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LSE: Public lectures and events
The Way Forward for Europe: a union of solidarity and differentiation?
00:53:06
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- [00:00]
A
Well, ladies and gentlemen, a very warm welcome to you. The first in this year's series of the lse, European Institute's series of public lectures called the Perspectives on Europe Public lectures. And we really are launching this year's lectures in fine style with the speaker who we were delighted accepted our invitation to come and speak to us today. And you are all here, of course, to hear Emmanuel Macron, who, as you all know, is the French Minister for the Economy, Industry and Digital Affairs. I think I will jump straight through because we need to husband our time as much as possible. For questions, he was appointed. Mr. Macron was appointed in August 2014 by Manuel Vas, of course, and he has told us that he would like to talk to us today about the way forward for Europe, a union of solidarity and differentiation, slightly hedging his bets because we suddenly come across a question mark at the end of that. But I'm sure you have the courage of your convictions and we'll decide at the end whether a question mark is applicable or not. But as I say, we're absolutely delighted that you. You're here with us today. Emmanuel, you will speak, hopefully allowing enough time at the end to take a few questions in time honored LSE way. It's part of our protocol, as I'm sure you know. So, without further ado, I will ask our speaker to come and share his thoughts with us. Emmanuel Macron, the floor is yours.
- [01:43]
B
Thank you. Hello, everybody. Thanks very much, Maurice. Life is inventive because one year ago, slightly more than one year ago, I was not a worse disappointment and we were discussing for me to join the LSE and work with you. So at least I'm here today, not to repair this past mistake, but I mean to try to explain my view here with you and because I wanted to share some. Some conviction, and probably the first one is that in today's words, there is no such thing as an island, which is not a provocation, but it's first for France, because some would like France to become an island. In fact, they are forgetting everything we have ever given to the world and everything the world has given to us in return. And they pretend that we, we could stop reforming the country because we are living apart from the rest of the world. That's a big mistake, because France is not an island. And some people in Germany sometimes do think that Germany is an island, because they could decide on its own over consolidation, thinking on its own interest, without taking into consideration the fact that Germany is part of the continent and a Eurozone and the EU and not an island. And I have even heard that some people in the United Kingdom do believe that you are an island by leaving the European Union. And I say again, because in some great kind of way, the UK was never truly an island, but rather a bridge over the world, bonding together countries that were thousands of miles apart by the magic of trade, language, tea and whatever. And they pretend that splendid isolation is the way to go. Isolation is easy, but there would be nothing splendid about it. So I say that because there is no such thing as an island in today's world. That's my deep conviction, because waivers are coming from everywhere, taking away some of our oldest certainties. They are coming from the west, where the worst economic crisis the world has known in centuries started a few years ago. They are coming from the east, where terrorism has reached and an unprecedented level where we've never seen as many refugees since World War II, where conflicts that died in 1989 seem to have somehow risen again. And also waves are coming from Europe itself, when you look at the anti European forces, and they rise in a lot of member states, even in France. And when sometimes you look at the tensions between member states, on this point we all have a shared responsibility, because the European idea, the only time in history that three nations have joined together in a peaceful union, has given way to technocratic passivity in a certain way. And our challenge today is precisely to see if altogether we are able to resume the European spirit, if we are able to have and endorse a European willingness, a European dream. That's our question mark. That's our challenge. And my deep feeling is that these tensions took root 10 years ago, in 2005, when France and the Netherlands opened what I call the lost decade of the EU by voting no. Because after this vote, all of us decided to stop talking about Europe, to stop proposing new things about Europe. And when you are in such a mood, basically you leave the floor to skepticism and you just discuss Europe during crisis or about Brexit or Brexit that is just about dismantling the union. This last decade has to come to a stop. And all these waves show us something we can no longer. What we have doesn't work anymore. It doesn't work when we leave all the member states handling the refugee crisis on their own. It doesn't work when you build walls between European countries 25 years after the Berlin Wall fell to reunite our continent. It doesn't work when the economic difficulties of a few member states threaten at some point