Podcast Summary: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon – Where Could Justice Go Wrong?

Podcast: LSE: Public Lectures and Events
Episode Date: January 27, 2010
Host: LSE Film and Audio Team
Speaker: Dr. Omar Nashabe
Main Theme: An exploration of the creation, mandate, and problematic justice of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) in the context of Rafik Hariri’s assassination, selective justice, constitutional controversy, and flawed processes.

Overview

This lecture by Dr. Omar Nashabe provides a comprehensive critique of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), a court established by the UN to prosecute those responsible for the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Dr. Nashabe unpacks how the tribunal reflects selective justice, legal and constitutional irregularities, and broader concerns about the international community’s approach to justice and impunity in Lebanon.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Background of Rafik Hariri and Political Assassinations in Lebanon

[00:01–~10:00]

• Political Context: Hariri, twice Lebanese Prime Minister, was seen as a mediator and peacemaker, closely connected to Saudi Arabia, Syria (then Lebanon’s hegemonic force), and France.
• Dynasty of Assassinations: Lebanon’s history is marred by a long list of political assassinations – from Prime Ministers to journalists and diplomats.
  • “Political assassinations are not new to Lebanon... This long list of crime does not make the assassination of Hariri less deserving of proper prosecution and fair punishment, but there is no legal or moral basis for pursuing justice in the Hariri case while refraining from doing so in previous and later cases.” (A, 00:56–02:36)
• Culture of Impunity:
  • Detailing Lebanon’s repetitive use of amnesty to absolve even the gravest political crimes.
  • The controversial 2005 amnesty law pardoned Samir Jaja for the assassination of PM Rashid Karami and others.
  • Quote: “In Lebanon, most of the assassinations...either went unresolved or unpunished or were whitewashed by general amnesty laws.” (A, 02:37–03:10)

2. International Reaction and Creation of the STL

[10:00–20:00]

• UN Involvement: Security Council's rapid response after Hariri’s assassination, dispatching investigators, and declaring the incident a terrorist act of international concern.
• Investigative Commissions:
  • Fitzgerald Mission concluded (hastily) that Lebanese and Syrian security apparatuses bore responsibility for the lack of order.
  • Detlev Mehlis (UN Commission head) initially suggested Syrian and Lebanese involvement but lacked indictable evidence. His recommendation led to the arrest of 8 Lebanese, 4 of whom spent nearly four years detained without being charged or indicted.
  • Successive commissioners (Brammertz, Belmar) became more cautious, avoiding politically loaded public commentary.
• Tribunal’s Mandate: Its uniquely narrow scope – only Hariri’s assassination (and potentially closely related cases) is within STL jurisdiction.
  • Quote: “What makes this tribunal even more special is its mandate, which is by far, by far the narrowest of any international tribunal.” (A, ~20:00)

3. Failures and Flaws in Prosecution and Process

[20:00–31:00]

• No Results: Over a year after launch, no indictments or meaningful judicial progress.
• Lack of Continuity: One-year contracts for key investigators, delayed appointments, and resignations (registrar, chief investigators, spokespeople) caused instability.
  • “Employing a chief investigator in a terrorist crime case for just one year is questionable, especially considering the necessary continuity, the complexity of the case and time constraints.” (A, ~28:45)
• Arbitrary Detentions: The four Lebanese officers were held for nearly four years on insufficient, even “insufficiently credible,” evidence. Their release highlighted both willingness to detain without charge and inability to bring cases to trial.
  • Quote: “By ordering the release of the officers, the Tribunal clearly implied that their imprisonment...was arbitrary.” (A, ~32:30)
• Comparative Justice: Cites the Yugoslavia Tribunal’s first indictment only four months post-prosecutor appointment, contrasting this with STL’s inertia.

4. Selective Justice and Political Selectivity

[31:00–36:00]

• Focus on Hariri Only: The tribunal provides access to justice only for Hariri and related cases, not for other victims of political killings (e.g., the 2006 war, earlier assassinations).
  • “...sympathy failed to pay any attention to any potential international justice mechanism mandated to prosecute those responsible for the slaughter of 1,191 Lebanese [in 2006].” (A, ~35:00)
• Budget Disparity: Lebanon pays 49% of STL’s $51.4 million first-year budget—greater than its entire judicial budget, for a tribunal with no indictments or detentions to show for it.

