A (5:43)

Thank you very much, Peter, and thank you to the lsc. It's a real pleasure to be here for what is a timely discussion. Very much about the US And Iran, but it's really about the broader landscape of the Middle East. I think it's important to consider that the Middle east is not just based on countries functioning in isolation. It's a geography that is very much interconnected by people, but also by conflicts. And a typical sort of policymaker approach has historically been to focus on conflicts in silos. And today we very much argue in my program at Chatham House that conflicts are very much interconnected and you can't solve one without really sort of addressing the fundamentals that drive conflict and also understand the interconnectivity of conflict. And from my perspective, the broader regional landscape of the Middle east is defined by multiple conflicts from the Israeli Palestinian one to the Iran one, and there are many in between. But let's focus on the US Iran dynamics and I've been given 10 minutes, so let me just start my timer so I don't over talk. And I want to just lay out sort of a bit of the backdrop or layout for you the status quo ante. Also describe the regional landscape of the Middle east Pre and post October 7th, because it's important to understand that landscape, examine the implications of the 12 Day War, and think about what's ahead vis a vis Iran, vis a vis the region, and vis a vis its ties with the United States. It's important to remember and lay out very clearly that Iran and the United States have had an adversarial relationship for over four decades. There's been a near absence of diplomacy. There was a period of determined diplomacy, not always directly managed by the United States, but saw many countries around the world try to bridge divisions over Iran's nuclear program. And that period lasted effectively from 2003 until the agreement known as the JCPOA or the Iran Nuclear Agreement was signed in 2015. And countries from Brazil to Japan to Turkey, Turkey to European countries to Middle Eastern countries were all involved to help bring about the jcpoa. But there has been a near absence of direct talks between Tehran and Washington for four decades. And that's important to really let sediment. If you have not talked to a country for four decades, you don't know that country, they don't know you, and you are trying to analyze and understand each other through open source materials, through intelligence, through third parties effectively. And I think that is again important to let sit. The United States has come to rely over the past 46 years more and more on sanctions as a tool to constrain, deter and change Iran's behavior. And Iran has over this period of time also developed tools and and developed more enhanced regional posture, relying on different deterrent capabilities in order to protect what is the driving force of the Islamic Republic. It's the security and the stability of the regime. And there have been varying degrees of success or challenges. We have had effectively from the United States, I think two Iran policies over this long period of time, there has been a policy of engagement determined to manage Iran's nuclear program, and that saw the JCPOA that lasted from effectively 2015 to 2018. We have had another policy known as containment. Way before you heard of maximum pressure sanctions, various US Administrations relied on dual containment policies seeking to contain Iran and Iraq, then focusing on Iran itself. I would argue that containment and sanctions have yet to really influence or change and alter the behavior of the Islamic Republic of Iran. So you would think after 46 years you might try something else. And certainly many American policymakers will say that JCPOA was something else in it was an agreement focused on a transaction forcing Iran to roll back the advancements it had made in its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief. That agreement has been interpreted to be many things. Some people saw that agreement to be a transformational agreement designed to change the Islamic Republic or change the Islamic Republic's behavior. Some people thought that agreement was an enabling of the Islamic Republic. The reality is that in Washington and in some countries around the Middle east, obviously Iran has been such a profound and protracted problem that has no solution to it. That finding the resolution has become very politicized. And it I think is deeply endemic across the American policy spectrum where Iran, perhaps like the issue of China today, is a sort of unifying factor among Republicans and Democrats. It's a hard one to resolve or manage. Needless to say. The first Trump administration, President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018. And from 2018 to today we have seen a series of escalations from Tehran and also from Washington. Iran began to accelerate its nuclear program in response to sanctions, began to roll back cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency through that period of time as well. Thinking that it could use its nuclear accelerations as leverage in a negotiation with Washington, the United States internally began to ramp up sanctions pressure. I'm trying to keep this simple. Nevertheless, we, through this period of time, there have been shocks across the Middle east that have altered calculations in the region, particularly around Iran and also towards Israel. In 2019, as part of Iran's what is known as maximum Resistance strategy, Iran decided not just to escalate within the realm of its nuclear program, but also to use its proxy network in order to put pressure not just on the United States, but on regional states in the Middle east that supported the US withdrawal from the JCPOA. And in 2019, one of the biggest shocks we saw in the Middle east that continued to have ramifications today is that Iranian proxies struck Saudi oil