the future of us all. It doesn't work when we stop talking about Grexit, only to start worrying about Brexit without proposing anything new. So the big question for us now is precisely to take into consideration the fact that the status quo is no longer an option. We have in fact two options and two options moving backward or going forward. Because just the statut quo means moving backward, de facto moving backwards. Meaning for the UK to get out of the EU would lead to serious economic hurdles over here. And in the most optimistic scenario of the remarkable paper published by the team of this call, I mean, you highlight the fact that perhaps you can save something around 0.53 GDP points, which is a contribution to the EU, but negative effects on foreign trade would cost you 1.2 GDP points. So in total, and in the best case, leaving the EU would cost the UK more than £12 billion a year. But a British departure for the EU would hurt us all. I mean the EU as a whole and France as well, economically, because you are one of the largest economy of the union and because you are the biggest financial place of the union, because you do a lot to strengthen the ties we have with the USA and helping us, I mean all of us to catch up with them. And it will also hurt us, diplomatically and militarily speaking. And I would say that it would hurt us even from an emotional point of view, because we've come a long way together, from battlegrounds all around Europe to hopefully a rugby peach a few days from now. But by the way, we have something peculiar altogether. But beyond all that, Brexit would be the defeat of solidarity and the victory of the endless process of Jus tru Tour. And I have to say I hate this concept of just retour because it's just the opposite of doing something together. When you marry somebody, you don't speak about jus tru tour every day. When you create something together, making efforts precisely live together, you don't speak about jus tru Tour. It's just about selfishness on a day to day basis. Solidarity is at the very heart of the European ideal. The one that made Byron join the Greek war of Independence and fight the Ottoman Empire. The one that made Shelley say that we are all Greeks. Our laws, our literature, our religion, our arts have their root in Greece. When you have this deep feeling there is no Jules Retour, it just doesn't exist anymore because you have something more. And my conviction is that we should not transform Europe as a project for accountants or bureaucrats, because it's no more a project. Everybody has to take its responsibility. But definitely, if we all see Europe as a way to bring together influence, money, any kind of resources, and to give them back immediately to each of its members, then we have nothing to do altogether. And what about a single market? To take just one example, it is not a direct return to our national budget. It does bring a lot to our countries. In other words, Europe is more than the sum of its members. So we need to go forward, we need to progress, because we are at a defining moment. If we want geopolitical challenge to be tackled, we need a European approach. If we want to transform human short term recovery into sustainable growth, we need to keep reforming and delivering better and faster. And if we want to avoid another debate about exit, whatever it is, we need a common project. That's why it is time to go further and to move on to the next stage. A union of solidarity, responsibility and differentiation. And I would not define my idol as a two speed Europe. But Europe needs to move forward along two different projects. Both are necessary, both are ambitious. Neither can be achieved without the other. But we can kill two birds with one stone and everybody can get what it really needs. We Eurozen members need a more integrated functioning. Why? Because we have been certainly victims of the two fold illusions. During a decade we thought that because of the umbrella of the same interest rates, we could avoid reforming our countries for some member states. And we experienced crisis. And during this first decade we increased divergences between economies. And right after crisis we started with a second illusion, which is through rules, more fiscal consolidation, our fiscal treaty and structural reforms. We will fix the situation, but it's impossible to make the different economies reconverge. So we started to reconverge in real terms through real reforms, which means much more painful reforms, but it's not sufficient, and that's impossible for the periphery to reconverge with its under. That's impossible without any transfer. That's our second illusion and our second mistake. And today we are blocked in such a situation where Eurozone basically produces its own divergence, because the center will exclude more and more the periphery. And even if you push countries to reform and implement painful reforms, sometimes is just a receipt to kill reformists and encourage populists and demagogues, because there is never positive news without any transfer. And today we are blocked in a sort of a religious war, according to me, between Calvinists and Catholicists, because the Calvinists are those who made reforms and efforts before crisis. And they made the assessment that a lot of countries, what we call the periphery and even For France didn't deliver and they want them