Virtue Ethics: LSE Forum for European Philosophy

Podcast: LSE Public Lectures and Events
Date: October 15, 2013
Host: Simon Glendinning (A), Director of the Forum
Speakers:

• Brad Hooker (B), University of Reading
• Constantine Sandis (D), Oxford Brookes

Episode Overview

This episode is a deep-dive into virtue ethics, exploring its historical roots, conceptual challenges, and how it stands in relation to other ethical theories. The discussion is characterized by lively debate, clear examples, and thoughtful audience questions. The focus is on what defines virtue ethics, the challenges it faces, and its place within practical and moral philosophy.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Return to Ethics in Philosophy (00:00-05:59)

• Simon Glendinning (A) introduces the new ethics strand at LSE, highlighting a generational shift from "the logic of the language of morals" to more practical concerns about what it means to be a moral human being.
• He points to his own discomfort with the idea of "moral facts" and instead finds it more intuitive to focus on "virtuous people" and the tangible reality of good character.
• Sets up the session with two speakers, Brad Hooker and Constantine Sandis, who will explore virtue ethics.

2. What is Virtue Ethics? – Historical Context and Key Characteristics (05:59-19:32)

• Brad Hooker (B) gives brief historical context:
  • Virtue ethics predominated in ancient times (Plato, Aristotle).
  • Focus shifted to natural law (Aquinas), then to utilitarianism and Kantianism.
  • Term "virtue ethics" only emerged in the 1980s, inspired by Elizabeth Anscombe's seminal paper "Modern Moral Philosophy" (1950s).
• Key Distinction:
  • Interest in virtues vs. having a theory where virtues define morality.
  • Textbook virtue ethics: "A distinct family of theories meant to rival utilitarianism and Kantianism."

"Virtue ethics...as in my little story just a moment ago suggested, is often thought to be a rival of utilitarianism and communism and contractualism and natural law theory and other approaches to ethics." (B, 07:55)

• Critique of Aristotelian Doctrines:
  • The "doctrine of the mean" is oversimplified.
  • The idea of rooting ethics in uniquely human traits is unnecessary.

3. Core Commitments of Virtue Ethics (19:32-26:59)

• Central Claim:
  • "What makes something morally right or wrong...is its relation to what a virtuous agent would either do or not do." (B)
  • Virtue ethics reverses the order: right action defined by the dispositions of the virtuous, not vice versa.
• Example: The familiar conflict between honesty and kindness (e.g., whether to spare someone's feelings by lying).

"A virtuous person has good judgment, has wisdom, and can make the right boundary decision about when one is more important than the other." (B, 19:32)

• Attraction:
  • The approach acknowledges vagueness and the necessity of judgment in morality.
  • Attempts to provide precise rules are often unrealistic.

4. Defining Virtue and its Challenges (26:59-37:57)

• The Challenge:
  • What makes a disposition a virtue?
  • Brad presents Rosalind Hursthouse’s account: virtues benefit the individual and/or the species.
  • Criticisms arise around circularity (e.g., honesty isn't always beneficial, as in Nazi Germany).
• Broader Objections:
  • Why should virtue only benefit our species? Could it benefit others?
  • This broadening leans toward virtue utilitarianism or rule utilitarianism.

5. Aristotle’s Function Argument and the Doctrine of the Mean (37:57-43:58)

• Constantine Sandis (D) elaborates on Aristotle:
  • The function argument: What’s good for a thing is related to its function (purpose, end).
  • For humans, rationality is central.
• Doctrine of the Mean:
  • A "mean" isn't a rigid midpoint (not simply five between zero and ten).
  • What counts as the "mean" varies contextually (patience in different settings).
  • Virtue ethics cannot codify rules as easily as other theories.

"It looks like what counts as patient is going to really vary from one context to another. And what's nice with virtue theory is it doesn't say the patient amount to wait is this." (D, 32:11)

6. Virtue Ethics, Rules, and Rival Theories (43:58-49:02)

• Are there Rules in Virtue Ethics?
  • There are, but they concern character (e.g., "be honest") not specific acts.
  • Virtue ethics appears less in competition with deontology and consequentialism, which prescribe actions.

"Virtue ethics isn't about what to do; it's about what kind of person to be." (D, 41:13)

• Potential Vacuity:
  • Is "do what the virtuous person would do" circular?
  • The challenge echoes the Euthyphro dilemma.

