Podcast Summary

Episode Overview

Title: Why is it Always "Us" and "Them": On the Natural History of Thinking Through Groups
Speaker: Professor Larry Hirschfeld
Host: Rita Astuti, LSE
Date: December 6, 2007
Podcast: LSE: Public Lectures and Events

In this episode, Professor Larry Hirschfeld explores the origins of group-based social thinking—why humans instinctively categorize others into "us" and "them." Drawing from interdisciplinary research in anthropology, psychology, and cognitive science, Hirschfeld proposes that group thinking—especially around constructs like race, caste, and kin—is rooted in innate, developmentally-driven cognitive modules. He examines both the evolutionary history and developmental psychology behind these processes, presenting original research, particularly his influential work with children, and addresses opposing views, including extensive audience questions.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Problem of "Us" and "Them" (02:00–13:00)

• Opening Framing: Hirschfeld humorously warns that the talk might not directly answer its titular question, but aims to shed light on our groupish thinking.
• Professional Background: He narrates the intellectual journey from anthropology to developmental psychology, aiming to uncover the foundations of social categorization.
• Central Question: Why do humans so naturally carve the social world into groups—and why do we attribute so much importance and meaning to those group memberships, often in the absence of explicit teaching or obvious difference?

"And it is on this, on a topic related to this work that he's going to talk to us tonight in his lecture why Is It Always Us and Them? On the Natural History of Thinking Groups."
— Rita Astuti [01:20]

2. Theories of Social Cognition: Theory of Mind vs. "Theory of Society" (13:00–21:00)

• Theory of Mind (ToM): Well-established in developmental and cognitive psychology; refers to our understanding of others as intentional agents with beliefs, desires, and mental states.
• Introducing "Theory of Society" Module (ToS): Hirschfeld suggests a potentially parallel cognitive "module" that enables humans to understand others as members of socially meaningful groups or categories.
• Group Membership & Behavior: Social behavior is interpreted both through individual mental states and through perceived group roles (e.g., expecting someone to act in accordance with their social identity or group).

“I’m calling it Theory of Society only because I’m trying to steal from the Theory of Mind popes, an attention-grabbing acronym. TOM looks better than TOS, but there wasn’t much I could do about that."
— Larry Hirschfeld [18:33]

3. Natural Kinds, Essence, and "Humankind" Categories (21:00–30:00)

• "Humankind" Concept: Every society assumes the world can be divided into distinct groups (race, caste, age, gender) with visible traits causally linked to presumed internal essences.
• Social Groups as Natural Kinds: These categories are treated as naturally occurring, with both external markers (appearance) and invisible inner qualities and capacities.
• Relativity of Groups: Groups gain meaning only in contrast to other groups; "we" are constituted by "them."

“Each group in a humankind is presumed to have a distinct physical appearance and a distinct set of non-obvious qualities and potential... The idea is that they are causally linked because you have a group essence..."
— Larry Hirschfeld [24:20]

4. Questioning the Conventional Wisdom (30:00–35:00)

• Against Domain-General Theories: Hirschfeld argues it's unlikely that reasoning about group categories is entirely domain-general (i.e., borrowed from other kinds of categorization like physical objects).
• Importance of Dedicated Mechanisms: He finds it surprising that, if group reasoning were so central in society, it would not have an evolved, dedicated cognitive basis.

“If our understanding or one of our primary ways of understanding other people were simply a function of category effects that can occur in any situation... it would be kind of surprising.”
— Larry Hirschfeld [32:44]

5. Developmental Evidence: Children and Group Categories (35:00–47:00)

• Early Appearance in Children:
  • Even pre-verbal infants are sensitive to racial, gender, and accent differences.
  • Children display “other race effect” and strong preference for familiar accents.
  • By age three, children infer that race and gender are inherited and constant (even when provided with information to the contrary, e.g., "switched at birth" experiments).
• Hierarchy of Categories: Kids judge some differences (race, gender) as more fundamental than others (body build, occupation).
• Children Remember Categories: They may not report noticing race but still remember and use that information in stories.

“When we crossed race with body build... three year olds overwhelmingly chose race. That is, race was the property... which was fundamental to who the person would be and would be the kind of person that they would grow up to be regardless of the environment.”
— Larry Hirschfeld [41:18]

• Mirror Effects Across Cultures: In France, children similarly recall racial distinctions even when not prompted or when not visually salient.

6. Is There a Specialized Cognitive Module for Group Thinking? (47:00–55:00)

• Experimental Evidence:
  • Children with Autism: Research with autistic children showed their ability to use stereotypes and reason about group membership can be dissociated from their ability to “mentalize” (understand beliefs/desires).
  • “Conflict Tasks”: Even autistic and three-year-old children are more likely to endorse social role-based reasoning (group stereotype) over mental-state reasoning when explaining behavior.
• Implication: This suggests two potentially independent cognitive systems: one for understanding minds, one for understanding group roles.

“If such kids don’t have problems thinking about people in terms of their membership in social groups... it may be argued... that these two kinds of reasoning... are governed by independent mechanisms.”
— Larry Hirschfeld [52:22]

• Key Data: Both typically developing and autistic children could perform group-based reasoning tasks—even when ToM was impaired.