to pay till the end of their life. They have to implement reform. But we will not contribute to any solidarity. On the other side, you have the Catholicist approach, I would say, largely driven by the periphery. And I have to confess that France is probably in this side, which is okay. We made some mistakes, we failed, but now we are doing our best. We change our mind and we go to church, we explain the situation, and the day after we can restart together. And we are blocked in this dilemma. And every European summit, every ecofin, every Eurogroup, you have this kind of dilemma between member states. So if we want to move forward, what we need is just to keep the balance between structural reforms, a greater fiscal and social convergence, and a better governance, which means intergovernmental approach is not sufficient, rules are not sufficient, because we need institutions to define these common projects, and we need transfer and solidarity to accompany reforms. We need to re articulate responsibility and solidarity. That's the main takeaway of the recent period. And we worked very hard altogether to try to find these contractual arrangements to articulate reforms and transfers. It's almost impossible. Governance is crazy, it's too complicated. But what we need, when rules don't function, you need institutions, you need new institutions. And the only way to organize transfers and to create an actual monetary zone is precisely to have a budget. That's why I do believe that the eurozone budget is the only of the current situation in the Eurozone. Because this budget is the only way to address the necessity for solidarity and convergence, to absorb asymmetrical shocks, to invest where it's smart to invest, because you have a common budget, which means you need somebody to monitor this budget. That's a proposal we made with Sigmar Gabriel, to have a Euro commissioner in charge of the eurozone, somebody in charge, somebody to decide for the common interest, and somebody in charge of the articulation of the Eurozone with the rest of the eu. And you need democratic checks and balances, which means you need a Eurozone parliament precisely to control and to create the actual democratic functioning of the Eurozone. I do think that such a scheme is at least a credible vision and roadmap to just to move forward for the Eurozone and in the same time for the EU as a whole. We should make a new step towards a better integrated single market, because that's a necessity as well. The single market is a DNA of the European project, but its own roots come from an English idea, one that says from the 18th century that free trade between countries, win, win on the long term. And basically we should make trade, not war. We have to make the DNA clear. And in France in particular. That's why I'm a strong believer in the single market. But we have to be pragmatic on the single market agenda. What we need is not to resume the general idea. We need to address the single market perspective on some relevant markets, energy, digital, capital markets. On these three areas, I do believe that we have to deepen the single market, which will allow us to work better altogether and especially with the United Kingdom. We also have a shared agenda on making the EU more efficient, clear and simple, because it is crucial. I'm truly convinced that UK's future lies within the EU, because some of the proposals made by the UK are extremely consistent with our own proposal to have a less bureaucratic approach of the eu. And it's consistent with, I mean, strengthening the single market agenda. But as Jacques Delors used to say, nobody falls in love with a single market. So it's definitely insufficient to resume the European idea to just deep in single market. We need to complement it with a true affectio societatis at the EU level. And this is why we proposed with Sigmar Gabriel in our op ed published in June, a generalized Erasmus program which would allow every European reaching the age of 18 to spend at least one semester in another EU country to either study or follow an apprenticeship. I think that it's not just a symbol. And probably a lot of you in this room know that at the end of the day, when you speak about Europe, why Europe is positive, you will never speak about banking union. I hope for you will never speak about industrial policy or competition policy, even if it's very important and I think increase our common interest. But a lot of you would speak about Erasmus because that's just direct experience of the European idea. We need it. The EU is at the same time the base of a single market, the field of our shared values and the institutional framework we can build on to set up ad hoc cooperation between member states about defense policy, for instance. That's the ambition we have to reach. And the question now is, how can we make that happen? First, I think we should not discuss first about instruments and technicals, because I know the classical answer when you make such a proposal, okay, are you for treaty change? Are you for treaty change? Are you for sovereignty transfer? I mean, today you start with this question. The answer is no for sure. But guys, what is your vision? What is your proposal? The question is not to discuss about how, but What? And a lot of politicians just decided never to discuss about the what to be fixed on technicalities. So first