facilities in September of 2019, hitting Apkaig and Khuraiz. And the impact of that was there were no deaths, thankfully there was infrastructure damage. Not a huge shock to energy prices actually. Also interestingly. But the shock came in that the United States didn't swoon in and protect Gulf states. And that was the sort of underlying security agreement between the United States and the Gulf states that had underpinned their relationship also for over four decades. And that shock manifested in Gulf states that had taken a containment based posture vis a vis Iran to move away from waiting for Washington to to manage the Iran issue or to try to militarily respond to Iran's aggressions. And in fact what we began to see Quite quickly in 2019 was that the United Arab Emirates restored ties with Iran formally in 2021, but began to send delegations to Tehran to sort things out. And simultaneous to that, Saudi Arabia initially actually brokered through Iraq and Oman began a series of back channel talks that resulted in the 2023 Chinese brokered Saudi Iranian normalization agreement. So the regional landscape also very much changed as a result of the US withdrawal from the jcpoa, shifts in the US security posture. And that regional landscape needs to be understood. Why does that matter? Because then we have very simplistically October 7th and October 7th has also altered the regional landscape over the past two years. Obviously we've seen Israel take a very forward leaning military posture, not just in Gaza and not just at the expense of Palestinians, but across the Middle east taking military action against Iranian backed network, the proxies known as the Axis of Resistance against Hezbollah, also sponsoring attacks in Syria, striking the Houthis and understanding that Israel's security has to be addressed by taking a forward leaning posture against Iran itself. So it's very important to Remember that on October 8, Prime Minister Netanyahu said it was about to embark, he was about to embark on a seven fronted war. And what we have seen over the two years is the execution, execution, not quite of a seven fronted war, but a six fronted war. And that included strikes on Iran that we saw over 2024 when we had indirect escalation between Iran and Israel and the June war of this past summer, which was shocking to many because Iran and the United States were engaged in diplomatic talks, but also shocking because that war crossed the threshold and brought the United States into that war with direct strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities. And that war. Let me just briefly unpack. It showed us a few things. First of all, obviously it showed us that this was a bold escalation and both Israel and the United States were willing to take a really different approach to managing Iran's program beyond the diplomatic field. It also showed us that the war resulted in a contained war, not this massive regional war that everyone was worried about. Doesn't mean that if there's another round it won't be a bigger war. But it was a contained war. And both Israel and Iran tried to avoid escalating and bringing other countries into the conflict. It also showed us, despite perhaps Israel's objectives, that the Iranian state was much more resilient than they were appreciating. There was much more unity within the Iranian political spectrum and that people themselves were not going to internally bring down the Islamic Republic at a time of perhaps uncertainty. It was a war that saw both sides declare victory, and it was a war that led to no resolution. Trump, of course, said that everything has been resolved. Iran's nuclear program has been set back. Israel has retreated to its own narrative that the Islamic Republic is weak. And yet the Islamic Republic remains there, institutionally resilient, but constrained by the continuing pressure of maximum pressure sanctions, and at the same time, no real clear off ramp for negotiations. So this is where we are today. We've seen, and I hope you've watched the theatrics of Monday, a very important step forward in bringing, hopefully, a meaningful ceasefire to the war in Gaza, but also very clear indication that much more work needs to be done in defining what a political process, if not a political settlement, looks like between Israel and Palestine. But beyond that, the president himself has clearly messaged and foreshadowed that diplomacy can't stop there. It also requires addressing the Iran problem set. And that shows that he recognizes that leaving Iran contained and sanctioned on its own isn't necessarily going to lead to that peaceful, prosperous, stable Middle east that he continues to talk about. So what's ahead and what do I see on the horizon? Very quickly, I think that there will be new rounds of diplomacy between Tehran and Washington. They are in direct contact. Don't believe everything you read in the media. Don't believe the narratives that all sides are putting forward. What's really necessary is for both sides to have new interlocutors or mediators to manage what a negotiation framework would look like. Ultimately, Tehran is looking for a facing solution that allows it to show that its nuclear program remains not completely dead in the water, but perhaps vibrant for research purposes. And it would sort of abandon everything else. And the United States, in return, can show victory. And we can talk about what those details would look like. Iran is certainly seeking sanctions relief. And ultimately, you know, if President Trump, and if you can imagine President Trump really succeeding in addressing some of these serious issues, which, you know, he says he does want to, this would be a really meaningful achievement for a problem set, a conflict, something that has perpetually destabilized the Middle east for well over four decades and perhaps Nobel Prize winning. So I'll leave you on that sort of confrontational but provocative idea.