7. How Children Learn About Social Groups (55:00–64:00)

• Learning from the Social Environment:
  • Group categories are learned not by direct teaching, but by implicit, community-wide cues.
  • Children’s stereotypes often do not mirror their parents’ attitudes; they align with broader community or dominant group values.
  • Even in suboptimal learning environments (e.g., for autistic children), stereotypes and group knowledge are acquired.
• Cultural Specificity: What counts as a salient “kind” varies by society—e.g., caste in South Asia, age in sub-Saharan Africa, race in the U.S.
• Community over Family Influence: Children’s social learning is highly attuned to the majority or dominant community, not just familial environment.

“The child has to learn them in order to be a competent actor in their particular environment… The cultural information seems to be particularly important to the theory of society module.”
— Larry Hirschfeld [54:20]

8. Evolutionary Speculation: Adaptive Value of Group Cognition (64:00–69:00)

• Not Just for Exclusion: Hirschfeld critiques the common evolutionary argument that “us and them” evolved to keep out predators or defend groups.
• Inclusion for Cooperation: He suggests the adaptive problem was actually how to include distant or unfamiliar people to expand cooperative networks (trade, kinship alliances) beyond one’s immediate group.
• Modern Mal-adaptations: The same cognitive capacity, when scaled up with agriculture and large societies, allows inclusion—and also large-scale exclusion, exploitation, and stratification.

“What it does is it creates a way of seeing those people as us… and that would have provided the pressure for the adaptation rather than the pressure to protect yourself from other groups.”
— Larry Hirschfeld [66:23]

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On labeling and group essence: “These natural groups... are always defined in relevant relative terms, even when it’s not necessary.” [27:34]
• On childhood prejudice: “Three year old children are really strident racists in many ways... but they’re sort of colorblind in terms of their play until about six years of age.” [44:23]
• On learning prejudice: “White people in America don’t talk to their kids about race at all. One of the striking things is that they just avoid the topic…” [56:49]
• On the impact of community versus parents: “Parents and children’s racial attitudes do not correlate at all… parental interventions make no difference.” [54:52]
• On the purpose of in-grouping: “The thing that creates us and them is as good at including people as excluding people—as long as the people that you include are people outside your band.” [63:04]

Audience Questions & Discussion Highlights

Is There Really a Distinct "Module" for Group Thinking?

Andy Wells, Social Psychology [65:41]

• Challenge: Is the module argument contradicted by the evidence? Where is the adaptive pressure?
• Answer: Selective pressure was not inter-group predation, but the ability to create new "us" groups for cooperative exploitation (e.g., trade routes). With societal scaling (agriculture, settlements), the mechanism of inclusion can flip to large-scale exclusion.

Why Focus on Black/White in Studies?

Olivia Harris, Anthropology [68:36]

• Question: Are similar effects found in other societies and groupings?
• Answer: Yes, patterns are similar across different societies/groups (e.g., North African vs. European, Israeli/Arab), and physical distinctions are often matters of costume or perception, not biology.

Language and the Formation of "Us" & "Them"

Dieter, Grinnell University [73:45]

• Question: How do language variants (accents, creoles, etc.) relate to group boundaries?
• Answer: Language is central to group formation, and children’s learning patterns align with broader social communities and can create new in-groups through linguistic innovation.

Is "Us vs. Them" the Only Way Children Learn about Society?

Senor Javcelovich, Social Psychology [76:25]

• Question: Is categorization the only route to societal knowledge (e.g., what about norms, institutions)?
• Answer: No—children also learn about institutions, roles, and political order; modularity concerns are probably much more fine-grained and multifaceted in reality.

Critical Challenge: Socialization Over Modularity?

Peter Hagerty, University of Surrey [81:00]

• Question/Critique: Couldn’t the “us/them” effect just be socialized through language rather than modular?
• Answer: Socialization and language are crucial—children acquire these patterns from speech and community, but speed and universality suggest a prepared learning mechanism.

Why Should Anthropologists Care?

From host on behalf of first-years [86:18]

• Answer: Understanding how children learn and construct social categories illuminates how societies structure themselves; the process is as much bottom-up (child-to-society) as top-down.

“For students in anthropology, it’s particularly important to recognize that the way our minds are structured is not trivial precondition to the way our societies are structured…”
— Larry Hirschfeld [87:02]

Timestamps for Key Segments

• Main Talk Begins: 01:58
• Theory of Mind vs. Society: 13:00–21:00
• "Humankind" and Natural Kinds: 21:00–30:00
• Developmental Evidence: 35:00–47:00
• Autism and Modular Theory: 47:00–55:00
• Learning Prejudice and Group Categories: 55:00–64:00
• Evolutionary Considerations: 64:00–69:00
• Audience Q&A: 65:41–end

Conclusion

Professor Hirschfeld advances a provocative thesis: human brains may be equipped with specialized cognitive mechanisms for reasoning about groupness, which underlie the persistent human tendency to divide the social world into "us" and "them." He presents compelling evidence from childhood development—particularly the precocious, seemingly universal way children pick up social categories—and examines both evolutionary origins and cultural variations in these processes. The audience challenges him to distinguish between innate modules and powerful, linguistic socialization processes, leading to a nuanced conversation about origins, experience, and learning. The episode ultimately invites listeners to reflect critically on the deep roots of social cognition, the power of community in shaping prejudice, and the complex interplay between nature and nurture in the making of group thinking.