let's discuss open and clear about what we are ready to do together. Do we want Europe or not? Do we believe in Eurozone or not? If you believe in Eurozone, you have to move forward, otherwise you would kill it. If you move forward at a point of time, you have to accept sovereignty transfer. Yes, and a treaty change. Yes, but because you propose something and let's have the political discussion, the actual political discussion, the democratic discussion about Europe and the Eurozone. What do you want, what do you propose, what is your vision? And afterwards I'm fine to discuss about technicalities. So yes, we will need a treaty change for sure, except if our people decide to break up and to dismantle, which will be a democratic choice. But I don't want to be put in a situation where without asking our people de facto, we will just kill the project by raising wrong questions, technical questions, and losing our people in useless debates. So the question if we believe in Europe, let's propose a vision, let's share the vision and common values. Let's share this assessment that if we believe in Europe and Eurozone, we have to move forward into that direction. And let's accept the fact that with this vision and this proposal, we can go in front of our people and propose a treaty change, we can propose sovereignty transfer, but they will not answer the question, are you for treaty change, but are you for the Eurozone or this new form of the Eurozone or not, which is the actual question? And the right question is what, not how. And our collective responsibility is a condition for our common future in Europe. And our responsibility as French, in order to be heard, is to get the job done. I mean, to do our part of reforms, to take our share of risks. And your responsibility as British is to be crystal clear about where you want to go as well. I think in the coming months, that's a critical period of time because all of us will have to explain very clearly what we want, what the UK wants, what France wants, what Germany wants. But at the end of the day we have to exit this sort of religious war and this period of selfishness and short term reflexes. And just to finish my speech, I mean, I wanted to quote a British writer that some French people basically decided to promote, which is a very telling of her, Chesterton, who had a very, I think highlighting sentence, completely encapsulating our situation. The whole modern world has divided itself into conservatives and progressives. The business of progressives is to go on making mistakes. And the business of the conservatives is to prevent the mistakes from being corrected. On my side, I definitely made my choice. Thanks for your attention.
- [23:53]
A
Excellent, Emmanuel, thank you so much for such an ambitious but yet grounded vision that you just shared. You've shared with us. We've got some time for questions now. I will say the usual boring things that chairs say on occasions like this. Please keep your questions short and sweet, no speeches. Raise your arm if you'd like to be called and please give your name and your affiliation as well. And we have a roving microphone. Do we have a roving microphone? Yes, we do. Excellent. Okay, so who would like to. Would you like to take two or three?
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B
Any questions together or individual? Yes.
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A
Okay, we will cluster the questions. We have to end at 4:30 sharp, I'm told by our French friends. Okay, yes, gentleman there. And then after that will be. The lady there caught my eye.
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C
Hi, Renaultier from Policy Network. Thanks very much for your talk. It's great to have you here. I have a bit of a technical question on how you basically manage a relationship between the two blocks you outlined, so the Eurozone and the rest. So you talk basically about the need for tax and social convergence in the eurozone and you say. Well, basically the second circle is very much about the single market. But how do you address these issues or these areas which could actually be interesting for both, such as tax cooperation? I mean, we know that it's a bit tricky. You know, the UK basically is a bit reluctant to cooperation on corporate tax. So how do you do that to make sure there is not a less regulated circle outside the eurozone?
- [25:42]
A
Thank you, Anil. There was a lady over there who'd caught my eye, had her hand up a moment ago. No, no longer. Okay, very good. Ok, no, then the lady just next to you there.
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B
Yes, thank you.
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D
So, thank you for the talk. So I'm French and I study EU politics here at Lacy. I'd like to know if you. So you said you had to talk about what instead of how. So just to be very brief, would you be for, in the long run a federal union?
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B
Could you repeat the final question?
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D
Would you be for a federal union?
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B
Okay.
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A
And right at the back, somebody who has tenaciously has. Yes, and the sleep jumper. Thanks very much. So, Emmanuel, if you'd like to try this.
