A (36:21)
Thanks. This is a hard act to follow. So what I want to do today was really talk about some of the ongoing discussions and some of the active markets that try to think about how do you bring in nature based carbon into markets. And so I should start by apologizing, especially given the Jim's description of out of sight, out of mind. This is in a lot of ways a very narrow way of identifying what matters. So we're focusing just on carbon, not on the many ways in which biodiversity impacts outcomes. But I think this is a place that has been active, but it's also a place that is still in a lot of need of how to make it function at the potential that it needs to. Robin gave us a very hopeful example from the Scottish Highlands. But you know, I suspect some reaction could be that even as the price rises may well still be undervalued by what it should be given the services it's providing. So what I'm going to talk about is based on many of you yesterday heard Professor Sheinkman talk about the set of submissions that are being made to COP30. So I, together with Robin Mariam Farbudi at MIT and Lucy Pager UPIT have been putting together one such proposal which is really to think about how do you try to bring nature based projects into global carbon markets. That's not good. Jim's pretty pictures eat up all the computer. So I think, as you heard, and again, I think this is an under explanation given all the benefits, for instance that come from tropical forests that Giuliano talked about. But just to give you a sense of the scale in 2023, global tropical primary forest loss produced 2.4 gigatons of CO2 emissions. This is roughly half of the United States annual fossil fuel emissions. And if you think about it from a perspective of development, there's now, I think, a very mainstream discussion about the energy transition, about the fact that as you get richer, you're going to use more energy. And that's a big concern in thinking about how do we move these countries on renewables. But there is also another form of transition that happens when you develop, which has to do with land use. You're more likely to cut down trees, develop roads, develop infrastructure. And what we are arguing is that part of trying to address how you reduce emissions in the air has to come by thinking about how do we give sustainable parts of development that don't rely on this amount of deforestation in large part because today it's one of the cheapest forms we know of how to reduce emissions going into the atmosphere. There's been, on a small scale, I'd say, lots of work on thinking about how do you provide incentives to individual owners of forests or trees to not cut them down. And we know that you can have payments for ecosystems that achieve some of this. But I think we've also learned over the last few years that you know the quality of the forest you may have, you may not want to give it at a very cheap price if you were going to cut it to build a large dam. So the people who are going to enter the market, the forest first, when you say, I'm going to pay you for not cutting down trees, are going to be those who are not going to cut down the trees anyway. They just get some free money. And this is the problem, what we call is this non additionality. Moreover, in order for us, especially when we think about, say, reforestation projects, which are an important part, for instance, the Amazon, you need to think about how long it's going to take for those trees to grow and become potentially carbon sinks. And that means trying to think about people's incentives over time. So what we've seen over the last two decades is an emergence of a voluntary carbon market that seeks to provide climate financing of this form to prevent landowners from cutting down trees to encourage reforestation. But it's challenging precisely because you don't know the incentives of those who enter the market. And so what you see is over the last few years, we've seen a huge crash in voluntary carbon market prices. And that's what led me to tell Robin that perhaps the trees that he started growing with his friend in 1996 are undervalued, but maybe they should also not be in the market at all if they're not going to get cut in any case. Right. And what we've also seen that this is a very decentralized market with many registries with non standard measurement and verification systems. And then the final concern is when you look in the voluntary carbon market, the way you should think about it is maybe you're taking a flight, you're feeling bad about taking a flight and you pay for emissions to go to zero. That may help you as an individual become net zero, but it doesn't provide us a pathway towards any global target. So what's the alternative and where do we want to head towards? So the alternative is what we would call compliance markets for emissions. And we've seen these now come up across the world. The way they work is you would have a set of industries and you would say all together, this is the total amount of emissions you're allowed to emit. You may start by giving companies a certain number of permits. They can exchange those permits where each permit is one ton of carbon you're allowed to emit. And then depending on what alternative uses one has for production capacity, you may choose to sell permits and just say reduce production or change move to renewable gas or you might buy permits. And that gives you a single price in the market which tells you what the marginal abatement cost for carbon is. This is the prices that you see in the EU emissions trading market from 2016 to 2025. And what you see, this is a market that works unlike the previous slide. Let me just go back to that for a second, where you saw a decline in prices over time. So the dark blue line is nature based credits. That's something like forests. Just to look at it right now, in 2023 it was trading at something like $3. It's now trading more at something like $7. Not very high. If you contrast it with the European Union EU ETS carbon market, a ton of CO2 emission avoided trades for €77 right now. So this is a market that has, it's not at the social cost of carbon yet, but it's relatively high and it is sending a durable signal about what carbon should be priced at. And so I think there's a general agreement that compliance markets design as emissions trading systems can both sustain high prices and are trusted by the demand side. Buyers are willing to trust that what they're getting in this market when they buy a permit is a single permit. And so what our work has been about is to ask how can