7. Actions vs. Motives: Acting Rightly (49:02-55:14)

• Philosophy of Action:
  • Drawing from Anscombe, it's as much about psychology/intention as about outward actions.
  • Converges with the idea that "acting rightly" (with the right motives) differs from merely doing the right action, as seen in identical charitable acts for different reasons.

8. Threats of Circularity and the Practical Guidance Problem (55:14-62:14)

• Host’s Question:
  • How do you define a virtuous person, except by what they do? Is this circular?
• Responses:
  • Virtue might take priority: "It's about acting honestly," knowing what honesty is, before knowing what action to do.
  • The challenge persists—virtue ethics must define virtues in a way not reducible to how the virtuous behave.

"A virtuous person would presumably not only do the honest thing, but do the honest thing for the right reason." (B, 51:03)

• Example:
  • If a non-virtuous person mimics virtuous behavior (e.g., congratulating a superior player), is it genuine? Sometimes, better to refrain than to feign.

9. Audience Q&A – Flexibility, Social Construction, and Relativism (62:14-84:51)

• Flexibility/Realism:
  • The "advice model": act as the virtuous agent would advise you, given your own flaws.
• Social Construction Objection:
  • Are virtues just social projections?
  • Brad Hooker: Strongly denies; virtues can't be defined just by society’s standards (uses racism as an example).
• Transience of Virtue:
  • Virtues like chastity change status; sometimes with technological or social advances (e.g., contraception).
  • But social attitudes can lag behind practical realities.

"...in that society I grew up in, being racist was widely considered to be permissible...the fact that it was considered good didn't make it good. In fact, it was terrible." (B, 63:13)

• Rooting Virtue:
  • Aristotle’s answer: virtues are tied to human nature and flourishing (biological and rational).
  • But human rationality is only potential—realizing it is the moral challenge.
• Final Arbiter Problem:
  • Is there an authority in ethics? No: unlike law, ethics lacks a "Supreme Court."
  • Absence of final authority makes room for persistent disagreement, but it doesn't entail that "anything goes."

10. Virtue, Motives, and Consequentialism (84:51-89:09)

• Critique from a Utilitarian Perspective:
  • Virtues may be instrumental for maximizing well-being.
  • But motives and intentions matter—virtue ethics captures this; consequentialism struggles if only outcomes count.
  • Two societies might have identical well-being, but one achieved through accidents, the other intentionally: the latter seems better.

"It seems that there's something much better about a world in which people are doing things with the right motives and the right intentions. And that's the bit that I'm not sure consequentialism can easily capture even if the theories converge." (D, 87:48)

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On the heart of virtue ethics:
  “What makes something morally right or wrong or permissible is its relation to what a virtuous agent would...do.” (B, 14:56)

• On practical imprecision:
  "You can't...codify how to resolve moral conflicts between competing considerations or competing virtues...You have to use good judgment." (B, 19:32)

• On social constructionism:
  “Whether something is a virtue does not depend entirely on—perhaps not even crucially—on the attitudes of the society, because we all know the attitudes of society can be just as bad as imaginable.” (B, 64:13)

• On motives:
  “…there's something much better about a world in which people are doing things with the right motives and the right intentions.” (D, 87:48)

• Wry self-awareness:
  “Brad, on the other hand, is a sour son of a bitch…” (B, 57:35)

Important Timestamps

• 00:00 – Simon’s introduction and rationale for the ethics strand
• 05:59 – Brad’s historical overview and definition of virtue ethics
• 14:56 – What virtue ethics is committed to
• 19:32 – The role of good judgment, conflict of virtues (honesty vs kindness)
• 32:11 – Doctrine of the mean and context-dependence
• 41:13 – Virtue ethics vs deontology/consequentialism
• 47:18 – The circularity challenge
• 51:03 – Motives and acting rightly
• 55:14 – Practical example: faking virtue
• 62:14 – Flexibility ("advice model")
• 63:13 – Social construction challenge and racism example
• 84:51 – Motives versus outcomes; comparison with consequentialism

Conclusion

The episode masterfully unpacks virtue ethics, acknowledging its intuitive appeal in focusing on character and motives, rather than just rules or outcomes. The discussion does not shy from complex theoretical issues—circularity, relativism, the role of society—and uses vivid examples to illustrate subtle points. While the speakers express some skepticism about whether virtue ethics is ultimately distinct or convergent with other theories, both affirm the enduring importance of character, judgment, and intention in understanding morality.

For listeners new to virtue ethics, this episode provides clarity, frank debate, and memorable illustrations that bring the theory, and its challenges, vividly to life.