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E
Thank you very much, Mr. Melissa, for your enlightening views. Being a non European citizen, the EU seems to be quite ideal for elsewhere in the world where people have tried regional cooperation but struggled and hadn't had it successful. In considering the EU vision, which you tried to talk about briefly here, what is it that is not functional or working in your view? It is an entity, it's an institution in itself, and it is trying to achieve its vision, which you've been emphasizing on. But more or less, in your view, what is the key factor which is preventing that institution from operating or giving or fulfilling its vision, which was the objective of its formation?
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A
Thank you. Thank you very much.
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B
So, first, about the relationship between Eurozone and the eu, I think, I mean, you have to coordinate first the policies that you decide to integrate at the Eurozone level and the other policies. That's something we experience with banking union. That's why I do believe that it's much preferable to have a Euro commissioner in charge of this eurozone budget, because they will be in charge basically of such coordination. But having said that, fiscal coordination or fiscal policy should be integrated. You should have a lot of coordination in terms of structural reforms, or be a sort of strengthened semester and monitored by this Eurozone commissioner. And you need to organize progressively, indeed your budget, which is a link with your second question about tax, and for me it's something which is completely compatible with the rest of the eu, is that you can define something like a coordinated approach with a few member states within the eu, if the EU recognize, I mean, the inability to provide the solution, which seems to be the case on the tax side, precisely to harmonize and progressively make your different systems converge. And I think that what we need in this perspective is first to organize the budget at the Eurozone level without making the tax as a precondition. I'm very much convinced by that. I mean, we have to use first the esm, we have to try to issue money with joint liability, which is the first way to precisely raise money. Because when you look at the aggregated debt at the Eurozone level, you are completely able to do so and provide after that a guarantee without any just hauteur, but to provide a guarantee with a joint liability and progressively, indeed to have part of the tax or a European tax as the basis. And the fundament of this convergence. You have vat, you have corporate tax, probably this one makes a lot of sense. You have basically unemployment insurance system, which makes a lot of sense to be harmonized as well, because it can offset a lot of asymmetrical shocks. So after that you have a series of technical options, but you need first to harmonize basis and second to, I mean, decide basically to transfer part of total of this tax to this common budget. That's my view. So I think it's completely compatible with the rest of the eu, especially if you keep the unanimity rule at the EU level for taxes and if you recognize that just reinforced cooperation between member states to move forward into that direction. Having said that, I think one important debate to organize this articulation is precisely to define the rules for ins and outs country. And I think it's part of the UK demand and that's why it's important to better understand what Mr. Cameron and Mr. Osborne have in mind on this issue. We found a solution during banking union process so I think it's not a so complicated precondition, but it's something to be solved and fixed very quickly. As for the second direct question about federal union, I think at the point of time, yes, I'm for a sort of a federalism at the Eurozone level. I think that at the EU level it's still too complicated, but we can, as I try to illustrate, we can be much more ambitious at 28 than we are today with a series of very concrete decisions. It should be a much more open and ambitious area, but at least an inner circle of this area should be much more fiddle if we are able precisely to fix this discussion about the what. But I do think that it makes sense and I do favor this ambition. As for the last question, that's a very complicated question because there is a sort of cultural component in your question to be completely able to see what could block basically the progression of this institution. I have a very few remarks regarding this situation. First, I think that we didn't finish the jobs when we started to provide a first vision and a first service of institutions. And when as it's not finished and accomplished, it's extremely difficult to have incremental modification. And for me that's largely a coordination issue and largely the results of the complexity of interactions. When we decided clear institutions like the ECB for instance, it works, it's extremely efficient and it's powerful. There is a lack of democratic control today at the Eurozone level at least. That's why I do believe in this proposal to have a Eurozone parliament. But on the rest of our organization we still have a lot of issues to be monitored from an intergovernmental point of view. And when you look at the crisis and the recent period of time, we always found solutions at the last moment in a lot of pain. And I think that this organization basically is not in a situation to provide a clear vision in period of peace, I would say so. That's why, for me, the key element to move forward is to have a democratic European debate on the vision and the perspective, to have just the courage to go to the country. That's why I like the idea to have a referendum. A lot of people say it's crazy, fine, but I think it's. At the end of the day, it's sane. We need an actual discussion with our people and present boldly our vision and to say, do we move forward or not? And as a result of. Of this debate, fix the game with some institutions and some democratic control. So for me today, the main blocking point in this region in order to better coordinate everything, even if, as you mention it, it's already much better than in a lot of regions. And we made a great step forward after World War II, but we made this step forward because we had a debate with. We constructed strong convictions between the different member states, and a few people decided to take the risk to move forward. I don't think we are in a situation just to have a few people in the current environment to take this risk. I think we have to share the view and to ask all of our people, do you allow us to take the risk to move forward? My view is that the risk is even bigger if we. I mean, we decide the statute or the standalone. But the best answer to your question is democratic debate and go to the people.