B (20:28)

Thank you for that and for, you know, a really great summary of kind of the topography right now in the region and the issues. And I think where you ended up is kind of a perfect segue to Dana who? Dana, you've written a lot about U.S. foreign policy. And I suppose the question here, where Sanam has kind of left this with Donald Trump is what kind of running room does Donald Trump have? And even if he has the running room, can he run on a kind of straight course with respect to Iran?

C (21:08)

Thanks. Thanks very much. Thanks to LSE for inviting me. Me. And you know, the answer to your question, the simple answer to your question is probably he has a lot of running room, but he has no idea where to run to. And I think I will try to explain that with a little bit of a, I mean, almost an autobiographical approach, which is justified only by the fact that I've been around for a long time. And so, you know, even though I'm not an Iran expert or a Middle east expert or a nuclear technology expert, the topic of this panel has really been the framework for much of my career. I say much of the career. I mean, I can sort of divide it. And the first stage was in the 1980s and 1990s concerned the cold War and then immediate post Cold War issues such as the Balkan Wars. But the second, longer one basically started on September 1, 2011. September 11, 2001. Sorry. And you know, it was kind of the rise and fall of American hubris in pursuit of kind of a supposedly strategic level threat from Islamist terrorism and its backers, including Iraq and Iran. And particularly to remember what the Iraq War was supposed to be about. Particularly the supposed are the idea of a terrorist WMD nexus. And you know, this rise and fall had political manifestations in presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Just to be clear, I'm not associating Obama with the fall. I associate him mainly with a successful, with a mainly successful effort to cope sanely, strategically and humanely with the consequences of the fall. You know, so this has been sort of the canvas of my work covering basically the first quarter of this century. You believe that? I don't. But Iran has been really at the center of that canvas because it's been a central preoccupation of US Foreign policy, probably too central for a number of reasons. And throughout that quarter century, the kind of foreign policy community with which I associate myself developed a set of interlocking assumptions and scenarios. I mean, this wasn't the whole foreign policy community, but rather what I'd call its liberal center. And analysts to the right would probably dispute that it was the center, but that's another argument. And these, these assumptions and scenarios regarding Iran included the following. First, Iran had not decided to build nuclear weapons, but it was determined to develop the latent capability to weaponize its program, its nuclear program if necessary, and the scale of its enrichment program didn't make any sense otherwise. Second, the this determination was actually quite understandable from Iran's strategic perspective, which we can get into, but it was also dangerous with damaging consequences for the non proliferation regime and regional security generally. But it was made doubly dangerous by Iran's rejectionist and arguably, arguably eliminationist rhetoric towards Israel. And third, if this was a problem for Israel, it was also a problem for the United States because of America's intimate political and security relationship with Israel. Moreover, Israel's increasingly, I mean that increasingly may be disputable, but its fraught relations with the Palestinians whom it occupied were bound up in complicated ways with the Iranian challenge, with the danger that conflict from one side of this triangle, or maybe the two sides of the tepee could, I guess America was the other side of the triangle, but you know, that conflict from one side could spread to full scale war on all sides. Fourth, there was no good military solution to the problem. If Israel insisted on attacking Iran's nuclear facilities or somehow persuaded the United States to do so, or if the United States decided to do so on its own, the probable consequence would be a wider war. It would only set the Iranian nuclear program back by a year or so. And in any event, Iran would only be much more determined to become a full nuclear nuclear weapons state. And that couldn't be stopped unless you actually invaded and occupied the country. So following from that, fifth, the only viable solution was a diplomatic one achieved through international unity, economic pressure and some degree of military threat. Crucially, this would require giving up the long standing American demand for no other enrichment. I mean, it wasn't exclusively an American demand, but I think it was the Americans who insisted on that most vehemently. In any event, it was going to be difficult if not impossible to achieve. And yet, Sixth, and Sanam discussed this later in the story, the nearly impossible was achieved in the JCPOA which she has discussed. The JCPOA did not definitively solve the problem, but it tolerably managed it and it was probably the best of real world possibilities. And it was destroyed in what could only be called an act of willful vandalism by President Trump in his first term. So that's sort of my intellectual framework coming to the last two years of real horror in Gaza, Gaza in Israel and in Gaza Israel's expansion of that war against Iran's so called axis of resistance in the region and against Iran itself. Which culminated in this 12 day war in June, I believe. And a lot of the assumptions and scenarios we talked about for so many years that I've just outlined have, have now played out. Israel attacked Iran's nuclear facilities and got the United States to help. These were seen as a nightmare scenario by many of us for many years. So the question is, has the nightmare happened? Obviously, in relation to Israel and Gaza? The nightmare has been beyond words. The other elements have not played out exactly as many of us feared and have diverged in ways that have partly to do with the overwhelming nature of, well, the overwhelming demonstration of Israeli superiority through its attacks, and partly to do with what, Peter, you referred to as running room, or I would say, let's say the singular characteristics of President Trump. You know, Israel's astonishing intelligence and air supremacy has created a situation that maybe we didn't anticipate. Yes, Iran would be expected to expand the war regionally and redouble its nuclear efforts, but for the foreseeable future, it has to know that if it does either of these things, it's going to get hammered again and again. On the Trump side, his decision to bring the United States into the war entailed a very Trumpian abandonment of the caution that was shown by Biden, Obama, and even George W. Bush once he was chastened by the Iraq disaster. But he also abandoned the cautions behind that, the assumptions behind that caution, in ways that have brought some surprising results. Specifically, no one believed that the United States could actually go to war with Iran for a few hours or even less and call it quits. I mean, there were a lot of reasons for this, including just the way the United States plans wars. But Trump did it, and he created his own reality, by the way, with a statement that after he did it, the nuclear program was totally obliterated, or whatever he said. Exactly. He used the word obliterated, which was nonsense, but also an excuse to end the war after a few hours. And, you know, the Kabuki of Iran's retaliation against US Space in Qatar was another example of something that Trump could get away with in a way that I don't think other presidents easily could.

B (30:12)

Now.

C (30:15)

These things I'm, I'm playing with apply also in a number of ways to Trump's role in the just concluded Gaza cease fire, which I don't, which I suspect may come up later. There are simply things Trump can do that other presidents can't do. These are mostly bad, but there can be pleasant surprises. Could this be a lasting nuclear deal? Could this lead as Sanam, I'm not sure what her conclusion was, but as she intimated, could it lead to a lasting nuclear deal? I doubt it because I doubt the administration has the diplomatic and technical expertise and capacity to pull it off. You know, having said that, I actually was in a Track two meeting with that included Iranians recently. And I put forward the argument that an American adversary looking for a solution should consider the possibility that this president has a freer hand than other presidents in diplomacy as well as war. So my very quick conclusion. I'm glad the 12 day war ended on day 12. Even happier that there is a Gaza ceasefire for as long as it lasts. And there are reasons to credit Trump for some of this, particularly when he wants to restrain Israel. For whatever reason, he has a unique ability to do so. But, you know, with Trump and maga, you get the whole package. Whatever he did in recent months can't be separated from, you know, his destroying the JCPOA in the first place. Military force is sometimes a necessary element of diplomacy, but disregard for the rules of international order makes me skeptical that any kind of order is being built on this. Or to put it in simpler terms, maybe more sort of Trump terms. It's hard to make lasting deals if you keep breaking them.

B (32:23)

Thanks, Daniel. I think I want to return in the Q and A maybe to the question or the issue of Trump's running room and what it might mean for dealing with Iran. Very interesting what you have to say, given now, Anahita, that we have the take on the United States U.S. foreign policy. How about the take on Iranian foreign foreign policy in the region?

D (32:55)