we, how can we move the voluntary carbon market towards being integrated into a carbon market of the kind that we see for industrial emissions? And one important feature of why you would want to do that is if you can do it and have a single price for carbon that buyers can believe, then they don't have to go about trying to figure out what the quality of different products is. Is this a tree that would have been cut if they hadn't paid for it? They can just go to the market and buy a single unit of carbon. Just as, you know, we go to the market and buy many things that, you know, we think an apple is an apple when we see it may differ in quality, but we know it. The other promising feature that we're seeing is that emissions trading markets are expanding very Fast. So in 2025 there were 37 emissions trading markets. They're typically domestic markets. So EU ETS is arguably the largest market in terms of scale. But you'll have regional markets, for instance in California, or you also have now a set of middle income countries heading towards markets. So in addition to these 37 emissions trading markets that cover 23% of global emissions, you have 12 more under development, another 12 under serious consideration. I've talked about how these emissions markets work, but a key feature that I think is central to what we argue needs to happen if you're going to bring nature based projects into a market where industrial emissions are being considered, is that you need to have a standardization and you need to have identically priced emissions being traded. So just to give you a sense of if you could achieve this, and that's always the big if, what would be the value of it? So this is a calculation that we've done based on existing data and based on estimates from the paper described below. If we took today forest based projects in lower income countries and we said we could pay for them and that those were credible payments that actually prevented deforestation, these estimates allow for some amount of non additionality, but you know, it can't be 100% then half of the entire EU ETS budget for 2026, which is 0.6 billion tons, could be eliminated for $39 per ton. And that's roughly half the price of the current ETS permit. So you can see, as economists would say, there are huge gains from trade if we can figure a way to bring these forest based projects into a compliance market. So what's it going to take to have a compliance market? The Advantage if you can do this is not that you're going to have rich countries buying up all the cheapest projects in low income countries, leaving them with no way to deal with emissions in the future. The aim would be to have an emissions market in which once you enter, you recognize that over time as say an industrial producer in a rich country, you may have to move from being able to buy forests in Zambia to have to cut your own emissions in 10 years time. But that time horizon is valuable. It's the amount of time it can take for innovation, for happen, for R and D, to make it cheaper, for as Jose said yesterday, for, you know, Bill Gates magic machine to become functional. But for this market to work, we are going to need to manage the risks. And this is a place where at least we argue that market design economists can play an important role in thinking about how do you manage these risks that come with projects. So in a typical market you think about measurement reporting and verification, we think you want to think of a different R, which is risk mitigation. So I don't know if anyone recognizes the picture on the side. Anyone seen Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy? So this was the paranoid robot in that Marvin. And so we've proposed that if you want this market to work, what you're going to need is a centralized institution that's going to be responsible for measurement, accounting, risk mitigation and verification. Their job would be to standardize the measurement that right now happens by lots of different institutions in different places and in a very non transparent way. So that's one thing they're going to do. And I think as Robin mentioned and Juliana highlighted, there's been huge developments in measurement. Satellite imagery now makes it possible to really standardize measurement, but it's going to be important to have a centralized protocol that is fully transparent. The second thing that Marvin will do is have to identify, and this is where the economists can play a role, is what are the kind of contracts that can help us mitigate risk? How do we have dynamic contracts that can ensure that a forest carbon project developer is going to maintain their projects over time? Should it be that we give out payments for these projects as forgivable loans where if at some point in time our measurement tells us that there's no more carbon being stored, you just stop, you ask for the payments to be returned and then there's also going to be risk in these projects that's going to not be the sort of private risk where I choose to behave badly, but rather they're just the fire and the forest burns down, who's going to bear that risk? And for that we're going to need to think about how insurance mechanisms exist right now because we don't have and ability to deal with this risk. What is happening is that attempts to improve this market are largely functioning by removing risky projects from it. So for instance, right now many of the protocols, core carbon principles that are being implemented in the voluntary carbon market say that for instance, introducing renewable projects or introducing deforestation projects is too risky, but the cost for us of keeping them out of the market is too high. And so our proposal is to say that we need to think about how we can harness the best from many disciplines, from the sciences when it comes to how we measure carbon emissions and carbon storage, from economics, when we think about risk management. And then, and I haven't talked about it, you know, think about learnings from political science and governance and how do we manage payments to communicate communities. And we're going to need all of this in order to have a way of getting nature based projects into regular compliance emission markets, both so that we can pay for the cheapest emissions first, which is critical when we have limited climate financing, but also something that hopefully over time we can build on to start pricing other aspects of natural capital like biodiversity and the many other aspects that Jim and Julian have talked about. So I'll stop there now. Thank you very much.