- [35:21]
A
Thank you, Tony Giddens. And the lady behind here and the lady over there. That may be our last three. We'll have to see, but. Okay, let's see how we get. Okay, Tony Giddens.
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F
I'm Tony Giddens, former director of London School Economics. I'd like to welcome you to the institution, say how much I enjoyed and appreciated what you had to say. But how come one deal with the fact that Germany seems determined to resist the economic mutuality and fiscal solidarity that a single currency demands if it's going to be effective, which is at the origin really the division between north and south and the rifts that we see across Europe today.
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D
Hi, my name is Jeanne. I just graduated from the lse. I was wondering what was your view on the ttip? And if you thought that was one of the damaging forces of the European project, And if you don't, I think it's a damaging force. What do you think should be put into place to ensure that small enterprises don't suffer from it? Thank you.
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A
Thank you.
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B
Sorry.
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A
And there's the lady. Yes, there. White shirt.
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B
Yes. Dark hair. Thank You.
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E
Hi, my name is Sophie, I'm just a financial analyst. My question is, a lot of Eurosceptics are concerned about the EU rigidity, so can you maybe have a word on how you think Europe could cope with another recession should the shock hit us near term?
- [37:19]
B
As for Germany, obviously that's the main challenge because if we don't find a compromise with Germans and if we don't manage to create a momentum, we will never, I mean, start playing. I think Germany is in a very strong position from an economic point of view. They have the, I mean, they have the feeling they made a lot of efforts in the past decades and that other countries didn't deliver. And they are definitely the leader of the Eurozone today. And that's true that for a large part of the population they seem to be reluctant for any transfer. But largely because we raise this issue in the Greek context, I would say that's why we have to be able to raise this question in a very different way. First, I think the precondition is about France and it's about France reforming its country without reforming the country and doing the job at home. We have no credibility to propose this idea. And I do believe that as long as Germany has the feeling that the second economy of the Eurozone is not doing better and reforming, actually they will never move because there is a lack of trust for good reasons sometimes. So that's why I do believe that we are reforming the country for ourselves. We have to do more and accelerate and intensify the reforms. But they have the precondition of any credible project we can promote and support the precondition of any discussion we could have with the Germans. The second point is to highlight in the German debate the necessity for investment and solidarity. FRA made a great job with his report asked by Sigmar Gabriel. We pushed very much this debate to say the new deal between us should be we reform our country. You invest in your country and our mistake in France would be to stop reforming. Your mistake in Germany would be to over consolidate. Please avoid making the mistakes both of us. And I think the society is progressing. FRA Char insisted on the necessity for investment and so on. Third, I think we have to highlight all the issues at stake regarding demography and the fact that if you look at Germany in dynamic terms, probably Germany needs Europe much more than a lot of people think. And for me, if we have this holistic debate altogether, you can create a dynamic and at the end of the day, that's the debate we try to have at the Greek moment in A bad situation. But it's just to say that's true, that you delivered in the pass period, you are in a better situation. And probably in the short run, a more integrated eurozone will mean transfer and net transfer for Germany. But nobody knows about tomorrow and the day after. And if you look at the pros and cons, you have some strong pros for you to be seen. But if you have just the view of an accountant, which is true for France, for Germany or a lot of countries, probably you miss your own history. And we make this mistake a lot of