Thank you, Peter. It's a pleasure to be here today and talk about this very timely relation, especially with regarding the President Trump, you know, second term administration. It would be much more, I think, timely than ever. But let me start with looking at this relationship relation a bit conceptually. US Iran relations since 1979 can be understood through the Alexander Wentz concept of cultures of anarchy, which reflecting a persistent blend of Hobbitian enmity and Lockean rivalry with a distant but conceivable, a conceivable, you know, concept of evolving towards a Kantian culture. So While mostly since 1979, the mistrust, mutual suspicion, confrontation and also rivalry have dominated this relationship. But also there was a moment of the pragmatic engagement between the two countries. And so such as we see that in 2001 in Afghanistan between Iran and US and then later, so years later in the JCP, the negotiation lead to the JCPOA agreement at the Time So, and also the rivalry. Iran indeed has also pursued a more rivalry, lucky style of rivalry with the US to challenge American hegemony across the region from the Iraq to Syria to Afghanistan and even Pakistan. So where the both countries have challenged and also competed together over the strategic influence. With this I just, I'm trying to not repeating the points that already Sanam and also Dana mentioned about this relation. I'm trying my best, but I think, I think we should have a look. We should see this relationship within all the changes has happened already started happening in the politics, economy, the concept of the security and foreign policy, because the very nature and the very foundation of the power and politics have been transformed for a while due to the digital transaction transformation, artificial intelligence. And so we are living in a world that has been more intertwined, interwoven than ever. So foreign policy absolutely as a main concept has changed a lot. So foreign policy at the moment is increasingly seen not as a tool of power projection anymore, but as instruments for economic growth, for development and for the national welfare and prosperity. So within this most many countries are redefining their strategic priorities mostly by balancing the relation between a triangle of three countries, the United States, China and Russia. So in the context of the Middle east also. Exactly this is happening then we have so a kind of new cooperation connectivity between the countries at the regional level and even cross regional is happening in the old domains of the energy, technology, economy and even politics. So with this, Iran, a country of significant geopolitical and geoeconomic position, find itself position in the overlapping context these two contexts of global and regional, which mostly trapped by its old principles of foreign policy, which is more ideological. And so having said that, it is just in relation with two of these powers, China and Russia, which is very controversial, not the United States. And the third, Iran has been largely excluded from all the regional and cross regional initiatives and also agreements. So it left Iran in a way with no choice. But with all these still Iran with all these developments still Iran as the center of Trump's Middle east policy, which in his second term, Trump has started again to revive the maximum pressure campaign and actually revive the maximum pressure through a kind of both economic sanction as well as the coercive diplomacy to bring Iran to changing its behavior. I'm not mentioning that changing the regime because he's explicitly mentioned that he's not going to change regime, but just want bring Iran to the negotiation table and in his own words, to an unconditional surrender. And I think this word also is a bit controversial because the first or maybe last one it has been used. It was in 1945, after the World War II, when Germany and Japan unconditionally surrendered themselves. So with this many believes, many observers believe that Iran strategically is isolated and weakened, but still in a way, operationally and practically, Iran is still resilient. So however, Iran is down, but it is not out. But Iran's foreign policy in this relation, it's very important because Iran's foreign policy mostly always has been based on a combination of the pressures from the international system which caused that Iran to have some priorities in its foreign relations and also the domestic pressure and the domestic and internal factional, you know, trends at the time. So at the moment Iran is trying, especially after the 12 days war, Iran is trying to find some, you know, ways to resort again to diplomacy. But it is very, very difficult in a way because Trump is mentioning that Iran has no choice other just to accept everything. And he is not alone in this because there is a coalition of international forces, mainly the Europeans and even the regional ones that they are accompanying Trump in this policy. What about the Iran? I think the consensus inside Iran and in decision making in the foreign policy is very difficult and hard when especially it comes to the relation with the US it is very difficult. But indeed all the formal and informal bodies of Iranian foreign policy decision making at the moment, they have a very hard time in taking decision towards what should they do. And however, leadership in recent days he mentioned that he is not going to accept the peace deal of the Trump. And after that Abbas Arakchee, Iranian Foreign Minister, also mentioned that the US should should respect our right. So and also in another statement by Shamkhani, he's the leadership defense advisor. Defense counsel, advisor. So in all way the top hierarchy at the Iranian politics, they are thinking of about not entering to the diplomacy. While there are also other sounds that it should happen. So I think that with this maybe we could reach to the point given all these dynamics that is happening inside Iran, Iran facing two scenarios in a way. First, resist to its beh and not changing its behavior. While the consensus mostly inside Iran is about just resisting. And if it happens, I think beyond the economic hardship and growing, all the domestic social unrest and instabilities there it will put Iran in the position that even may limit legitimize the international intervention under the Article 7 of UN Charter, then it would be a very bad situation. And I think that also Iranian leaders are aware about this. And even recently Mr. Shamkhani, he also mentioned that if such a thing is going to happen, Especially about the imposition of the UN Resolution 1929 about closing the vessels and stopping the vessels of the oil export of Iran. So they have no choice to closing the Hormuz Strait. But on the other side we have another scenario that maybe would be very positive. Yes, I'm adept. Yes. So if Iran except come to the diplomatic negotiation and start a diplomacy and let the diplomacy goes on. So such a shift would mark a fundamental redefinition of indeed Iran's strategic identity from a revolutionary and ideologically resistant actor to a pragmatically adaptive power which potentially moving the U. S Iran relation towards from the long standing hostility towards the Kantian culture of coexistent cooperation and also friendship. Yes, I prefer to stop here.

B (45:11)

A good place to live.

D (45:12)

Yes.

B (45:13)

Okay. Yeah, that's great. Well, thank you. The floor is going to be open in a second. I think I'm going to maybe exercise the chair's privilege to ask a first question that I think, I think it was in a way prompted by something that Dana said. But I think, you know, it really dovetails in some ways or it's relevant to the points that all three of you made. It seems to me as a non expert in this area that one of the takeaways from the past few weeks is that the ground has shifted in a significant way strategically in the region and in particular that what we've seen is an American president force, in this case an Israeli leader, to do something the leader simply did not want to do and in doing so, you know, has kind of has shown that he's, I don't know, maybe more. More inclined to entertain the policy preferences of Arab countries in the region. And to me this is a fairly significant shift. Maybe it doesn't last because Donald Trump, I think Dana, as you said, I mean if he zigs and he's. But in a way, to me it looks kind of as I think about Trump's term, that the investment that many countries in that region made in Donald Trump, most obviously in the case of Qatar with a big airplane, paid off. And I think the question to my mind is that I want to ask you about is not what this means for the United States and not what it means for Israel, but what it means for Iran. I mean does this given if I'm right about the ground shifting, if I take Sanaa, if I start with where, you know, you referenced the response to the 2017 attack by Iran on the Saudi oil fields and it kind of opened up new possibilities that maybe have, you know, that October 7th closed off. Does this provide an opportunity to return to those discussions or not? You know, and I guess the same question in a way for you, Anahita, is like, does this pragmatism kind of a turn towards pragmatism? Does this invite or encourage or incentivize Iran's turn to pragmatism to see Trump move in this direction? Or is it actually the reverse? Because given Iran's heavy investment in proxies in the region that caused not only issues for Israel, but many of these Arab countries there were, you know, it would be hard to find an Arab capital that was, in my sense, you know, all in with Hamas, you know, looking for a different kind of arrangement for the Palestinians in the region. So this is a long winded question, but what I'm wondering is whether or not the shift in, if I'm right, in kind of the US position vis a vis Arab countries, what the knock on effects or the implications are for Tehran, if there are any, you want to go?

