a matter of principle. On the issue of Ms. Khan's resignation, who's by the way, a close friend. Yes, Ms. Khan explained to me over the phone and in many face to face that she resigned because she has a baby and her husband is a diplomat in the uk and I wish her all the luck. Yet that was not explained in an official statement by the Tribunal, and therefore this is only for me and not for the Lebanese public. The Lebanese public had the right to know in detail why Mrs. Khan left her position as spokesperson and moved to London. It would have been very simple and it's one of the remedies that I suggest that the outreach office of the Tribunal explain to the Lebanese public and to the general public why the specific reasons. And there was no statement whatsoever by the Tribunal on the resignation, on the reasons for the resignation of Mr. Khan, nor on the resignation of Judge Morrison. And even after I published that there was suspicion that there is a conflict between Mr. Robin Vincent, the registrar, who resigned, and Mr. Belmar, the prosecutor, there was no comment by the Tribunal to clarify this particular matter. However, the Tribunal when I wrote about issues that that had to do with remarks pertaining to the rules of procedures and evidence, the Tribunal responded with a large expose that I published in Al Akhbar. So therefore, not responding to one issue that is of delicate nature and responding to other issues that are of equal delicate nature is questionable also and shows that there is a weakness in the outreach office, the Tribunal that must be dealt with. You spoke from an international perspective on if there was interference or you stated also if there were internal weaknesses. I'm not sure this would require further examination and analysis. I cannot answer this question at this point, but what I can say that apparently there was a lot of political stress to create the Tribunal, and President Cassesi himself, in a recorded interview had told me, and it is published also, that the Tribunal is created by a political will. And when I asked about the selective nature, he said, yes, it is the Security Council that created the Tribunal based on political will and therefore political interests. Now, have there been any weaknesses inside Lebanon in analyzing the situation? Perhaps. I think the atmosphere was charged emotionally and that created obstacles to reasonable analysis of the situation. The blast that I explained at the beginning of the lecture was so huge that it created an emotional shock in Lebanon in 2000. And therefore, perhaps this created obstacles to analyzing the situation in a reasonable manner. For Tamara, what motivated the security council for 1757? I think I also would answer in the same fashion of Jihlan, that perhaps there were some pressures, but this will certainly, and to answer your second question, affect the ad hoc tribunals in general. And there were no recommendations in Lebanon. What was surprising is that there were no recommendations in Lebanon immediately after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafi Hariri to sign the Rome. The Rome Declaration and therefore there were no requests to enter the icc. Apparently there was a will to create a special tribunal and that is a matter that needs to be further examined and analyzed if one is truly seeking justice and not political maneuvering or revenge.

[D]

Thank you.

[B]

We have to be out of the room at 8 o' clock at the absolute latest. So I think we've got probably got time for three very brief questions. So I'm afraid some people are going to be disappointed and I don't know anybody. So it's fairly sort of potluckle virtue to. I don't. In front here.

[D]

Yeah.

[E]

Hello. Eric Barnett with the shortest question of the evening. Given that it seems that the special tribunal will not tell us who killed Mr. Hariri, will you please tell us?

[A]

I wish I could.

[B]

Okay, that was a very short question and answer Next to you. If you could keep it as quick, we could have some more.

[D]

After everything you said, I was actually quite surprised to hear that you wanted to expand the tribunal because everything you said suggests that it's going to fail and it's a huge expense of money. Surely the expansion will also cost a huge amount of money and are you comfortable for the Lebanese Ministry of Justice to subsidize that after what you said about the preference to invest in Lebanese Ministry of Justice capacity building up at the very back?

[B]

Well, if it's very quick we'd like punish both of you.

[D]

Hello, Nicole. I was wondering why. Why compare the special tribunal and assassination with the 206 war? Doesn't your comparison undermine the death of the Prime Minister and his colleagues? Aren't they both totally different cases?

[F]

So.

[D]

So I'm not denying that the 206 War is a breach of international law on human rights, but why the comparison in this case? Thank you.

[B]

Over here, next to you. I think we can. As they're quite quick, we can.

[H]

So I have two brief questions. My first question was do you think that the tribunal is going to come across information which they find politically impossible? Inconvenient? And if so, will it just fail and stop to function at that stage? Or do you think they might actually pursue something that's inconvenient to them? And the second question, which is somewhat related, which is it struck me when you were talking about the sums involved in this. Is it not possible the entire exercise, the entire point of this exercise has nothing at all to do with justice, but simply is basically it's a way for people in Lebanon to see that something is being done to Mourn the loss of Rafiq Hariri and the people who died with him, so that there can be this like cathartic process in a similar vein that you see like the very Keech buildings that they put up in Soledair and things like that. So thank you.

[B]

If you could do it in one sentence each here and here and then that's it. So literally. Okay, there first, as the mic seems to have got there first.