time in the past period. And we created Europe precisely because at critical points we managed to go beyond our own interests for an historical vision. And the question is how we manage to raise ourselves beyond our own interest on the short run. Because if you are a short termist, you don't even reform your country. If I were a short termist in my country, it's much better to stay at home to explain everything is okay, we are controlling to give good food to my people and good news, it's a short termist vision. I think that the short termist vision in Germany would be precisely to. To say, I protect your money people. We will not go further, they are not theirs. But at the end of the day, that's not the spirit of this collective history. So I do think that reform in France, holistic and complete debate in Germany and creating this momentum altogether to raise our people at the right level, which is a challenge because we have to go beyond our interest. But I do believe that when you look around the Eurozone, you are much more convinced about the necessity to have a strong Eurozone altogether. So I think that's a debate to be run in Germany with business people, with politicians, with people. And I think we can move forward. But if a core of member states have serious policies at home, we can recover. For me, there is still a lack of trust which can block a lot of things. As for the ttip, I mean we are definitely in favor of trade as one of the engine for growth. And the President expressed himself very clearly about that. I mean, EU is engaged in the DT process and we do think that's a great perspective. We had some sensitive points like litigations for investors, for instance. I think the recent proposals made by the Commissioner, I mean going the right direction and are extremely interesting. So we're fixing a lot of issues. I think it will take time. Why? Because that's not a classical trade discussion. That's not about tariffs or even not just standards. It's about how to harmonize collective preferences. So that's not just a pure trade debate, that's a political debate. But it's very important and extremely structuring for, for years and decades. So I think we have to be much more clear on both sides on what we want and where we are ready to go. On financial services, for instance, are the US ready to go on public procurement? Is the US ready to go. I mean, we still have a lot of questions. I think that the US decided to organize itself much more, I would say clear and fast, because they created this task force, they streamlined the process and they had this process with the Congress. And I think it will facilitate a lot of their job. So now perhaps we have a new momentum, but for sure it will take time due to the issues at stake and due to the fact it's not just about trade, but collective preferences. But at the end of the day, I do believe that we have a lot of potential upside through such an agreement and such a treaty. As for European and EU rigidity, you're right, and it's part of our assessment, it's part of the UK assessment as well. And I mean, nobody has a silver bullet to deal with this EU rigidity in one, one day. But at least first we increase the pressure on the Commission on the different areas to streamline the processes. Okay. To provide more flexibility to the member states on day to day life, to use the subsidiary principle. I think it's extremely efficient and we have to do more. So I think the review organized by the UK will be a useful basis to do this job. But I think we have to distinguish what is about institutional organization and what is about functioning. You need flexibility on functioning. You need less bureaucracy and more adapted organization. But the idea is not to change the organization itself. That is not to create a sort of a la carte approach that's completely different. If it's what you mean by flexibility, I think I don't share this view or otherwise. It's impossible basically to monitor anything. And if you look at the refugee situation, you can pretend that it's asking for flexibility, not to apply rules, but I mean, it just means at the end of the day you don't have common rules. So okay for more flexibility if you mean less bureaucracy, less red tape. And I think that the idea to adopt at the European level something like the Commission you have in Great Britain to simplify rules and stop over regulation or useless regulation, makes a lot of sense. And if flexibility means just to change the rules, to carve out for a few Countries, I think the answer is no.