A (49:17)

Sure. Thank you. A couple of points that can maybe help explain the landscape. First of all, to be clear, despite Iran's continued support for the so called Axis of Resistance and despite the events of the past two years, it's worthwhile really underscoring that that Iranian regional normalization has been a consistency across the Middle east. And I would say it's very much expanded. Iran has deepened its relations with many of the Gulf states short of Bahrain, and also widened its institutional relationships beyond also to Jordan, Egypt. By no means are we saying that Iran has built deep trust or the deep tensions with Iran have been resolved. But there has been a profound shift in the region where states are seeing direct dialogue and engagement with Iran is very important. And Iran sees it the same. How do we know this? Nothing has broken in the normalization and diplomatic engagement across the region has increased. And in fact, it was Cairo, quite surprisingly, that was trying to broker an arrangement between the International Atomic Energy Agency and Iran just over the past few weeks in September. So that is the status quo between Iran and the region. And all regional states are looking to preserve that status quo. They are not looking for another round between Israel and Iran. They're very worried about the spillover of that round. They see that last round in June as being relatively contained and they see Iran as having been relatively contained in its responses and very much think that another round would look different. Secondly, to your point, I don't think it's the Qatar airplane plane that is the inflection point here. It's actually about Trump's I think, broader security strategy that is about economic arrangements rather than military engagement in the Middle East. It's about burden sharing. It's about encouraging investment into the United States. And you can say that plane is doing so. But Trump came to the Middle the of east, not to Israel, but to Doha, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh in May and gave an extraordinary speech where he talked about commerce, not chaos, technology, not terrorism. And the Gulf states were on a sugar high that only lasted until June when the war began, but really saw this president offering a new vision for American engagement in the Middle east that wasn't a military engagement, but was something different, commercial, transactional, something that they could work with. And Trump, of course, also removed sanctions on Syria, engaged with the new Syrian leader, Ahmed Al Shara. So things felt really good. And actually on Monday, Trump again talked about the commerce, not chaos, again talked about no more terrorism, a new Middle East. So that vision very much underpins the Gulf Trump relationship that is very much shared. And I think the real inflection point that really must be understood is certainly the United States, through multiple presidencies, particularly Biden and then Trump, have supported Israel unequivocally. But Trump has recognized that Israel's activities have been destabilizing, not just in Gaza, but to us Arab relationships has been destabilizing to a new landscape in the Middle east, particularly in Syria, which has been unexpected and one that the United States wants to support. And thirdly, the extraterritorial operations of the Israelis might have been okay with regards to Iran, but they crossed the Rubicon in hitting Qatar her. And it was the September 8 strikes on Doha that broke Trump. And he said enough already. And I would just throw that out there to say that that's what has opened the door to a bit more willingness to look at these arrangements in a different way. And I think what's striking about Trump and it's just Trump, his system, the people behind him are deeply divided. They have different ideologies and competing ideologies. It's a president that is looking to try new things, doesn't necessarily think, I don't necessarily think it's going to work. But the willingness to try new things and approach entrenched conflicts in unprecedented ways is, I suppose, for the time being, welcome. The devil, of course, will be be in the details.

B (54:26)

Dana, do you want to weigh in on this?

C (54:28)

Yeah, I just, I mean, I'm reluctant to say things about either Iranian politics or Arab politics next to two real experts, but I'll do it anyway. In you know, in the lead up to the Abraham Accords in Trump's first term, there was this general, general sense of an implicit strategic, you know, the fruition of an implicit strategic alliance between Israel or at least strategic convergence between Israel and states that had Arab states that had long rejected its rejected it or opposed it. And, you know, you could say that Israel did a lot of work.

D (55:16)

On.

C (55:17)

Behalf of these Arab states in its real punishing attacks against Hezbollah and the axis of Resistance and that they should be pleased. But, you know, the Gaza nightmare was just more than anybody but stomach and, you know, it took a situation where again, somebody might tell me I'm being unfair, but where you sort of heard Arab states paying lip service, I mean, particularly Gulf states paying lip service to the Palestinian cause, to something they really couldn't ignore. So, you know, I just wrote here Gaza exclamation point a couple times. It just. And you know, I mean, I'm sure there are still some ways that they're welcoming what Israel has done in certain respects against Iran, but or at least against the Axis of resistance. I told. But you know, I also have a sense that the idea of Iranian, you know, Iran as the dangerous would be hegemon in the the region has really been replaced in their minds by the idea of Israel as the very dangerous would be hegemon in a way that I don't think they really thought for quite a few decades after the Arab Israeli wars. Now, what does that mean for the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was your question? I mean, I don't know. I mean, it strikes me that there would be a huge opportunity and this will show my sort of American perspectives here, there would be a huge opportunity if Iran took a different rhetorical attitude towards the existence of Israel. You know, it's not a question of Israel's right to exist. It's a question of the fact that Israel does exist and it has to be accommodated despite everything or after everything which has been, as I say, truly horrific.

B (57:27)

That's great. Anahito comment before we throw it open to the floor. Questions?