5. Constitutional and Legal Controversies

[36:00–40:00]

• Bypassing Lebanese Sovereignty: STL was enacted by UN Security Council resolution without Lebanese parliamentary approval. The process is questionable under both Lebanese constitutional law and international law, according to various states (Qatar, Indonesia, South Africa, China, Russia).
  • “This Security Council infraction of a founding member of the United Nations’ sovereignty could only be passed under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.” (A, ~38:00)
• Selection of Staff: Judges and staff appointed without clear, public criteria or necessary experience—sometimes with political conflicts of interest (e.g., Hariri’s son as Prime Minister, advisor with prior anti-Syrian statements).
  • Quote: “The problem with the selection process...is that the statute of the Tribunal does not contain detailed criteria for appointments, such as the need for expertise and experience in international human rights and criminal law.” (A, ~40:00)

6. Frequent Resignations and Internal Disarray

[40:00–43:00]

• Repeated resignations of key figures in the Tribunal, often with unclear explanations, deepened public suspicion about STL’s legitimacy and effectiveness.
• “Resignations for various reasons are not unusual in International Tribunal. However, in the case of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, resignations were numerous, fast, frequent and their reasons were not fully clarified.” (A, ~41:00)

7. Proposed Remedies and Recommendations

[43:00–45:00]

• Expand STL Mandate: Broaden it to address all political killings since 2005, and reform Lebanese judiciary to prosecute historic crimes, including those pre-2005.
• Transparent Recruitment: Implement transparent, rigorous background checks for tribunal staff and publish biographies.
• Improved Outreach: The STL must better explain internal changes (e.g., resignations) to maintain public trust.

Audience Q&A: Notable Issues and Quotes

Selectivity and Legitimacy of Justice (46:08–47:32)

• Dr. Nashabe underscores that the same judge who sentenced Samir Jaja for PM Karami's assassination is now vice president of the STL:
  • “Why would you not consider the decisions to come in the tribunal...since the same judge who was sitting on that tribunal back then is the vice president of the current tribunal?” (A, 46:08)

Political Selectivity and Deadlocks (49:27–50:38)

• Question on whether no tribunal is better than a flawed tribunal, and whether Nashabe’s argument serves one political faction.
• Nashabe: “The objective...is constructive, not a destructive one. Some work needs to be done on the tribunal to make it more...legitimate.” (A, 54:32)

Media Freedom Concerns and Unique STL Provisions (51:10–53:08)

• John Silverman highlights STL’s unique provision allowing defamation suits against journalists:
  • “...this is the only international tribunal which has introduced that. And I think that's an appalling attack on freedom of expression...” (F, 51:10)

Constitutional Process and Parliamentary Legitimacy (57:48–60:48)

• Debate about whether the government’s process for adopting STL and the resignation of ministers was deliberate obstruction. Nashabe says intent is unclear but calls the legal process problematic.

Possible Political Pressure and Tribunal’s Motivation (61:27–62:03)

• Nashabe acknowledges that the STL was created by “political will and therefore political interests,” not purely legal justifications.

Expansion vs. Investment in National Justice (70:11–71:10)

• Nashabe admits expanding STL would cost more, but alternatives are weak; “...you’re going to be spending [the money] on local tribunals and improving the system.”

On Access to Justice and Comparison with 2006 War (71:24–71:59)

• Nashabe argues all victims deserve access to justice, not only high-profile cases:
  • “Would the victim of a crime have access to a judicial mechanism in 2006? Why is there a difference among people who have lost loved ones? Isn't everyone entitled to access to justice?” (A, 71:24)

On STL’s Future and Potential Indictment (73:17–end)

• Nashabe is pessimistic but hopeful:
  • “I think that the prosecutor will come up with an indictment...but...the very legitimacy of this tribunal will be questioned and raised in the tribunal...and this will cost even more money and will make people feel more unsure about the whole judicial process. And that should not be the case.” (A, 73:17)

Memorable Quotes

• “Imperfect justice may be better than no justice at all... However, imperfect justice may contribute to impunity and make ex-warlords who expressed unprecedented enthusiasm for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon immune from prosecution for heinous crimes they allegedly committed or were involved in during the 70s and 80s.” (A, 42:29)
• “...imperfect justice may contribute to impunity and make ex-warlords...immune from prosecution for heinous crimes...” (A, 42:40)
• “The tribunal, in its first sessions, perhaps the very legitimacy of this tribunal will be questioned and raised in the tribunal. And that will take a long time...and this will cost even more money and will make people feel more unsure about the whole judicial process. And that should not be the case.” (A, 73:17)

Timestamps for Key Segments

• Background and History of Impunity: 00:01–10:00
• UN & International Involvement: 10:01–20:00
• Failures in Tribunal Process: 20:01–31:00
• Selective Justice & Legal Criticisms: 31:01–40:00
• Constitutional/Legal Controversies: 40:01–44:00
• Remedies and Recommendations: 44:01–45:00
• Audience Q&A: 45:00–80:00

Conclusion

Dr. Nashabe delivers an unflinching critical analysis of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. He asserts that without a broader scope, better transparency, and real judicial reform (both locally and internationally), the STL risks undermining Lebanon’s struggles for truth and justice and deepening societal divides. The lecture ends on a cautious note—indications that, despite impending indictments, legitimacy issues and the burdens of selective justice threaten to turn the STL into a costly, divisive, and ultimately unsatisfying exercise in international law.