[A]

My name is Mohanat Hasna from 11 and 2.

[E]

Quick question.

[A]

Is there a duration for the international.

[G]

Tribunal or will stay keep having reports?

[A]

Thank you.

[B]

And last one.

[A]

Yes, mine is more a comment on the problem of selectivity, which can be seen, I think, also from an international point of view. I'm Filippo Dionigi from LSE, PhD student. And the selectivity seems also to me appearing also in the fact that this third divine analysis doesn't address a crime against humanity. But while on the contrary, the other international tribunals do. And I was wondering why you didn't address that.

[B]

So I don't think essentially the tribunal is not addressing the issue of crimes against humanity.

[A]

Crimes against humanity? Yeah, it's not against the crimes against humanity, I guess, is there?

[B]

Okay, thank you. That was a. Everybody kept very nicely to make it allow as many people as possible to speak.

[A]

Yes. Well, for Mr. Eric, I didn't say that the special tribunal for Lebanon is never going to find who killed Prime Minister Hari. We are certainly very hopeful and that's why presenting remedies, it's not a waste of time and effort. It's for a purpose to actually in the hope that this will improve its capacity at doing what it was set to do. As for the lady, yes, I think that the expansion of the mandate of the tribunal will cost more money, more than the $72 million. But what are the other options? To drop the $72 million in a tribunal that has so many shortcomings and so many difficulties, or proceed and actually increase the budget? Because that budget, anyway, you're going to be spending it on local tribunals and on improving the system. So it is a debatable matter yet for sure now we have paid $72 million and Lebanon is indebted. We have a deficit of more than $40 billion. We're going through difficult times economically. And so therefore this matter should be discussed in parliament. And the government had already committed itself to the tribunal in its government declaration recently. So therefore apparently Lebanon will proceed with with this payment. So it might be more adequate to expand the mandate, even if we have to Pay more. That's a suggestion to be debated for Nicole. Yes, I have. In the words that I mentioned in this paper, I said exactly what you just repeated, that some may argue that it is not comparable, yet it is access to justice we are talking about. So therefore, would the victim of a crime have access to a judicial mechanism in 2006? Why is there a difference among people who have lost loved ones? Isn't everyone entitled to access to justice? That is the question I am raising. And if people were killed after Mr. Hariri, shouldn't they have as much as Mr. Hariri's family? These families of 1191, do they have the right to have the same access to a judicial mechanism as is the family of Mr. Hariri? That's the question. And these are the principles of justice. This is the principle of justice. I don't see where there could be any other alternative perspective, but an unjust perspective. Now with someone asked a question about if the political. If the findings of the tribunal may seem politically inconvenient. Yes, I am not sure about this matter. Perhaps it will have to be compared with other special tribunals and the findings of other special tribunals or the lack of findings of other tribunals because of the political pressures that are being put. And there are many signs of political pressures on prosecutors in other tribunals, as we may recall. Perhaps the former Yugoslavia tribunal is a good case. As for. As for the second part of your question, I believe was about the money. No, I answered this question already. Okay. And Mohanad asked the question about the duration. The judges have a three year mandate and it's subject to renewal. Renewal by the Security Council in consultation with the government. And that was one of the issues that was critical because if the Prime Minister is going to be consulted on the reappointment of the judges. The idea was that I put forward is that. But the Prime Minister is the victim's family. So how can the victim actually reappoint the judge? And that's problem that I'm not sure how it will be resolved for Philip. Crimes against humanity. I'm sorry. Yes, this is the last question. For crimes against humanity. Well, this crime was qualified by the Security Council as a terrorist crime and therefore deserving an international tribunal, as was the decision made in the first Security Council resolution to sign the agreement. But the tribunal has no mandate for crimes against humanity or genocide. And that's unfortunate because Lebanon went through civil war where there were some signs that there were mass killings on different sides. And on both, I mean, and during that time, you could everybody knows the background of the war and the atrocities that we witnessed in Lebanon. So it is also surprising to create a tribunal that has such a limited mandate in a country that had so much suffering and so much lack of access to justice. Then why have only give only access to in one case and not give access in other cases? Especially since there is no full consensus in Lebanon today. So that is the question being raised today, and it continues to be debated. And the tribunal and I would like to end by saying that I think that the prosecutor will come up with an indictment. I think that there is no way that the prosecutor Belmar wouldn't come out with an indictment. There was so much effort and so much money spent and so much data collected, that in the end of the line he will have to come out with an indictment. But what I am saying here in this lecture is that this tribunal, in its first sessions, perhaps the very legitimacy of this tribunal, will be questioned and raised in the tribunal. And that will take a long time to resolve in the principle Chamber and in the Court of Appeal later on. And this will cost even more money and will make people feel more unsure about the whole judicial process. And that should not be the case.

[B]

And that is exactly 8 o'.

[A]

Clock.

[B]

So thank you very much.