D (57:32)

Yes, just a couple of questions, a couple of comments. And your question? I think that first, Israel and US have some, you know, similarities and also differences on the strategy towards Iran, how to approach towards Iran, Iran and definitely on the side of us. US has mentioned several times that he's the Trump and US is not going for any regime change, but bringing Iran to the table of negotiation for changing behavior. However, apparently, because Israel especially sees Iran and especially if its proxies as an existential threat for itself. And so they are trying to even change the regime of Iran going for that. But at least I think at this point Trump didn't allow Netanyahu to go for that. So letting the diplomacy goes on on with the case of Iran. And they are just as I mentioned earlier, through a kind of both economic sanctions, especially after the reimposition of the UN sanction as well as reactivation of the snapback, we see that the pressure on Iran has been more and is going to be more especially because also also all the economic channels of Iran for the circumvent sanctions, including in Iraq is now is blocking. So in this case we will see that Iran find itself in a way alone. And maybe this bring Iran to some important decision about about the diplomacy and giving the chance to the diplomacy on the side of Iran. However, I do agree with Sanam about maybe a third party should come in this process like the Egypt did between the Iran and the IAEA and it starts the negotiation between Iran and us. However, Israel is not so maybe wouldn't be so satisfied with this process. But we have to wait and see.

B (60:07)

Hi, I'm interrupting this event to tell.

D (60:09)

You about another awesome LSE podcast that.

B (60:12)

We think you'd enjoy. Lseiq asks social scientists and other experts.

C (60:17)

To answer one intelligent question like why do people believe in conspiracy theories?

D (60:23)

Or can we afford the super rich.

C (60:26)

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A (60:32)

Now back to the event.

B (60:33)

Okay, so we're gonna open it up now. Great. I'll take this person right down here. We'll start here and then we'll go way to the back there. Just keep your hand up, second row to the back. Okay, Start here. Thank you.

A (60:51)

Thank you so much, panel.

D (60:53)

Dr. Waikhil, my question is from you. You mentioned that Iran has expanded alliances.

A (61:00)

Yet when we look at the region.

D (61:04)

Almost every major Arab state, including Egypt, has normalized ties with Israel or is engaging diplomatically under the Abraham Francis framework. Even President Sisi has invited did invite Netanyahu to the Red Sea summit.

A (61:24)

So in that context, can we speak.

D (61:27)

Can we speak of Islamic Republic regime expanding alliances, you think? Or is it in fact becoming more isolated? Is that so? Iran is basically holding only to non state proxies.

B (61:42)

You question back there.

C (61:44)

Hello.

B (61:46)

Please introduce yourself.

C (61:47)

Hi, my name is Tyler. I'm a master's student at the lsc. I've heard Dana, you refer to the difference or what's going on between Israel and Gaza is a nightmare. And Sanam, you've Referred to it as.

D (62:03)

War in a conflict.

C (62:05)

Why don't you refer to it as a genocide?

B (62:08)

Okay, hold on for one second. Nita, do we have a question online?

C (62:12)

Yeah.

D (62:14)

Thank you. So we have a question from Anthony Valian, who is an LSE alumni, and his question is regarding Trump's negotiations for.

A (62:22)

What he calls a new version of the jcpoa.

D (62:25)

He says, do you think Netanyahu will allow Trump to make and keep a deal with Iran and within America? Do you think both the Democrats and the Republicans. Republicans would abide by this, or would a new administration ditch this?

C (62:38)

Okay, so we didn't get that, actually.

B (62:43)

Do you want to just repeat the last? It's about the JCPOA and whether or not Trump will pursue it. Yeah.

D (62:49)

So he says, do you think Netanyahu will allow this? And then in terms of American domestic policy, do you think the Democrats and the Republicans will abide by this?

B (62:58)

Or.

D (62:59)

Or do you think if a new administration came in, they would ditch this?

B (63:02)

Maybe just revise this? Is there any chance that Trump would go down this path?

C (63:09)

Yeah, the path of the new jcpoa.

B (63:11)

Like a revised Trumpian jcpoa. Thanks me. Go ahead.

A (63:19)

Yes, it's a genocide. No problem saying it out loud.

B (63:23)

2.

A (63:23)

It's not a company competition, actually, that's the reality. It's important to see the regional landscape as it is, not how we want it to be. There have been three normalization trends in the Middle East. Turkey and the Arab states, Israel and the Arab states, and Iran and the Arab states. But if you want to make it competitive, by my count, there's only one Arab state that hasn't normalized ties with Iran, and that's Bahrain.

B (63:50)

And.

A (63:50)

And secondly, if you count, it's Lebanon, Syria, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Yemen that haven't normalized ties with Israel. And I never called them alliances. They're called relationships between states. So it's important to, like, characterize the landscape appropriately. I don't think Iran today, in 2025, is as isolated as it was was a number of years ago. I think it is certainly much more integrated politically, diplomatically, and economically. And those relationships help the Islamic Republic endure despite maximum pressure sanctions, despite the return of five UN sanctions. And it is the mediation, facilitation, and engagement of Arab states, currently very much underway today, that are also driving the Trump administration's approach and outreach to the Islamic Republic. I just say one more thing. What we actually want to see in the Middle east is an integrated Middle east, not an Israeli dominated Middle east or an Iranian dominated Middle east, but actually a Middle east where conflicts are not just managed but politically settled, where there's peace and prosperity, governance and accountability and one where Israel and Iran are integrated into the Middle East. And that requires an approach that is very bold that looks to underpin any kind of approach and agreement. To the third question, I don't think there'll be a new jcpoa, but there certainly should be some arrangement where there is a non aggression pact and principles of non interference are embedded across the region, where all regional actors agree to stop the proxy dynamics that are used by all states and that there is an acceptance that Middle Eastern states should have agency over the region. There needs to be a regional security infrastructure and Iran and Israel can either join in or you know, be marginalized by their neighbors that are certainly looking for a different vision of the Middle East. Not revisionism, not expansionism, not aggression, but something else. You know, the new Middle East.