- [46:38]
A
Well, Emmanuel, time is unfortunately drawing to a close, but I exercising chair's prerogative, if I may, to put a question to you before we close, and it won't have passed your notice, of course, that you are A in London and B, at a rather interesting time in Britain's relations with the eu. Now, you'll be familiar with a term from political science which is that of veto player. And France, in no uncertain terms, in the most literal sense of veto player, of course, performed that role with some panache, shall we say politely, in the 1960s on two occasions in respect of the United Kingdom, as, as you know now, the British media, the commentariat, have got it in their head. I'm not taking a view on this, but they've got it in their head that of all the countries that David Cameron will need to square if there's to be a successful renegotiation, France is going to be the most difficult, the most problematic, and I just wanted your own view, as candid as you can be as to whether France has given up. It's. It's also tendres for playing vetoes, for exercising vetoes, and that is something of the past.
- [47:52]
C
Or.
- [47:54]
A
Do you think the British media, these commentaries have got it rather wrong in depicting France in these uncompromising terms. But it's hard to imagine a Europe that works without Britain and France working as one. But that could we now be in a situation where that really could be jeopardized and that sine qua non of an effective Europe could be jeopardized now? And what. Anyway, I'm most interested to know what do you think France, how France will play its hand, to the extent you can tell us in this public forum.
- [48:28]
B
Look, Maurice, two remarks on your question. First, the question is not just about veto. The question is about how you play referendum now in Europe. I think that's an interesting point because we were used to organize referendum on common question to see do we share the view and do we want to move forward. And now with Greece and with uk, you have a new sort of referendum which is, I want something for my country which can block or change the life for the others. Do you agree or not? Which is a sort of veto to the others. So I think you are starting to taste the veto in a certain way in uk, because I think your approach is completely different. I was saying you have to go to your people and to raise a question and have a democratic debate, but my view was you need a European democratic debate.
- [49:27]
F
Debate.
- [49:28]
B
And now in this recent period, we see a very peculiar approach, which is, on my own, I want to adapt the rules and the common rules and I ask my people if they agree to stay or not. I don't know if it's kind of a bluff, but that's a new dynamic. So I would not compare the context of your referendum with the classical referendum or potential pass veto for France. But I just want to insist on the fact that all of us have to be very careful with this use of referendum, otherwise all the countries will multiply referenda as soon as they have any issue with the common rules, which is not the best way precisely to build a common project. So I'm very much in favor for a referendum at the point of time on the same question for a common progress, but this one is very peculiar. Second, for the French veto or not, I think it's definitely too early to say that because I don't know about the question. So I think first we need the British question. And today the question is I need something to be part of the club. I'm fine, I told you, I'm completely aligned with that. I want Britain to be part of the club. But what's the question? What you need and if this is a bargaining game to say I have to keep my people so you have to give me that. That's. I mean, that's a game you experience with the Scottish in your country. That's exactly the same thing. That's exactly the same thing. I want to stay. I want to convince my people we should stay. But you have to give me more. Guys, you want to be part of the UK or not? I have the same question. If you want to simplify some rules, but if you want to stay part of the eu, I'm a fan of society, but if this is just to fragilize the eu, I think France will not be the veto. A lot of member states will have a problem and we will never find a compromise. That's why I do think I'm a strong believer in a win win approach. I told it publicly last July with George o'. Spaun. I'm very much in favor of finding an agreement which would address people's concern in this country and allow the government to win the referendum. But first you have to clarify your requirements. You have to say what you need. I understand about red tape, I understand about competitiveness, I think I can understand about ins and outs, but we need the precise proposal. And about flexibility, as I answered, it depends on the level of flexibility. And the kind of flexibility. So what we need is a very precise proposal to see if it's acceptable or not. And it's not. For France, I think for on this question, there is nothing to deal with French public opinion or France's interest. It's just something. Do we think we destroy the EU for all the other member states by accepting such a thing, or do we think it's completely neutral? And if it helps Great Britain to remain part of the club, we're fine? That's my view. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you. Thanks to all of you. Thank you, Emmanuel.
- [53:08]
A
Thank you. I think we can all agree we've had, well, just over an hour. It's been a really rich and interesting, stimulating hour and 10 minutes. You've given us. Emmanuel, you've given us a splendid time, and thank you very much.