D (66:11)

Yeah, I was just adding maybe just reiterating again some points of the sana. I think there is a, in the new Middle east mostly it is about the integration from full integration of the Israel and also Iran at the same time together to the Middle east, the new Middle East. It is very important. So, and it's, I think it's a while, especially after the ABRAHAM Accord in 2018 and after that, two years after that. We see that much. The region has been on the track of moving away from confrontation to cooperation. So they have already started it and at the time one of these cooperative engagement happened between Iran and Saudi Arabia at the time. So still region is on that track. But we will see how Iran also can be integrated in the region, especially regarding its, regarding to its regional role which is very important at the time and also its nuclear issue. Yes.

C (67:28)

So if I understood the question about the. I'm not sure I entirely understood the question about a new jcpoa. But you know, just to make a couple points, first of all, we're not going to get a new jcpoa because I mean from the American point of view you'll never get that good a deal anymore because what happened was that Iran developed further its massively scaled enrichment facilities. A lot of these are, you know, a lot was destroyed, grant you but it developed expertise and abilities that cannot be taken taken away. Moreover, it has, you know, something like 400 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium and other, other amounts of lesser enriched uranium stored in, you know, scuba sized cylinders. SCUBA tank sized cylinders. I mean this stockpile, you know, there was an assumption immediately that it had been removed and hidden. Now there seems to be countervailing evidence that it actually was left in Fordo and is buried there. You know, it's probably not easy to get to, probably very difficult to get to, but it creates a situation, if they do get to it, which I assume they can eventually, where they don't actually need to recreate this massive enrichment capacity, enrichment activity, because they already have enough material which they can further refine in really small scale, clandestine ways to make like 10 nuclear weapons. Now, you know, what you would do with 10 nuclear weapons is an entirely different question. I mean, that's not necessarily a game changer in any particular way, but. So, you know, but the political aspect of the question, you know, I would repeat that this comes back to Peter's original running room question. Yeah, I think that. Because I think the question was, Republicans in doubt, would it be torpedoed or reversed? You know, I think Trump, whatever deal Trump could reach, if he could reach a deal, might be not reversible in the way that a Democratic president's deal was reversible genocide. I'm not going to be as forthright as. As Sanam was in answering that question because I don't actually think that my checking off a box really answers what Israel has done, which has been enormous and terrible. Something enormous and terrible was done to Israel as well. You know, there are credible. I mean, there are international tribunals that are addressing this question. And as far as I can see, the evidence they're looking at is credible. But we all see what's happening. And I'm not even sure why it's necessary for me to use that word.

B (70:56)

Thanks. That's a good place to leave that. Let's take some questions here. How about the person right up here in the olive coat? Yeah. Hello. First of all, thank you so much for this talk. It was really insightful. It's hard to hear you. Can you speak directly into the mic? Thank you so much for this talk.

A (71:15)

It was really, really insightful.

B (71:17)

And I've got to ask, because we have short time here, just get right to the question as quickly as possible.

A (71:23)

Assuming an ideal scenario where, like, the.

D (71:27)

Gaza ceasefire deal is actually successful and.

A (71:29)

That there are successful diplomatic negotiations, and I'm saying, assuming ideally, what do you.

D (71:35)

Think the Islamic Republic might do in.

A (71:37)

Regards to recalibrating its proxy network in the Middle East?

D (71:40)

Thank you.

C (71:41)

I wasn't disagreeing. I couldn't hear you. That's why I was shaking my head.

B (71:45)

So we've sent a mic upstairs. Do we have anybody Upstairs. Who's got a question? How about this gentleman right there?

C (71:51)

Yeah, hi. Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is not getting any younger, obviously. I think he's like mid-80s. I think he's seen as a bit of a barrier to, of preventing kind of the hardliners regime to develop nuclear weapons. Are there any dialogue within kind of Trump's administration acknowledging that?

B (72:20)

And can you coming get right to. We need to get to the question. Yes.

C (72:26)

Yeah. My question is, do the Trump team think, do they think that there's a potential for a hardliner to become the next supreme leader and for a nuclear.

D (72:39)

Weapon to be developed? Who, who should be there?

C (72:45)

Someone within the regime that was pushing for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon because as you mentioned, there's factions within the regime.

B (72:55)

So some pro nuclear faction. Can they get control of the regime? Got it.

C (73:01)

I'm going to stay in here.

B (73:03)

How about the gentleman in the very back there in the white shirt?

C (73:09)

Thank you so much. I'm Shayan. There's an interesting popular narration among Iranian public opinion that Iran and Israel inherently by nature are in tension between each other.

A (73:24)

Regardless Ayatollah rule in Tehran or Shah.

C (73:28)

Or a president, a Democratic president. I refer to the Financial Times article.

B (73:35)

Go straight to the question.

A (73:37)

Okay.

C (73:38)

There is another narration that Iran and Israel could collaborate with each other because they are matched together strategically by geopolitics, because they both surrounded by the Arab countries and these two non Arab countries can collaborate to each other strategically. Which narration do you think has more carry more weight and what's the implication for future of Iran? Thank you.

B (74:04)

Okay, who wants to fight first?

A (74:08)

Okay.

B (74:10)

You want to go first?

D (74:11)

No, no, no.

A (74:12)

Okay, quickly on Khamenei, I mean, he has supposed fatwa that prevents Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon. And I think that very much currently is going to hold while he remains alive. It's very hard to predict what's going to come next and certainly we do a lot of scenarios and, you know, not really effective at predicting it remains to be seen. There are plenty of people that think that Iran will try to break out or sneak out. I think it's very easier said than done. And Iran is heavily surveilled. There's a lot of intelligence and right now, you know, it would be hard to see that happening immediately, maybe over time. But, you know, let's see. No clear answers there on Iran and Israel. I don't buy zero sum sort of analyses, so I won't take any of the provocations. It's not one Way or the other. I think we really have to explore and examine Iran's history in the region and Iran's history with Israel. Certainly prior to the revolution there was the alliance of the peripheries. And it seemed that Iran and Israel alive along with Turkey, had a natural strategy driving their relations against Arab states. I don't think people really have delved deep into understanding the dynamics of Iran, Israeli relations that we're not always happy going into the 1979 revolution. And certainly there were tensions under the Shah's regime that we don't talk about about. Iran during that period of time was also working in southern Lebanon. Iran was supporting Kurds in Iraq. Iran was an expansionist state under the monarchy, took three islands in the Persian Gulf, tried to lay claim to Bahrain. And so it just makes us, you know, maybe pause and think about Iran's role in the region as always perhaps being activist or being activists for quite a longer period of time. And so, you know, we should reflect on these binaries that very much preoccupy people in the diaspora, that getting rid of the Islamic Republic is going to change the nature of the Iranian national interests. So I just leave you with that to reflect on. I think we have to be honest and see countries for how they are and how they behave, not how we want them to be quickly on the proxies. It's the hardest question to answer. I think that can. It can't come immediately. It has to come over time. It is ultimately about investing in the agency and governance reform inside Lebanon, inside Syria, obviously for Palestinians and Yemen as well. Ultimately what is urgently needed is a similar reform process for Iranians themselves. And only when you build better accountability from within these states do they become less vulnerable to external interventions.

C (77:05)

Intervention, yes.

D (77:08)

Just one point about Iran, Israel I think it was, you know, Israel for a long time blamed the US for the policy towards the Islamic Republic. Why letting Iran expanded and also deepen its network, regional network. It is not new. In 2000, I remember two 20042012 by the Brzezinski. I read in his book and also in his interviews that they always said, okay, we want Iran to change its behavior, but also we understand that Iran is between the Arab countries that gives a security, you know, kind of threat to Iran so they can do what they do till they don't damage the American interests in the region. So later after the JCPOA event and I remember that interview happened with the not Brzezinski Kissinger and he was also mentioned again some concerns about Iran and Also asked Iran at the time to change its behavior. Otherwise, we cannot accept that. And even he made this explained, he mentioned this sentence that Iran has to decide between being a nation or a cause. It is very famous. So Israel and even the Arab states also from 2000, especially early 2000, always blamed us for being soft towards Iran and let Iran to expand its proxy network till reach this point to the 7th of October. So I think, yes, in this sense, I just wanted to mention and refer to this historical background about the US Policy towards Iran inside the region, region, and also how the US how the Israel and also the Arab states think about it.

B (79:18)

Dana, do you want to comment on this or no? We can move on. Well, what I can see is that we have a little less than five minutes. So I thought maybe I would actually give each one of you, as we kind of wrap up here, you know, I'm tempted to ask what kind of, you know, what's your worst fear? But I think maybe try to end on a slightly higher note. If you had identified one thing that gives you some hope about kind of the path forward, I mean, what would it be? You know, Anahita, why don't I start with you? We'll just work down that. You only get one, one thing and you have a minute.

D (80:08)

And I think that really, I wish that Iran goes towards peaceful times with its own people and also with the region and with the global, you know, powers as well, to bring prosperity for the Iranian people. Really? Yeah.

B (80:34)

That's good. You stuck to one, and that's great. Dana, what about you?

C (80:38)

When you look at it, my one thing has multiple parts, but that's okay. You gotta, I, you know, you know, you do see this unmistakably vibrant and in some ways resistant civil society in Iran. You see the same thing in Israel in a lot of ways. Not particularly enlightened at this moment regarding the Palestinian issue, but nonetheless committed to democracy. And we've spoken about the question of whether the Trump administration, administration has, you know, has special dispensation or special running room. And I think in the end, I'm not particularly impressed by its capabilities to manage something here. But I do think that, you know, after the exhaust of the last two years, after the word I'll use again, the nightmare of the last two years, you know, peace does sometimes come through exhaustion and through stalemate and just the one last multiple part of that. So Israel demonstrated incredible mastery over the skies of Iran, and it demonstrated, you know, intelligence supremacy and everything else we've talked about. So its power was really great and fed its hubris, arguably. But, you know, Trump stopped the war before some elements of Iranian comeback were possible. Among other things, Israel, you know, the trade off or the ratio between Israel was running out of interceptors and they're more expensive than Iranian missiles and Iran had a lot of missiles left. So this was not quite the cakewalk for Israel that it might have appeared. And I only bring this up in the hope category to say, you know, maybe sides will have room for exhaustion and peace. Peace.

B (83:05)

Sanam, you get to take this home.

A (83:07)

Okay, I'll say this. I think I don't have a huge amount of hope that the Iranian political establishment or the American political establishment can on their own bridge the divides. They don't know each other, they haven't spoken to each other properly. The views are very entrenched. I also don't have a huge amount of hope that any of this is going to get resolved quickly on its own. I also would say Israel and Iran are deeply entrenched in a, you know, devastating and I think, you know, maybe longer term adversarial relationship that we're not considering. What I do have, and that worries me for all of the people across the region. What I do have hope about is that the region has changed. And that is important to understand. This is not we're not snapping back to the status quo ante of October 6th. Regional states have new threat perceptions. Regional states have new priorities. Climate is a hardcore security issue. There's energy diversification going on. Regional states are looking to exert agency and understanding that leaving conflicts to fester is very dangerous. And that's what October 7th has taught most of the region. So my hope, the glimmer of hope I have is that regional states are exerting more agency and collectively and individually, they will play a larger role in trying not just to manage, but hopefully to arrive at meaningful political settlements.

B (84:55)

That's a great place, it seems to me, to leave it. And please join me in thanking our speakers.

D (85:09)

Thank you for listening.

A (85:10)

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